NATURE and JUDGMENT

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To

HARRY BUCHLER

philosopher

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PREFACE

At a time when much is being said by philosophers about their own proper function and practice, the impulse to dispense with prefaces and plunge into subject matter can be very strong. I am inclined to agree with Hegel that in any effort to achieve comprehensiveness it is precarious to state at the outset an aim, a theme, or a program. Only good luck can prevent summed-up reflection from lapsing into "a string of desultory assertions and assurances." The reader will perceive that the viewpoint here developed concerns itself not solely with one recurrent theme but with many interrelated themes; that it bears on the resolution of various traditional problems and suggests various new types of problems. If the viewpoint proves to be in any way compelling, its ideas should be applicable well beyond the direct range of the following pages.

This book and its immediate predecessor, *Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment,* may be read quite independently of one another. Nevertheless, they are closely related, contributing to the same systematic end and the same philosophic structure. I would therefore naturally wish the reader of either book also to read the other.

An attempt to discover fundamental traits in the process of experiencing and producing is an attempt to sharpen the definition of man's status in nature. Such definition or portrayal never has been accomplished by

any one philosophic perspective, and there is no reason to expect that it ever will be. Nor can it be completed, since inevitably it aims both to be consonant with the results of specialized investigation and to anticipate the possible traits of man. Yet some philosophic instruments, some directions, are nearer to adequacy than others, and I hope that those I am trying to devise are among the nearer.

My wife, Professor Evelyn Shirk of Hofstra College, has given every page the benefit of her gift for intensive philosophic observation. Likewise, the comments and criticisms made by Professors James Gutmann and Sidney Gelber of Columbia University, and by Professor Benjamin N. Nelson of the University of Minnesota, have helped considerably to decrease the number of imperfections in this book. The sustained encouragement I have received from Professor John H. Randall, Jr., of Columbia has meant a great deal to me.

J. B.

New York
May, 1955

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I. JUDGMENT

MAN is born in a state of natural debt, being antecedently committed to the execution or the furtherance of acts that will largely determine his individual existence. He moves into a contingent mold by which he is qualitied and located, and related to endless things beyond his awareness. From first to last he discharges obligations. He is obliged to sustain or alter, master or tolerate, what he becomes and what he encounters. In the understanding of the human process, natural or animal obligation is more fundamental than what philosophers isolate as moral obligation. The latter, a special case of the former and therefore existentially continuous with it, is unintelligible when considered separately. For moral obligation is to natural obligation what language is to sign-activity, what science is to interpretation, or what sequence is to relation—part to whole and species to genus. All the imperatives of man are conditional so far as their specific content and the means of their fulfillment are concerned. But some imperatives are categorical in the sense that they are inevitably present in experience. Certain needs must be met, however they are met; certain aims must be satisfied, however they are satisfied; certain consequences must be avoided, however they are avoided. Techniques, choices, habits, decisions must be adopted, whatever their mode and substance; they are neither more nor less categorical,

neither more nor less absolute, than the living process itself.

Man the natural debtor, then, owes, is obliged. The circumstances that comprise a life need to be dealt with. They need to pass into the history of the individual. If they are problematic, they need to be resolved, and if they are not problematic, they need to be absorbed or endured. Debts, obligations, are met by producing. In the specific situations of ordinary living, instruments are devised to meet deficiencies or to overcome hindrances. The instruments men actually employ are innumerable, and there is no way of anticipating their possible characters, just as there is no way of anticipating all possible situations, problematic or nonproblematic. A machine may function to accomplish labor, a leap may function to evade a missile, a word may function to determine an emotional state. Each of these is a product. It emanates from a producer of things, of acts, and of verbal symbols. To think, however, of each product as corresponding to a given natural obligation would be a mistake. Human products and human situations are not simply or irreducibly isolable. Products can precede situations to which they are subsequently applicable. It would be equally a mistake to regard all products as purposively directed. There are gratuitous as well as instrumental products.

In the everyday sense of the term, an individual produces and ceases to produce, alternately and irregularly. In a more fundamental sense he produces continuously, for he is always making, doing, or stating. But to say that he is always producing does not mean that he only produces. He is related to what is not produced by him as

well as to what is. The things that happen to him are at least as numerous as his products. Experience and production are not synonymous, the former being the inclusive process. Later we shall call anything "related to an individual as individual" a *procept*. The expression "related to an individual" will turn out to be an intricate and difficult one.

Products, as even customary usage recognizes, are not necessarily effects of intention. They may be actualized without being designed, that is, come into being without being known to their producer. They may be momentary results or lifelong developments. The genesis of products is elusive, even in the commonest instances. The individual is not a box which opens and expels bundles. Even when easily identifiable, products are not easily localizable. Acts, contrivances, and assertions may be anonymous and influential or notorious and impotent. What is being produced when a scientific hypothesis or a work of art comes into being? In either case the ramifications are not limitable; for in the one, formal implications and methodological effects are continually possible, and in the other, there is no boundary to the scope of critical articulation. The ramifications realize the substance of the product, which, plainly, may far exceed the existence and ken of the producer. Similarly, the producer as strict causal agent is identified in the last analysis by convention. It is a commonplace that no product can be wholly "original." What this means, in the most exact sense, is that acts, contrivances, and assertions in some degree necessarily reflect and are connected with the world in which they arise. A wholly novel product would be a product

ex nihilo, and even if creatable would be unrecognizable. It does not matter, for it comes to the same thing, whether we say that there is always more than one "producer" or whether we say that there are efficient factors beyond the producer which account for his being the producer. Thus the product, itself at least potentially ramified, stems from a ramified relationship.

The product of the naturally located, ramified individual is not yet the same as the "social product." A money system or a political tradition is rooted differently from a work of art or science. It springs not merely from individuals communally and experientially situated, but from gross facts of anonymous relation and physical order, from a concourse of undeliberated practices, in all of which the productivity of any given individual may be indifferent. That there are social products seems incontrovertible, not in the sense that individuals have nothing to do with them—no one in his right mind ever held such a view—but in the sense (*a*) that certain products cannot be the result of a single individual's effort; (*b*) that the genesis of these products cannot be convincingly or satisfactorily explained even by adding together the accounts of many individuals each functioning in his environment, since the activity of a number of individuals considered distributively is different from the activity of the same individuals considered collectively or as part of a configuration; and (*c*) that certain relations among individuals may be more efficacious toward production than are the individuals as such, in so far as any other individuals so related would yield the same result.

The continuity between social and individual products is best exemplified in the process underlying those products that are of greatest consequence in the inventive life of man. This process we shall call *query*. Query is the genus of which inquiry is a species. A yawn, an exclamation, a crumpled piece of paper, a philosophic concept, and a madrigal are alike human products, and in a sense are of equal philosophic importance to a theory of human utterance; but only those which are methodically wrought are products of query. In query the individual becomes his own interrogator and advocate—he is engaged at least in a process of reflexive (or self-directed) communication. Social products are primarily the results of social communication. Reflexive communication presupposes social communication, which it imports as it were into the process of individual experience.

It will not be necessary to qualify each generalization about the individual product with reference to what is possibly its ultimate social origin. If we speak here principally of products as termini of individual utterance, it is because we are concerned with generic properties of products and their methodological status rather than with the sociology or psychology of their occurrence. The latter are far from irrelevant, but the distinction of emphasis is not thereby erased. No one can doubt the philosophic significance of thinkers like Durkheim, Freud, or Max Weber. But the philosopher inevitably preserves continuity with traditional philosophic problems. Regardless of his motive, his procedure is to array what emerges from the study of man in nature within a perspective of greatest possible

breadth, though not necessarily within a formal "system." It is precisely the requirements of such a perspective that dictate the characteristic philosophic level of generality. The philosophic viewpoint is not sacrosanct, and not by itself morally better than any other form of query. It is simply a different mode of encompassment. One of the contentions to be advanced here is that every product is a judgment. Since it seems more convenient and more consonant with philosophic practice to ascribe judgment primarily to the individual, however much the traditional philosophic interpretation of judgment may need to be corrected, it is the individual producer that merits most attention in the present enterprise. All human judgment, even the most private and inconsequential, depends indirectly on natural conditions, including social products. But we may speak of the individual as producer in the way that we speak, more particularly, of the individual as actor and knower.

The notion of the product as such actually underlies much of the thought of men like Hegel, Cassirer, and Santayana. It was the grand products of man that they analyzed and depicted variously as structures, growths, or human perspectives. To the common traits of all products they gave less attention than to the differences, largely because the influence of evolutionism led them to posit and to concentrate on a necessary moral distance between the grand and the commonplace products. The natural or existential continuities between these they could not possibly overlook; for they were sufficiently trained by Plato and Aristotle to seek the roots of art, science, and philosophy in the natural

capacities of man. The sign-studies of Peirce, Royce, and Mead, together with the powerful work of Dewey, have done much to invigorate the study of human utterance by suggesting the centrality of communication. A host of mid-twentieth century "linguistic"-minded writers, in pursuit of "analysis" and "clarity," have returned to the particularistic philosophizing of the lesser medievals and have interrupted the study of foundational questions.

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Every individual has what is commonly called "a general attitude." Confused or inarticulate as it may be, it is something cumulatively established. It comes to prevail after "a certain amount of experience." Indifference, obsession, lassitude, or near vegetation are alike "attitudes," differing in their relative amenability to conventional formulation. In one sense, the "general" attitude is something directed by the individual toward the course of his existence, past, current, and prospective. In another sense, it is a qualitative flavor or a qualitative verdict emerging from and mirroring the course of his existence. It is a compound of completed situations and of dispositions. To some extent it is a mode of perception and realization, and to some extent a mode of habituated action.

"Attitude," unqualified, signifies something more directly discoverable than "general attitude." It is applied to specific situations, persons, objects, or events: "What is his attitude in the matter?" The implication is, What does he think, how does he feel, what does he intend to do? This usage is only an application of the

broader and seemingly vaguer usage. The cumulative factor is no less present in the situational attitude than in the general attitude. When one is asked to express an attitude, it is taken for granted that one will apply his "experience" and his resources toward the definition of his own status in the situation. The man who hesitates to express an attitude questions the extent or pertinence of his resources, while the man who prematurely expresses an attitude overvalues his resources. An attitude is an appraisal, expressible whether or not expressed. It is an estimate of a situation in the context of a history, or of a history itself. Like any trait, like an illness for instance, it is in principle discoverable, or inferable from other data.

These considerations prepare us for others of more far-reaching consequence. An attitude is a position that the individual takes, a posture in relation to a natural complex that may include himself. Man is unavoidably a taker of positions. And the way in which his positions are rendered discoverable is through his products, that is, his acts, his contrivances, and his verbal combinations. The product, being a product *of* the individual, actualizes a relation between the individual and some natural complex, but a relation consummated *by* him. It is an utterance or judgment. It defines a place where he stands. Collectively, a man's judgments constitute the record of all the places where he stands —meaning, all that he does, makes, and says. We must go on to ask in greater detail what it means to have an attitude or take a position; whether products are indeed the form taken by these positions; whether it is justifiable to regard products as judgments; what judg-

ment is; and what the philosophic implications or advantages of this approach are. Since the answers to these questions are closely intertwined, we need not consider each in isolation from the rest.

Why does an individual do, make, or say anything? The impulse to answer, half-facetiously and half-evasively, that it all depends on who the individual is and what motivates him, is fair enough and does not suppress the universality of the conclusion at which we would arrive. To produce is to manifest the natural commitments of a self, and to apply in a fresh instance the cumulative resultant of these commitments. The man who takes a short cut on his walk home is *ipso facto* making a judgment, and a judgment of a rather complex sort, with respect to means that fulfill his habits, desires, or needs. He is devising or applying a technique that arises out of what he is and what he has been. To say that in taking the short cut he is making a judgment does not mean that he is asserting to himself what goals the action will accomplish. It is his action that is the judgment. He may, in addition to his action, represent the action verbally. But whether he does so or not, the action subserves the same function. It is as much an expression by him as the assertion. (We shall distinguish "expression 'by' " from "expression 'of.' ") It is of course customary, both popularly and philosophically, to apply the term "judgment" to the assertion. "He judged the shortest way home" is supposed to mean "He said to himself, this is the shortest way home." But to limit the usage is to limit the analysis. If the man walking home were completely preoccupied with other matters and took the shortest path auto-

matically, this habitual action would still, fully as much as the verbal representation, embody a policy relating him to his environment and to his own past history, and characterize the existences among which he is located.

When a man carves in stone, determines his wardrobe, composes music, or arranges dinnerware on a table, when, in short, he makes, he is ordering materials in accordance with an established or an evolved disposition. He is judging a natural complex by contriving its structure or by modifying an existing structure within it. He is adopting one order and ignoring or discarding another. What he makes is one mode of defining where he stands and what he is in a given set of circumstances. He may, in addition, assert "this is good," "that belongs here," "those I like." The judgment consisting in the assertion may supplement, accompany, precede, or be fused with the judgment consisting in the contrivance. How a man orders materials, no less than what he describes them to be, reflects the direction of his self and defines the character of something in his world.

Every judgment is at the least a pronouncement on some phase of the individual's world. Painting pictures is a pronouncement on the characteristics of what is envisaged, and composing music is a pronouncement on the traits of sound-combinations. Cowering in fear is a pronouncement on the dangers of the immediate environment. Taking the shortest route epitomizes many facts and relations: the time it takes to get home, the allocation of personal energy, the properties of movement. Taking the shortest route not habitually but once, or for the first time, or whimsically, or at random, are all judgments but different ones, and, de-

pending on the full circumstances of each, conceivably very different ones, differently defining properties of the individual's world. To call every judgment a pronouncement is not to imply that acting and making are alternative ways of asserting. Persistence in the narrow usage of "pronouncement" is as stultifying philosophically as persistence in the narrow usage of "judgment" itself. To pronounce is to apply an attitude or to bring a natural complex within the orbit of an attitude. The properties of things are defined by being brought into relation to us. We bring things into relation to us, we render them more determinate in a given respect, by doing something to them, *or* by making something out of them, *or* by saying something about them. We pronounce on an object when we eye it with interest, when we mold it into a round shape, or when we call it "red." The proverb that actions can speak louder than words would be a tolerable recognition of the fact that other than verbal products are judgments or utterances, did it not suggest that an act is a covert form of speech. There are better bases of recognition in established usage. In one of his stories Hawthorne, referring to the look of weariness and scorn on a character's face, speaks of "the moral deformity of which it was the utterance." [1] Yet even in the broader usage of "utterance" there remains the danger of narrow interpretation, as we must note presently.

Judgment is as much appraisal as it is pronouncement. To separate appraisal and pronouncement is impossible. In pronouncing upon traits we are appraising their status in relation to other traits. Every instance of making, saying, or doing rests on a tacit appraisal

of some traits as relevant and some as irrelevant. To run from a situation is, indifferently, to pronounce it as dangerous or to appraise it as dangerous. To describe an object as red is, indifferently, to pronounce on the presence or absence of a given color, or to appraise a color as deserving or not deserving a given predicate. The ubiquity of appraisal is obscured by such distinctions as that between "prizing" and "appraising." [2] Supposedly, prizing is a direct behavioral act; appraising, an "act that involves comparison." Appraisal is made out to be the intellectualized level of estimation. But "comparison," and therefore appraisal, is present on any level of estimation. Comparison can take the form either of deliberation and criticism on the one hand or of unmeditated discrimination on the other. Both are appraisive, the former through systematic production, the latter merely through production as such. Discrimination or selection from alternatives is present in the simplest products; it helps to explain the product as judgment. Like "appraisal," "discrimination" can be intellectualized to the exclusion of its essential meaning; it is so often made synonymous with "keen discrimination" or "wise discrimination" that the rudimentary factors in it are overlooked. Similarly, "indiscriminateness," which implies the absence of wisdom in discrimination, is made synonymous with the absence of the process itself.

The use of any predicate in an assertion is a tacit discrimination or selection from among various possible predicates, and therefore appraisive. A discriminative and appraisive phase of action obtains on the animal level. If we choose to regard shivering from cold as a

form of action by the organism rather than as a mere event in its life, we cannot overlook its total character as an act: by its act the organism is appraising a situation as discomfiting, having made a primitive discrimination of quality and responded by a form of movement instead of inert submission. To sculpture is to appraise the role and value of shapes and masses. Eating, dancing, arguing are alike appraisive: the sensuous, kinaesthetic, emotional, semantic, or other factors which influence them bind the individual to standards and to mandatory decisions. We appraise whether we prize or repudiate, and whether we accept or reject—that is, in so far as we are producing at all.

When we judge we are partially determining the properties of a sphere of existence within a given perspective—from a given "position." We combine and select. But in order to understand more exactly what is involved in a judgment's "expressing" or "embodying" the "attitudes" or "positions" of an individual, it is necessary to examine these notions somewhat further. A judgment may "express" an individual's position in the sense that it reflects facts about the individual, for example the fact of his being bold and confident. In this sense, each judgment is primarily a signature of the individual who makes the judgment, a proxy for him, a miniature sign of his history. The "attitude" or "position" *is* the individual in cross section, and the judgment conveying it conveys the individual. And collectively, the individual's utterances are a mirror of him. When we grasp the fact that a judgment can thus be a revelatory vehicle, we encounter in methodological form one of the insights of Freud. For in effect he

looked upon all human products as reflections of selves and their past, and thereby accorded to the results of making and acting an equal status with those of saying. But the vividness of his perception at the same time limited its philosophic promise. In tending to regard products as reflections he obscured their function as pronouncements. This confusion was hidden in his use of the generous term "symbol." An adequate conception of products as judgments accords to them a substantive as well as a revelatory function. It is the substantive function of judgment that is of the greater philosophic importance.

In the substantive sense, the "attitude" or "position" is a content, not a personal state. It is the content that the judgment "expresses" or "embodies," not the individual as mirrored through his states. An individual's utterances are utterances by rather than of him. They are the contributory phases of experiencing. Making, saying, and acting, in this sense, primarily determine a subject matter or available natural complex and only secondarily disclose an agent. (The disadvantage of using "expression" as the major generic term instead of "utterance" or "judgment" lies in its unsatisfactory associations and its subordination of the substantive to the revelatory factor. Its apparent advantage is that in common usage doing and making are accepted along with saying as forms of "expression." But "expression" and "self-expression" are by tradition too closely interwoven, and the revelatory suggestion in general is too strong to admit of properly reduced emphasis.)

But it must not be thought that if judgments are substantive the individual plays no role in the determina-

tion of the substance. A judgment presupposes a set of limiting conditions, a perspective, within which it functions to define properties. The individual is one natural complex among the natural complexes which establish a perspective or limiting order for each judgment. Its perspective is what makes a judgment relevant to some portion of the world. An individual judges with respect to the traits that are traits for him. When he molds, describes, or acts he reckons with realities that antedate the production; yet it is he who through production primarily circumscribes the scope of the product.

In every product a revelatory and a substantive dimension may be found. Whether a product is of interest mainly to the biographer and psychologist or to the philosopher is determinable by a variety of contextual conditions. On the surface of things, a shriek and a proposition in mathematics are judgments that are easily classifiable and separable. But no fixed scheme is philosophically satisfactory. A gesture, a proposition, a verse, a shriek have each a multitude of possible functions, dramatic, economic, logical, historical. Every judgment has both an ostensible and an effective "subject matter." The latter is based on the underlying communicative intent or on the actual communicative result. The face of a judgment, its nominal ingredients, its standardized status are of concern primarily to the anthropologist and the grammarian. In the theory of meaning, such factors can be of only minor importance. For meaning, in most of its manifestations, is hardly a matter either of legislation or of etiquette. From one point of view, the revelatory element of judgment is itself substantive. For whether the subject matter of the

judgment be its own producer or some other portion of the world, this subject matter is always a complex of natural traits which, different as they may be in character, are similar in existential status.

What we ordinarily identify as a product is composed of parts, each of which, strictly speaking, seems to be at least indirectly a product, whether so identified or not. In the same sense, the identified product may itself be part of a larger or more extensive product. A half-mile walk, each step in the walk, and the enterprise which the walk subserves are all products, as are each word in a poem, the poem's verses, the poem as a whole, and the poet's total output. But we have said that every product is a judgment. Are all parts, therefore, judgments no less than the commonly identified wholes of which they are parts? Is a single step or a single word a judgment? And if so, do we not arrive at absurdity when we go further and call the various movements of which the step consists, and the letters or sounds of which the word consists, judgments? Now what we call or decide to call a product and therefore a judgment depends on some tacit canon of distinction between a product and a mere event or existential complex. Ordinarily we should say that a step is a product of action, but not the arc which the foot describes in taking the step. The latter is recognized as an existential component of a product and not as itself a product. Likewise, each poetic word would be called a product, but not the height of the word or its distance from the next word or its component letters. The bases of the differentiation are by no means wholly conventional. The course of affairs makes it imperative that, in isolating

products for purposes of denomination and recognition, we neglect certain phases inevitable in the production. There must always be a sphere of intelligibility and interest. The minute components of a product are usually neglected because they fall outside an established or intended purview of meaningfulness. The letters of the alphabet and the mechanical characteristics of locomotion are universal ingredients, universally available, and as such ordinarily lack the minimal degree of uniqueness that a product possesses. To be sure, intelligibility and interest have no absolute boundaries. The height of a verbal character, of no great concern to most people, may be of consuming interest and importance to a police officer or a historian of script; and the arc described by the walking foot may be of great significance to a student of athletic form. In these perspectives, what is a mere event to others, is a product; and the judgment inherent in the instance of making, doing, or saying that is under consideration may be articulated with ease. Whatever, therefore, in some possible perspective, can be deemed to *be* made or *be* said or *be* done is legitimately regarded as a judgment. What by itself, though the component of an acknowledged product, appears in a given perspective only as an event is to be regarded as at best an incipient judgment or the component of a judgment or a potential judgment. The same analysis applies to an "idea" or "thought" or verbal expression that may as yet be outside of any determinate context: these are natural complexes that may come to function as judgments or phases of judgment. Ideas, symbols, or thoughts occurring within a determinate context are elliptical or ab-

breviated judgments and are commonly articulated into a standardized form. A product or judgment, then, is not to be regarded as a lump, a ready-made parcel, but as a designated whole within the process of producing; just as this process is itself to be regarded as an inseparable phase of experiencing. The usual malpractice of philosophers who examine a product in order to evaluate its semantic or cognitive status is not that they tend to overlook the importance of its parts but that they tend to overlook the possibly more important whole of which it is a part.

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The three modes of human production, doing, making, and saying, are three modes of judgment which may be designated respectively as active, exhibitive, and assertive judgment. Each of these, neither more nor less than the other two, defines the traits of a natural complex in a given perspective. Each emerges from the intersection of various processes. One of these processes is an individual history, within which the judgment is an event, and from which it draws some of the materials and some of the nuances of its character. Another is the persistent impress of nature at large, which has placed the individual from the outset in a state of relative urgency, to be thenceforth mitigated by judgments. A third is the process of social communication, which largely determines the external form of judgments, contributes to their matter, and transmits through its own media the specific influences of nature.

The most familiar guise of the assertion is of course

the declarative sentence. Assertions usually occur in some form of symbolism which has syntactical structure. But it is an error to suppose that assertive judgment or either of the two other modes can be identified exclusively by a set of physical characters. "Saying" and "asserting" may suggest writing, talking, and images of words, very much as "courage" incurably suggests warfare. "Acting" and "doing" may suggest the image of a man in rapid motion or wrestling with levers. And "making" may suggest the image of a man kneading clay or fitting boards together. But an assertion may be made without using words at all, for instance, by the act of nodding in answer to a question. Nodding as such could be considered an active judgment which, in this context, also functions assertively. The ostensibly auxiliary function may be of greater importance in communication and experience than the act as such. In another context, nodding may be an act of lamentation, or a distracted utterance of grief; and in such cases the assertive function may be negligible or absent. A poem consists of words, but ordinarily it is an exhibitive judgment, primarily a shaping or molding. It may assume assertive import for one person or another. Its exhibitive function may be small in value and its status as an active judgment magnified—for example, if it stimulates patriotic sentiment or wins a prize or violates a statute on obscenity. An assertive judgment, for example a lecture, may be regarded as a work of art, and, in so far, exhibitively. So may an action, such as a dance. Doing, making, and saying, then, the three modes of judgment, are functional rather than struc-

tural distinctions, despite the fact that custom associates them respectively with movement, with sensuous or visible forms, and with the use of words.

The principal distinguishing mark of an assertive judgment is the applicability to it of the predicates "true" and "false," as well as those predicates commonly regarded as derivative from or dependent upon some epistemic state of a user, "probable," "likely," "doubtful." Conversely, when questions of truth or falsity or probability, or, in general, questions of evidential status, are asked about a product, that product is being used as an assertive judgment. Assertive judgment is distinguished also by the fact that it lends itself, with great elasticity, to socially accepted forms of ellipsis; most of the assertions made in everyday discourse are elliptical and even utterly disguised. In practice, assertive and nonassertive judgments are bound up all together in amorphous masses. Human communication, being fully as interrogative as it is contributive in character, often concerns itself with the resolution of the ellipses in assertions. "What do you mean?" is most often the demand for the formalization of an apparently indeterminate expression, expectantly assertive. It is the signal for the transformation of that product into a product conventionally tractable. By the layman it is applied to works of art as well as to assertions—to cases where translation may violate a product rather than resolve an assumed indeterminacy. And it is applied, with less incongruity but often with equal unreasonableness, to products of formal inquiry, such as scientific or philosophic works, which can translate within limits, and which can (always in the case of science,

at least) translate assertively, but not necessarily into familiar modes of formulation. "Common-sensist" and positivist philosophers, who perforce are content not to lock horns with the procedures of science, apply their methodological naiveté to philosophic judgments, exorcising both individual expressions and entire conceptual structures which are not translated into assertions of preconceived types.

It is a temptation to say that assertive judgment is the mode of utterance by which men record their institutions, their situations, and the events of nature; that it is the unique instrument by which natural process is taken hold of or made, as we say, intelligible. We "record" in the sense that we appropriate something for possession, or preserve it in relatively unchanging form. But this is what we may be said to do also when we shape materials in a work of art. What we exhibit may be "representational" or it may not; and in either case, we preserve or record as well as array discovered or produced traits. Among all types of products, what seems intrinsically unfitted to be a vehicle of record is the act. And yet written history, the deliberative record of the past, or "artificial memory" as Santayana calls it, is a compound of action, contrivance, and formulation. It achieves possession by seeking and sifting remains and evoking testimony (all these through action), by ordering (exhibitively) what it has thus garnered, and by describing (asserting) what it has thus ordered.

An individual judges his world, and judges it exhibitively, whenever he rearranges materials within it into a constellation that is regarded or assimilated as such. This identification of the exhibitive judgment

is not redundant. The rearrangement, the specifiability of materials, the constellation, and the emphasis on the constellation are distinguishable factors, all essential. For rearrangement, first of all, is insufficient. By an action which influences the lives of other persons, an individual may effect important rearrangements. His active judgment is potentially, but not through the action alone, also exhibitive. In thus effecting rearrangements, he is manipulating complexes in so far as they are existences rather than in so far as they are materials. In an exhibitive utterance we order or shape what are specifiable as materials; it is not enough, metaphorically, to "shape" the course of existence. Such materials include conventional or devised signs of all kinds. And the product of the rearrangement may be "sensuously" and "affectively" available or "intellectually" available. But the third of the essential factors is not yet necessarily implied. When metal tools (materials) are assembled (rearranged) for the purpose of opening a safe, we may not properly speak of an exhibitive judgment. The materials are not ordered into a constellation or structure, unless it be temporarily or instrumentally. But what, now, of a verbal assertion? May it not be said to be typically an ordering of materials (words) into a constellation, and is not the constellation essential in determining the import of the assertion? We require the fourth of the conditions for exhibitive judgment, that aspect of the ordering which most directly warrants the use of the term "exhibitive." To contrive a structure is to be concerned in some sense with its character or quality as a structure. This is not to say that such concern need be of lifelong

duration; it may be fleeting. Nor is it to say that such concern or such involvement need be momentous; it may be casual. In every instance the pronouncement inherent in the product relates to ordered natural traits as traits, or to traits in just that order. The sentence, in so far as it functions no more than assertively, is a constellation of materials but is not emphasized or regarded primarily as such. Depending on the presence of this condition, the use of the voice in speech, of the body in motion, of words in written sequence, of bricks in building, is or is not exhibitive.

The process of shaping, in order to be exhibitive, need not be methodical and purposive—it need not be a process of query. An ordered constellation may function as such habitually rather than by design. And it may function as such not only without the intent of its producer but without his knowledge. The exhibitive emphasis is not something with which an agent has to endow a judgment. The judgment needs no official sanction; it must *be* exhibitive; it must exhibit a structure. A blacksmith who forges iron hinges without a sense of their character is yet pronouncing exhibitively in so far as the product, qualitatively considered, reflects his established make-up (the revelatory aspect of the judgment) and his tacit appraisal of the potentialities in iron (the substantive aspect). Even within methodical utterance, exhibitive judgment may lurk unawares. The author of a system of philosophy may be keenly conscious of the assertive content of his product and oblivious of its exhibitive function. For the combination of symbols, besides having conceptual value, may be entertained and possessed as a sheer edi-

fice of ideas, and as such alone may compel or fail to compel.

It follows from these considerations that works of art—using the phrase, as we consistently shall, without honorific intent, and applying it to all instances whatever of methodical contrivance—are a subclass of exhibitive judgments. They are exhibitive judgments engendered by query. Making is more pervasive than methodical making. Philosophically, to detect the universal traits in all making and to emphasize the differentia of art are equally fundamental.

All judgment to some extent de-temporalizes nature, holds it in suspense. For what it selects from a large, various network of processes it also isolates and detaches. This capture of traits from process is itself a process, the most elemental means by which permanencies become available. It is most obvious in exhibitive judgment and least obvious in active judgment. To make something is to concretize in a manner readily discernible by the stubborn bluntness of common sense. The product is "there," mysterious and opaque, perhaps, but indubitably wrought. Nor can its possibilities of new meaning alter its established identity. The sock darned remains the same sock. From natural process the assertive judgment extracts no such tangible entity. Yet it is similarly arrestive. It is in itself fixed testimony; once completed, it says what it originally said, and forever more. Its constituent elements may be differently construed by the generations, or even a moment after its utterance, and its possible ambiguities may never be wholly resolved. In each of its uses or

contexts, however, even if by the power and grace of human convention, it is irrevocably affirmative and constant.

An action is the most difficult mode of judgment to regard intelligibly. Not that actions are rarely isolated in common estimation—they are isolated too often, so far as interpretation is concerned, and arbitrarily disconnected from both their lineage and their effects. Nor is the temporal character of action its unique attribute. Each instance of asserting and of making likewise transpires. What accounts for the dubious unity of an action is its apparent evanescence. Once done, it ceases to be present, unlike the exhibitive judgment; and unlike the assertive judgment, it cannot be called back into being together with its original context. Whereas ordinarily assertions and contrivances are directly possessible and usable, actions are not. The paradox of all this is that in the case of assertions and contrivances society has small capacity for classification, while action it readily fits into preordained categories. Despite the fact that actions need to be recovered, and that they are recoverable only through memory and testimony; despite the fact that direct perception of them requires the keenest interpretative power, completable only in retrospect, existing garb will always be stretched to fit them and they will turn out to be proper or criminal, generous or reprehensible, noble or evil, white or black, with crushing inevitability. Judgment in any mode is susceptible of further or secondary "judgment," formal appraisal, commonly (with virgin simplicity) true or false (assertive), good

or bad (exhibitive), right or wrong (active). An active judgment may be identified by the fact that it is subject to the application of moral predicates.

Strictly, an active judgment has the same type of unitary integrity as the other two modes. Once identified, located, and interpreted, whether reasonably or not, it can repeatedly be characterized, repeatedly be influential in human affairs, and as often as not be reenacted or duplicated in essential semblance of its original occurrence. An act, through a continuous progeny of acts, can persist in as powerful a form as the documents or monuments that are among its instruments of perpetuation. Documents and monuments are themselves never self-articulative and are equally dependent, in the last analysis, on the prevailing resources of men. The assertion and the contrivance, however tenacious their physical embodiment, persist only so long as communicative standards provide for them. A pertinent specimen of active judgment is a dent in a piece of wood. Whether it be trivial or important depends on the kind of dent it is, what object is dented and where, who prizes the object, and why he prizes it. The dent persists in its size and place, it remains a dent, despite the remote termination of the original act, as long as the wood exists, or until it is eradicated by the effect of another and different act.

The modes of judgment are the forms in which men render their experience tractable and expose their natural circumstances. We are addicted to the view of the human product as expressing "thought," "imagination," or "emotion." The experience of man, sprung, as we shall put it, from a union of manipulation and

assimilation, and consisting in the permutations of this union, is too continuous and deep-rooted to sustain such a view. It is not the will that is free, said Locke, it is the man. In parallel manner we may say that it is not the mind that judges, it is the man. To think, as philosophers chronically do, of assertion alone as "judgment" is to miss the fact that even assertion cannot be understood adequately if understood merely as the product of mind. An assertion has a natural history, and its symbols reflect in their import varied natural situations, including the circumstances of human community. True, the substantive assertion is not to be identified with its circumstances; but the circumstances determine what the substance will be, and the activity of thought is only one of these circumstances. Ideas and meanings are by and large the outcome of living rather than of pure psychic invention. Assertion is not a name for a sudden unaccountable appearance, in the world, of propositions in the abstract. It is juster to say that assertion makes nature at large available to mind than that assertion about nature arises from mind. But even what assertion makes available to mind it makes available not to mind alone. For truth, though articulated, as we may say, by mind, is assimilated by life; mind being precisely, as Aristotle taught, the capacity of life to articulate truth.

Each judgment is the individual's situational recognition of his universe, a universe highly reduced in scale and present in the form of complexes that are to some extent uncontrollable. The judgment reflects both the impact of this universe and the momentum of the self. Now part of this reflected universe is the society

of individuals in which the processes of communication obtain. The modes of judgment are also modes of communication. We communicate by acting and by making no less than by stating. The communicative power of products may far surpass the communicative intent of their producers. Becoming communal possessions, they affect conduct and understanding, or in general the content of individual judgment in every mode and the idiosyncrasies of future communication. The communicative power of a product is in no way dependent on the mode of its production, nor on the merit or moral quality of its utterance. One act by a Hitler or a St. Francis of Assisi may have a more pervasive communicative effect than the entire outpouring of assertion by most other men. And on the other hand, a single assertive product by an Aristotle or a Luther, in its communicative force, pales the totality of most human action.

The fact that all three modes of judgment may be efficacious in communication follows in part (though only in part, for there are other considerations) from a philosophic truth suggested in modern philosophy by Berkeley and generalized by Peirce and Royce, namely, that anything whatever may function as a sign. Anything is subject to interpretation and is therefore a possible vehicle of communication. The materials of communication are not a special ontological class. All matter, Alfred Lloyd said, is a "medium of exchange." [3] Judgments in any mode may consequently function as signs, even as facts and objects not emanating from a producer may. But methodologically, the role of judgments, in contrast to the role merely of signs as such,

is of especial importance. By their utterances men do more than feed material to one another. They compel and modify belief, assent, conduct, taste, feeling, and understanding. They affect the norms and the qualities of communication besides adding to the data of communication. At bottom, of course, products are events, events produced. Produced events can soften, intensify, illuminate, or darken unproduced events. Unproduced events, on the other hand, can influence the status of produced events by affecting the character of human production. Produced events are preceded, succeeded, and overwhelmed in number, though not necessarily in moral significance, by unproduced events. Production is a process within "proception," that is, within the natural process of individuated movement that we more loosely call "experience."

iv

Philosophers have long been under the governance of an interesting type of prejudices, those that nourish each other and pass as insistent results of cooperative investigation. We may express a group of them in the dominant language of this day and in the following composite viewpoint:

"Knowing is a 'mental' function, expressed overtly in propositions. A judgment is the mental form which a proposition or assertion takes. (Knowing, therefore, is assertive in character.) For the sake of precision, we must not confuse the cognitive process of assertion with such noncognitive processes as action and art. Judgment is referential, while doing and making are merely expressive of the doer and maker. Besides, there is a

basic problem whether judgments of fact are or are not essentially different from 'judgments of value'; for the former are descriptive and the latter are appraisive, and there is doubt whether the latter are judgments (assertions) at all. Many pseudo-problems in philosophy arise from the fact that we confuse the informational functions of language with its emotive functions; for do we not know on the authority of Aristotle, Ogden and Richards, and various 'analytic' philosophers that these should be carefully distinguished?"

The value-theorists are much concerned with whether or not all judgments of value are judgments of fact, but much less with whether all judgments of fact are judgments of value. The pragmatists, emphasizing the active character of belief, neglect the judicative character of action, and even more, the judicative character of contrivance. The philosophers who seek ballast from "ordinary usage" dignify only some ordinary usages and declare others to be in need of qualification and correction. Ordinary usage actually turns out to be embarrassing. It asks, for example, not only the question "What does that word mean?" but also the questions "What is the meaning of that action?" and "What is the meaning of that painting and that play and that epoch of history?" Just as theoretical democrats are often suspicious of popular decisions, ordinary-language philosophers refuse to credit vulgar perception when questions like the latter are raised. Instead of asking what the common traits are that underlie all usages of "meaning," they insist on distinguishing the supposed clarity of "literal" usage from the vagueness of the "metaphors" in so-called nonliteral usage. Other phi-

losophers, with a stronger sense of analogy but with shopworn philosophic tools, wonder whether there can be said to be "truth" in art, accepting for art a quasi-assertive status instead of questioning the adequacy of the view that equates judgment and assertion.

What does it mean to attribute "cognitive" significance to a judgment? Presumably, that the judgment is a vehicle whereby we can acquire or transmit knowledge. Are all three modes of judgment cognitive in this sense? Unquestionably. So far as acquisition of knowledge is concerned, acting and making are a means no less than stating. Making provides a type of possession which is unavailable through verbal representation, and a combination of materials more concretely manipulatable than those in any other type of utterance. Acting is a necessary condition for the attainment of any cognitive result, as well as itself, under appropriate circumstances, a distinctive form of knowing. In the most fundamental sense, knowing is that process by which an organism gains from its own continuing living or from the world available to it the capacity to produce or to experience in different, unprecedented ways. The individual who makes—who, by exhibitive judgment, contrives in order to show, or contrives with the result of showing—can both acquire and impart this kind of gain. He can augment a skill, contribute to control of the environment, and alter the world available for subsequent experience. In the same manner, action can modify the total relation of the organism to its world. It can, to be sure, merely perpetuate the monotonous responses of an individual to an already confined world. It can be as stagnant as assertion can. But

it can also be the condition necessary for utilizing and predicting more of the world, the condition of new judgment, active, exhibitive, and assertive. It can be gain, in the cognitive sense.

Now there are several objections that have been brought to bear in one form or another since the Greeks against assigning to making and doing as important a cognitive function as to stating. (1) If making and doing are instruments of knowledge, this is a lesser kind of knowledge, concerned with particulars instead of universals, or with practice instead of theory. In modern terminology, it is knowledge by "acquaintance" rather than by formulation or description. It is at best "experience," not understanding. (2) Making and doing, being direct, are inarticulate. They are brute contacts with the object, indistinguishable in this respect from mere events or natural collisions. Knowledge needs to be, in Santayana's famous phrase, "a salutation, not an embrace." It requires mediating signs, which make its object articulate, and which provide the degree of detachment necessary for understanding. (3) Making and doing are incapable of abstraction and therefore cannot be systematic. The "knowledge" they yield cannot grow in any organic or cumulative sense. (4) To the extent that making and doing are relevant in knowledge it is only as subaltern elements in a process of thought or reflection. Whatever comes of acting and contriving needs to be translated into assertive form if it is to have a cognitive dimension. Thus acting is also knowing only if it is reflective acting, that is, if it is also thinking; and making is knowing only when

considered itself as a form of thought, for instance, "qualitative thought," as Dewey calls art.

In each of these objections there is something significant. But in each there is also something defective. Let us start with the last. (4) There is no doubt that by customary agreement, founded in rigid conviction, assertion is the primary vehicle of knowledge, at least in the West. It is, however, not at all clear whether this is a fact inherent in the nature of human judgment or whether it is an outcome of social evolution that is given primacy by the conventions of discourse. It is evident that in the experience of every individual certain actions or certain works of art are best left untranslated into statements, not because of hidden antipathy to the promotion of knowledge, but because, on the contrary, verbal translation is inadequate, irrelevant, or anticlimactic to knowledge already felt to be gained. Yet what about criticism? Is it not essential to knowledge, and is it possible in any other than assertive form? This, of course, only pushes the problem back one step. Criticism is customarily associated with language. But it need not at all take the form of language, and certainly not of assertive language. If by "criticism" we mean evaluation of human products by other human products, who can deny the status of criticism to much of visual art, to many a frown or nod, to the acts of aggression and affection that permeate daily affairs and the course of history? But suppose even that active and exhibitive knowing do require, in addition, assertive formulation and therefore thinking? Does this establish the primacy of the latter? The process of think-

ing itself indicates otherwise. For in thinking we move from one alternative to another and back; we actively pursue and survey possibilities. Thinking, in this respect, is a form of action, action about signs and about the unresolved status of natural complexes in a perspective of the thinker. The action of thought, like any other action, may be confined to an individual or be publicly duplicated. Philosophers have always spoken and still do speak of thinking as an "act or operation of the mind." But thinking is exhibitive as well. Signs must be arranged in an order, and the order at some point must be accepted as just that order and no other; in other words, if thought is to be consummated, it must rest at the adoption of one constellation among several. The exhibitive constellation may be emphasized as such only momentarily; yet this phase of thought is inescapable. Thought or reflective assertion, then, is indissociable from acting and making, both in relation to signs of an ideational or abstract character and (more extensively) in relation to physical objects. And if so, it is no liability to the cognitive status of making and acting that they, in converse dependency, require assertive judgment for their cognitive augmentation or consummation.

(2) If making and acting were brute contacts with objects, if they were noncommunicative or if they were necessarily devoid of signs, the objection might be well taken. But the phases of an act mediate one another, and so do the parts of a contrivance. It is not possible to do or make anything without the same mutual dependency of the components as in linguistic formulation. Each element of a product is a sign and

is tacitly interpreted by some other sign. This means, not necessarily that each element "designates" or "stands for" another, but that it bears to another *some* relation that is indispensable in the development of the product. In the development of a product, unlike the simple occurrence of an event, the relations of the elements are other than solely causal and spatio-temporal. In the realm of making and doing, one element may be subordinated to another, may accentuate another, may be symmetrically juxtaposed with another, or may be the moral condition of another. (To this version of the sign-function, in which the emphasis on designation or reference is reduced, we shall return in section i of Chapter IV.) If it be rejoined that sign-interpretation must be assertive, the generality and openness of function inherent in the very notion of a sign is contradicted, and of course the question at issue is begged. Signs do indeed make what is known articulate; but to assume that articulation is necessarily linguistic is to establish only by definition the cognitive primacy of assertion.

(3), (1) It is true that doing and making are not capable of abstraction and progressive generalization; nor are there, in the usual sense of the term, "universals" in action or in contrivance. But what does this imply? Assertive knowing involves universal terms; but doing and making are not processes that involve terms at all. Likewise, abstraction is a technique that relates to terms. And "theoretical" knowledge relates by definition to generalized assertions. The fact that these properties are not properties of doing and making means no more than just that. It implies nothing in the rela-

tive estimation of these modes of judging as cognitive. Within the realm of assertion some forms of knowing are more abstract than others. Pure mathematics is more abstract than physics, but this does not make it more truly knowledge than physics. (Some have argued, ironically enough, that pure mathematics is not "knowledge" at all.) So far as the relevance of the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is concerned, it must be remembered that this distinction is ordinarily made under the assumption that assertion is the only mode of judgment. Making and doing, by the conditions of such a preestablished distinction with its narrow alternatives, have to be classified as "acquaintance." "Acquaintance" is in fact not cognitive in the way that description is when the term is taken to mean mere contact. But the kind of contact referred to in the framing of the distinction is simple sensory contact. And simple sensory contact is as inapplicable to what occurs in active and exhibitive judgment as is description. Now cognitive values surely admit of degree. But cognitive differences of degree apply to products and disciplines under significant conditions of comparison. We can not say that one type of knowledge is more exact than another if exactness is not an ideal of one of the two types. We say that chemistry is more exact than sociology, because presumably sociology aspires to the ideal of exactness. We say that one astronomical theory explains more than another, because both aspire to explanation. Or we say that one philosophic work is more systematic and more suggestive than another, because system and suggestiveness are goals attributed to philosophies. But

the fact that history is more particularistic than physics does not make it less truly knowledge. And if poetry is, as Aristotle says, more universal than history, in the sense that it reveals the generic in human existence more than history does, that does not make *it* more truly knowledge. Physics, history, and poetry are cognitive in different respects, not in different degrees.

The cognitive values of the three modes of judgment are not easily comparable, and perhaps are not comparable at all; and this may be part of what has to be meant by the view that there *are* three modes of judgment. Making and doing are not "systematic" in quite the same sense as asserting. But on the other hand, asserting is not vivid or consuming in the same sense as making and doing. In the light of these considerations we need not be puzzled, as we so often are, by the fact that from great novelists we can "learn more about human nature" than from psychology or social science. Exhibitive knowledge is not analytical knowledge, though products which are exhibitive are often also analytical; and likewise the other way round. A typical example of an analytical product which is also exhibitive is the mathematical demonstration, in which the symbolic arrangement shows, as well as establishes, the connection of the propositions involved. A typical example of an exhibitive product which is also analytical is found in certain forms of the novelist's art. The analysis takes place, not indeed by merely the showing, but by the showing in repeated and different situations. Thus in D. H. Lawrence and in Henry James we encounter the difficulty which persons experience in relating to one another feelingly and getting to under-

stand or to love. The nature of this process could be detailed assertively by means of a number of fertile concepts. Without the introduction of formal concepts the novelist nevertheless achieves an analytical goal. What his contrivance exhibits, it exhibits by variation and repetition. Each of the varied instances or situations has community with the others. The theme is, as it were, systematically rotated. Each instance, with its differentia, corresponds to a conceptual qualification of the theme. Whatever the novelistic resolution, the theme remains subject to further articulation. A similar type of analytical rotation occurs in a set of musical variations on an initially stated theme. Another occurs in painting, where a recurrent subject is in effect systematically varied; and this is observable either in the collective product of an individual painter (for instance, the dancers of Degas) or in the course of historical treatment (for instance, the successive versions of "Madonna and Child").

The modes of judgment are not reducible to one another. Each mode at best (and it may be very good) can approximate to a version of the others by the use of its unique means. Each under certain conditions can articulate the others, but not translate them in the sense of producing literal equivalents. There is no way by which equivalence or fidelity of translation could be determined. Certainly not by a measuring rod in *one* of the modes without begging the issue. One respect in which the three modes are related is through mutual influence. What we know theoretically may affect the content of how we act and of what we make; and the

way we act or what we make may determine the ideas we formulate.

v

A recent writer says: "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery. When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say? *Then how is another one to be constructed?* And how strange that we should be able to do anything at all with the one we have!" [4] Philosophy here is the therapeutic technique by which general intellectual health is acquired, health consisting in clarity of usage. With this conception we need not become directly concerned. But the conception of language associated with it is relevant to our purpose and affects the general theory of utterance. Language, on this view, is a complex instrument that knots itself up constantly because of its vastness and trickiness. It is ever in need of repair, not only because of the kind of thing it is but because of man's confusions about his own relation to it and about the rules and resolutions that he needs in order to employ it. Other philosophic approaches, making very different general assumptions, come to similar conclusions about language, with somewhat greater emphasis upon the intractability of language and its inherent defects as an instrument. The result, in all these approaches, is con-

cern over the "limits of language" or over its relation to "reality" or the "external world"; or over its mysterious properties. Ultimately, the responses based on these diagnoses, true to their respective general commitments, stretch to two extremes. One is the espousal of speculative reticence, and a fear of elastic usage. The other is the espousal of supra-linguistic insight or intuition. These problems, ancient in origin, stem from the widespread assumption that language is an "instrument of communication."

Various attempts, too numerous to mention, have been made to conceive the notion of language broadly and to place it high as a philosophic category. Among those which are recent and which happen to be pertinent to the present undertaking, three may be noted. (1) One is the development of the general theory of signs. This has had the effect, either of generalizing the notion of language to make it coextensive with the entire domain of possible signs, or of regarding it as one species of signs. This approach, in either version, has many merits and in large part has become indispensable. Its most conspicuous limitation is its lack of a theory of the product. A sign may be an unproduced object as well as a produced vehicle of representation. The truths that anything existent may function representatively and that there are classifiable variants of this function require to be complemented by a generalized conception of judgment and a satisfactory conception of experience. (2) Language has been treated as a species of social behavior, and has been interpreted biosocially in terms of the concepts of gesture and the social act (Mead). For all of its salutary influence (it

has had more effect on social scientists than on philosophers, and its blows against the antiquated psychology of the epistemologists have not been fully recognized), this view encourages a rather exaggerated emphasis on the manipulative as against the assimilative dimension of human experience. (3) The conception of "symbolic forms" (Cassirer) subsumes language in yet another way. Language is a "way of seeing" the world, a way of rendering it into symbolic cloth. The symbolic forms of language, myth, science, and art are regarded partly as modes of individual perspective and partly as cultural frameworks. Great as are the values of this approach, it inclines to mentalize perspective. Moreover, it looks upon nature too much as fitting various symbolic schemes, and too little as determining symbols and compelling products.

Philosophers will doubtless continue to chafe at "the limits of language" and to fancy themselves either as in the grip of a tool or as overly indulgent in its use. In this vein, they will continue to ask whether art is a language, whether it communicates, whether it transcends language, whether it can be said to possess truth; whether value-expressions are expressions of feeling or statements of fact, mere exclamations or genuine assertions; and "just what" function commands in language have.

To call language an "instrument" of communication may be colloquially defensible, and perhaps practically tenable in a broad philological account. But it is as misleading as to call an institution an instrument of culture or the church an instrument of religion. An institution is culture in one of its forms, the church is

religion in one of its forms, and language is communication in one of its forms. By the substantive sense of "an" institution, "the" church, "a" language, we mean the manifestation of the process (culture, religion, communication) in a standardized version, that is, in a relatively immobile and recognizable structure. It is less confusing to regard some specific component of language or of religion (for instance, a word or a prayer) as an instrument, though not under all conditions. An instrument is presumably a complex of traits that is used as a means or that functions as a means regardless of design. The word "airplane" is a means of designating and identifying a product. The delineated syntax of an algebra is a means of formalizing it. But to say, analogously, that language is a means of communication is to oversimplify both language and communication. Such a statement assumes language to be a great body of tools socially available, whereas language is better understood as a common attribute, a state of community that actualizes itself as a form of communication and as a process of production. It pictures communication as primarily a giving, a taking, and an exchanging of tools (linguistic and other signs), whereas communication is better understood as a relation which presupposes individual histories and forms of community, nonlinguistic as well as linguistic. Locke, with his characteristic genius for inclusiveness, called language both "the great instrument and common tie of society." [5] The two metaphors are not harmonious: it is not clear how a social bond can also be a social instrument. Presumably an aggregate of acknowledged signs (the instrument) reflects, through its usage, a common poten-

tiality for production and communication (the tie). Yet even when we consider not language as such but individual linguistic products, these products, like all other products, and especially if they are of some magnitude, are more than instruments, and instruments only in a restricted sense. For the most part they are indissoluble mixtures of compulsion and convention—of uncontrolled response and of selection from alternatives. They are manipulative and assimilative. The manipulation of natural traits, such as sounds and marks, into an order is also an assimilation of these traits; it may be deliberative, spontaneous, or inevitable, or all of these in combination.

To pass from the unqualified view that language is an instrument of communication to the view just suggested is insufficient without some elaboration. The communal bond eventuates in direct communication only contingently. Products, linguistic or nonlinguistic, may affect communication long after their producers have ceased to exist, and apart from any direct purpose of utilizing signs, or apart from any direct relation among given individuals. The ordinary image of communication is of two men talking to each other or writing to each other. From this is derived the further, indirect usage whereby it is said that men are "in communication" even when not talking or writing at the moment. From this, in turn, comes the still more indirect usage of "mass communication" through public media, where the personal relation is all but absent. If we go one step further we arrive at a state which appears to be a dissolution of communication but which is the state of its potential occurrence. Community is

a necessary condition of communication: individuals who lead lives in some degree parallel, and who are subject to the same dominant commitment or allegiance, are in a state of community or experiential togetherness. Language, one of the bases of human parallelism, is not so much a common possession as a common condition. Even when we speak of "the language" of a nation we misinterpret the status of the vocabulary and syntax by thinking of them as tools. They are overt forms of communally influenced habit, and of dispositions to communicate and produce. A foreigner who learns the language adds to his possessions only in the sense that he "possesses" potential relations to a community or its literature. By manipulating the new symbols he may accelerate the responses of others. The symbols undoubtedly may serve as instruments to facilitate operations that he wishes to complete. But significant responses can also be aroused by one who knows nothing of the language—who does not "possess" it; and on the other hand communication can be at a minimum where an individual commands huge vocabularies. The instruments may or may not turn out to be instrumental. Symbols used merely as instruments to arouse response can be causally efficacious and wholly uncommunicative.

When language is considered in abstraction from its larger existential and functional setting, and portrayed as a kit of tools, its essential character is by no means hidden. A vocabulary, or set of established words, is a more or less permanent record of experiences which are common, which recur persistently, and which reflect the typical history of individuals. A word preempts

an available object or situation or other natural complex for common recognition and allusion. The kit of tools is thus the epitomization of social experience, the reflection of parallelisms among individuals. The same words that record the typical in experience are combinable for purposes of doing more than recording and for the opening up of situations not ordinarily experienced or not otherwise experienced. Such combinations are, after all, products, and the words are not to be regarded as separable from the production but rather as regularized phases of a perpetual process of experiencing and producing. Those who, like Croce and Collingwood, have emphasized as fundamental the "expressive" character of language, whatever the merit of their general position may be, have effectively questioned the notion of language as something external to experiencing and as an implement utilizable by fiat.

Highly distinguishable as linguistic and nonlinguistic utterance are, the line between them is a thin one, determined by social and circumstantial factors as much as by any other. To an Englishman, the gestures of an Italian are likely to be inessential acts superimposed on sounds and not themselves linguistic. A community regards the physical properties of speech foreign to it as largely idiosyncratic. But language functions actively and exhibitively no less fully and indeed no less frequently than it functions assertively. This is the generalized formulation of what Berkeley was suggesting when he said that "the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring

from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition." [6] The exhibitive functions are present in common speech as well as in fictional literature, and the active functions are present in the mere influence of discourse on conduct. Too often this active influence is associated with commands. In general, philosophers have given themselves zealously to studying the overt properties of linguistic combinations and just as zealously to ignoring the modes of judgment embedded in these forms. Psychoanalysts in the last half century and dramatists from time immemorial have been aware that situational and communicative contexts hold the answer to the study of meanings. Freud's distinction between the manifest and the latent dream-content applies to the whole of language: there is a manifest and a latent linguistic content. But the meanings of language configurations are not quite so latent as condescending criticism tends to assume. Out of vanity or impatience or unimaginativeness, philosophers prefer censuring one another to finding and articulating the intent in one another's structures. Preoccupation with grammar, innocent enough in itself, has retarded the discovery of meanings, and, in philosophy, has encouraged the confusion of literalness with exactness.

Declarative sentences, the philosopher's sacred symbol of assertion, may be exclamatory so far as actual function is concerned; imperatives and exclamations may be assertive in function. Poetic discourse reveals these methodological facts almost systematically. When Macbeth says, "Light thickens" (III, ii, 50), he is ostensibly asserting the descent of night; but though the words do not formally exclaim, exclamation is the func-

tion achieved, and the terrible fascination of increasing self-involvement is the latent content of his language. And when Lear says, "Pray, do not mock me" (IV, vii, 59), he is uttering not a command but an incipient affirmation of discovery, a veritable epitome of his life. In each instance the communicative and factual situations define the functions of the words. One is an ongoing situation, consisting in protracted crime; the other, a sudden situation, consisting in the perception of a loved one. But it is the specific situation, not the type of situation, that primarily determines the linguistic function. When philosophers ask whether value-expressions "really assert" or "merely exclaim," or when in deference to the traditional hegemony of assertion they ask whether works of art can be said to have the privilege of being true, they are walking on the methodological surface. To investigate discourse or art without distinguishing modes of judgment and their functional possibilities is like substituting the observation of physiognomy for the analysis of conduct.

vi

Perhaps the most influential usage of "judgment" among philosophers is that of Kant: a judgment is an assertion the being of which is in the realm of thought. Many philosophers have distinguished the judgment from the proposition, there being in the latter notion no suggestion of the process, the genesis, or the human power of assertion; for in the notion of judgment the circumstantial as well as the substantive aspect of assertion is presumably held to be embodied. A judgment or assertion is a claim to truth; and the study of

judgment traditionally, therefore, has belonged to the theory of knowledge, for whether, in the more special usages of philosophers, the term "knowledge" is or is not actually applied to every instance of what is called judgment, knowledge is the domain within which or relative to which judgment has functioned and has been relevant. For Kant, explicitly, judgment and production are entirely distinct; so that, as he says, in judging beautiful objects taste is required, and in producing them, genius is required.[7]

Kant did not originate the equation of judgment and assertion, nor did he prevent philosophers from variously conceiving the nature of assertion; but his usage expressed a dogged philosophic strain among writers before and after. To this strain there attached different emphases. One was the old legal usage, according to which a judgment is a decision or determination, a settlement of an issue or an authoritative conclusion. Aquinas and Dewey, for example, are impressed by the promise of this usage, and they generalize it for philosophic purposes. Aquinas, noting that judgment is "correct determination" in matters of justice, finds it appropriately broadened to mean correct determination in any matter whatever.[8] Dewey conceives of judgment as "the settled outcome of inquiry." Inquiry is the generic process of which the legal trial is an instance. The consideration by which Dewey distinguishes the proposition from the judgment is that the former simply expresses something and expresses it at any stage of inquiry indifferently; while the latter characterizes (*a*) a conclusion or decision or termination of inquiry, and beyond this, also (*b*) a factual effect, "an existential de-

termination of the prior situation" which, he adds, "was indeterminate as to its issue." Dewey proposes that the distinction be recognized by using the term "affirmation" to designate the proposition and the term "assertion" to designate the judgment.[9]

There are other major emphases that cluster round the notion of judgment. Hobbes thinks of it primarily as discernment and discrimination, and as discretion when applied to practical matters. Plainly it is not the factor of decision that impresses him but the factor which consists in the detection and untangling of traits. Thus sharpness of discrimination is "good" judgment.[10] Locke, on the other hand, thinks of judgment as one of the mind's two powers—the other, knowledge —of dealing with truth and falsehood. Unlike knowledge, whereby the mind observes the agreement or disagreement of ideas in satisfaction and conviction, judgment is presumptive and estimative.[11] (Thus for Locke all judgment would be assertion, but not all assertion would be judgment.) This usage, though not so easily recognizable, is firmly entrenched in current speech and has deep roots in the English language. According to it we say colloquially, "We aren't sure (we don't know), but this is our (best) judgment in the matter."

Each of the foregoing philosophic usages (others, of course, could be cited) derives from some older and common usage. In each the generalization of the usage is based on the discovery of some analogy between a more limited type of situation (that recognized in the common reference) and a more pervasive type of situation of which the original is deemed one species; or

upon the discovery of a trait *implied* in common usage and deemed to be as important for philosophic interpretation as it is inconspicuous in common emphasis. What frames each philosophic usage is the total philosophic structure in which it is housed and whose needs it meets. The philosophers mentioned utilize the notion of judgment by distinguishing it, more or less sharply, from some correlative. Thus for Hobbes, judgment is to be distinguished from fancy; for Locke, from knowledge; for Kant, from production; for Dewey, from affirmation.

In the present approach, the properties emphasized by these and perhaps other philosophic usages are not rejected but, it is hoped, preserved, or proportioned, within a generalized conception. Judgment is indeed determinative or decisive, discriminative, and estimative. But the full significance of these properties can emerge only when they cease to be limited to assertion and hence confined within an inadequate viewpoint. The appraisive character of "judgment" is recognized by several philosophers in one or another form; for instance, by Hegel, Bradley, and (allowing for difference of terminology) Dewey. But again, the significance of seeing that assertion is appraisive depends upon the more fundamental position that there are nonassertive forms of pronouncement, and that these too are appraisive. To regard judgment as exclusively an approximation to knowledge, and therefore as a concept in the theory of knowledge, is to err in the understanding not only of judgment but, as we have seen, of knowledge itself. Philosophically, the theory of judgment or utterance is more comprehensive than the

theory of knowledge; for in the account of knowledge the notion of judgment is inevitable and indispensable, whereas in the account of judgment the notion of knowledge is not. And we shall find that if the habitat of judgment is not limited to the mind or the mouth, then neither can the process of judging methodically or interconnectedly be limited to "thought" or "inquiry."

Like the philosophic usages of "judgment," the everyday usages are compatible with the present generalized account and represent particular applications of the generic function involved. Consider, for example, the expressions "judge not lest ye be judged" and "bringing judgment against another." These expressions seem to imply the possibility of avoiding "judgment." Yet they do not imply that men can suspend the function of asserting, or the functions of acting and making. Nor do they imply that in asserting, acting, and making, men can avoid all pronouncement and all appraisal. They are concerned rather with a particular type of utterance that is regarded as immoral and controllable. To "judge" in this pejorative sense is to exceed the bounds of reasonable humility by an unbecoming pronouncement and an unbecoming appraisal. It is to usurp the special function of competent, constituted authority (God, the law, proper evidence), a usurpation which consists not in appraising but in appraising prematurely or with undue finality. The legal usage of "judgment" as "authoritative determination" is the basis also of this common usage, which in suggesting forbearance from such authoritative determination does not imply the possibility of avoiding all determination. It is

officiousness that is to be avoided. Judgment, then, is inevitable, but legalistic judgment (as the expressions wish to indicate) is not a universal necessity and not a universal prerogative.

If judgment or determination is inevitable, what sense is left to the established usage illustrated by the expression "he showed judgment in doing what he did"? "Showed judgment," however, is the elliptical version of "showed good judgment." It is a usage similar to "showed individuality," "showed power," or "showed awareness," which are elliptical versions of "showed unusual individuality," "showed great power," and "showed subtle awareness," and which do not (for they cannot without absurdity) imply as a possibility the literal absence of individuality, power, or awareness from some human beings. The expressions "good and bad judgment," "sound and unsound judgment," are applied not in all instances of making, acting, and saying but in those instances which are subjected to the conditions of comparison. Conditions of comparison, of course, entail the introduction of a scale of values. No instance of judgment is exempt from the possible application to it of formal standards—that is, of additional judgment on a more purposive level. But on the other hand, the fact of judgment in itself does not entail the presence of such standards.

Common usage, entitled as each philosophic perspective is to its own favorite correlative of "judgment," perhaps most often chooses "action." Thus the neighbors of Don Quixote thought that "every moment his actions used to discredit his judgment, and his judgment his actions." The Don himself, by a metaphysics

that was crude but not vulgar, could scarcely look at the matter this way. He knew that deed as well as word exemplified judgment, and his own endlessly committed judgment reflected itself in a life that was all of one piece. Having experienced intensely, perhaps madly, he perceived the affinity of action and statement and art, and was dedicated to the fulfillment of his utterance in all of these possible forms. Nor could he outlive the division of his indivisible existence, capitulating wholly, in perfect consistency, unlike his reformers who would eventually leave this life without a like submission to the testimony of experience.

II. QUERY

THE HUMAN SELF, as some philosophers have recognized, is spread out in space as well as in time. Its principal power is action at a distance. It is connected with other selves and with the world by unseen ties —of obligation, intention, representation, conflict, memory, and love. Any phase of the self's continuous movement may be regarded, abstractly, as a position, an attitude potentially embodied in a judgment. The self's spread, its relatedness, is the basis of sociality. Aristotle found association to be of the essence of man, and more recent philosophers have generalized this concept and its applications by their emphasis on togetherness. Togetherness has many manifestations, and the tendency to identify it with some one of these alone, like joint presence in a situation, or overt contact, needs to be avoided. In human communication the modes of togetherness are subtle and difficult to analyze. So often have writers treated of communication as a relation among nonhuman objects that it is unwise to overlook the possible suggestiveness of their usage. It is hard to escape the impression that the metaphysical fact of togetherness has imposed itself on common as well as philosophic sensibility. We speak today of communicable diseases, and perpetuate the usage of our ancestors in speaking of the communication of motion by bodies. Here togetherness is emphasized in the form of trans-

mission (Locke called it "transfer"), the passing of a trait from one body to another. Other forms, significantly different, have been discriminated in literary art. Thus, "someone was moving in the library, which communicated with the office" (Henry James); [12] or, "behind it was another room, with which it immediately communicated" (Jane Austen).[13] Spatial togetherness, so simple and yet so fundamental in the affairs of man, is the property of moment here. But still more is implied; for the first author also speaks of a wall "having been removed and the rooms *placed* in communication"; [14] and the second also speaks of two doors "communicating with each other, as they may be *made to do*" by changing the location of objects.[15] The property of potential connection, mutual availability, mutual involvement, enters as an aspect of togetherness. This helps us to understand the nature of potential relatedness among men, and in particular the nature of relatedness among products.

Judgment is a necessary condition of continuing community, as sheer social togetherness is a necessary condition of judgment. Significant relatedness among individuals implies common commitment in some form. Since a community is more than a numerical aggregate, its components must be more than units. Each must be ramified, so that it is sufficiently heterogeneous to make new relations possible with the complexes of nature, and specifically, with the lives of men. Products or judgments are the ramifications of the individual. A judgment leaves a mark on nature, however faint, for it is at least an element within individual experience. It is what makes possible the moral extension of the self

and the realm of meanings. As judgments ramify the being of the individual, so individual judgments may be ramified or developed. When pursued systematically or methodically, the process of ramifying judgments is the process of query. In order to analyze the most essential attributes of utterance, we must discover what is generic not only to such species of query as science, art, or philosophy but to its unnamed manifestations as well.

The traditional term "inquiry" has come to be used in a very broad sense, as when we speak of "freedom of inquiry" or "the sacredness of inquiry" and mean thereby to include all the inventive processes of man. This breadth of usage for "inquiry" is both good and bad. It is good because it suggests that an important form of conduct is not limited to the profession of a discipline. But it is bad because it forces the mold of assertive judgment over the other modes of judgment. To speak of art as inquiry is misleading and awkward. The term is applicable to science and to one function of philosophy; but art is contrivance. Inquiry may enter into art, contrivance into science. Contrivance in natural science takes the form of physical experimentation, and in mathematics it takes the form of symbol legislation and symbol organization; but in both, the order of judgments subserves an assertive function which is, as the case may be, descriptive, explanatory, or inferential in character. In philosophy, contrivance is an end in itself: it takes the form of arranging categories into an order of judgments which compels as an order and not only as a means of assertion. Like art, philosophy contrives to exhibit traits; like science, it

aims to affirm truths. Science, art, and philosophy are, of course, equally modes of invention. But "query" is a fuller term than "invention." "Invention" primarily suggests the emergence of the product; "query," the process of advance, the nature of this process, and the product as a relative termination. "Query" bears the sense of activity as persisting beyond a given product, whereas "invention" suffers somewhat, even if unjustly, from the suggestion of episodic activity. The freedom and sacredness of query, not merely of inquiry, is what must be meant in the account of the struggle between reason and unreason.

Morally speaking, query and invention belong together, and in practice they are inseparable. Invention is the promise of query, query is the temper of invention. Invention guards query from being sterile, query guards invention from being diabolical. We shall think of query as a process expectative of or inclusive of invention. And we shall think of invention as the methodical process of actually producing in consummation of query. (Thus the sense of the term implied, for instance, by a musical historian when he says of Handel that "he invented little or nothing" [16] will be regarded as absurd, reflecting solely a concern with novel technical forms.) Some writers would insist primarily on the term "creation," and would even regard it as superior in comprehensiveness. To this term and its derivatives there can be no basic objection: in some contexts it is not only useful but quite unavoidable. Like "invention," it lays more emphasis on the activity as terminating effectively than on the activity as quest. In a sense its widespread use counts against it for a general theory

of judgment. It has acquired an almost exclusively honorific connotation and a certain preciosity. Partly on the basis of its role in traditional religion, it suggests also excessive mastery of the producer over the product. Somewhat like "experience," it will always claim a hearing, having acquired permanent tenure in spite of or because of its looseness; but there is no good reason to give it principal billing.

If art is not, properly speaking, inquiry, in what sense is it query? Now a judgment, of any kind, perforce makes use of natural complexes, and it is a judgment because it modifies these complexes. The modification may be a mere matter of degree; it may be no more than the repetition of a stereotyped assertion; it is still a modification. For to strengthen a personal habit by repetition, or thereby to contribute to the fixity of the social atmosphere, is no different in principle from weakening these forces. In both types of modification a product added to the nature of things has relative efficacy, and in both it has relative significance. Similarly, in the simplest instances of contrivance—the building of a fire, or the buttering of bread—the qualitative character of the product may be of some relevance in the producing. When contrivance assumes more purposive and elaborate proportions, when the qualitative aspect of the potential product grows in importance, when, in short, "fine art" emerges, a number of consequences appear. First, contrivance occupies a larger role within the total economy of effort. Second, the risk of its fulfillments becomes greater. Third, the place of individual resourcefulness becomes more central. Fourth, the number of alternatives that

arise within the process of making increases. Fifth, the rigor of selection and choice becomes greater. These are the conditions and circumstances of query. For they amount to the fact that contrivance becomes interrogative in character. When the maker becomes the artist, the process of making becomes crucial. The materials of nature are no longer ready to hand but need as it were to be quarried. The greater the project of contrivance, the less adequate is the surface of nature. The producer becomes more of a strategist as well as more of a purposive agent. His modifications of nature assume the status of transmutations. As in art or exhibitive query, so in the other modes of query. The more interrogative the pursuit, the more challenging and precarious the transmutation. Or conversely, the greater the project of transmutation, the greater the intricacy of query.

The idea of contrivance as interrogative must necessarily be strange to those who think of questioning as a process nonexistent outside the sphere of grammar. "Putting questions to nature" has become an acceptable version of scientific investigation. But if we go this far away from the limits of conventional speech, we can not abstain from recognizing the interrogative character of other modes of query; for they illustrate the same process in other guises. The initial obstacle to this recognition comes from what seems to be a basic difference between science and other forms of invention. When science puts its questions to nature, there are answers. What "answers" are there in nonscientific products? It is clear, however, that the answers to scientific questions are no more literally "given" or "sup-

plied" by nature than the questions are "put." What we call an "answer" is an assertive form of production that results from a type of experience peculiar to science. It results from the deliberative assimilation and deliberative manipulation of nature that we call scientific inquiry. An answer is the fulfillment of a certain type of productive experience. In nonassertive types of productive experience there is a similar transition from an indecisive to a decisive state—from an interrogative state to an ordered growth of judgment. We do not give the completed product the name of "answer," but we must recognize its determinative function in a process of production. The architect of a house questions the available possibilities and resolves his alternatives exhibitively. He interrogates primarily through contriving rather than primarily through formulating. The poet seeks verbal combinations and devises verbal combinations. His devising is part of his seeking. The progress of his query depends upon the relative appeasement of such interrogation. Exhibitive query is thus internally interrogative, as inquiry is: seeking, and fulfilling the quest, is part of a methodical process of judgment, which culminates in something definitive. A product of art, taken as a whole, may also have an interrogative function over and above that inherent in its original production. It may stimulate query in others, either in renewed relation to it or in the direction of a new product. It may also function, not merely exhibitively as a work of art, but as an action with an interrogative value. Thus the play staged by Hamlet has the effect of interrogating his stepfather. When the king rises, "frighted with false fire," he par-

tially completes an "answer" to a question exhibitively posed.

Can we speak of active query, as we can of assertive and exhibitive query? Organized moral action is query. For better or worse, and unlike inquiry and art, it is seldom termed a "discipline." The conditions constituting query in doing are the same as for the other modes of judgment: the augmentation in experience of the role of doing, the increased risk in its consummation, its challenge to resourcefulness, the multiplication of the alternatives facing it, the greater rigor of its choices. Traditionally, methodical conduct is conduct informed by reflection. With this as it stands there can be no argument. The errors lie in the intellectualized version of reflection. Reflection is supposedly the mental forerunner of action: for is not theoretical science more fundamental than practical science, and does not mind, high up and farseeing, survey the field before bidding the organism to act? If such compounds of truth and confusion are to be escaped, the study of query must take a different approach. For the moment it is necessary to point out that if inquiry and art inform action, action informs them as well. An action has both an effect and a quality. Art, science, and philosophy are (at least) protracted action, and they each subdivide into habits and techniques of action. Action as such, it is commonly believed, does not question; it simply occurs and exists. But this is an error. We question as much by our actions as by our words. The perspectives which give interrogative power to actions also give interrogative power to words. What we do in a given instance may challenge the stability or value of our pres-

ent situation, suspend an aspiration, create a pair of alternatives for someone else, impose demands and conditions—and in general, by active commentary on present existence, complicate the future course of utterance in any mode. We are never, to be sure, actors purely and simply; but then, neither are we ever discoursers or contrivers purely and simply.

Are assertive and active query processes of transmutation, no less than exhibitive query? The answer, which is yes, requires us to abandon the crude view that we affect the characters of existence only when we order bits of matter. Material orderings are, no doubt, inevitable in all judgment. Action of any kind, methodical or not, eventuates in some altered complex, and the signs utilized by assertion are tangible marks, sounds, or structures, the combinations of which constitute changes in at least the outer crust of fact. But the technologic aspects of judgment, whether of this rudimentary kind or whether concatenated and magnified by query, are not the key to all transmutation. We can transmute an environment by adopting a new opinion about it, or by avoiding a pattern of behavior within it. The transmutation in these cases may be effected regardless of whether we can designate some specific state or "form" in which it is said officially to consist. It may be the order of our ideas or of our habits, and their persistency or flexibility, which are transmuted. These are facts of nature, even as skyscrapers and drained marshes are; and accordingly they are not occurrences "within" query, any more than skyscrapers and marshes are "outside" it. What is transmuted, however it be transmuted, is neither "outside" nor "inside" the domain of query.

The said and the done are thus no different in natural status from the made, and are neither greater nor less than it is in transformative power. Both the occurrence and the degree of transmutation depend not at all on the mode of judgment but on the substance and circumstances of a given judgment, whatever its mode. Saying, doing, and making are equal as forces of history. But the irony of history, consisting in the chance intersections of judgment, looms large in determining the magnitude of effects. Much has been wrought by the unintended results of an act, by the adventitious responses to a work of art, and by the sheer deductive expansion of a sentence.

ii

Query is so often collaborative and communal, it flourishes so frequently under conditions of social intercourse, that we can easily overlook the similarity of such conditions to those prevailing in individual or reflexive query. The individual, though he may confront his alternatives of judgment simultaneously, deals with them successively. As interrogator, he must furnish his own provisional "answers" or further structuralizations of judgment. He is therefore necessarily engaged in a process of communication, reflexive communication. As Royce put it, he is always mediating between a self that was and a self that will be. Philosophers occasionally concede the fact of "self-communication" by imagining that a man might keep a diary, or that an artist might be the spectator of his own work in progress. Fortunately, the human individual is more complex. Reflexive communication is scarcely an accident. Though

the process has received recognition from philosophers, it has not received its just due. Plato, Peirce, and Royce have intellectualized it, and portrayed it as a kind of dialogue carried on in the mind. Mead has biologized it, and left it, for all his valuable analysis, an inscrutable succession of animal postures.

Query, whether collaborative or not, presupposes reflexive communication. It is the interrogative spirit methodically directed. As the most powerful force making for civilization, it has been invested with an air of mystery, largely because significant insight and invention are not beholden to previous rule even in accepting it freely. The term "imagination" is often associated with methodical activity that minimizes system or regularity of procedure and emphasizes spontaneity or unexpected perception. It is a good term that has become broader with age and that has the merit of being universally congenial. It is not a very adequate approximation to the notion of query. But as "invention" suggests the *terminus ad quem,* "imagination" suggests the *terminus a quo* of query. At its highest and deepest it is what Plato described as divine madness. Centuries of philosophic attention have made it out to be an "operation" or "power"—mediating between sensibility and thought, for instance; or, by some strangely arbitrary and exclusive allocation, underlying invention in art. Currently it is in a democratic stage, being applicable less to lunatics, lovers, and poets and more to advertising executives. And yet the chief obstacle to the understanding of query is not the view that query can be dragged into the world but the view that its domicile must be mind. The locution which

vaguely herds all disciplines into "inquiry" refers with consistent vagueness to "the things of the mind." From this it is a short step to either of two mischievous consequences: one, the feeling common among philosophers that art, not being properly inquiry, is not truly interrogative; the other, the feeling that art, being necessarily the work of mind, is "truth" in some different and perhaps higher sense, a deeper form of assertion.

A variant of this second view is the position of Dewey, that art is thought, but not thought that uses words or verbal signs. It is thinking "in terms of relations of qualities," [17] "qualitative thought." There is a "logic of artistic construction." There are certain works of art (presumably not worthy of the name) "in which parts do not hang together and in which the quality of one part does not reinforce and expand the quality of every other part. But this fact is itself a manifestation of the defective character of the thought involved in their production. It illustrates by contrast the nature of such works as are genuine intellectual and logical wholes. In the latter, the underlying quality that defines the work, that circumscribes it internally, controls the thinking of the artist; his logic is the logic of what I have called qualitative thinking." [18]

It is certainly not easy to discover what is the basis for determining whether the parts of a work of art "hang together," nor indeed what this expression implies. What is it that binds together the "parts" of Bach's *St. Matthew Passion?* It cannot be the Scriptural history, for this is present in other comparable scores that are more "defective" in qualitative thought. Which of the many qualities of a work is the "underlying quality

that defines the work"? It has been said of certain artistic products, for instance *Hamlet* or *Remembrance of Things Past,* that they are excessively diffuse and that their parts "do not hang together." Whether or not they are "genuine intellectual and logical wholes," they dwarf most works to which such an attribute is commonly applied. Vast and not easily patterned complexities, repetitiousness, and abundance of what are, "logically" speaking, gratuitous ingredients are characteristic of many great works of art. It is simply not true, in these works, that the quality of one part "reinforces and expands the quality of every other part." In other great works such a description may be said to be more meaningful and apt. But in these cases it is scarcely illuminating to say that the mutual enhancement of the parts derives from their constituting a "logical whole." Thus in compound products like Vivaldi's Opus 8 or Handel's Opus 6, which consist of twelve "parts" (concerti) each of which is further divisible into parts, it could easily be maintained, on the loose criterion in question, that the opus is less of a "logical whole" than is each concerto, the concerto in itself being relatively more determinate as a form than a group of different concerti. Yet in neither case can one maintain that any of the individual concerti possesses the compelling magnificence of the twelve in sequence. Whatever "logical wholeness" may mean for a work of art, the qualities of the total product remain what they are; the criterion seems to be quite irrelevant as a clue to value. For, in general, to subsume contrivance under thought is covertly to impose a scientific model on all purposive production. The adjective "qualita-

tive" turns out to be far less fundamental than the "thinking" that it modifies. Insidiously, inquiry persists as the normative framework of all ordered judgment, inference or calculation as the mode of all interconnection, and warranted assertion as the standard of all consummated utterance. Any work of art, and in general any product of query, necessarily has some kind of unity, and probably various kinds. It has at least the kind of unity that permits the identification of it as *a* work. But the conception of unity in such terms as "hanging together," based on the assumption of "intellectual" unity as the norm, seriously oversimplifies the nature of query, and the nature of artistic query in particular.

Reflexive communication, and query, which is its systematization, are processes into any instance of which each or all of the modes of judgment can enter. Exhibitive and active judgment are not posterior to assertive. Their role and efficacy is the same, and their relative prominence is dependent upon the type of query. If we recognize three actual modes of judgment, we shall do well to recognize three corresponding types of process in which each respectively is potential. The physicist's concepts are assertive in the producing no less than in the product. Works of art, as exhibitive products, spring from exhibitive processes. Political decisions are acts fathered by a course of political action. Abstracting, exhibitive shaping, and acting are thus names of a natural history preceding purposive judgment, not merely descriptions after the fact. The probing and the creating are in the same mode as the product. But the complexity of query is indicated by a

consideration corollary to this. Once it is seen that not only the artistic product but artistic query is exhibitive, and that action and assertion likewise emerge from active and assertive query when they emerge from query at all, it is also seen to be unlikely that any enterprise of query is in *only one* mode of judging.

The interrogative character of reflexive query means that the individual hovers between alternative and choice, between selection and evaluation. The sayer is both pleader and arbiter; the doer, both actor and manager; the maker, both artisan and critic. But to some extent the sayer acts and shapes, the doer shapes and pleads, the maker pleads and acts. In each instance of query there is a chain of judgment. The mathematician's and physicist's chain is primarily inferential; but the exhibitive phase of their query consists in the role which conceptual organization plays for them as organization. To such organization are customarily applied predicates like elegance, economy, grandeur, and precision. The musician's chain of judgment is primarily a series of groupings, of alternative successions of sound, dramatically represented, competing for election; but the assertive phase of his query may consist in speculation about the length of phrase or movement, in calculation about total or partial effect and location of musical accent, or in historical awareness of the role of what he is contriving. Query by the educational administrator may consist in a chain of observations, studies, conflicts, interviews, and conferences, all of these being actions subordinate to a single, planned active enterprise; but assertive and exhibitive elements

abound, the latter for instance in the effect on him of the order of the curriculum, the hierarchy of rank, and the academic organization.

In each of these instances of query the constituent processes are more fluid, more protracted, more diffuse, and more contingent than schematic representation can indicate. We are inclined to regard instances of query as demarcated and homogeneous—as occupying the period between sitting down at a desk and getting up. Neat and easily apprehensible situations are much more congenial to the desiccated labels of epistemology than instances that are of unchartable duration, or that are not professionally classifiable, or that are halting and ungainly by the canons of good measurement. Query, however, occurs in life, not in the head or in the throat. Francis Bacon speaks of those who "in the promiscuous liberty of search have relaxed the severity of inquiry." [19] Locke, on the contrary, as though reminding us that the ideal of inquiry does not obliterate its nature and natural history, perceives the relation of the species to the genus: "For all reasoning is search, and casting about." [20] Inquiry, being a form of query, is a form of search; Bacon notwithstanding, "the severity of inquiry" actually presupposes "the promiscuous liberty of search." If reasoning or inquiry is one form, query is the equivalent of "search and casting about."

Coarse in texture as the typical instance of query is, the texture of its unsystematic context, reflexive communication in general, is far coarser. The path of unplanned probing is one of recurrent antitheses and reversals. The individual's "questionings" are tangled

masses of questionings, so that in practice the disentanglement of intent is fully as fundamental as its fulfillment. The sequences of judgment are much more heterogeneous than in the least systematic cases of query: exhibitive, assertive, and active judgments may succeed one another and influence one another in ungovernable pattern. In ordinary intercourse, unaware of this fact, we express astonishment when a person is unable to "explain himself," or when a person of great attainments in one field shows off to disadvantage in another of quite simple scope. We expect the person who cannot "explain" to articulate himself solely in the assertive mode, and we expect the person of eminence to articulate himself in any mode at all. The "failure" in each instance springs precisely from the irregularity no less than the complexity of human experience and hence of the communicative process. The unpredictable junctions of thinking, contriving, and acting may eventuate effectively or ineffectively, so far as human attainment is concerned; but either way, their mutual intimacy and proximity is the rule rather than the exception in the human animal.

It is necessary to guard against characterizing the interrogative situation as the "problematic" situation. The philosopher, the artist, and the common man, it is often said, have their distinctive problems. But the notion of problem continues to be too much influenced by the particular form of interrogative process exemplified in scientific method. "Indeterminacy" may be better than "problem" as a name for the generic situation that is to be altered by the process of communication. Yet "indeterminacy," too, suggests a dilemmatic

urgency that awaits mitigation, as if in all cases a bad state needed to be replaced by a good one. When Peirce spoke of doubt-succeeded-by-belief as the appeasement of disquiet, he was definitely speaking in a framework of assertive judgment. Reflexive communication, and query in particular, may or may not be characterized by such urgency—even where the mode of assertive judgment predominates. Reminiscence, for example, may be pursued with detail and good order, and with sharp discrimination of qualities and relations, yet with no sense of the need to solve or resolve anything. Even the consideration of prospects may be attended by no "problem" in the plausible philosophic acceptations of the term. The process of interrogation is a process of discovery bred by probing, but not at all necessarily a movement toward belief or an investigation of fact. The choice and rejection of alternatives is intrinsic to the consummation of a product; but pursuing a problem is only one way of confronting alternatives and only one way of consummating a product. Reflexive communication, then, is not limited to the play of doubt and belief, and the interrogative spirit is not limited to the regulation of doubt and belief; and it is for this reason that query is not limited to inquiry. Nor is the interrogative spirit an emotion or "a state of mind"; it is a trait predicable of the individual. Of course, an impoverished conception of the individual and an unsatisfactory analysis of experience will make any integral predicate seem artificial. But the theory of the judging individual needs to be perfected, and the comfort of the philosophic rubrics needs to be avoided. For what is more vulnerable, less illuminative of fact,

than the versions of knowledge, method, or conduct that are frozen by superannuated philosophic perspective?

iii

The natural history of a product of query, like any other natural history, has its "stages." Each specimen inevitably deviates from regularity because of its relative uniqueness, and the stages themselves admit of indefinitely numerous variations. An instance of query can be arresting in its apparent perfection of growth, like a classic of scientific reasoning, or tortuous and convoluted, like a strategy of social betterment. Nothing is more typical than for the producer to legislate norms of production, to swell his idiosyncrasy into law, unless it be the urge toward the schematization of query, felt by the historian and the philosopher. Themselves immersed in query, the historian and philosopher try to detach their perception from the factual accidents of query. But both the vanity of the producer who writes himself large and the formalizing tendency of the philosopher who sees all things as small are invaluable. The one augments the accumulated experience of query, while the other peers into its structure. The pitfall of the philosopher lies in the selection of his models of query. Since he cannot be omnivorous, he necessarily thinks in terms of what appear to be the fullest manifestations of a process. Thus it is common for the analyst of scientific method to think mainly in terms of physics, and it is the notorious practice of the writer on aesthetics to exaggerate the testimony of the visual arts. Students of invention are prey to two extreme portrayals of the

process. In one it emerges as a lordly passage from Insight to Labor to Consummation; in the other, as a hellish agony that bursts eventually into a Miracle.

"Insight," "inspiration," and "intuition" are names for characteristic events within the span of the interrogative temper, which precedes these events in its being and persists after they vanish. The interrogative temper is more akin in its nature to hunger than to puzzlement. It cannot itself be regarded as a stage of query. Query is rather the activation of it in a given direction. Now one important aspect of this activation is what may be called the spoliative factor in query. We described query as the methodical ramification of judgment. The ancient analogy of the branching of a tree may be usefully elaborated. The new branch is continuous with an older and larger one, as an enterprise of query is with society and other complexes of nature. It is genuinely new, quantitatively and qualitatively, however minor or inconspicuous it may be; and in its fresh substantiality it deviates from an initial direction, it imposes a weight, it expands ruthlessly against adjacent growth. It crowds the world a little more, consuming what might not have been consumed. It is a natural complex to be reckoned with in any question of harmonizing things. A project of query is spoliative in its impact, for in adapting to the world it causes much of the world to adapt to it, and there is no reconciliation without some diminution of existing values. The grander project of query is more analogous to the clearing of a wood, which leaves brush in its wake. The fact that the order which emerges is a desirable one does not retract the spoliation. The interrogative break

from the status quo is more than a rejection or departure. It is violence toward habitual acts, ideas, or forms. It is an inherent fact of disregard, sapping the self-sufficiency of the present.

Not in its impact alone is query spoliative but in its total progress and effects. It restricts and grooves action and thought as much as it adds to them. It guides and illuminates, but it also enjoins, prohibits, and coerces. It reverses trends which have been long in the building. It perplexes men, robs them of their peace, multiplies the problems of their absorbing an environment reflectively. But spoliation through query is in itself neither a pejorative nor a eulogistic notion, being comparable in this respect to catabolism in the physiology of the individual, or to the consumption of food. Sooner or later, a project of query becomes circumscribed. The world resists and the inventive individual fears overextension of the interrogative temper. Hence the spoliative factor in query is harnessed. Query can no more be entirely spoliative than it can be entirely free of spoliation. The individual who would be wholly interrogative would not possess the interrogative spirit at all, for his judgments would be discontinuous. Chronic negativity, paralysis of preference, actually never inaugurates query. A sharp distinction must be drawn between such impotence and the procedures of classical skepticism or of Socratic investigation. Query with suspension of explicit preference as its result is not to be confused with suspensiveness that inhibits query. Skepticism was a tradition of relentless inquiry into specific concepts of knowledge, certainty, belief, truth, definition, evidence, and conduct. Its course of

query was determinately, almost uncannily, channeled; and the particular content of its recurrent conclusions never obstructed its character as an enterprise. The Socratic method is indeed a *method,* the very antithesis of timorous caution. Its boldness of movement can never be clear to those who think of the Platonic dialogues as a mass of astute but noncommittal propositions. For it renders its products not by simple affirmation but assertively, exhibitively, and actively, in subtle proportions. It is in a sense the paragon of query, being masterful in all the modes of judgment.

There is an intimate relation in query between spoliation and contribution. The relation emerges when we begin to consider what is entailed by the contributive factor. The ingredients of a product arise from the inventive selection of possibilities. The interrogative individual is the one who is the better able to see what the possibilities are, to discriminate carefully among them, and to concretize those which are congenial to him. The means by which men engage possibilities and distinguish them are of course multifarious, and it is a mistake to suppose that in query the lines can ever be perfectly clear-cut or wholly visible. This fact has led some to believe that true query is irresistible: once the first step occurs, the march toward invention is fated and the possibilities never retard the actualities. However this may be, there always are alternatives to any step in invention, and it is mainly because query has so often been simplifiedly portrayed in the interests of idealization that we think of real alternatives as available to us only after the fact. We know from both direct testimony and critical study that the alternatives

in query can strike the individual with overwhelming profusion or can be recalcitrant and unwelcome. But whether they are peripheral and shadowy or obstinately intrusive, they must be reduced. Contribution requires that some alternatives be obliterated, suppressed. There must be as it were a spoliation of the possible, a preemption of what is to be. The decisiveness necessary for movement in query prescribes ruthlessness; for in all choice there is some brute arrival at the relative end.

Spoliation of what is not yet actual appears at first blush to be a self-contradictory notion. But it is not. In the first place, possibilities are themselves actual data for the individual in so far as he is engaged in query. They are possibilities for him, and may not be for anyone else, owing to the relational complex in which he is located. In the second place, to despoil manyness in favor of oneness is to influence the world of those who are not engaged in query, those who stand to assimilate what emerges from query. The possibilities rejected or suppressed by the individual are lost to those for whom they were once possibilities by indirection. For example, in the query-situation of political action and deliberation, certain social changes are possibilities for those who comprise the community of query and therefore exercise the power of choice. These are directly available to the latter and indirectly available to the community at large. When the possibilities are rejected, when they are negated by alternative action or opinion, a contraction, a loss, a spoliation of the possible has taken place. The loss may be good or bad in its specific effect, but this does not alter the metaphysics of query and its factors. In some instances of query spoliation of

the possible is far greater than spoliation of the actual. Typifying the latter process, ethical or anthropological query may almost literally take away existing popular complacence. A great work of individual art, on the other hand, may be indifferent in its actual spoliative effect on habits of feeling, thought, or action. It may not have the type of impact on previous artistic traditions that a positive product of science may have on the standing of previous scientific products: it may have no power of negation or reversal. Its inherent power may lie solely in the manner by which a consummated character was wrought for it; or what is the same, in the exclusion, by the producer, of forms that the product might have taken. The indirect effects of this power may be the determination of future public taste, the conditioning of disciples, and the contribution to a culture of its representative character. Such traits should not be generalized to apply to all manifestations of exhibitive query. The builder of an industrial empire, who has thereby contrived an order compelling to him, may in the process profoundly diminish the lives of those to whom the same order is oppressive. In this complex instance of query, entailing an interrelation of all modes of judgment and yielding what functions in one perspective as an exhibitive product of vast proportions, the determination of what might have been, however great, is dwarfed by the effect on what is.

It is the contributive phase of query, in abstraction from its necessary union with the spoliative, that one ordinarily associates with the fact of transmutation. Transmutation through query comprises, at its least, an aggregate of complexes (things, symbols, behavioral

relations) ordered over a period of time and made to grow quantitatively. A musical score grows in size, a hypothesis grows through inference, a pattern of conduct integrates acts and relations. But it is a fair question to ask, precisely in what does the nature of contribution consist? Altered order and quantitative increase are not sufficient elements. They could be present in the case of products which are not products of query but only accretive outgrowths, random developments, of the general process of reflexive communication. Somehow in the ordering of his potential product the producer engaged in query arrives at a peculiar kind of relation to it. In his movement toward such a relation consists the contributive factor of query. It is hardly exhausted by his purposive fostering of the product's growth. He might as well foster the growth of another's product. The growing product must evince a value that measures, so to speak, the direction of his query. This value is a partial autonomy acquired by the product. The relation reflected by the autonomy is a relation of compulsion. The product compels the assent of its producer. The producer orders the state of his own subjection. Contribution is thus the manipulation of complexes and possibilities in the direction of assent. The power of the producer expresses itself in the establishment of his product's power. In assertive query contribution aims at compulsion by evidence; in exhibitive query, at a qualitative whole which needs no alteration; in active query, at a situation which is tenable.

Compulsion of the producer by the product is not a relation that obtains unaccountably. Nor is the quest

of this relation a symptom of self-abnegation. It is plain, to begin with, that the complexes with which query initially functions are something less than completely docile. They have determinate traits prior to their role in production. This is most obvious in the case of the persons, customs, and situations that form the data of active query. The likely recalcitrance of these materials antecedently circumscribes the purview of human conduct; it serves as an initial compulsion. If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, one reason is that intentions can rarely be consummated with any degree of perfection. In exhibitive query the recalcitrance of the original materials turns out to be equally great. The properties of movements, metals, words, colors, tones, though more directly accessible in a spatial sense, become the more inimical in proportion as the enterprise is deeper and greater. Unlike the technologist, the artist is confronted by a difficult communicative relation to persons; from the beginning, regardless of his resolves, he contends with the limitations of human discernment and the particular climate of social receptivity. The process of shaping, needless to say, is not confined to the production of poems, pictures, or sonatas; the shaping of towns, religious policies, and educational patterns reckons with individuals and their habits. The same individuals and habits, as the subject matter of inquiry, rather successfully elude the instruments of valid assertion, as the experience of the social sciences testifies. Nature yields its configurations stingily, paradoxically resisting the quest for the evidential compulsion that it ultimately enforces.

That the individual should seek to be compelled by his own product is no more strange than that he should wish to be governed by governors of his choice or by rules of his making. It is sometimes said of a diplomat that he is "complete master of the situation," or of an artist that he is "complete master of his materials." Such an account would be amusing if it were less vague and less pathetic. Complete mastery of the elements in query would terminate interrogation and stultify consummation of the product. The product is always part master of the producer, because it embodies in itself the outcome of all his activity, all that he has invested it with throughout the process of query. Unlike his product, he, at any one time, is unequal to the sum of all his time. His arrival at the state of assent is recognition of the fact that his query has been cumulative and efficacious. It is recognition of the fact that his product can transcend, in substance and in power, the circumstances of its birth.

iv

The complex judgment that we call a product of query passes, at its completion, from a reflexive community to a social community; or, if truly a collaborative product, from a smaller to a larger social community. In query it is not possible to be possessive. The greater the general availability of the product, the greater the fulfillment of query. A product becomes available when it functions to any extent in the apparatus of judgment that belongs to others than its producer. There is a traditional way of identifying this situation. Philosophers and critics have asked whether a product "communi-

cates." Legitimate as this formulation may be, it inclines to be misleading. It is more significant to ask whether a product is a datum in communication. The former question suggests the product on one side, individuals on the other, and an effluence traveling from one to the other provided that the product has the force to propagate it and men have the capacity to receive it. Or when this question in a special form asks whether a work of art communicates, it seems to assume that there exists in such a product a code which must be deciphered. The more important consideration is whether a work of art, or any judgment whatever, has entered a community of utterance—that is to say, whether it stimulates action, whether it is just absorbed, or whether it engenders further query and invention. The typical question (whether a product communicates) tends, among other things, to take it for granted that an assertive burden is immanent in the product. But we may not legitimately expect an exhibitive product to account for itself assertively. Nor may we expect communication apart from a community.

When a product becomes a datum of social communication, it achieves only the first step in its journey to the promised land. For it may persist merely as a name or as an event, as an entity recognized to exist but unable to flourish. Despite its nominal completion, its resources may remain dormant, and the reason for its persistence may be some accidental condition of its impact. Most products of query, whether from their own feebleness or from the unkindness of existence and history, disappear from living communication or sink into the limbo of a small insular community. The most

favorable destiny for a product (subject even then, as it will appear, to the ironies of communication) is to be articulated. "Interpretation," as we call it, is all that a product aspires to; but articulation, which implies something more, is what it deserves. For the present purpose it is useful to distinguish these two notions. When a product is articulated it is *ipso facto* interpreted; that is, conditions and traits pertinent to its being are introduced, beyond those which are directly apparent in it. But the product itself is also in some sense extended. We do more than help to bring it into our ken or our experience, as we do in merely interpreting it. We also directly affect its character as a product. Usually it is what is produced, and not nature at large, that we would be said to articulate; nature we simply interpret. Nature interpreted is, to be sure, nature modified, to the extent that interpretation is one more natural trait added to a company of traits. What is interpreted (the company of traits encompassed) has entered into the new and larger natural relation objectively constituted by the process of interpreting. Whether in this sense the interpreted natural complex is also necessarily "extended," and therefore "articulated," may be left to verbal resolution. There are, in any case, certain facts of nature, such as human perspective, or events of human history, which we shall later wish to regard as subject to articulation. Perspective is inevitable in production, being related to the product through the general process of experiencing.

Any instance of query, simply as query, is articulative. Whether we speak of "query" or of "articulation" we are speaking of the process of ramifying judgments.

Articulation as such is far more pervasive, for it occurs unsystematically as well as systematically, and it is applicable to all products whether results of query or not. But when we say that a given judgment is ramified by query, we emphasize mainly its union with other judgments in a more complex structure; and when we say that the judgment is ramified by articulation we emphasize mainly the detection or augmentation of its own substance or the exploitation of one of its potentialities. The function of query is to utilize a given judgment as means to a greater or at least newer end; the function of articulation is to actualize more fully either that judgment or an aspect of it. Articulation of a product of query is necessary for the continuing consummation of query. Though at bottom it is an elemental and informal process in human experience, articulation becomes, when systematized, that type of query which, directly or indirectly, effects deliverance of a product conventionally said to be completed.

Articulation in particular and interpretation in general are good, because they further the availability, and hence the assimilability and controlment, of the product of query. Nothing in the universe, and certainly no human product however modest, is wholly possessible or assimilable here and now, nor exhaustible so long as time and communication multiply its contexts. To articulate a product is to manipulate it for the sake of realizing it. There is no imperative that forbids or excludes innocent and noninventive response. But we do not necessarily fulfill or realize a product when we accept it. We begin to articulate when encounter with the product generates communication, reflexive or so-

cial, that is insistently centered upon it. Piety to a significant product consists in gaining from it without violating it, as fruit is gained, repeatedly, from a tree. It is good—it is necessary, both for the fructification of meaning and for valid appraisal—to articulate any product: formal appraisal cannot precede the conditions of formal appraisal, nor meaning the conditions of meaningfulness. But although the process of articulation as such is a good, specific instances of it may be of dubious worth. They may obfuscate the whole of a product in favor of a part, or the best of its parts in favor of a dogmatic emphasis on unity. Both in the occasions of its practice and in the pursuit of its purpose, articulation is much subject to chance. It may transmit to a community a product that is to be assimilated as carrion is assimilated. It may, on the other hand, transmit a product that, in consequence of this office, inspires new articulations by new successions of communities. At its worst, as in much that passes for "criticism," it is a technique of self-aggrandizement by the critic at the expense of the product. At its best, it not only realizes the product (whatever this may hold in store for the product's fate) but makes it the basis of fresh query and invention. Whether in the form of everyday completion of meaning, or in the form of commentative criticism, or in the form of independent query bearing on a previous product, its relative sufficiency may be great or small.

The fact that articulation can take a great many forms is of philosophic importance. Common parlance, though it stretches its own "literal" usage by moderate analogy, nevertheless limits the notion of articulation

to verbal language and assertion: to say that a man is articulate is to say that he can express himself in language with force and effect, that his ideas (not merely his syllables) are distinct. But in this conception, as in so many others (witness "utterance," which precedes "articulation"), common parlance encompasses more than it consents officially to mean. If "bringing out clearly" (the nominal function of articulation) can be stretched from syllables to ideas, it can be stretched without strain to any form of "expression." Now an analogy directs our attention to structural traits that lie embedded in the meanings we employ. The reason why these traits are embedded and not all "there" on the surface is that our meanings are ways in which we are related to the complexes of nature, including the perspectives and products of men. What we mean is partially hidden for the simple reason that our ties with existence extend far beyond the conditions of any present usage and any present action. In any situation we always mean more than we intend to mean, though never as much as we might mean. Thus, after we initially associate "articulateness" with "clarity" and "distinctness," we soon discern that what originally satisfy these criteria in the form of sequential and discrete elements (sounds, ideas) satisfy them better when they are fluent and voluminous. Separate and individually perfect elements may be poorly adapted to *total* clarity. Only at first blush is fluency incongruous with distinctness. For the notion of distinctness, like the notion of articulateness that it is designed to explicate, itself needs more discerning construction. The criteria, then, need broadening no less than do the means of satisfy-

ing the criteria. Yet even further, the more essential criteria need to be distinguished from the less essential. Articulation is indeed a bringing out, a deliverance; but the forms of deliverance are perceived to be many. The traits that at first seem essential to all articulation—"distinctness," "clarity," and the like—are essential only to certain of its forms and are quite irrelevant to others. When we speak of the producer within the process of query as articulating his own incomplete product in the direction of completion, the exact form of deliverance is of fairly small moment as compared with the ultimate character of the product. When we speak of another, however, as articulating the same product in the direction of a fullness greater than that of the "completed" original, the form of deliverance is less easily separable from the character of its result.

In all cases, something is drawn from the product by articulation. A concealed element is exposed, an inconspicuous element is magnified, a fertile element is preserved; something is deemed unsatisfactory—reason enough for reducing it in emphasis or for giving it great emphasis. The purposive life of man is a continuous cycle of judgment and articulation. We found that judgments in one mode can interrelate with and abet those in another, and that actually they are difficult to dissociate from one another in any train of reflexive communication. It is evident, then, and easily discoverable in practice, that the articulation of a product need not be in the same dominant mode of judgment as the product. We can articulate a historical situation by a drama, and a drama by formal criticism; a building by a verbal analysis of its functions or by

the systematic use of it over a period of time; an epic by a mural painting; a religious dogma by a poem; a pattern of action by a legal trial; a cultural complex by a philosophic system; a philosophic system by philosophic criticism, by another philosophic system, by sociological inquiry, by a novel, by the pursuit of a moral ideal. With respect to a given product, alternative modes of articulation are hardly comparable, except by the criterion of general satisfactoriness or unsatisfactoriness in the result. One mode cannot be normatively prescribed; it can only be chosen. There is no ultimate mode of articulation.

The effect of articulation on a product of query may be more or less spoliative, more or less contributive. This fact springs not from the temperament of the articulator but from the more fundamental fact that query as such is spoliative and contributive, and that these attributes are interrelated. The interrelation comprehends numberless patterns of articulation. The most instructive, methodologically, are exemplified by the work of men whose inventive stature is similar to the stature of those whom they articulate. A rough and partial categorization, not without overlapping, suggests that some articulations amplify a product, some attenuate a product, some challenge and modify but preserve a product, some "translate" a product into another mode of utterance. For instance, Bach, writing partly in the style of Buxtehude and partly in a style unique to himself, exhibitively articulates the collective product of another. His work merges the two styles in a product of great diversity and volume, and the art of Buxtehude is newly defined by its relation to the

art of Bach. Bach has amplified the work of a predecessor in the sense that he has used it in his own query as a factor making for the consummation of his structure. Likewise, but with important qualifications in the comparison, Newton amplifies the work of Galileo, utilizing it in a construction of greater generality. In both cases, the earlier product is one of the conditions of the value and magnitude of the later. In both cases, the new product results partly from an articulation of the older one. But the two types of amplification differ significantly, owing to general differences inherent in the nature of art and science, and to specific differences contingent on the process of individual query. After Bach, and indeed after the entire history of later music, Buxtehude's total product remains unique in a sense that Galileo's does not. The physics of Newton suffices, at the time of its achievement, without that of Galileo, whereas in the case of the two artists the parallel characterization would be nonsense. Newton "absorbs" Galileo in a sense different from that in which Bach "absorbs" Buxtehude. For if a great part of what Bach could do, Buxtehude could not, a great part of what Buxtehude could do, Bach could not. In both the artistic and scientific cases considered solely as articulations, the later product helps to fulfill or realize the earlier. But the later musical product only actualizes a potentiality of the earlier, while the later scientific product absorbs the whole burden of its predecessor as means to an end, to an end identical for each. The earlier musical product persists in a type of autonomy that ceases to belong to the earlier product of science.

Opposite, in significant respects, to the articulation which amplifies is that which attenuates. An example is the relation of Hume's *Treatise* to Locke's *Essay*. Many of the Lockean themes and problems recur in Hume, but the range of the *Essay* and the peculiar suggestiveness it engenders are absent. The articulation consists in a far more intensive pursuit of some of the themes, and in a contraction of speculative tolerance, at the cost of a far less intensive pursuit of other themes. Directly, then, in his concentration of some of Locke's analyses, and indirectly in his abstention from some of Locke's interests, Hume clarifies the bearing and helps to define the perspective of Locke. The attenuation of the *Essay* actually promotes the deliverance of that product and makes uniquely possible a great new product. Merely in the office of historical articulator, Hume does more for the subsequent understanding of Locke than the latter's contemporary line-by-line commentators are able to do. This form of articulation is not in all respects opposite to that which amplifies. Like Bach, Hume "absorbs" some and not all of a given predecessor. And like Bach, he actualizes certain potentialities; these he truly amplifies. Bach's amplification is the ingestion of traits into a great horn of plenty; Hume's is the microscopic enlargement of traits in an austere chamber of inquiry.

There is a type of articulation that is ostensibly a proposal to repudiate or supersede a product and is in effect a preservation of its essence. Calvin, despite his aims, effectively invigorated the Catholic Church by helping to demonstrate the inevitability of certain traits inherent in all churches. Kant, professing a revo-

lution, rendered permanent the grip of British empiricism on the modern philosophic temper. Abstractionism in the visual arts, determined in its innovations, succeeded actually in broadening the apparatus for the assimilation of all visual art. In the realm of active judgment this form of articulation is common. The Republican administration of the early '50s in the United States and the Conservative administration of the early '50s in Britain, both proclaiming reversals of preceding policy, perpetuated the fundamentals of their inheritance. If politicians cannot discern the processes of institutional growth, historians and sociologists can; but the same human processes are articulated actively by the politicians and assertively by the students of society. Since the continuities of government and the commitments of society are more enduring than the purposes of a party, an administration articulates them by its modifications as well as by its direct fulfillments. It transmits basic political judgments to new contexts and promotes the process of social testing.

The "translation" of a product into another mode of judgment articulates by altering the function and status of the product. Thus Aristotle translated Greek drama into a body of definitions and principles; and Italian Renaissance painters, exhibitively probing the Christian legend, lifted it in its newer form out of the reach of dialectical theology. Such articulations reveal the power of a massive product, sometimes compounded of social and individual elements, to pervade human experience; they reveal its insistent presence. To some extent, of course, every instrument of articulation whatever "alters" a function of a product—

every exponent of Christianity, every actor and scholar of Shakespeare, every critic of Hegel, every experimentalist, every town planner, every practitioner of political democracy. Translation into another mode, however, is distinctive enough to be regarded as preeminently alterative of function, in the present sense. What is perhaps more important, ultimately, than the differences between the species of articulation is the difference between the lesser and the revolutionary instances of articulation, whatever the species. The greatest instances of articulation are extremely like and extremely unlike what they articulate. It is impossible not to be impressed, in reading Aristotle, by how much of a Platonist he is and how much of a non-Platonist he is, and by how closely these polar traits are fused. The deepest articulation is often the deepest query. It realizes prior query in departure from it: for a product is most truly extended not by fulsome mimicry but by union with new experience.

V

The Greeks, despite some dissension in their midst, enthroned Logos, celebrating the superiority of theoretical to practical and "productive" knowledge. Since Western society had to reckon with Greek philosophy permanently, no school could evade some pronouncement, however implicit, on its attitude toward Discourse. The number of positions became great, and the issues became enormously complex. This was not strange, for as time went on and as the world continued to change its face there could be small consensus on what was being defended and what was being opposed.

The Fourth Gospel, identifying the Logos with God, placed it beyond strife. But since God became man, the Logos became human too, and ceased to be exempt from human scrutiny. In the form of "reason," "knowledge," "science," "language," or "philosophy," it subsequently became the central issue in the foundations of method. Between the rationalists and dialecticians of every shade at the one extreme, and the nihilists and philistines at the other, innumerable gradations developed, fostered partly by abstract speculation and partly by the evolving requirements of religion and politics. Without detailed knowledge of a specific context (and often, unfortunately, with such knowledge) it is difficult nowadays to discover whether an exponent of "reason" opposes it to faith, to experience, to emotion, to intuition, to inconsistency, to coercion, to purposelessness, to irresponsibility, to barbarism, to lawlessness, to authority—or to some one meaning of one of these terms. Positively, he may be defending the efficacy of reasoning, or the attitude of reasonableness, or some form of rationalism. And if, for instance, it is "reasoning" that he is defending, it may be the principle of contradiction that he is thinking of or simply the power of human thought and insight.

The disparagers of "reason" complain in numberless ways, depending on historical conditions. They may hold it to be inadequate in some respect or incomplete in some respect; to be the breeder of impious mischief, the artificer of words that mask "reality," or the merely conventional vehicle of human purposes. They may think of it as an arrogant purveyor of axioms, as sterile formalism, or as an apologetic for natural science. They

may think of it as overlooking, or as threatening to exclude, the affective and instinctive dictates of man, or as crowding out mystical imagination, or as subordinating art to concept and theory. It is hard to link any one position with a vested interest. The personal religionist who finds philosophic speculation cold finds the same coldness in the intricacies of systematic theology. Within natural science there are those who find the scientific method to be effective on the ground that it is deliberately limited in scope, and those who find it to be unlimited in its pertinence to all human experience. Among the men of art, comprising both its practitioners and its philosophers, some see art as fulfilling reason, others see it as transcending reason, still others see it as exposing or humbling reason. Some philosophers are afraid that an appeal to reason breeds too much "metaphysics"; others are afraid that it breeds the wrong kind of metaphysics. The phrase "the limits of human reason" has one type of meaning when applied to Hume or Kant, another when applied to Bergson, still another when applied to certain romanticists or existentialists of this century. There is a great distance between those who find that reason culminates inevitably in blankness, antinomy, or paradox, and those who find reason too prosaic to admit us into the richness of paradox and of nothingness. There is no end, then, to the varieties of fear, pride, and perception.

So great a number of attitudes are not to be mediated by a few phrases: they represent a body of perspectives developed by the stubborn facts of geography, culture, and history, and in general by the forces of nature that

make for individuation. If the central differences are discussable at all, it is in virtue of the saving natural fact that perspectives overlap and can be shared, and that even differences like the foregoing presuppose substantial common ground. What emerges with startling force is that traditionally the tendency has been to identify the processes of reason with the processes of *assertive query*. This tendency applies equally to champions of discourse, to methodological pessimists, and to irrationalists. And it is not in the least corrected by the various historical recognitions of the role of practical wisdom, practical reason, or practical "judgment" as distinguished from the theoretical capacities of man. For practical or moral judgment in these usages is simply assertive judgment about matters of practice and conduct. The difference recognized is not in the mode of judgment but in the interest levels or subject matters with which "judgment" (assertion, discourse) can deal. Practical reason is simply "reason in its practical use," which takes the form, as theoretical reason does, of propositions, postulates, formulations (Kant). Likewise for Dewey: judgments of practice are propositions; they "are not a particular kind of judgment in the sense that they can be put over against other kinds, but are an inherent phase of judgment [i.e., assertion] itself." [21] Thus, "Propositions exist relating to *agenda*—to things to do or be done, judgments of a situation demanding action. There are, for example, propositions of the form: M. N. should do thus and so. . . . And this is the type of judgment I denote practical." For otherwise, "there is a danger that the term will lead us to treat as judgment and knowledge something which is not really

knowledge at all and thus start us on the road which ends in mysticism and obscurantism." [22] One is inclined to ask, in comment on the self-confident conclusion of this last quotation, whether the avenues to knowledge are so distinctly recognizable, indeed so clearly preempted and marked out, that deviations are readily detected. The conclusion, in any case, is facilitated by the restricted or propositional conception of judgment and by the consequent arrogation of knowledge to assertion or inquiry alone.

Thus the problem of reason has been taken too often as the problem of the limits and forms of discourse. It is the problem of how much inquiry can accomplish, and not, unfortunately, of how much or what can be accomplished in different forms of human query. In such a light, it is easier to understand the misgivings of the irrationalists. For, seeing that some processes of human experience and production have a value not owing to inquiry, they become disillusioned with inquiry instead of accepting it as one mode of query. Similarly, the defenders of inquiry and discourse, perceiving products of a nondiscursive character, relegate them to a noncognitive domain or regard them as extrarational and as the potential weapons of obscurantists, instead of accepting them as other modes of judgment or equal manifestations of human utterance. It is not so much that men preoccupied with one domain are unaware of invention in other domains, or even of properties common to the different domains: it is the salient common properties that escape them. Hence the understandable fear on one side of conceding too much to those who may wittingly or unwittingly spread the forces of

darkness; and the fear, on the other, of seeing invention strangled by the exclusive authority of discourse. The attribute of reason must be applicable to the whole of human production and not merely to the forms of talk and thought; to inventive communication in all its forms and not merely to that exemplified by assertive query.

Failure to perceive this accounts for the hopeless impasse in certain philosophic controversies. Consider, for instance, the opposition between two schools each of which has on occasion supposed itself to embody the claims of reason—those who have held that all human judgments are fallible and those who have defended the finality of "intuitive judgments." The former suppose they are keeping the way open for the eternal applicability of reason. The latter suppose they are vindicating the bases on which reason can securely rest. Each school alike implicitly postulates a narrow scope for judgment and therefore a narrow scope for query. Hence one champions the inevitableness of continuing inquiry, while the other champions both the autonomy and superiority of the "immediate" in cognition. With better tools of analysis, the elements of error in each position can be distinctly recognized, and the context of the problem redefined. The fallibilist is wrong in supposing that all judgments can admit of further verification, for only to assertive judgment does the notion of truth and falsity, and therefore of verification, apply. The intuitionist is wrong in supposing that some assertions admit of unmediated or final verification, for we cannot conclusively ascertain the truth of the endless number of possible consequences latent in an assertion. If, on the

other hand, the basic contentions of intuitionists and fallibilists were reformulated, both would be right. The intuitionist would be right if he were understood as denying that continuing *inquiry* is necessary for all *modes* of judgment. The fallibilist would be right if he were understood as affirming that continuing *query,* with its inevitable *articulation,* adds to the discovered substance or meaning of any judgment. The pitfall of some intuitionists is their feeling that if they cannot be granted finality in judgment they must turn away from judgment altogether. Though complete self-sufficiency is not to be attributed to judgment, whatever its mode, independent authority can be attributed to nonassertive judgment. Fallibilists, on their side, seem tied to the feeling that any judgment not susceptible or further susceptible of confirmation and refutation is no judgment at all. Reason, however, is not obstructed where confirmation is irrelevant. The essential process of reason in furtherance of query is articulation, of which confirmation is but one form.

At some time or other everyone has occasion to say, of some particular experience, or some product, that "it cannot be expressed (or described) in words." Of course it can be, no matter what it is. The real question is whether it is useful or desirable or satisfying to do so; and this is determinable only in the case at hand and in the light of numerous considerations. Much less often do people say, of a product or an experience, "it cannot be painted, or danced, or acted out, but only described." And yet, if they did say this, it would be with as little justification. Anything at all can be painted, danced, or acted: the question is, with how

much suitability, appropriateness, or gain? The reason why most people use the former type of comment so much more frequently is that they tacitly attribute primacy to discursive judgment, and are able the better to emphasize the significance of a particular experience by holding that it defies "utterance."

Outside the layman's world a somewhat different emphasis is implied when it is felt by sensitive thinkers that certain experiences are indescribable. Here the assumptions are made, first, with regard to discourse, that it has intrinsic unfitness in relation to certain *types* of experience; and secondly, with regard to such types of experience, that they are of an elevated, supreme character. Actually, anyone at all for whom any type of experience is important can feel the same way, with respect both to language and to that experience—that such an experience is preeminent in human life, and that language fails in just such crucial cases. Any type of experience whatever can under certain conditions be endowed with this privileged status, and in each instance the individual will consider discourse to fail in rendering the quality or gravity of the experience. And, in each instance, he is both wrong and right. The discourse (though itself a form of experience) is not the experience in question, and it is wrong either to expect it to be or to indict it for not being that experience. But it is understandable that the experience as such should be preferred to the discourse, and it is equally understandable that the discourse should be disparaged if it claims to reproduce the experience, which is never actually reproducible except by recurrence. So far as most of the mystics, and especially the

religious mystics, are concerned, what escapes them is the fact that *no* mode of query, discursive or otherwise, if it merits the name of query, is wholly identical with its subject matter; and the fact that no instance of query can be the precise substitute for the actual occurrence of an event or an affective state.

III. EXPERIENCE

Among the circumstances that have impeded a general theory of utterance, one in particular continues to flourish among philosophers. This is the tendency to interpret the principal terms that relate to human processes as naming "operations" of some organ or "acts" stemming from some power, or as reflecting one of two spheres, psychical and physical, supposedly defining the scope of human life. Thus—taking the more defensible instances first—breathing is an activity associated directly with the lungs, somewhat less directly with a respiratory "system," and still less directly but no less unmistakably with body. Remembering is an activity associated directly with a power of imagery and a power of possessing past events, and indirectly but surely with mind. By and large there is nothing wrong with these attributions. Nor is there anything wrong with the mind-body classification simply as a classification. The distinction of mind and body, wholly apart from its various philosophic elaborations, expresses age-old discernment of major factors in individual life. It facilitates the identification of one or another human merit or ill or limitation. It recognizes conflict and separation among human functions. It recognizes qualitative differences of function. The resistance of the psychical and the physical to integral philosophic explanation is at the same time a resistance to mere ingenuity and reductionism.

But like all conceptions equitably based, that which first posits and then in each instance looks for "operations of the mind" and "operations of the body," by its inertia has become overly inflexible and therefore consistently deceiving. One reason for the narrowness of the traditional version of judgment is that it is depicted as an operation of mind—plausible enough, perhaps, when the only other conceived alternative is to make it an operation of body. The notions of thought and inquiry seem harmlessly associated with "the life of the mind," but such an association is woefully inadequate to the notion of query. And the same is true for the notion of "experience." Although in many phases of actual usage this term is not treated exclusively as an operation, since the context of expressions like "human experience" and "the experience of mankind" suggests other factors, there is an almost universal conviction that experience is somehow connected, if not necessarily with "the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory" (Hume), at least in some sense primarily with mind or consciousness or thought or reflection. Even Dewey, who contributed so greatly and lastingly to the correction of exclusively psychologistic conceptions of human life, and who climaxed a fifty-year movement that aimed to introduce biological and social dimensions into the interpretation both of experience and of mind itself, persisted in regarding "thought" or "reflection" as the fullest and most genuine manifestation of "experience." Partly because of a limited conception of judgment and of query, and partly because of difficulties inherent in his version of the relation between experience and nature,

Dewey wavered in his approach to the role of mind in the experiencing process. The typical activities of mind appeared in his view to be the condition for experiencing in a more authentic or more complete sense of the term. Ontologically, however, the process of experiencing, simply as process, can be neither more nor less complete. It either obtains in a natural individual or it does not. What thought or intelligence does bring to completion is a certain moral power in experience. But intelligence as a condition of maximum good in experience is to be distinguished from intelligence as somehow a condition of maximum being in the process. The reason this distinction is blurred in Dewey is that the moral flavor which he assigned to the meaning of "*an* experience" (see section iii of this chapter) also crept into his notion of "experiencing."

Fundamental, to Dewey, is "the contrast between gross, macroscopic, crude subject matters in primary experience and the refined, derived objects of reflection. The distinction is one between what is experienced as the result of a minimum of incidental reflection and what is experienced in consequence of continued and regulated reflective inquiry. For derived and refined products are experienced only because of the intervention of systematic thinking." [23] Again, experience "reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth, and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. That stretch constitutes inference." [24] Now if the culmination of crude or gross experience lay in the process of assertive judgment alone, and if inquiry were the only way of ordering judgment, it would be true that "derived and refined products are experi-

enced only because of the intervention of systematic thinking." If, however, active and exhibitive judgment are taken into account, and if inquiry is seen as only one mode of query, Dewey's position leaves much to be desired. The breadth and elasticity of experience, its "stretch," is much vaster than is indicated by "inference." Inference is the stretch of assertion. It is a phase of articulation and invention, but not a necessary phase. The stretch of experience is multifarious. Moreover, it cannot be limited to production, even when the conception of production, in terms of the modes of judgment, is greatly expanded. What happens to the individual, either in consequence of his judging or over and above it or in spite of it, belongs to the stretch. Those who, like Whitehead in his later work, have wished to broaden the conception of experience without restriction to the traditional purview of mind, have suffered mainly from inability to define their limits. Experience in Whitehead's version overflows the bounds of human life and becomes virtually synonymous with relatedness of any kind among things of any kind. And even then, the ironic consequence is that, though experience is construed as escaping the confines of mind, it does so in a dubious sense, because the categories of mind themselves, as it turns out, have been extended to the whole of nature.

A just conception of experience is essential in the analysis of utterance; for whatever the interpretation given, it seems necessary to say that the products of the individual occur in his experience and come through experiencing, and that these products, which judge in different ways, can only judge what is in some way

experienced, though the judging is itself partly constitutive of the experiencing. If a satisfactory concept of experience is needed for the theory of knowledge, it is doubly needed for the more general or underlying theory of judgment. Yet the facts of judgment must very largely influence the framing of this concept. The process of human experience must fit the facts of human utterance, even though it is not limited to these facts.

The human individual is only one kind of individual, but the kind of which it is meaningful to say that it experiences. Philosophers have written much on the nature of "personal identity." For us it will be sufficient to say that *a* human individual is whatever is identified or denominated as such. The fact that man is characterized by a state of natural debt, by a perpetual incompletion, does not cast doubt on the existence of individuals but emphasizes only the extended nature of individuality, its communicative essence, and the indefinite bounds of its relatedness. At the same time, philosophic restraint and a sense of evidence cautions against the position of Whitehead that "every actual entity [or individual] is present in every other actual entity." [25] Repugnance to the doctrine of disconnected substances need imply not the opposite extreme but the more conservative likelihood that an individual *can* be "present in" other individuals. We require, then, to avoid two positions: that of anthropomorphism, by limiting "experience" to human individuals; and that of the doctrine of internal relations, by not merely admitting degrees of relevance (which Whitehead actually professes to do) but so couching the conception of

experience as to recognize a meaning for irrelevance.

In order the better to understand the group of complex properties that philosophers aim to encompass when they speak of "experience" and "experiencing," we shall in what follows often subordinate these terms or lay them aside, however peculiar such a procedure may seem. For the terms are so laden with a burden of contrary and confused differentia, so encumbered by the hoary banalities which cognate terms like "empiricism" and "empirical" suggest, that a fresh start with superior conceptual equipment is necessary. After reformulation and the delineation of essential traits we may presumably return to the older language with greater control of its usage. In a sense, of course, this older language can be superseded only in a limited way, and cannot be totally abandoned. It remains the language of common sense—even if, as we are too likely to forget, the language of common sense, influenced by standards of literate expression, inevitably reflects some ideational bias. Common sense needs to abstain from qualification, and needs to make its discriminations rough and sure, if it is to make possible elementary human intercourse and the business of simple existence. The identifications it makes in nature are not like sharpshooting, which risks failure in behalf of higher stakes, but like the broadside, more secure if less exact.

In so far as philosophy aims at furthering discovery and attaining its own unique form of understanding, it cannot help exploiting the suggestive possibilities of language. The choice open to the philosopher is not between language wholly familiar and language with

some degree of novelty, but between one and another method of embodying novelty. The philosopher must either coin new terms, or stretch the "meanings" of terms in current usage, or combine existing terms in unfamiliar ways. Each of these procedures has its pitfalls and excesses. But there are no other alternatives short of utter vacuity. The problem is to determine the optimum uses and the apt occasions of each procedure. The philosopher estimates the linguistic technique which will convey his concepts without sacrifice of their substance. Some philosophers have introduced categories or major expressions with relish and abandon, others have dreaded even a single new expression lest they alienate a timid public. The judicious position between the extremes is sometimes discoverable only in retrospect. But it seems probable that resistance to unfamiliar terminology is mainly a disguise for resistance to unfamiliar concepts, since philosophers are as much chided for misusing old terms as for inventing new ones. The responsible introduction or extension of terms, whether in philosophy or in science, reflects a conceptual need and serves a conceptual purpose. In response to this need and this purpose, one of the important functions of language is to steer query into its subject matter (whatever natural complex this may be), and conversely, to determine more surely a natural sphere for query. In this function, language plots unsuspected or neglected configurations of traits. It leads our resources toward the encompassment of configurations. It preempts and above all preserves configurations for query. The unfamiliar philosophic category that has justified itself to its user must counter one resist-

ance by another—the inertia of easy usage by the resistance to oversimplification. The growth of nomenclature, provided that it issues from the urgency of query, is a positive good, not a necessary evil.

ii

We start necessarily with the discernment of an all-embracing movement characteristic of the individual life. This movement is at the very least in time and in space. Temporal movement is continuous, uninterrupted, and pervasive—beyond the individual's control. Spatial movement, which is partly within the individual's control, is subject to suspension, sometimes because of and sometimes in spite of the control. One portion of this individual process, the portion known as growth, itself has temporal and spatial characteristics, and is actually divisible into many kinds of growth. The entire process is determined and predetermined: physical, social, genetic, morphological, physiological, intellective, and affective forces, all feeding impulses, habits, and dispositions, ensure the outcome of the process as human. The unique pattern, on the other hand, of these concerted forces, ensures the individuality and contingency of the process. It will not do to describe the process simply as the "living process," for living processes are perfectly conceivable without the presence of anything called "experiencing." So far as most philosophers are concerned, the addition of experiencing to living amounts to the addition of conscious awareness—an attribute which is only part of the process, and not a necessary part of all its manifestations. Dewey, observing that philosophers have spoken mainly of ex-

perience at large, and wishing to stress the importance of particular experiences, of "an" experience, holds that "life is no uniform uninterrupted march or flow. It is a thing of histories, each with its own plot." [26] But the living individual as such has a history, and *this* history *is* certainly an uninterrupted flow. And it is the nature of this history or process that is most in need of investigation. Here, then, we may augment our nomenclature, lest important traits be obscured by tenacious associations. We must expect the meanings of the terms to emerge as we proceed and not to be completed instantaneously. For it is not possible instantaneously to detail all of the applications that contribute to a meaning.

We shall name the process in question *proception* or the *proceptive* process, and describe the human individual as a *proceiving* individual or *proceiver.* The individual "proceives" or is said to "proceive," and these terms will be used grammatically much in the way that terms like "functions" and "to function" are. "Proceives" (like "functions") is not the present tense of an operation, not something done *to* something else or visited *upon* something else. So that if we speak, as it sometimes will be convenient to speak, of "the world in so far as it is proceived" or of "existence proceived," this will be only an elliptical way of designating an ontologic situation, an entire relation together with its relata, and will not imply that something has become the object of an act. We shall have to speak of *procepts* and of the *proceptive domain.* The suitability of the term "proception" stems in part from the fact that it permits these derivatives. If a term must suggest cer-

tain properties at the outset or be useless, then at the risk of initial imprecision let "proception" suggest the inseparable union of process with receptivity, of movement in nature with impact by nature, of things shaped with events accepted. The emphasis is on historicity and natural involvement. Most simply, as we shall subsequently be in a position to say, proception is the actualization of procepts. As the term "proception" is needed to identify and to preserve conceptually the precise character of individual historicity, individuated process, so the term "procept" is needed to identify and to fix the status of a natural complex that enters into this process.

But what can be made clear from the outset is that "proception" and "proceiving," though corresponding in usage very roughly to "experience" and "experiencing," are free from certain questionable metaphysical assumptions permitted by the ambiguities of the latter terms. Thus, philosophers often speak of "the realm of experience." Some of them mean to distinguish it from a realm of "existence," implying that what is to be found "in experience" may not, in so far, be said to "exist." Others, distinguishing experience from nature, intend a contrast between two existential orders, the precise interrelation of which they conceive to be a principal problem of philosophy. Still others regard the "realm" of experience as a part of the "realm" of nature. Proception eliminates these equivocations. It is a natural process, distinguishable in specific terms from other natural processes.

The first trait to be distinguished in the proceptive process is its directed and propulsive character. "The

inmost texture of [man's] being is propulsive," says Santayana; in all of human existence "there is a self-reproductive, flying essence." [27] Birth and growth, the primary propulsive forces, place the natural commitments of the individual directly before him. To some extent propulsion is as it were ornamented or qualitatively augmented by the individual, as in the process of query, or in the pursuance of affective drives. To some extent it is constantly modified by the larger natural complexes of which he is part: events push him in one path rather than another. Even when he is said to be thwarted in his purposes or impulses, he is being pushed on, in a complex that works itself out with the component of disapproval. The propulsions of the individual together with the specific directions in which they lead constitute his *proceptive direction*. This is the resultant direction, or directed outcome, of all that comprises his life. It is variable, or malleable by events. Among other factors, it entails what, in a now common but not altogether felicitous phrase, is called "funded experience." "Funded experience," to be sure, is much more compatible with the notion of proceptive direction than is the classical "stock of ideas" or "store of impressions." But it is not easily reconciled with the factor of movement, and its use seems to suggest that a fund, once established, is there forever; that it can be affected only by quantitative increase and not equally by the content of an addition to it. Actually there is no fund the significance of which, or the total character of which, cannot be altered and even revolutionized by the character of subsequent situations. It can be rendered paltry and inconsequential or enhanced in its

relative power. The concept of the proceptive direction avoids making the funded past a bundle separate from present involvement, a store to which items are occasionally added and from which judgment can borrow, making it instead integral with the individual and with the world presently pertinent to the individual. The individual's past persists as a proceptive complex—that is, as a natural complex which is essential to the uniqueness of the total individual-in-movement. This description conveys what will be meant by saying that anything is or becomes a part of the individual's experience, namely, that it is predicable of the individual as individual, of his make-up; not *merely* of his mind, his foot, his heart, or his estate.

The notion of a proceptive direction in no way excludes from the content of individual life the common facts of conflict and indetermination. On the contrary, the proceptive direction is the outcome, partly actual and partly potential, representative of any configuration of facts. That any number of diverse facts and traits fit into some identifiable structure is a truism; if they did not, it would not be possible to speak of "an individual" at all. Nor is the proceiver anything separable from the plurality of traits and circumstances distinguishable in his history: it is quite enough to say that they make a history and are not just a plurality. Proceptive direction, moreover, has nothing to do with what a man envisions for himself, or with his having a "purpose in life." It is a name for the discriminable effect and prospect of a history. If there are human individuals there must be proceptive directions. But this fact stated, another may be added without delay. With

the notion of proceptive direction it may be possible to help define "human"; proceeding the other way round is not very promising.

A stone, dislodged from a mountainside, must roll in some direction, however fortuitously. Whether it rolls eastward or westward depends solely upon the conjunction of circumstances. The proceptive direction, likewise, is the direction effected by the conjunction of the circumstances relevant to the individual. Though it entails spatial and temporal facts about the individual, it is itself no more of a spatial or temporal term than the terms "development" and "growth" are. And like the term "individual" it is devoid of any eulogistic significance. Were there no proceptive direction, there could be no characterization of the course of an individual life, and hence no individual life except in a purely biological sense. Although in practice such a characterization is always a challenge, it is also always possible. To say that an individual necessarily has a proceptive direction means, then, that certain potentialities of doing, making, and saying, and certain potential relations to other things, are excluded from his future while others are included in it, all by virtue of the cumulative power of his past in total relation to his world.

Proception, the natural historicity of the individual, thus cannot be propulsive and directed without being cumulative. The importance of understanding this often recognized trait emerges when we consider that it embraces other traits which philosophers have found to be distinctive of "experience." For instance, Aristotle and various others have called attention to the

duplicative and repetitive element in what is properly called experience, as distinguished from specific functions (or "operations") like sensation or perception. We are said to perceive a quality or an occurrence. But only in so far as the occurrence is identified, classified, or recognized as relating to other repeatable occurrences is it said to be experienced or to be part of our experience. This property is also implied in the phrase "human experience" and in the context "human experience shows that. . . ." That is, repeated instances of the same kind reveal certain conclusions; numerous individuals confirm one another's repetitions. Hegel, rebelling against the tendency to regard experience as a kind of faculty, and against the conception of experience at large as a mere collection of experiences, portrayed individual history as embattlement. The movement of experience, like the movement of social history, lay in the harmonization of ideas (or as Dewey freshly but analogously formulated it, in the resolution of indeterminate situations). Though Hegel continued the chronic association of experience with the life of consciousness, he came closer to the realization that a cumulative process underlies and gives meaning to the repetitive factor. For there may be any number of repetitions or recurrences without significance and without effect in individual life. Whether, as in the intellectualistic view, the instances of fact that men encounter are connected with one another experientially by a bond of reflection, or whether, more generally, they are each germane to a pervasive interest within the individual's life, their character as experience is their role in a history.

The cumulative factor in proception embraces other factors that have received independent emphasis but that are alike indigenous. It explains the emphasis on repetition and the emphasis on novelty, which at first notice are incompatible. One strain in both common and philosophic usage suggests that without replenishment and spontaneous newness "experience" is dormant or even nonexistent. A current writer discerns that adequate recognition of this trait is one of Locke's merits. "Locke is that very rare thing, a *genuine* empiricist who has turned philosopher instead of writing novels. His world amazes him; a pineapple, a dreamless sleep, a dual personality, a ground almond, a rational parrot constantly pop up to be explained and to destroy the continuity of his thought. It is the temper of the Royal Society, shrewd, sensational, omnivorous of physical detail. . . . [implying that] life is infinitely various: do not try to bottle her in scholastic jars." [28] In a related and not dissimilar vein, Peirce sees as the essence of experience shock, resistance, and constraint. The confrontation and absorption of oddity by the individual, or the encounter with brute newness, is by no means a matter of resolving something that is incongruous with what has gone before. It belongs to the primitive texture of human existence, as does the sheer recurrence of events. It is in part (when taken on the level of awareness) a *sense* of oddity; and more broadly, a natural *acceptance* and a natural *utilization* of oddity by a proceiver (by an individual in so far as he is said to "experience"). When one is said to "reveal his experience" to another, or to "share his experience" with another, the assumption involved is that what has be-

come integral to one individual's life may be communicated as a trait relatively novel to that of another. Both repetition and novelty, then, turn out to be factors in the cumulative process of proception. Repetition fixes and solidifies the events of this process, while novelty increases its breadth and helps, by sharpening the qualitative difference between past and present, to define the proceptive direction. The traditional phrase "to learn from experience" is extraordinarily complex. Its verbal equivalent, transitional to interpretation, is "to profit from the past." It presupposes all three of the factors just enumerated: many repeated instances of occurrence, a cumulative efficacy in these repetitions, and an integration of new instances with the old.

iii

Proception, like every other process, may be said to transpire "in" nature, and the relations of an individual as proceiver (as "experiencer") may be said to be "to" or "with" other natural complexes. The "in" here may be understood partly in the familiar sense. The individual is simply contained within a framework that is larger and older. No sentiment about the ultimate eternality or the potential infinitude of the self can conceal its littleness in the natural order. But although the natural order, transcending the being and the reach of the individual, may be said literally to envelop him, it does not follow that every natural situation of which the individual is part is an envelopment relation. To be "in" a situation—in thought, in love, in danger—is to be specifically related, a sense not comparable with being "in" the natural order. There is a third "in" that

links the other two together. Basically, experience or the proceptive process is "in" nature in the sense that it is continuous with other forms of order and existence, possessing, as each form does, traits peculiar to itself and traits common to other forms; and this applies equally to being "in a situation." Where the relation of an individual is said to be "to" or "with" things natural, a more direct and pressing problem is posed. This problem is not to recite as many different instances of the relation as possible, but to define the common character of these instances as constituting the individual a proceiver. Proception being a process, in terms of what substantive elements does this process go on? Or: how are the complexes of nature related to an individual history? Or, in more conventional terms: what is meant by the "content" of experience? Here we shall need to utilize the notions of procept and proceptive domain.

An individual is a natural complex contingently associated with, affecting, and affected by, other natural complexes. The complexes, including every part or phase of his own individuality, that are related to him within the span of his history comprise an aggregate. This aggregate, possessing within itself an indefinite number of patterns analytically discoverable, is his world. And this world is a part of the world at large; or, it is the world at large in so far as it can be said to be modified by his presence in it. It is the world that ultimately sustains his being; that comprises what he reacts to, thinks of, and theorizes about; that comprises his situations, happenings, and products. The world not included in "his" world is the world that cannot be

said to be related to him, except in the remote sense that his and all other spheres of existence alike exemplify processes of nature. On the other hand, "his" world is no insular box. It is continuous with the world of all other individuals, identical with theirs in so far as neither he nor they as individuals make it any different, but uniquely determined in so far as it is an aggregate of complexes which are not in *all* respects the same as those of the other aggregates.

Now it is essential to observe that an individual's world is not coextensive with his "experience." Everything in his experience is necessarily part of his world, but not everything in his world is necessarily part of his experience. For the further distinction must be made between what is related to him in so far as he is a natural complex not different from other natural complexes, and what is related to him in so far as he is an individual, or natural complex that is unique. For example, sunlight, and the air pressure in his environment on earth, would ordinarily, simply as such, be related to him in the former way, indifferently with other men and other things; whereas the house he lives in would be related to him uniquely. And on the other hand, a brick built into his house, like a star in the heavens, is a complex that might fall into the former category: it might be in his world and not in his experience. The aggregate of such complexes as are related to him uniquely, constitutes the "content of his experience." This is a subaggregate of the aggregate that constitutes his world. And this subaggregate is his proceptive domain. Any natural complex (any fact, thing, relation,

event, situation, state) within a proceptive domain is a procept; so that any complex within *his* proceptive domain is a procept for *him*.

It is the need for this distinction between the "larger" and "smaller" worlds of an individual—between "his world" and "his experienced world"—that makes it ambiguous to speak simply of the world that is "available" to him. For this might mean the world that sustains his existence along with other existences, or the world that has formed his existence and no other; the former a world that is proceivable, that could possibly be proceived by him, the latter a world that he has proceived and is proceiving. More strictly, there are *three* "worlds": the world that includes both complexes related to and complexes unrelated to a given individual; the world that includes only the complexes related to him; and the world that includes only the complexes related to him uniquely. Theoretically, the first world might have been identical with the second. And the first, therefore, as well as the second, is proceiv*able*—that is, it is logically possible for anything at all that exists or has existed, to become relevant to the uniqueness of some individual, whether through some type of existential effect or through its seizure by query, as in discovery by astronomy or by historical inference. The first world (the indefinite "whole of nature") is the entire actual and possible world, past, present, and future; the second ("his world") is the world without which a given individual would not be; the third (the proceptive domain, or "content of an individual's experience") is the world without which he would not be what he is. The three worlds are of respectively

diminishing inclusiveness, concentrically related to one another.

A procept, we said in an earlier but unelaborated context, is a natural complex that relates to or affects the individual as an individual. To "affect," or to "relate" to, the individual in *this* sense means either to help perpetuate what he uniquely is or to alter the character of this uniqueness. In other words, any existence becomes a procept for an individual when it serves either to stabilize or to modify his proceptive direction. Thus the natural complex known in a particular instance as growing thin is a procept, a happening that has affected a given individual, an event relating to him in a particular way. The natural complex which consists in the seeing of a blue hat at a certain time is a procept for a given individual: being an instance of similar previous vision and similar previous identification, it strengthens by repetition a habit of that individual (though it may modify his direction in another respect). The natural complex which is called the death of an individual, if it happens to modify the life of another, is a procept for the latter. Each of these complexes is an existing something which affects someone. A "thing" is what may affect any individual. A procept is that thing in so far as it does affect a given individual. Thus a hill, a war, a cloud, a hat, an election, a heat wave is one and the same fact or thing potentially relatable to any or all individuals. In so far as it enters into the history and commitment of each, it is a procept for each, and therefore in some respect different for each. It may enter the history by being endured or by being perceived or by an indefinite number of possible rela-

tions. We often speak of the "events in our experience." And we should continue to do so. Events are events whether they are experienced or not. But neither the experience nor the events in question have the same status as before. Both we and the events are now part of other relational situations. An effect has taken place in our proceptive direction; the events have become procepts. The factors strengthening us in what we now are or altering us from what we now are may not be such factors for others. Procepts for me are events effectively relevant to me. The events that are procepts for me may be either different or utterly nonexistent in the world that constitutes another's proceptive domain.

A procept, therefore, is a natural complex relevant to a proceptive domain (or natural complex that has become "part" of a proceptive domain). A proceptive domain is an ordered aggregate of procepts. Proception is the process whereby a proceptive domain acquires its order. A proceptive direction is the character of the potentialities in proception. A proceiver is an individual that possesses the properties of proception (or, less formalistically, an individual considered not merely in so far as he exists or even lives but in so far as he proceives, or relates continuously and uniquely to a world).

A procept is not "in the mind" or in the body (except in so far as the complex in question happens to be a bodily event) or "in" the individual; nor is it "external" to the mind (whatever that may mean) or to the individual; nor is it some proxy ("essence," "idea," "datum") between the individual and another existence. A procept is the *existence itself,* the existing fact, state,

situation, or other natural complex *in so far* as it is relevant to an individual as individual. Likewise, proception *is* the continuing interrelation of the individual with other existences of whatever kind; and the proceptive domain *is* the existential order in which an individual's life and history and self consists. The complexes of nature are not "presented" to experience. They occur, and when their occurrence involves an individual they *constitute* experience. The reason for these asseverations emerges when we try to reproduce the foregoing distinctions wholly in the locution of "experience."

For instance, are we to say that "a procept" is the equivalent of "an experience"? Instead, we should ask whether by "an experience" we mean simply and essentially "a procept." If we adopt the reverse order of questioning, the question is begged. For what *do* we mean by "experience" in the phrase "an experience"? Do we mean a "sense-datum"? an "act of consciousness"? a happening in someone's life? Thus Dewey, for example, speaks of "an experience" very differently from the way he speaks of "experience." "An" experience transpires only when "the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment"; experience which is "anesthetic," which lacks "completeness" and "unity," which has no "consummation in consciousness," no aesthetic or felt "quality," is not "an" experience.[29] Plainly, these qualifications apply not to all but only to some procepts, and to a relatively small class at that. From a purely technical point of view, there is nothing to prevent a decision that "an experience" shall be stripped of its rhetorical associations and be made equivalent to "a

procept." But if this is not done, the expression "a procept" finds no concise equivalent in existing terminology.

Are we to say that "proceptive domain" is the equivalent of "fund of experience"? Once more the question is begged if we try to determine equivalence by taking the older form of expression as the standard. For what kind of thing *is* it that is funded—habits? ideas? acts? objects? And does "funded" mean the same in all these cases? Again, is the phrase "to proceive" the equivalent of "to experience"? We may say that the former expresses for the latter a more generalized and more precise meaning than the latter ordinarily has. We may not say that the two phrases are always substitutable for one another. "Proceive," when it appears to be used transitively, is only an ellipsis for a more complex relational account; "nature proceived" means, not the object of an operation, psychic or otherwise, but nature in so far as it is related to a given individual history. "Experience" is used both transitively and intransitively, transitively when it is said, for instance, "he experienced a storm." "To proceive" means "to function as an individual, directively and cumulatively"; "to experience" has many and incompatible meanings.

Every one of an individual's judgments is necessarily one of his procepts. For what stems from him is part of that which makes him what he is. The individual as producer is organically part of the individual as proceiver. Feelings, thoughts, or judgments are natural complexes which *must* be procepts for some individual: they are existences that occur only in relations of an individual and are necessarily relevant to some proceptive

direction. Considered in their particularity as occurrences, feelings or thoughts belonging to one individual may or may not become procepts for another, depending on whether they acquire relevance to the latter's life: they may become stimuli to his own feelings and thoughts, or influences on his action. There are numerous complexes literally related to individuals and yet not ordinarily related to them as procepts, such as the microorganisms in their shoes; for such facts in their triviality, no less than the laws of electromagnetism or astronomy in their universality, are as a rule indifferent to the uniqueness of the individual. Whether certain facts like the standards of living in Asia are or are not procepts for given individuals is a specific problem of discovery and analysis. Such specific problems are of direct concern to the historian, psychiatrist, biographer, or ethnologist. There is, however, no particle or configuration in nature which may not conceivably enter into relation to some individual-as-proceiver (rather than as-sheer-natural-complex) and thereby acquire the status of procept. If the air pressure or the light of day, which ordinarily are related to all individuals indifferently, do become procepts or uniquely relevant existences in the lives of some individuals, it is as subjects of query or of simple judgment, as causes of unique individual effects, or as neurotically pertinent objects.

Awareness is one possible factor among others in proception. The enlargement and continual repatterning of the proceptive domain of an individual is dependent only in part and only at times on awareness. This truth, neglected by contemporary philosophers, is a common-

place to the older philosophers of the passions, to poets and storytellers since antiquity, and to almost all of the differing schools of modern psychology. Most "empiricist" philosophers think that the world becomes experientially available through "data." And there would be nothing wrong with this if the "data" were construed not primarily as noises and patches, nor even as tables and chairs, but as the circumstances of rearing and growth, as pervasive and imperceptible moral influences, as the structures of human togetherness, as the contingent stimuli to curiosity and emotion, as the forms of health and disease, as the boundaries imposed by the facts of society, heredity, and mortality. "Data" in the significant sense are materials, constituents, subject matters, not sensory "surfaces." When awareness does become prominent as a factor in what men call the highest phases of experiencing, particularly in moral relations and in the processes of query, it is truly *awareness* that is prominent, and not simply the activity of "thought." For reflective or inferential awareness alone will not fit the patterns of active and exhibitive judgment, nor indeed of assertive judgment, nor the diversity of invention and communication.

The "data of experience" cannot be other than the complexes of the world as proceived. The general distinction between appearance and reality, customarily invoked by philosophers to support a more special distinction between "datum" and "object," is legitimate only in the realm of common sense practice and the realm of "explanation." For in these realms it is a functional distinction between a standard, universally identified thing or configuration and something else deemed

an irregular, unexpected, private, or adventitious version of it; for instance, between a waking journey and a dreamt-of journey, or between a round engraved penny and a flat, unfamiliar copper rectangle that proves to be its edge. Philosophically, the intrinsic, fixed distinction between appearance and reality or shadow and substance is inexcusable, reflecting an indulgent bias for one form of reality as against every other form. If, as has sometimes been suggested, this bias is the symptom of one kind of valuational preference in opposition to another, there is still no reason for conceptually ordering the cosmos in accordance with such a preference. Among those philosophers for whom the real means the permanent or eternal and the apparent the transitory, a valuational and an ontological distinction clearly (and understandably) coincide. In the light of a more comprehensive conception of experience than that which prevailed anciently, the one realm is as experienceable as the other, and each is a factor in any proceptive domain. Those philosophers, however, for whom in monstrous but unwitting irony the real is the inaccessible, have succeeded not in sundering nature from experience but in providing perennial fodder for the philistines. They have, as Whitehead suggests, actually tried to make two natures, nature meant and nature dreamt. But what is intrinsically inaccessible cannot be meant; and a dream which has uninterrupted order and continuity, a dream to which there can be no alternative condition, is no dream at all.

It follows from the foregoing considerations, first, that in every instance where a natural complex becomes

a procept, a change takes place in the status both of the individual and the other existence involved. Two natural complexes each become modified in their total relations, and a full description of each would have to record the role of each in a larger or newer complex of which it is an element. Thus "naive realism," "representationalism," and similar approaches grounded in a dubious metaphysics have no meaning here. On the other hand, the general approach sometimes called "objective relativism" is given support. Secondly, since not all natural complexes are procepts, that is, not all are necessarily pertinent to the unique being of any given individual, a doctrine of "internal relations" is avoided. And thirdly, since all natural complexes can conceivably become procepts, a doctrine of intrinsically unavailable realities is avoided.

It is not difficult, in terms of the concept of proception, to account for usages of "experience" ostensibly not about individuals. Commonly we speak of "social experience," and of what men learn from it; of "the French experience of parliamentary government" or "the American experience of competition." There are "lessons of human experience," and when men are urged to "appeal to experience" or to "consult experience," it is oftener than not something different from their individual environment or their sensory powers to which reference is made. Social forces, social products, and social histories do not have to be explained away. Neither does "social experience." What simply has to be acknowledged is that there are real similarities between one individual and other individuals. The similarities obtain between spans of one individual history

and spans of other individual histories. Similarity of this kind is proceptive parallelism. Proceptive parallelism makes social history and social experience possible. For without it, the "history" of a group is a history of unrelated masses rather than of representative traits. Proceptive parallelism, instead of implying the reduction of social existence to individual experience, on the contrary prevents the atomization of the social. What we generically call "human experience" is not the mere multiplicity of all human happenings: that is not what we could be urged to "consult." It is rather the tissue of likeness in individual human histories. We are urged to "appeal" to what can be appropriated in some mode of judgment by one individual and another and still another. It would make no sense to appeal to what is available in one way to this individual, in another to that, and in no way to all. There is no social experience, and actually no social being, without community, and there is no community without proceptive parallelism.

iv

It should be evident why the individual does not "experience" with his mind or with his body or "with" anything at all. "Experience" is primarily predicable of an individual history: as an attribute expressed by a verb, it is the distinctive movement of this history; as an attribute expressed by a noun, it is the structure of this history. Or in the terms that fix these meanings and define the nature of this history, the relation between an individual and the world affecting him as such is the relation between two natural complexes of very different magnitudes, each of constantly varying

determinateness with respect to the other. This relation, the essential natural status of the individual, works itself out as the proceptive process. In the proceptive process we can distinguish a structure of complexes (the proceptive domain) constitutive of the complex called the individual, and a resultant definitive inclination (the proceptive direction). It is not to be feared that in such an account the "subject of change," the existence of "personal identity," has been lost. Body, mind, person, organism are all in residence. The fact that these are identified collectively as phases of a natural complex does not dissolve any of the permanencies in man. His blood still moves, "as it were, in a circle"; his viscera are still there to serve and trouble him. It is an old story that philosophy respects and adopts but may not worship the entities of common belief, and above all may not be intimidated by them. If common traitors are occasionally ruled out of court, it is for the greater glory of good citizenship.

In what way can recognition be given to the distinction between the individual as an initiator of experience and the individual as, so to speak, a collector of experience? Philosophers have debated the relative weight of activity and passivity in experience, and the scale of emphases has been a major criterion for the classification of their opinions. "Sensationalism," "intellectualism," "rationalism," and "empiricism" are often regarded primarily as answers to this question. Is the portrait to be that of a train rider looking out on the countryside? Or an organism struggling uphill on foot? Or a framer of categories for mute data? Or a solver of problems? Each of these analogies presupposes its own

metaphysics of the individual. The first and third centralize the role of mind in experience, one making it a recipient of impressions, the other making it a power that bestows intelligibility. The second makes the individual a sentient body that moves "as on a darkling plain." The fourth emphasizes the role of mind not in a central but still in an unmistakable way, making it not a sufficient but a necessary condition of experience, and conceiving of the individual as an organism oscillating repeatedly between the fringe of intelligence or reflection and the heights of inquiry.

Now in describing the further properties of proception there is no great harm in using the terms "active" and "passive." But as in previous instances of nomenclature, these terms suffer from the twin liability of being laden with unhappy associations and being insufficiently fertile for a generalized account. We shall do better to ascribe to proception two generic dimensions, manipulation and assimilation, which are inseparable, as dimensions of a process must be. The proceiver does not alternately manipulate and assimilate. As a bidimensional being, he may be studied with major emphasis now on the one dimension and now on the other, just as the length of an object may be examined in disregard of its breadth, or vice versa, without denying either the inseparability or the equal status of the dimension functionally disregarded. In the language of activity and passivity, the individual is not merely both an agent and a patient but an active patient and a patient agent, occasionally considered for purposes of abstraction in one or the other of these capacities. Manipulation and assimilation are inclusive dimensions.

Memory, attention, imaging are dimensions of the individual's awareness; digestion, circulation, respiration are dimensions of the individual's physiology; but manipulation and assimilation in the sense here intended are dimensions of the individual as proceiver. It is important to understand what this characterization means. It does not mean that manipulation and assimilation apply to the individual in general in the sense that they apply to none of his functions in particular. On the contrary, it means that each of his special functions, contributing to the nature of a whole, contributes to the manipulative and assimilative character of that whole.

What does the individual manipulate? Books, chairs, slices of bread? These certainly—but there are no objects which are par excellence objects of manipulation. The tendency to think of the easily controllable instances as the major ones derives to some extent from the etymological and narrower suggestions of the term "manipulation": direct handling, physical domination, of objects. But it derives also from the social habit of identifying a process mainly by its typical results. Thus "memory" suggests not primarily the quest for what is past but a set of recovered images; "love" suggests not primarily a form of continuing relatedness but some specific state; "diplomacy" suggests not so much a technique of negotiation as the expedited instances of negotiation. This disposition to erase the meaningful auspices of an effect, or wholly to absorb conditions into results, and process into product, is a form of idolatry, and in philosophy it causes much confusion (at least as much as the idolatry illustrated by the opposite ex-

treme, the tendency of geneticism to absorb results into conditions and products into processes). It easily leads, for instance, to the conception of the "object" of knowledge as in all cases "there" to be known, or to the conception of the product of utterance as a lump to be deemed meaningful or meaningless in the way that something is found to be black or white.

The identification, then, of processes with consummations of processes largely accounts for the linking of "manipulation" with objects regarded as wholly available and controllable, as "manipulated." The same tendency accounts for the linking of "experience" with sounds, colors, shapes, and tastes—these, supposedly, the most direct and most available data of existence. It is also not difficult to see why "manipulation" is often superseded in meaning by (or made synonymous with) one of its species, "unethical manipulation." It is a short step from associating manipulation with its most controllable objects to associating it with its most important objects, namely, other men; and since to be manipulated is presumably to be wholly manipulated, the process as such is taken to imply unethical conduct.

The proceiver, a being with predilections and interests, necessarily possesses an economy. This economy or strategy is imposed by his natural obligations and propulsions. A dog pushed into the water swims to shore, though not always to the nearest shore. The propulsions of human experience place the individual in waters more or less challenging if for the most part shallow. The proceptive economy, expressing itself in manipulation, permits the individual to cope with obstruction, provided that some alien fact of nature does

not blot him out of existence. This strategy native to proception is not to be confused with the problem-solving process, than which it is far more rudimentary. We manipulate the environment in part by the very continuance of our biological functions. What is ordinarily called "self-preservation" is an optimistic rubric which puts the cart before the horse. Preservation is the continuing result of manipulation; it is persistence that we mean to attribute to protoplasmic individuals. Manipulation, therefore, is not merely and not even typically the piecemeal handling of objects but the perpetuation of functions developed in the environment by the individual, who may accomplish this by his bodily presence in a situation, by flight from a situation, by habituating himself to illusion, by hammering nails into boards. The environment of a creature is never totally accessible to experience and judgment. It is available in the form of successive perspectives. The individual manipulates his environment by structuring complexes within it—agreements, threats, contentions, devotions, hurts, plans, common values. The sensory things and qualities that are thought to be the keys to the process are more frequently minor elements in a gross framework of obligation and pronouncement. In the popular senses of the term, both the neutral and the pejorative sense, "manipulation" is voluntary activity. But as an attribute of proception it no more necessarily entails awareness, and in particular it is no more a result of willing, than proception itself, or than living. Intentional manipulations are commonly though not necessarily instances of manipulation directed to specific ends. Deliberative manipulations

are a subclass of intentional manipulations. No instance of intentional manipulation, however, supersedes all the rest of manipulation, any more than a speech by one actor supersedes the ongoing play. It is necessarily concomitant with many manipulative relations, some more continuous or prolonged than others, some more comprehensive in scope than others.

The proceptive economy, like the social or interproceptive economy, strives not simply to prevent loss but to achieve gain. Manipulation is originative as well as defensive. And in its originative aspects it is just as little limited to directly controllable objects. It is the building and undoing of relatedness. Men approximate their ends by inaugurating or extending or altering relations, and it is these relations which entail as means the sensory forms of manipulation. Rephrasing and severely modifying the ancient dictum that there is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses, we may say that there is nothing in the intellect or in the senses which is not first in the proceptive economy. The very nature of sensing requires some orientation of the individual's endowments and some specific relation to the world. Every instance of sensing actualizes some situational disposition to sense. Where the proceptive direction of an individual subordinates this disposition, he is opaque to what others see, hear, or feel.

The world that the individual manipulates is at the same time a world that he accepts and that he endures. It is a world that he assimilates. What he actually manipulates and assimilates is always some finite portion of his world. But this finite portion may take the

form either of the customary objects that are supposed to be wholly manipulatable and assimilable or of indefinitely interrelated situations. The individual may manipulate by turning a key in a lock or by influencing the affairs of nations. He may assimilate by feeling pain or by sustaining the consequences of his ignorance. The so-called wholly accessible objects are never wholly accessible at all. Neither the key nor the pain nor any other possible complex can be manipulated or assimilated in all of its conceivable relations or constituent aspects. And in assimilation, as in manipulation, awareness is incidental, not essential.

The distinction that invites comparison with the present one is Dewey's distinction between "doing" on the one hand and "undergoing" or "receptivity" on the other, the latter in some contexts called "having" and in some contexts "enjoyment." It is important, both for the development of the present distinction and for the notion of proception in general, to observe the differences.

First of all, "doing" in Dewey's sense is an emphasis on instrumental experience, on an ordering of means to ends. But manipulation is not necessarily instrumental in character. The man who inadvertently inhales more deeply and quickly on approaching another is ordering his environment but not acting instrumentally—unless we insist on locating a naive teleology in the situation. The man who juxtaposes two facial images in memory, though experiencing manipulatively, need not, in the juxtaposition as such, be acting instrumentally. And the man who rises and runs unaccountably, in panic from unknown causes, can be said to be ad-

justing means to ends only by the most intellectualistic and reductive construction of this idea. Yet the situation is part of his proceptive economy. It is part of an underlying organization the pattern of which is unintelligible by common behavioral standards and in which means and ends are nonexistent or indistinguishable.

Secondly, "receptivity," "undergoing," "suffering," "having," "enjoying" are almost invariably associated by Dewey with "immediacy" of experience, with "qualitative experience" or "the experience of quality," with experience in so far as it is "final" or "terminal," and hence with what, in virtue of these properties, is ineffable. But assimilation is a process to which "immediacy" does not apply very meaningfully. Omnipresent in the individual's life, it consists in the elemental acceptance of existences that is one condition of their being procepts for him. The facts and the qualities, the structures and the limits of his world, in so far as they have occurred, are irreversible. Whether or not the individual is aware of these occurrences and existences, whether he approves or repudiates them, he is bearing them as data for his life. Assimilation consists in "receptivity" not merely to "quality" but to the very addition of procepts to the proceptive domain. Dewey describes "having" as "sensible, affectional, or appreciatoral." He says of "immediate events" (or "qualitative events") that "their *occurrence* is one with their being sensibly, affectionally, and appreciatively *had*." [30] But an event which enters into an individual history, which becomes a procept, has, merely in such a capacity, nothing to do with any "experience of quality" in the sense suggested. Assimilation may or may not be, and

preponderantly is not, characterized by sensible, affective, or appreciative states. What an individual assimilates is what he sustains, not what he feels; though he may sustain an event primarily through the medium of feeling, as when he is struck in the face or when he is frightened by the prospect of death. But when, for example, he is slandered by his neighbors, in the total absence of awareness on his part, great changes may take place in his possibilities and relationships, and the course of his subsequent experience altered; yet these occurrences are assimilated into his proceptive direction, sustained by his involved and related self, in utter independence of any "immediate or qualitative experience." So contrary is this notion of assimilation to Dewey's "undergoing," and to his conception of experience in general, that he often writes as if he were concerned to reject it. Thus: "Suppose fire encroaches upon a man when he is asleep. Part of his body is burned away. The burn does not perceptibly result from what he has done. There is nothing which in any constructive way can be named experience." [31]

Thirdly, "doing" and "undergoing," according to Dewey, can vary inversely with each other, or suppress each other. An "excess of doing" may reduce "receptivity" to almost nothing, and an "excess of receptivity," a "mere undergoing," may crowd out action or "contact with the realities of the world." [32] Or in a different context, but analogously, the immediacy of "having" excludes "knowing," and the concern of knowing with sequences, relations, and coexistences is an alternate experience to having. Ideally, says Dewey, doing (or knowing) and undergoing (or having) should

each enhance the growth and extension of the other. We have seen that manipulation and assimilation are related in an entirely different way. To speak of one as suppressing or inhibiting the other is nonsense. Being co-dimensional, they are also each continuous. It is possible to speak of an individual as ceasing to "know" (in the sense of ceasing to reflect), but an individual who has ceased to manipulate or to assimilate has ceased to be. The individual cannot be said to assimilate, or to manipulate, in greater degree at one time than at another, any more than he can be said to proceive in greater or lesser degree. When we say, in ordinary speech, that one individual has a greater power of assimilation than another, or that he can assimilate "more," we are speaking of the comparative character of their experiencing, not of its degree or quantity as experiencing. The "more" describes the kind of traits and facts assimilated, not the function of assimilating; it applies to the kind of elements in the proceptive domain, not to the proceptive process. When we limit a comparison to a particular form of experience—we say, for example, that one man assimilated certain ideas more fully than another did—a quantitative aspect seems more plausibly to be present; but this is actually a colloquial version of the fact that the assimilative experience of two men is differently allocated. The world that any man assimilates, though subject to comparison by one standard and in one respect with that of another, is never more or less truly a world.

When, similarly, we say that one individual has "more experience" than another, we are elliptically describing or evaluating their differences in a given re-

spect, for instance, the extent of their travel or the duration of their professional career; for one is not more of an experiencing animal than another. The comparison is like the rhetorical statement that one man is "more alive" than another, which refers to the character of the two lives and is a dramatic appraisal, not a quantitative measurement. Nor can one man "judge" more or less than another; the makings, doings, and statings of one can be compared with those of another only in relative value. What each man assimilates, he assimilates. He is not less or more of an assimilative or manipulative being than any other, but a being that in part assimilates different things; and this is indeed what, by definition, makes him a different being. One man cannot absorb the world that another can. But it is precisely because men have different powers that their worlds are in some respect different. That which a man is powerless to assimilate is simply that which is no part of his proceptive domain. As assimilative power is an acceptance, assimilative impotence is an exclusion. The manifestations of manipulation and assimilation are endless in number. It makes sense to say not that the degree but that the way in which we manipulate and assimilate alters, for changes in the affairs of life relate us differently to the world. Likewise, the process of query makes it meaningful to speak of methodical manipulation and methodical assimilation, for the ways in which a man's environment is ordered by him and borne by him are to some extent determinable by his choice. Choice is itself at once a shaping and an acceptance: a subject-of-query is manipulated because it can be sustained or endured as a procept, and

endured or assimilated because it can be shaped to be the procept that it is.

It is plain, then, that the distinction between doing and undergoing, between the instrumental and the final or immediate in experience, is a less generalized one as well as a differently oriented one than that between the two proceptive dimensions, and is not easily adaptable to the concept of proception.[33] And yet, how much less faithful to the complexity of experience is the tradition which Dewey attacked and which held him in its grip more than he suspected. In this tradition, the sole manifestation of "activity" in what is called "experience" is "thinking," and the sole manifestation of "passivity" is "sensing." Rationalists and empiricists alike have made a travesty of experience, and have argued in a dark corner rather than in the full light of day. That they have been concerned with experience mainly in so far as it bears upon "knowledge" does not condone the narrowness of their common framework, since the conception of knowledge has itself been, in consequence, correspondingly narrowed and dogmatized. They have inadvertently left it to art to deal with experience in its proper breadth and to render exhibitively what they should equally have recognized and encompassed assertively. "Thinking," as activity, is only one instance of manipulation, and "sensing," as passivity, is only one instance of assimilation. But the true measure of the traditional narrowing of experience reveals itself when we realize, as a moment's consideration can enable us to do, that the assimilative dimension is present in thinking, and the manipulative in sensing.

Proception or experience is the diversified interre-

latedness of manipulation and assimilation, a process comprising an order of things manipulated as well as a manipulating, an order of things assimilated as well as an assimilating. As assimilator, the individual is a witness, a gatherer, a patient, a recipient of the complexes of nature. As manipulator, he is a shaper, a transformer, an initiator, an agent of these complexes. Implicit throughout the course of the permutations in proception is the role of the individual as commentator on nature, including his own nature. This commentary is utterance or judgment. Utterance is the succession of "positions" or "postures" in proception. Each of these takes the form of a product, an instance of making, saying, or acting. And it is because every product is inherently a position in nature—inherently a pronouncement and appraisal—that it is a judgment. The judgments of man appear on first consideration to be instances solely of manipulation. To produce, to comment explicitly or implicitly on things, is to help actualize new properties, to bring about for oneself (and indirectly or directly for others) new procepts, or (what is the same) to modify present procepts. But it is only this particular way of describing judgment that conceals its assimilative aspect. For in doing, making, or saying, we are inviting what we have not yet possessed. We are accumulating situations and traits as well as initiating them. We sustain whatever it is that we modify. Metaphysically speaking, there is no such thing as "touch and go." In "touching" we accept and in "going" we bring. This follows directly from the natural status of proceiving. For as we have seen, every change in a procept (or, every advent of a procept) entails some change

of status both in the existence involved and in the individual to whom this existence is relevant.

We noted earlier that the present conception of experiencing emphasizes historicity and natural involvement. Recently a philosopher has said, of other philosophers, that whenever they are at a loss for a precise word to denote some relation under study they resort to the vague panacea "involve." This witty falsehood does not conceal the fact that in many cases, and particularly in the case of experiencing, probably no other word than "involve" could so precisely satisfy the character of the process. In experience there is a proceiver and there are other natural complexes. The proceiver is in a state of natural involvement in consequence of his natural historicity. What are the alternatives to this formulation? Is experiencing a relation of "subject and object"? Without rehearsing the difficulties and ambiguities of these terms, which of the relata is the subject and which the object—and why? Is the subject the relatum endowed with mind? And is experience therefore "mental activity"? What is the effect on the distinction of subject and object when both relata are said to be minds? It does not take long to see that by making such terms basic we are committed to the metaphysics of egocentrism that plagues modern epistemology with arbitrary assumptions and dead ends. Most of the current terms roughly synonymous with "experiencing" are not only terms signifying "mental operations" but are derivatives of the supposed subject-object relation—perceiving, feeling, knowing, and the like. The term "involvement," perhaps more familiarly applicable to the proceiver's history than to the natural com-

plexes which are his procepts, but in all strictness equally applicable to the latter as related to a given proceiver, expresses first, the common presence and common relevance of all the relata or determinants of proception, and second, the modification imposed by proception on all its relata. To be involved is to be affected or uniquely modified by a relation. To perceive an object is one form of involvement. To inherit a fortune, to be a child, to become ill, to feel momentary pleasure, are other forms. The term "involve" not only leaves room for the discoverable presence and specification of various forms of itself—social, mental, historical, physical, and whatever other forms are not yet satisfactorily characterized—but effectively reminds us that elements of experience glibly selected out by discourse may be continuous with one another and integrally related in fact.

The experiential relation is an "object-object" rather than a "subject-object" relation. Only if the latter pair of terms is appropriated for specific occasions and interpreted functionally, that is, used in order to name or discriminate the situational differences between related complexes, is it sometimes a desirable way of speaking. We discriminate one of the involved complexes, possibly either, as proceiver, and the other as procept. The difference between the complexes is not a difference of incorrigible status (for instance, between "mind and the external world" or between "percipient and datum") but of natural or existential traits. Proceivers are human complexes; their procepts may or may not be human. The experiential relation is a natural fact, like any other relation in nature, with describable differences between the complexes related.

The proceiver does not "construct the world out of data" or "infer existence from experience" or "recover the world from appearances" or "posit the reality of a non-ego beyond consciousness" or "transcend immediacy"; nor is he immersed in a "sentient whole." We must guard against other false implications and equivalences. Proception or natural involvement, unlike Dewey's "experience," does not "reach down into nature": however deep down or high up it is alleged to go, it remains in the center. It is not to be identified simply with togetherness. In the broadest sense, "togetherness" belongs to coexistence of any kind, and hence to the "coexistence" of proceiver and procept; in which sense, though it is presupposed by, it does not explain or imply, proception. Nor, finally, can natural involvement be equated with "transaction" or "interaction," which suggest one dimension of involvement but fail without aid to suggest the other, or assimilative, dimension.

V

A comprehensive theory of experience should be able to resist conceptual challenge, but should be able equally to cope with the perplexities arising from specific forms of experience. Most theories of experience, and in all likelihood most philosophic theories of any kind, focus attention on a prototype of human experience that they regard as superlatively problematical. One recent philosophic position, highly representative in its conception of activity and passivity, raises provocative questions. It is influenced by the common human consideration, present to all individuals at some

time and perhaps to some individuals at all times, that there is a recalcitrancy in natural fact which dominates experience overwhelmingly. We appear to be borne on a current that is independent of our productivity. Great portions of time and great phases of change seem to escape uncontrolled and even unencountered in the course of our existence. Being irreversible, they appear to be simply attended by us in a kind of inevitable passivity.

To this consideration, however, another is joined. Despite the great helplessness of the individual in the face of material change, he is able to traverse vast domains of nature by the power of thought. Where all else is largely uncontrollable, thought is able to surmount the intransigency of fact and to populate any number of worlds; and it is able, above all, to note and to represent to itself the whole scene, including its own helpless station. Hence, it is concluded, the nature of human experience witnesses a basic difference between two kinds of passivity and two kinds of activity. Mind or thought is passive so far as causal efficacy is concerned. But mind is active and matter is passive so far as the power of representation and vision is concerned. The helplessness of the human individual arises from the fact that he is at bottom a natural complex overwhelmed by vaster forces; while the glory of mind arises from the fact that it can triumph morally over its own imprisonment.

A view of this kind, thoroughly traditional in spirit but transferred to an untraditional perspective, is to be found in the philosophy of Santayana, both in the earlier and the later version. Despite the difficulties that the

view engenders for the full coherence of his outlook (difficulties the gravity of which he never fully saw), it is intended by him as wholly naturalistic. The existential circumstances of mind are even exclusively material. Mind's status is that of a light kindled after a long natural evolution. Its tenure is dependent on accidents. For Santayana, as for others of naturalistic persuasion, these conclusions permit the recognition of objective tragedy.

In its attempt to encompass the ultimate dramatic import of human existence, such an approach is compelling. But its imperceptible transition from a just moral issue to a questionable metaphysical conclusion results largely from its conception of experience. It sees experience as mental life; a history, to be sure, but a history of consciousness. This history is ideally depicted as culminating in a great wonderment by mind, in a euphoric sense of transcendent liberation. For it is not a natural history but a history apart, rationally evaluating its irrational, brute surroundings. The active and the passive phase of integral experience have become hardened into distinct realms of being: the manipulative and assimilative dimensions of the individual have been separated, and assigned respectively to matter and spirit, never to be intelligibly related. The individual has ceased to be a cumulative organism and has become a natural monster with a parasite in its midst. Thought itself, theoretically affirmed by Santayana to be the entelechy or completed actuality of an organism, has crystallized into an inert substance, a "basket case" casualty of the warfare between discordant concepts.

A theory of experience entangled by the dogmas of

epistemology thus commits a penetrating philosopher to the kind of consequence that he habitually deplored, namely, the transformation of a fact into a necessary mystery. The individual's wonderment at his gross dependency and his moral solitude, his sense of protest, is not a proof of epiphenomenalism but a natural judgment of finitude. It is man that is tragic and finite, not mind. The fact of finitude in man is no different in existential status from the fact of finitude in any other natural complex. And the sense of finitude is no different in existential status from the sense of fear or of warmth. Philosophers are continually astonished by the human fact of reflexive communication, and even naturalists regard it as miraculous, lapsing into a kind of covert dualism that seems to bring the race of men closer to the side of the angels. Chauvinism is at its most foolish when extended to the species. Other species and other complexes have no less miraculous differentia, and of course all facts, including all the other facts about man, are miracles in one perspective or another. If man ever has reason to congratulate himself, it can not, in any case, be for his endowments but for his works, and for a comparatively small number of these works at best.

There are other pervasive human experiences the interpretation of which varies with each analysis of experience. One in particular reveals facts that need to be accounted for. Men commonly discover, even after a lifetime of purposive labor, that the appraisal of their own history takes the form of a rather simple feeling, a sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This feeling, obscure in origin, and sometimes nameless and vague, seems detached from the individual history which pre-

ceded it, so that it is possible for satisfaction to crown a history predominantly futile or wasteful, and dissatisfaction a history predominantly arduous and constructive. Even when the feeling is "consistent" with the whole of experience, it does not seem to be "earned" by experience. A mere feeling fortuitously acquires the authority to approve or disapprove a vast structure. The testimony of feeling, moreover, seems to be authoritative periodically within and throughout life, regardless of the span it appraises.

If experience were the kind of cumulative process we have described, could there be such disparity or indifference of connection between the proceptive history and a given feeling? And if conscious feeling has such authority at any time, would it not seem that consciousness is the necessary condition of all experience in the proper sense of the term and not merely one of its factors? The answer requires us to press the question whether there actually can be a disparity between the proceptive direction and a given feeling, and whether the occurrence of such a feeling is actually to be accounted evidence of experiential continuity on the one hand or of fragmentariness and isolation on the other. The sense of anticlimax, of fortuitousness in feeling, is not to be denied. But what does it prove? What reason is there ever to believe that a feeling of great import is extrinsic to the total burden of proception? A feeling is a procept, related like all other procepts to a domain. If it were independent of the character belonging to the rest of the domain, it could also have no bearing on that character, and therefore no content at all. If it is pertinent at all, it is not unaccountable, despite its seeming aloneness. It is pro-

duced by a history and it has its own history. What, then, of the persisting sense of detachment or accidental autonomy that forms the substance of the feeling? An explanation needs to be given, whether experience be construed as proception, as "transaction," or as "conscious life." As understood in any of these senses, or in any other sense, experience is full of vagaries, ironies, and incongruities; but these are not incompatible with its determinateness and with a proportional efficacy of its elements. A feeling that functions appraisively is a judgment. Judgments are not wholly novel parcels, and the facts of habituation and cumulative impact cannot be dismissed any more than the feeling can be. We therefore necessarily look to concealed connections within experience, to missing links, to explain the appearance of hiatus or discontinuity.

"Hidden experience" (undetected, undiscovered) is a troublesome notion, perhaps poorly named, but the recognition nevertheless of a stubborn fact. It is fortunate that in practice the biographer and the psychotherapist need not bring their metaphysics to bear on their discoveries. The view that hidden links are to be found somewhere in a network of mechanical or reflexological acts entails an oversimplification of experience; and the view that these links lie in the Unconscious, besides its classic difficulties, conceptually blackens one half of experience and renders most operative what is least intelligible. In both these approaches the appeal is to a temporal and even to a cumulative sequence. But it is doubtful whether either of two such types of sequence can be said to constitute a history. A behavioral history is too bare to contain the intricacy and pleni-

tude of procepts and products. And a history half of which is intrinsically hidden would hardly seem by itself to explain the efficacy of hidden things. The theory of the proceptive process identifies the status and the factors of an individual history. Whatever is hidden in the individual is a natural complex that became a procept, that is, became relevant to him, in one respect (in its cumulative influence) but not in another respect (as a felt occurrence or as a cognitive object). We have seen that experiential assimilation need not be "sensible, affectional, or appreciatoral"; that it cannot be limited to "immediate experience." The hidden factor, having been assimilated, effectively was, and therefore effectively is, part of a proceptive domain.

The proceptive past is neither more nor less accessible than the social past. The "unconscious," if it is to be preserved as a piece of functionally useful terminology, is best interpreted as a name for the pervasive structures of an individual past, its orders of coexistence and its orders of succession, and its continuing influence. What "lies in the unconscious" is something which is as yet a cognitively unrecovered situation of the proceptive process. The consideration that is overlooked when a present feeling appears wholly alien to a total past is that these two realities, the feeling and the past, compared, are not presently available in the same sense; direct comparison is vitiated by the sudden unwarranted condensation of a past into a simplified present. The past is treated not as an order within a process but as a newly actualized procept. The feeling thus gains in stature as the past is shrunken into a capsule available for direct comparison and direct appraisal.

In fact, then, a present feeling neither annuls nor ratifies a history. It is the fruit of a process, as is every experiental event contemporary with it, and it is no more of a surd than any other constituent of the process, or than the process itself.

IV. MEANING

HUMAN EXPERIENCE becomes what it is in each instance largely through the individual's addition of products to the constantly augmented domain of his procepts. Man is potentially a rational animal—invariably a "symbolical animal" (Cassirer) and perhaps even invariably a "metaphysical animal" (Schopenhauer). But since reason and symbolic activity are most intelligible in terms of the processes of proception and production, it seems more fundamental to say that man is a proceiving and judging animal. Now the procepts (including the products) of men differ in their eventual or effective function. They differ in their relative influence, pervasiveness, and importance, over and above their difference as distinguishable complexes. These differences among them, when added to their numerability, are responsible for the presence of meaning within human experience. Meaning, unlike truth, is a property that belongs to active and exhibitive as well as to assertive products. Moreover, unlike truth, it belongs to procepts which are not products—that is, of course, under certain definite conditions, the same conditions under which it belongs to products. It cannot belong to things or events which have not become procepts, except in the sense that what is as yet unexperienced may acquire meaning after it is experienced. Meaning is an activity of the proceiver as well as a property of procepts and products, and this is commonly recognized by

the use of the term in both a verb form with participles and a substantive form: we "mean" so-and-so, and this or that "has" meaning. To say that it is an activity of the *proceiver* is not to speak redundantly: the emphasis on the individual as proceiver is to be distinguished from the mere reference to the individual as entity, and from the reference to some special capacity of the individual. For meaning, like judgment, cannot be adequately analyzed in terms of "mind." Nor can it be adequately analyzed in terms of "behavior." It is a category requiring the idea of proception: the insufficiency of most theories of meaning reflects an insufficient theory of experience.

A satisfactory conception of meaning cannot limit itself to some one supposedly important species of meaning, much less outlaw species which insistently characterize human experience. It must detect the traits common to "cognitive" and "noncognitive" meaning, "logical" and "psychological" meaning, "public" and "private" meaning. It must accept as its initial datum the fact that meaning *is* attributed to active and exhibitive no less than to assertive judgments, and *is* attributed to events and objects. Among the more thoroughgoing of modern foundations for the concept of meaning is the theory of signs. This theory, with varying degrees of explicitness among its spokesmen, grounds the property and activity of meaning in communication, and communication itself in the sign-relation. Anything functions as a sign when it stands for something (including another sign) to someone; that is, when it designates and when it has an interpretation. According to Royce, signs in essence reflect the pres-

ence of mind. According to Mead, signs are biological mechanisms which function socially, and mind is itself definable as the presence of a type of sign-activity in the organism.[34] Peirce, who supplied the original insight and apparatus for both these versions, inclined in his own version to neither extreme, and from time to time, especially in his later work, included feeling and effort (muscular or psychic effort), along with thought, as ingredients of "interpretation."

A consequence of the type of approach represented by these philosophers is that any product or other procept has the property of meaning only in so far as it is a sign. A further consequence is that meaning arises in the process of communication. The second of these consequences is acceptable (excluding for the moment certain necessary qualifications) provided that communication is regarded as the general framework of utterance, and not as the sole essential factor in the occurrence or the explanation of meaning. The first consequence is too restrictive if "sign" be construed in the usual sense, namely, as anything that "represents" or "stands for" something other than itself. Ordinarily, events or musical phrases do not "stand for" anything at all; yet they are often said to have meaning. If it were true that anything which bears meaning is a sign (or that signs alone are the bearers of meaning), we should have to regard a sign not as necessarily a "representamen" (Peirce), but as anything which for the individual is a means toward further judgment. Royce and Mead, though not so aware as Peirce of the possible complexities of the sign-relation, sensed the greater importance of interpretation or response in the sign-situa-

tion and the lesser importance of the sign as a designation, a vehicle of reference.

Among the pitfalls of the approach to meaning based on emphasizing the sign-relation is the tendency to misconceive the process of communication as a whole. If we understand "sign" in the narrower sense (as a proxy for something else) rather than in the possible broader sense (as a means of further judgment), we must surely conclude that communication is not carried on in terms of signs alone. But even in the broader sense of "sign," there can be essential phases in a communication situation besides the use of signs. Consider the situation in which two construction workers are cooperating in the placement of a steel beam. Active, exhibitive, and assertive judgments enter into their communication: they make strategic movements, they contrive a metal structure that must be just that structure, they give each other directions and describe what is going on. These common judgments are procepts for each worker, constituents of the situation for each. Besides these judgments, there are objects in and elements of the situation which are procepts for each worker but which do not function as judgments; for instance, the metal in the beam, the narrowness of the footing, the framework in which the beam is being fitted, the distance between the workers and the street below, the heat and glare of the sun. Among the products or judgments made in the situation, some may be signs in the narrower and some signs in the broader sense. Among the events and objects not produced in the situation, some may be signs in the broader sense: for instance, the beam signifies (is interpretable as) a bond between two upright pieces

of metal in the framework; it stands for nothing, but it is an instrument fostering judgment. Other elements of the situation, such as the glare and the narrow footing, may not function as signs in either sense of the term. They may be brute elements of the communication. Yet they are elements as truly as any others are, and elements of the communication, not just of the existential situation at large; for they influence the character of the communication, and they are unique circumstantial factors of this kind of communication and this particular instance of communication.

We suggested that difference of function, in products or in other procepts, is the basis for the property of meaning. In order to understand what this implies, it is necessary to revert to certain considerations on the nature of experience. Experience is an order and a movement, the movement providing elasticity to the order and the order providing substance to the movement. The order comprises an organism uniquely interrelated with a mass of complexes. This is the proceptive domain: had Hume declared personal identity to be an order of events rather than an order of perceptions, he would have been less stultified by paradox. Now in everyday discourse it is often useful to say that what may be a "fact" for one individual may not be for another. For instance, satisfactory weather for a vacationer may not be satisfactory weather for a farmer. In a fuller sense, of course, the "fact" may be regarded as the same for both. The physical description of the weather by the farmer and by the vacationer is the same, and the actual differences resulting from the different constituents of the situation are acknowledged as such

by both. It could equally well be said that the fact is the same for both men but that its meaning is different for each. Or, it could be said that the same fact is modified by its presence in, or its relation to, two different orders of fact. The latter formulation is the more fundamental so far as the concept of meaning is concerned. Meaning belongs, when it obtains at all, not to the fact as fact but to the fact as procept. The weather as weather in any given instance is the same for all, but as related to two individuals it is different; the one fact is two procepts. Meaning, then, occurs within an order of some kind, which needs definition, whether this order be taken as the proceptive domain (the whole order of an individual's experience) or some lesser order within that domain.

Still another way of explaining the foregoing difference of "fact" would be to say that the weather occurs in two different perspectives, that of the farmer and that of the vacationer. This way of putting it is both well grounded in popular usage and of considerable philosophic advantage. To begin with, it is superior to saying that the meaning of a fact (or of a product) depends on its "context." Philosophically speaking, both "perspective" and "context" are generalized from narrower usages, one from a reference to vision, the other from a reference to discourse. In both cases the generalization is easy. In both cases the notion of an order is central. But "perspective" lends itself better, when necessary, to the emphasis on variability of order. A context is a fixed structure or interconnection within which something possesses or acquires its character. By itself it suggests no relation to experience. Once gen-

eralized, it applies indifferently to an order of events irrelevant to a proceiver or to an order within his proceptive domain. "Perspective," on the other hand, suggests a human order, and is more pertinent to the analysis of experience and meaning. It has been generalized, by some philosophers, beyond the purview of experience, but with an inevitable flavor of animism.

For an event or thing to acquire meaning it must be located not only within an order but within a given human order, a proceptive domain. This is only the minimal condition of meaning. If it were sufficient, all procepts simply as such would have meaning; and this is not the case. Nevertheless, for the moment, it is clear that a proceptive domain may be regarded as a perspective, the perspective or order of greatest possible breadth for the individual. Practically, when we say that the meaning of the weather is different in the perspectives of the vacationer and the farmer, it is not very illuminating to interpret these perspectives as simply their proceptive domains; it is very much like saying truistically that the life of a farmer is different from that of a vacationer. It is important, however, to discern the continuity in human experience of lesser orders within and with a greater order, and at the same time, the enormous difference which an alteration of order (a "shift of perspective") may make in the function or character of a procept. For it obviously does not follow that a procept, occurring at some particular time in the course of a man's life, retains the same meaning for him merely because it is identifiable as the same procept through its changes. A man's wealth may be a procept of great importance in his life; yet it may fluc-

tuate from time to time, and each of its states may be independently regarded (in philosophical terms) as a procept or experiential modification. The meaning of the more inclusive procept or of a subordinate procept may vary irregularly with its changes, since its possible relations to other procepts (i.e., since the orders or perspectives within which it is located) will determine its role. The antecedent character of a proceptive domain may determine the character of a given procept, and a procept may influence the existing character of a proceptive domain. The degree of effect in one direction or the other largely establishes the character of experience and the meanings within it.

How is it possible for one and the same individual, whose experience may be regarded as one all-inclusive perspective, to "mean" different things, or assimilate different "meanings," in different perspectives? Does not the all-inclusive order supersede, as it were, the lesser orders within it? To vary the question, how can the individual be less than an individual? The answer lies in the nature of judgment in particular and proception in general. What a man produces or experiences, he produces or experiences under certain conditions. These conditions may be of varying degrees of pervasiveness in his life, and accordingly so may his products or his procepts generally. A specific set of human conditions, constituting an order, is what we mean by a perspective. A product or procept, though of one and the same individual, and though by definition a unique determinant of his experience, is not necessarily, and in fact is rarely, of consequence to every phase of the individual's life. Though it is relevant to

the whole, in the sense that it falls within a unitary or individual domain of experience, it is not necessarily of direct import to the whole any more than to all the parts. It may be in conflict with another product or procept pertinent to another phase of the individual's life. The specific character of the proceptive direction may depend on just such plurality and contrariety. The multiple perspectives go to make up one gross effect, one cumulative trend. For some individuals, no product or procept is ever of such magnitude as to be directly effective in their total experience. For others, much of what occurs in their experience has momentous or total effect.

Since products and procepts necessarily occur under specific conditions that exclude other conditions, that is, in some perspectival order, why is their meaning anything more than their occurrence? The answer is that what is meaningful does not simply possess a quality (of meaningfulness); it functions (meaningfully). Otherwise, we should have to say, awkwardly and even foolishly, that many things have meaning in and of themselves but that no one knows what these meanings are. Location in a perspective is one of the conditions for existence of a procept or product qua procept or product, and hence a necessary condition of its meaning, but still not a sufficient condition. We say that the weather has one meaning *for* the farmer and another *for* the vacationer; that it "signifies" one thing or another. If "signifies" is taken as "sign-ifies" or "acts as a sign," then presumably to the one individual it "stands for" something different from what it stands for to the other. But we have observed that this cannot be the

universal or fundamental trait of the meaning-situation. For the musical phrase may have meaning to the composer or critic without its standing for anything, and the French Revolution may have many meanings to the historian even though, as a unique structure of events and ideas, it may not "stand for" something else in any sense. To return: the weather has meaning in the perspective of the farmer. And this implies that it is a procept which, in its direct bearing, may affect not the entire course of his life but rather, say, his haymaking operations this season. The perspective within which the procept acquires meaning may be a limited one, although potentially, being within a proceptive domain, it can acquire great bearing on the character of that domain and therefore on the proceptive direction. The weather "signifies," then, not necessarily in the sense that it stands for something other than itself, but in a more basic sense.

The weather will have or acquire meaning for the farmer only in so far as he is the author of a judgment into which it somehow enters—only in so far as he makes, does, or asserts something relating to it. This is equivalent to saying that the weather must become an element of a certain kind in a perspective of the farmer; for a perspective is an order of interrelated judgments or other procepts. It is also equivalent to saying that the farmer must "interpret" the weather. But "interpret" needs explication in terms of the concepts presently under consideration; it is not the explicator of these concepts. We found (Chapter II, section iv) that it has certain disadvantages when used without qualification. Especially when applied to the problem of

meaning, "interpretation" suffers from a mentalistic connotation; so that its function must be more exactly specified. It remains better to say, thus far: the weather acquires meaning only if it is judged, and does not yet possess meaning if it is just proceptively relevant. And as with a procept like the weather, so with a product: a product acquires its meaning in so far as it is the subject matter of another product or judgment.

Here certain questions seem to obtrude themselves. What constitutes "becoming or being the subject matter" of a judgment? May not one judgment "about" another or about a procept be extrinsic to the character of the other judgment or the procept? May not something which enters into a perspective of judgment enter it accidentally? Do we not often act toward a product as if it meant something which it did not? And do we not say many things which are both irrelevant to other things and in themselves "meaningless"?

The tenor of these questions only points up the need for further qualifying and completing the conditions of meaning. In the process of introducing a judgment relating to another judgment or a procept, we do not *merely* act toward, make something with, or say something about, the latter. In acting, making, or saying we establish, reveal, or tacitly specify the way in which the product or procept functions with respect to other products or procepts in the given perspective. The judgment brought to bear must, whether implicitly or systematically, articulate the perspective within which the product or procept is to have a role. Articulation, we saw, extends or helps to produce what is articulated, and thus qualifies "interpretation," which by itself

often implies only the introduction of judgments designed to present but not to affect the status of what is interpreted. In articulating we may define or redefine, enact or reenact, produce or reproduce, a perspective: in all cases we expose or partially expose the elements that constitute and express this perspective. The farmer, the artist, and the scientist, whenever they mean something and find something meaningful, produce or reproduce an order, and allocate to certain procepts or products a place in that order. The weather has meaning for the farmer because in his actions with respect to it or in his comments about it he is indicating the relations of the weather to his other procepts; he is articulating a group of conditions, an order in experience, a perspective. The musical phrase has meaning for the composer because he is exhibitively grouping it with other preceding and succeeding phrases that help to give it a function or role within an order of sounds. The French Revolution has meaning for the historian because by describing its events, institutions, and persons he can establish, reveal, and define their role in the numerous orders of events that include them; his historical judgments articulate a historical perspective. An ordinary statement made by one individual to another has meaning for both because it is succeeded by other judgments which, through juxtaposition with it, articulate the perspective common to all these judgments; it has meaning, or a meaning-function in a perspective, because its use promotes the processes of identifying, predicting, describing, or disclosing, all of which serve as articulative processes. We saw (Chapter II, section iv) that articulation need not

be in the same mode of judgment as the judgments articulated. By action we may help to realize the meaning of a contrivance or a theory; by contrivance, the meaning of an assertion or an action.

A procept or product thus has a meaning if and when it subserves the articulation of some perspective within which it can be said to be located. To subserve articulation is to initiate it, to stimulate it, or simply to be eligible for it. What "is" meaningful or "has" meaning facilitates either the production or the discovery, by subsequent utterance, of other elements in a perspective. Simply to say, of something, that to have meaning it must "play a role" is not enough. Any event that influences us is a procept for us. By definition of "procept," it "plays a role" in our experience. Yet it need not be actually meaningful. It may not have been judged, either by the proceiver or by anyone else. We "find" meaning "in," or "give" meaning "to," a procept or product when through judgment we increase the availability of some order within which it is an element.

How, it may be asked, can we have suggested that a product or judgment does not acquire meaning simply by its occurrence? For it is understandable how an unproduced procept may not be meaningful and still be a procept; it remains an existence relevant to the character of the self whether we know of the existence or not. But if a judgment does not yet fulfill the conditions of meaning, why call it a judgment? Despite the formidable sound of this objection, the answer is not difficult. A judgment comes into being not as an instantaneous and completely propertied event but as an event

with a certain type of promise. It promises to disclose a perspective to articulation; it promises to function meaningfully. Like all other species of things, it is named in terms of its fullest actualization. But it cannot antecedently possess all the functions with which circumstances may endow it. It is something which addresses communication, not a beginning and an end of communication all rolled into one. It is a judgment precisely because it is a product that does admit of meaning-activity. It is a pronouncement, an appraisal, a commentary because it can be *discovered* to pronounce, appraise, comment in a particular way. This discovery is part of its fulfillment as meaningful. Every judgment properly so called is potentially meaningful in an assertive, exhibitive, or active capacity. Most of the contexts in which we have referred to judgments have presupposed their eventuation in meaningful status. The foregoing account of meaning is necessarily more tortuous as an account than is the actual attainment of a meaning-status by any given judgment. Every judgment as such is expectative of this status in its ontological career. For it has a career, even as its producer has, and like its producer, becomes increasingly interrelated. Acts, contrivances, statements *acquire* meaning. Meaning is not the condition of their origin. It is one of the conditions of their efficacy and their availability. Likewise it may be said that every unproduced procept has potential meaning; for as a procept it plays the type of role eligible for meaningful discovery. The meaning of an individual's products and the meaning of his experience are kin.

The perspective of a judgment meant may be an or-

der of acts, of contrivances, or of assertions, or, as is usually the case in human experience, of all three modes of judgment. It may be a moral enterprise, a formal work of art, a mathematical system. In each of these, one mode predominates and all modes are represented. With "perspective," as with other fundamental notions already considered, it is necessary to guard against an exclusively intellectualized version, one in which the original emphasis on perceptual seeing is generalized no farther than "mental seeing" or than "phenomenological seeing" in Husserl's sense. The synonymity of "perspective" and "point of *view*" should not deceive us. Methodologically speaking, the "point" is more fundamental than the "view," in the sense that it can be a point of action, or in general a point of judgment and a point of assimilation, as well as a point of sight. Colloquial usage actually recognizes this by the further synonymity of "point of view" and "standpoint," and by various other phrases that emphasize perspective, for example, "from where I stand" or "in my case." "Vision" (the "view," the "sight") itself has frequently been broadened to include in its scope philosophic encompassment, artistic transformation, and planned action. A perspective is the sphere of conditions under which experience is concretized and specific judgments are applicable. "Procept" was defined as any natural complex relevant to an individual as individual. Two natural complexes each of which is a procept for the same individual may be relevant in very different "respects"—in different perspectives. A perspective is therefore a *sphere* of relevance within the life-perspective or proceptive domain, within a man's "experi-

ence." A natural complex relates to an individual always in *some* respect; and whatever is produced, likewise, is produced in *some* perspective.

A perspective is not "inside" the individual's mind or skin, any more than the proceptive domain is. The proceptive domain is an order of complexes (including an organism) the interrelatedness of which constitutes a self, or inclusive order of individual experience. To discover or determine a meaning, to articulate a perspective, is partly to develop and partly to find in that order one trait rather than another. Being a fact of nature, a perspective is itself a procept, or complex relevant to some individual. But a proceptive domain may be as similar to another proceptive domain as it is unique. The same complexes may be common to different individuals, and two orders of complexes may overlap. From which it follows that some perspectives may be common to different individuals. What is called "common experience" or "social experience" may be intended in either or both of two senses. In one sense, it implies the existence of common perspectives. In the other, it implies a sum or group of individual perspectives. Common perspectives and an aggregate of individual perspectives are alike "commonly" available: they are either present for the experience of an individual or transmissible to an individual in the course of time. Common perspectives are available for the individual's participation; an aggregate of accumulated perspectives is available as a heritage for his assimilation. In the former case, the perspectives are there for him to share or adopt or recognize as already shared by him, voluntarily or involuntarily; in the lat-

ter, they are there for him to utilize and understand. In either case he modifies in some degree what he acquires experientially. In a sense community of perspective is more fundamental as a determinant of "social experience" than a body of accumulated perspectives. For an aggregate has small significance *as* an aggregate, as a historical accumulation, if each of its perspectives is not potentially as shareable as actually it may have been unshared. The fact that perspectives can be shared makes social communication possible. In communication new perspectives are socially defined and present perspectives are socially explored, and this is true whether the form taken by the communication is one of collaboration or of strife.

Communication is an indispensable condition of meaning only in the sense that *either* in reflexive *or* in social form it is part of the process of articulating a perspective. The tendency of some philosophers to emphasize the influence of social communication on the individual, with tacit reduction of emphasis on the converse influence of reflexive communication, is founded in a prior emphasis on speech symbols as the main type of symbols in communication and as the most fundamental type of signs in general. From this it would follow, erroneously enough, that reflexive communication is carried on essentially in assertive terms, in the process of thought, with making and doing as at best auxiliaries of this process. There is a further point that needs to be made in defining the relation of communication to meaning. To say that communication is one factor in the meaning-situation is valid. But to say that nothing can have meaning unless it is "communicable" is valid

only if the same distinctions that apply to "communication" are applied to "communicability," namely, the distinction between reflexive and social communication, and the distinction between reflexive communication and one of its species, reflexive formulation. By the nature of the existing conditions, some meanings may be reflexively and not socially communicable. And by the nature of the existing conditions, some meanings communicable in either way may be communicable only in nonassertive form. For the most part, to philosophers "communicable" means "communicable in assertive language" or "formulatable." But if the genus "communicable" is thus reduced to one of its species, "formulatable," the alleged and time-honored necessary connection between meaning and communicability does not obtain.

ii

The preceding discussion is designed not to negate or exclude any of the various special philosophic conceptions of meaning but to indicate their limited scope and to frame the general conditions which give them whatever value they can have. Among these special versions, some are set forth theoretically more often than others. A meaning, it has been said, is a "definition," the possessor of the meaning being a word; or an "interpretation," belonging to a statement, and consisting in an equivalent expression or series of expressions. Or the meaning of a word, and sometimes of a statement, is its "reference," the object or situation the word designates, the facts to which the statement "corresponds." Or a meaning is a special type of definition,

specifying some "operational" procedure. Or the meaning, of anything at all, is the "psychic effect" or "psychic impact" or set of "associations" aroused by it. Or a meaning is an "intention," and meaning in general is "intent." Or a meaning is a "habit (or rule) of action," or "habit of expectation," or "rule of identification." Or meaning consists in the "consequences" of what we believe—sometimes the logical consequences of an assertion, sometimes the psychic or emotional consequences of entertaining the assertion. Or meaning lies in the "practical effects" of our expressions. Or the meaning of an assertion is the "method of its verification." Or, to cover both assertions and the "truth" of works of art, meaning lies in "authentication." And so on. Definitions, associations, reference, intent, habits, rules, formal and emotional consequences, all no doubt have a place somewhere among the manifestations of meaning. But they can not be simply added up to provide the generic condition that satisfies the modes of judgment and the nature of proception.

The conception of meaning as the allocation to procepts and products of a function within a perspective raises a number of problems. What determines the limits of a perspective? And just what, therefore, are we articulating in the process of meaning? In the ordinary phases of experience, perspectives are determined for men by the concourse of events, by the endowments of their organism, and by the accumulated force of their past. The closest they come to purposive (or initiative) determination of perspective is through query. The products of query may themselves often be regarded as

perspectives, though each is evolved within the limits of another perspective. A theory, a course of action, a work of art, are ordered connections of subaltern or constituent products. But even in query, the producer can no more limit the boundaries or fully ordain the properties of his product and its parts, and hence of his perspective, than a parent can wholly predetermine the nature of his offspring. When the product or perspective emanating from query is assimilated by others, however passively or uncritically, it is necessarily modified. The perspective remains to some extent indeterminate and as it were open, owing partly to the possibility of its assimilation in some new proceptive domain and partly to the contingencies of its career in any one proceptive domain. Perspectives cannot be shared without being determined in some new respect, just as lines cannot intersect without coming from and leading to new directions or without creating new angles. It follows that the meaning of a product of query, like that of an unsystematic product or of any procept, is never fully fixed or determinate. The scene in a play, the action within a course of action, the concept within a philosophic system may have a predetermined role: but the role is subject to the vagaries of its perspective and the relative powers of an articulator.

In the realm of assertive query there are instances where control of the perspective is at a maximum, notably in formal logical systems, which characteristically stipulate the sign-"vocabularies" and the rules of manipulation. But there is no way of preempting all possible properties that a sign may have in such a system, despite the fact that all admissible conditions govern-

ing the juxtaposition and combination of signs have been specified. It may conceivably be found that a sign plays some role or has some function in the system other than that intended for it. Some new analyst of the system may see the system as a whole and the signs within it in a new light. The framer of the system may have overlooked an ambiguity in his prescriptions for it. Moreover, since new deductions are always possible in a formal system, the implicit status of a sign may turn out to be altered by its location in unforeseen contexts. To insist that the role of a given sign is fully determinate is merely to reiterate a resolution or rule but not to achieve "complete mastery" over the possible properties of a product. No product, we suggested earlier,[35] is ever wholly creatable by its producer or wholly exhaustible in the specification of its possible functions and traits. There are, then, contingent and unlooked for circumstances allowing for indeterminateness, or "openness" of meaning, and limiting the determinateness of meaning brought by the producer. The articulator can thus contribute beyond the producer's power as well as beyond his intent.

In all products whatever, we also saw (Chapter II, section iii), there are limits to control that are of another kind—those imposed by the essential conditions of production and by the natural recalcitrancy of the materials involved. That is to say, determination by the producer is limited by the basal determinateness present in any complex and in the process of production. Determinateness is thus encountered as well as introduced. There is always some degree of fixity counterimposed on the judge by what is judged, on the pro-

ducer by the subject matter. Just as in a mathematical system the types of practice are limited by the need for explicit rules of *some* kind and by the procedure of inference essential to *any* system, so in a dance or a play or a sphere of conduct there are requirements of combination and sequence in the absence of which the product would not be that product, nor indeed a product at all. The intervals between the physical movements in a dance cannot be of indefinite duration, the speeches in a play cannot be of indefinite length, the parties to a moral relation must have some interests in common. These inherent conditions, which limit control over a perspective, are not like the contingent circumstances which preserve openness or indeterminateness of meaning. They tend to close or narrow meaning in competition with a like aim by the producer. Whereas he limits meaning by invention, they limit it by the rigidities of existence, including the habits of man. A perspective can be neither completely closed nor completely open. If wholly determinate meaning is a myth, wholly indeterminate meaning is not meaning at all.

The sphere of common conduct and common sense is one in which meanings possess a paradoxical status. On the one hand, the meanings that arise from everyday makings, sayings, and doings may be said to be highly determinate. The great degree of routine, authority, and social inertia make for recurrent, regular judgment. The typical and familiar in experience fit into typical and familiar perspectives, and play the same role repeatedly; so that meanings are stable. The articulations of common experience are neither sharp

nor sustained. They are inherited models which have proved to do a job. But on the other hand, these meanings which are so determinate are subject to easy collapse. They are determinate in the way that bubbles are determinate, with ever the same rotundity and recognizability, but tenuous and evanescent in the particular instance. They recur readily and speedily, given favorable conditions, but they cannot stay for long. The common man who is questioned intensively or from whom distinctive response is required becomes confused or inhibited. He has borrowed his articulations. To say that it is the nature of common experience to be uncritical and untheoretical is to credit these facts but not satisfactorily to explain them. The explanation lies primarily in the character of the perspectives of common life. Though recurrent, and though predictable in their nature, they intersect and shift promiscuously. What we call common experience is characterized by a minimum of query, and not merely by a minimum of assertive abstraction. Whereas in query one or another perspective dominates for a time in relative isolation, in common life virtually no perspective is strong enough to hold the fort by itself. Action and assertion are habitually pallid, contrivance is serviceable but perfunctory. The solid citizen is the man who experiences nothing solidly. The situations of query which are closest to common experience, or as we should perhaps say, to which common experience is closest, lie in the realm of active judgment. They are the situations of conflict, travail, and indecision. The common man free of query belongs to nation, family, occupation, and church with normal, healthful apathy. Incipient

query assembles the different commitments into jumbled coexistence. The problems of preference, obligation, or political action are exacerbated by the crowding of many perspectives. The common man is able to "see" few things because in active query there is too much to see for one who must be in various stations at once and fulfill various roles with equal allegiance. Action becomes mazelike, and vision takes place through many glasses darkly. Where, before, the perspectives in experience were profuse and weak, they have become each too insistent to relinquish the field. The meanings that were once determinate and fragile are now rugged and indeterminate.

iii

Is it necessary to distinguish between the mere absence of meaning in an ordinary situation and what philosophers call "meaninglessness"? Among the existences in an individual's environment, a situation or a product is as likely not to possess as to possess meaning for him. Widely used judgments are universally meaningful under normal conditions, that is, when articulating judgments are habitual or ready at hand. When something is said to have no meaning for an individual, these conditions simply are absent. A man either understands, responds, judges, or he does not. He does not apply normative considerations that rule on the presence or absence of meaning. The machinery either functions or fails to function. The philosopher of these times, however, has no hesitation in declaring products "meaningless." It is rarely himself that he blames for failure to understand. It is the product as such and the

methodological conduct of the producer. Historians criticize one another for factual error, misconception of evidence, lack of imagination, exaggerated emphasis on the scientific possibilities of historiography, or undue limitation to a single perspective. Sociologists upbraid one another for excessive preoccupation with grand categories or excessive preoccupation with statistical inquiry. But philosophers attack at the roots, in mortal combat, declaring void not only single expressions but whole systems of discourse. They commit each other's work to the flames, find obscurantism everywhere in arduously built structures, and excommunicate each other to the supposedly innocuous realm of poetry. They feel free to do these things not merely in cases of manifest quackery but where a system of discourse has been articulated by generations of philosophers and has influenced historic thought and action. It is instructive to observe how philosophers who reject the view that meaning is an intrinsic property of objects adopt in practice the view that meaninglessness is an intrinsic property of certain types of expressions and statements.

Such expressions and statements are appraised in accordance with whether they do or do not exhibit criteria imposed by the critic from without. The charge most frequently made against the language of classical philosophy is that terms which purport to have "reference" actually do not. But precisely what constitutes the reference or designation of a "descriptive" term, and of certain characteristic philosophic terms in particular, is a complex problem, not helped toward solution by the use of simple analogies. The conditions of designa-

tion are determined by the character of the perspective, not by the number of alternative "meanings" available in packaged form for a term's usage. But regardless of what a term "purports" to do, its value may ultimately lie in an exhibitive rather than in an assertive function. Since designation is not a necessary condition of meaning, criticism which relates to the meaning of philosophic utterance must be based on a more general criterion.

The abuse of the appraisal "meaningless" does not imply the nonexistence of meaninglessness. The central question at this point is whether the difference between (*a*) the absence of a meaning-situation as such, and (*b*) the "meaninglessness" of elements belonging to a meaning-situation, amounts to a difference of kind or of degree. The attribution of meaninglessness in philosophy can be based on the following types of circumstances. (1) An element of a philosophic structure, a term, a phrase, an explicit assertion (all elements are potential if not actual judgments) is declared meaningless when it is found by an assimilator to have no specifiable relation of a conceptual kind to the other elements of that structure, and therefore to have no value toward the articulation of the perspective. It does not function as a judgment but merely is present as a physical complex. (2) An element is declared meaningless when an assimilator can discern no possible way in which it can function within his own philosophic perspective; when he is unable to "translate" it into his own idiom. An entire structure is declared meaningless when an assimilator finds no way in which it can be articulated by the judgments he brings to bear. He

finds no overlapping or community between the other perspective and his own, and cannot therefore "adopt" the other or identify with it.

The difficulties enumerated in (1) and (2) constitute an impairment, obstruction, or dissipation of the meaning-situation. It is clear, from this fact, that the meaninglessness of an element in a meaning-situation and the absence of a meaning-situation as such are the same in kind. What is deemed meaningless by the critic is actually the absence of a meaning-situation for *him*. For the meaningless element within a situation can itself equally well be regarded as a meaning-situation of smaller scope. And the larger, original meaning-situation (whether of philosophic or common experience), which we say is either present or absent, can equally well be regarded as an element in a still larger meaning-situation, such as the general discourse of philosophers or the perspective of everyday activity. Meaninglessness and the absence of a meaning-situation are thus alike essentially impediments to judgment and communication; except that the one is laid to vice and the other to fate. Let us return to more detailed consideration of (1) and (2).

(1) Whether this type of circumstance ever obtains in so clear-cut a form, it is difficult to say. That it frequently obtains in no uncertain degree is plain from the reformulation and self-correction by philosophers of their own products. When a philosophic critic finds a specific element of a perspective meaningless in the present sense, this implies that he has been able to identify himself with the meaningfulness of other elements in the perspective; and he is therefore freed from

the prima facie suspicion of intolerance. On the other hand, (*i*) elements which have been found to be opaque in one generation have been found to be luminous by earlier or later assimilators, or by contemporaries with different articulative tools. Thus the determinism assigned to God by Spinoza, unintelligible to those who regarded his perspective in the light of classical theology, was highly meaningful to those who saw his conception of nature as the expression of an overarching mechanical order. And (*ii*) elements which seem to have no function within the perspective of a philosophic system are sometimes found to have a function, and therefore ultimately a meaning, in the biographical perspective of its producer, or in the cultural perspective that may not be directly revealed in the product. The meaning of an element relative to the biographical or cultural perspective may or may not affect the status of that element's meaning in the philosophic system. Hobbes's conception of social covenant seems to be of dubious meaning when interpreted in temporal terms as historic fact. When seen in the light of a revolutionary age and of Hobbes's personal reaction to it, the genetic version of "contract" becomes more elastic and more plausible. In this case, the social and biographical perspective not only gives its own meaning to the concept but also clarifies (articulates) the philosophic perspective in which the concept occurs. The concept of revolution, not directly present in Hobbes's analysis of contract, affects the meaning of contract as a temporal phenomenon. Revolution (in effect a "war of all men against all men") necessitates subsequent recon-

struction and redefinition of the total political order, such reconstruction illustrating a social covenant temporally "transferring right" to a "common power" that gives effect to the "laws of nature." In other cases, for example those of St. Augustine and Kierkegaard, an opaque element within the ideational perspective likewise frequently acquires meaning in the cultural or biographical perspective; but as often as not for philosophic assimilators in these cases, the one meaningful role fails to establish another meaningful role for the element as concept.

Finally, (*iii*) an element which is found to have no assertive role in a philosophic system may yet have an exhibitive role. Some exhibitive elements of a philosophic structure are more obvious than others. Obviously exhibitive, for instance, is the dialectical apparatus of objection and reply exemplified by St. Thomas Aquinas, or the "geometrical method" exemplified by Spinoza. The fact that Spinoza's inferences are sometimes defective and that his propositions do not always follow from previous assumptions by strict mathematical standards does not vitiate the exhibitive function of the ordering. Other types of elements in a philosophy which appear not as formal devices but as substantive materials, for instance the myths of Plato, have often been denied assertive meaning, but plainly help to determine for other concepts or substantive elements their character as parts of a perspective. Similarly, Aquinas's conception of angels or pure forms, even if denied assertive meaning in a perspective where the assertive meaning of other elements is accepted,

functions exhibitively, and therefore meaningfully, in so far as it helps to complete the character of the architectonic.

(2) A philosophy which in whole or in part cannot be utilized philosophically by another individual is an unavailable product so far as that individual is concerned. "I don't understand" or "it has no meaning for me" is always a better adjudication, morally and methodologically, than "it is meaningless." Whether communication is to be made more likely by modification of the product or by modification of the assimilator's resources is a recurrent problem for criticism. In these days, to take an example, Plotinus's doctrine of "emanation," or actually the philosophy of Plotinus as a whole, is remote and unintelligible to most philosophers. But those philosophers who are content to call the system "poetry" act very differently from the way poets do. The poet is less impatient with and less inclined to dismiss "obscurity" than the philosopher is. What the philosopher may regard as inarticulate the poet may regard as a stimulus to articulation, as the beginning and not the end. An influential deterrent to the progress of mutual understanding among philosophers is the assumption that there is some one proper way to articulate another's perspective, on the analogy of the code to which there is one key. If philosophers are capable of gloriously constructive rebellion, they are also capable of utter subjugation by the forms of grammar and the fashions of nomenclature. The articulation of a perspective requires a certain latitudinarianism. The articulator who cannot "discover" a satisfactory translation might do well to invent one, not as

sport, but in accordance with a sense of philosophic identification, and indeed in response to the obligations of critical query.

It has sometimes been contended that many philosophic expressions which claim to be and appear to be assertions are not assertions at all; that, despite their possession of the conventional declarative form, their subject matter concerns supposed objects other than the "objects of possible experience." In terms of the foregoing general circumstances under which meaninglessness is attributed, the reason why, according to this objection, an alleged assertive judgment cannot function in the perspective either of the philosophy concerned or of any other philosophy is that it violates the very conditions of assertive judgment. Its ostensible subject matter cannot be connected with anything that could be specified as a procept, and it is therefore a block to articulation. A substantive content may be arbitrarily assigned to it, but only arbitrarily, for there is no way by which a content can be discovered for it.

Now there is no doubt that certain philosophers have wished to keep their cake and eat it. Their assertions have purported to describe and identify what they have officially held to be indescribable and unidentifiable, or "unknowable" and "ineffable." There is *something* that is functioning as a procept or "object of experience" for them, but they themselves have rendered it unintelligible by committing outright contradiction. So far, then, the objection in question is sound, and the general spirit, at least, of the warnings by philosophers in the so-called empiricist tradition has been of value. But too often, when it is required that philo-

sophic assertions limit themselves to "objects of possible experience," the "experience" prescribed is only one form or one phase of experiencing. All meaning, to the extent that it is efficacious in the proceptive domain of some individual, is "empirical." What philosophers espousing an "empirical" conception of meaning have desired in particular is the disregard by philosophy of any form of experiencing other than that which is adapted to the procedures of natural science or which is accessible to the grasp of common sense. The assumption underlying this desire is that excessive charity in the philosophic temper leads to excessive individualism, and hence to irresponsibility and the retardation of knowledge. Philosophy, it is held, should become a scientific discipline, aiming at rigor and clarity, and avoiding obscurity by renouncing the temptation to metaphorical utterance.

The philosopher who thinks that there is an ideal of literalness and an ideal of clarity to which philosophy should conform, and that "metaphor" is the instrument peculiar to poetry, is deceived. The original and basic theory of assertive meaning in the philosophy of the recent past, Peirce's pragmatism, regarded itself as a formula explaining "how to make our ideas clear." The quest for "clear and distinct ideas" was centuries old, and in a sense coincided with the birth of philosophy. The new stimulus came from developments in formal logic and from a strong insight into the nature of sign-activity. It sprang from the desire for a mode of clarity that would be impersonal and free of psychological idiosyncrasy. The model of philosophic assertion was to be scientific assertion, grounded in the com-

pulsion of overt experimental practice. But Peirce's achievements in this regard notwithstanding, for a general theory of meaning the notion of clarity, not to speak of any specific theory of clarity, is inadequate. So far as the exhibitive and active modes of judgment are concerned, it has small value if any at all. But even for the meaning of assertive judgment, clarity is neither primary nor normatively pursuable to the exclusion of other norms.

Philosophers for whom clarity is the dominant consideration almost necessarily circumscribe the scope of invention, and often pay the price of limiting themselves to newly formulated variants of commonplaces. But further, clarity is not pursuable as a dominant philosophic norm because there never has been and there is no promise that there ever will be reasonable agreement on what constitutes clarity—neither on its philosophic criterion nor on the application of a specific criterion once chosen. Those who make it a cardinal aim usually restrict the sphere of meaningful assertion to what they themselves feel is congenial, for instance, "common sense discourse," or (as alternately tolerable) scientific discourse, which, ironically enough, entails very different standards of clarity. In effect they minimize or discourage the exhibitive function of philosophy. Philosophers who regard their own work as essentially the clarification of ideas often make important contributions precisely because they devote great labor to the articulation of perspectives in which these ideas have already occurred. Assuming that in a given instance there is some understanding and agreement on what "clarification" is to consist in, such clarifica-

tion is one form of articulation. But even regardless of any consensus on clarity, articulation is a value, and labor dedicated to clarification may be valuable in spite of a narrowly conceived norm. In whatever version, clarity must consummate formulation, not legislate to it. To appeal at the outset of philosophic activity to clarity above all, is like appealing to utility above all. Utility is a development from ideas, not a condition of their invention.

The purpose of clarifying is to expedite communication, in some form or other. There is no doubt that what is in fact totally incommunicable (in any mode of judgment) is of small human value. But a product that is difficult to communicate may often be the worthier of communication. Only the specific human situation in question can determine whether it is more important to intensify the substance of a product at the possible expense of its ready communication, or to facilitate the communication of a product with secondary regard for its intensification. Desirable as it may be to combine the two aims, query is no respecter of expedience. In general, and on the basis of historical experience, it may be said that query, and philosophy in particular, makes perfection of the product primary, while common sense makes expeditious communication primary. Some of the common-sensist movements in philosophy have flaunted this historical lesson and confounded these two functions of human experience. They are entitled to such liberty, and even obliged to exploit the many weaknesses latent in the accumulated testimony of the past. But all of query, and not only philosophy, witnesses the primacy of the prospective product as

product. The greatest products of art and science are rarely "simple": they rarely sacrifice depth of query in the service of rapid assimilation or mass consumption.

"Literalness" in philosophy is as difficult to determine as "clarity" is, and as impossible to legislate. If it is a property determined by etymology and lexicography, or by formalized logical syntax, its prescription paralyzes the quest for traits of increasingly greater generality, and therefore much of the process of constructive philosophizing. All the classical British philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, fancied themselves to be apostles of literal usage, and have been extolled as such by champions of literalness ever since. Their maxims, fortunately, could not suppress their own philosophic powers: too often they have been praised or disparaged for what they preached rather than for what they practiced. Hobbes held it an "abuse of speech" when men "use words metaphorically, that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others." [36] To be sure, the principal idea of *Leviathan* is expressed by a metaphor—"an artificial *man* which we call a commonwealth." And some of the most fundamental concepts explicating the nature of commonwealth are repeatedly expressed in metaphorical terms. Thus, in covenant, "right is *laid aside";* men are obliged "to *lay down* this right to all things." By a "fundamental law of nature . . . men are *commanded* to endeavour peace." And the concept of a "covenant of every one, to every one" is hardly a "literal" account of a transaction.

Locke and Berkeley, aware of the value of metaphor,

though not of its inevitability, tried to choose good metaphors for their own use. Locke varied several metaphors for mind: *"white paper," "empty cabinet," "dark room,"* and *"closet."* Berkeley was most fond of his *"Language* of the *Author* of Nature." Sometimes Locke, unobtrusively in the course of investigation, would produce a striking metaphor indigenous to the argument, like the reference to duration as "another sort of *distance,* or *length,* the idea whereof we get . . . from the *fleeting* and *perpetually perishing* parts of succession"; [37] or like the description of reasoning, previously cited, as *"search* and *casting about."* But neither Locke nor Berkeley was aware of the pervasiveness of metaphor in his own usage. Over and over again, as the basic texture of Locke's discussion, ideas *"come into* the mind," are *"stamped upon"* the mind, are *"imprinted on"* the mind, the memory, and the senses. They are *"conveyed in* by the senses." The mind *"stores* itself" with a *"stock* of ideas," or *"lays up"* ideas. *"External"* and *"internal"* sense are the sole *"fountains"* or *"sources"* of knowledge. Perception is "the *inlet* of all the *materials"* of knowledge. A self-evident principle *"carries* its own *light* and evidence with it." And so on from beginning to end. Berkeley, more than a little concerned by what he took to be mischievous metaphors like "support" (substance as a support of qualities) and "attraction" (in the Newtonian account of gravitation), was unaware of his own metaphorical heritage from Locke. Ideas are *"imprinted";* one *"looks a little into* his own thoughts" and acquires a *"stock* of ideas"; general laws *"run through"* the *"chain* of natural effects."

Hume, classical exemplar of sobriety and precision, is dependent on metaphor for virtually every one of the key notions in his work. Taking *An Inquiry into Human Understanding,* we find that resemblance, contiguity, and causation are "the only *bonds* that unite our thoughts together." (The *Treatise,* of course, had made the self a *"bundle."*) The mind, presented with an object, "is *carried* to the conception of the correlative." The Lockean *"internal"* and *"external"* senses, the *"stock* of ideas" and *"chain* of ideas" are all present; and what to Locke was a casual metaphor, *"impression,"* is made a central term. An impression of the senses *"conveys* my thought," and "I *paint* [objects] out to myself." Some ideas *"take faster hold* of my mind" than others. Commonly or "literally" we say that a sense-organ "feels." To Hume, belief is "something *felt* by the mind." The mind *"gives"* to ideas more *"weight"* than it gives to fictions. It "renders them the *governing* principle of our actions." Our conclusions from experience *"carry us beyond"* (or *"go beyond"* or *"reach beyond"*) our memory and senses. But they always rest on "the present *testimony* of our senses, or the *records* of our memory." Imagination is arbitrary "where we *consult* not experience." We cannot dispute the *"authority* of experience," which is "ultimately the *foundation* of our inference and conclusion."

Metaphor cannot be avoided if philosophy is to be more than the formal prescription of symbols. In large measure, what makes the difference between good and bad metaphor, as indeed the difference between satisfactory and unsatisfactory concepts generally speaking,

is the relative power of the perspective within which they function. Since their meaning is determined by their role in the perspective consequent upon its articulation, their full value in most instances cannot be antecedently determined or gratuitously assigned. This is the reason for another error of Hobbes, who supposed, as do so many philosophers currently influenced by the logic of formal systems, that philosophic meanings can all be set out in advance. He condemned his predecessors for their failure to use mathematical technique. "For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions or explications of the names they are to use, which is a method that hath been used only in geometry, whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable." Philosophically "absurd" conclusions indicate "want of method." Philosophers "begin not their ratiocination from definitions, that is, from *settled* significations of their words." [38] Now *settled* significations (as distinct from provisional ones) attain philosophic value when the settlement is made during or after, not before, query. No philosopher properly so called courts ambiguity or obscurity for its own sake. The fact of the matter is that ambiguity and obscurity may persist in philosophic reflection despite the introduction of settled meanings by resolution. For the speculative process inevitably modifies initial resolutions if it is positive and not purely formal in character. The growing perspective alters the role and hence eventually the meaning of its elements. The philosopher is faced with the alternatives of preserving his initial definitions at the cost of query or modifying them in accordance with query. Obscurity and ambiguity are

frequently the result of negligence, which amounts to the careless disregard of both these alternatives. The second of the alternatives, whatever its effect on "clarity," is manifestly the more compatible with disinterestedness in query. Sometimes the choice is a difficult one, and the alternatives are not easily discernible. In such cases, it seems better to risk possible obscurity in the promise of invention than to risk the curtailment of invention by the dread of obscurity. For in philosophy the chances of significant invention are much smaller than the chances of eventual clarification.

iv

One of the natural traits of perspectives is their divisibility. It is sometimes possible to detach part of a perspective and unite it with another perspective. And it is sometimes possible to extract elements from a perspective, to utilize them in conjunction with products of another perspective. But if the meaning of a judgment is determined by the nature of its function within a perspective, how is it possible to dissociate the judgment from its essential conditions, from the order which is part of its being as a judgment? Is it not rather an empty shell that is borrowed, only an outwardly similar sign, and not the same judgment? Yet in fact we know that philosophers, artists, and scientists draw judgments from one another in disregard of, or even in deliberate rejection of, the total perspective of which these judgments are originally part. They borrow ideas, themes, specific hypotheses, insights, procedures. Philosophy, which in its history is so frequently depicted as a series of individual systems, would not have had a history at

all were it not for the divisibility of perspective. This history is valuable as an instrument in the furtherance of new speculation because specific judgments no less than entire outlooks and methods operate either as stimuli to the solution of old problems and the framing of new ones or as ingredients in new outlooks. What appears to create difficulty in the theory of meaning is the fact that when an element is drawn from a philosophy it *may* retain substantially the same meaning after being introduced into a perspective very different from the one in which it presumably acquired meaning. For example, it is possible to adopt Kant's distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" with substantially the meaning he gave it, while rejecting not only the uses to which he put the distinction but all the other essentials of Kantianism. Or it is possible to accept Hegel's analysis of sensory immediacy and to repudiate most of what is essential to Hegelianism.

The problem persists only if we assume that the perspective which determines the meaning of a given concept can be none other than a historically unique system. Thus we often assume that it is the historically distinctive quality of Kantianism that gives meaning to each and every one of Kant's concepts. But Kant is necessarily a philosopher first and a Kantian second. The meaning of some of the concepts in his thought, even if they occur only in his thought, is primarily determined by the philosophic perspective in general and not by the Kantian perspective in particular. Hence the accessibility of these concepts as potential elements of other products emanating from the philosophic community. It is true, of course, that every concept of Kant's, con-

sidered merely in so far as it is framed by him and not by someone else, is as unique as any other. Yet some concepts are more dependent for their meaning on their relation to the total order of Kantian concepts than others are. Those which are borrowable are no less dependent for their meaning on their role in an order of concepts. But they are not necessarily dependent on *one* order. Thus Kant's conception of a synthetic proposition and Kant's conception of space both require interconnection with other conceptions. But the former may be taken from the Kantian system and reconnected, as it were, without greatly modifying another system; while the latter requires commitment to much of the essential Kantian machinery.

From a complex work of art, as from a formal philosophic system, it is possible for differently oriented assimilators to derive substantially the same meanings, owing to the divisibility of perspective and the power of a product to reflect more than one perspective. For instance, the value consisting in disinterested love, as described and exhibited in the New Testament Gospels, may have similar meaning for and compel equal assent from men who reject and men who accept the general sentiment of otherworldliness. Likewise, the music in a setting of the Roman Catholic Mass may have similar musical "meaning" or value for opponents and devotees of Christian metaphysics and the morality of Christian obedience. These instances are not explained merely by the fact that two differently oriented men both assimilate in the domain of exhibitive rather than assertive judgment. For this would explain why they might both derive meaning, but not why they might both derive

the same meaning. Nor is it satisfactory or unambiguous to say, as it often is said, that the "universal" elements in a product are what make possible equal articulative response and equal approval. If the "universal" elements are the elements universally meaningful, the question is begged; for the question is why they *can* be universally meaningful. If the "universal" elements in the product are those already possessed by or similar to products previously experienced by men, the formulation is ridiculously false. For it is the *unique* elements in the story of gospel love or in a great setting of the Mass that are understood and valued. Plainly, then, it is because different men alike articulate a perspective other than and presumably wider than the perspective of Christianity that the religious music or the value of charitable love can function for them with the same role. To say that it is the *perspective* which is "universal" would be nearer the truth. It is in the realms of moral conduct and tonal value that the elements of the original product have at least exhibitive meaning. The perspective of the assimilators, the one that makes this kind of assimilation possible, is the perspective of hearers and of morally discerning persons, and not that of believers and doubters.

What is implied in saying that one perspective may be "broader" or "wider" than another? An individual may, for example, share a nationalistic perspective with vast hordes of people. Nevertheless, it remains true that his proceptive domain is the "widest" perspective possible for him as an individual. The prevalent extent or social currency of a perspective, statistically speaking, is not to be confused with its inclusiveness as an

order of experience relative to other orders of experience in individual life. A perspective is always a perspective *for* individuals, whether alone or in common. It does not matter how pervasive nationalism may be geographically; for an individual who is a nationalist it may yet be of lesser scope and importance than other perspectives in his experience, and for an individual who is not a nationalist it has no scope or comprehensiveness as a perspective at all. A non-nationalist's understanding of the nationalistic perspective and his discursive community with nationalists will come partly from the fact that he and nationalists alike share another perspective broader or more inclusive than nationalism—more inclusive for him and more inclusive for them. To say that Kantians and anti-Kantians all share a broader perspective, the philosophic perspective, is to say that it is broader *for* all concerned. But for some concerned, whether Kantian or anti-Kantian, the philosophic perspective may be narrower than, say, an economic perspective, and for others concerned, the philosophic perspective may be wider than an economic perspective. This fact is independent of whether the philosophic perspective belongs to large or small numbers of men, or of whether it belongs to larger or smaller numbers of men than does the economic perspective. A perspective may belong to many individuals; its relative scope (or breadth) for each of these individuals may vary greatly.

The relative scope, breadth, or inclusiveness of a perspective in individual experience is determined by the number and the variety of judgments and procepts dependent on it for their being. In a man's life, one

perspective is broader than another if it is the more stable or tenacious influence in the shaping of his proceptive direction. The broader perspective is the order responsible for the eventuation of the more persistent, more efficacious, more recurrent, or more numerous meanings. Where one perspective is said to be inclusive of another, it is by definition broader. But one may be more inclusive *than* another, without being inclusive *of* it. There may be only overlapping between the two, and both may compete, as it were, for a greater share of the proceptive domain and a greater influence on the proceptive direction. A perspective is itself, we said, a procept for the individual. No order as procept can be more comprehensive than that which coincides with the proceptive domain.

The idea of perspective—so extensively and yet so loosely employed—is important for the lessening of emphasis on the distinction between the "inner" and "outer" world. Philosophers have sometimes wished to preserve this distinction by erasing the distinction between inner and outer *experience,* experience as a whole becoming an inner world, distinguished from the "external world." The inner world is the "foreground," the outer world the "background." If it seems desirable to preserve *some* such type of distinction, stultifying philosophic consequences should be avoided. Actually it is not a discontinuity between experience and nature that imposes itself, but rather a need to distinguish between one natural sphere that has proceptive effect and another natural sphere that does not. The former is "experienced," the latter simply "exists." But of course the latter may come to succeed the

former as the "content of experience." Experience has no intrinsic boundaries. What needs to be preserved as a distinction, then, is the distinction between that which is relevant and that which is irrelevant to some selected domain of existence, such as the proceptive domain of some individual or some order within this order. The idea of perspective permits us to account for the flexibility of experience, its potential openness, its variations, its differences from individual to individual. The "inner" (or "outer") world is strictly *an* "inner" (or "outer") world. An inner world can be no more than the elements in a given perspective, an outer world all that is irrelevant to this perspective. Leibniz, Alexander, Mead, and Whitehead, by extending the notion of perspective to nonhuman individuals, solve the whole problem, but solve it in too costly a fashion. Their purpose is to endow *every* natural entity with an "inner" world relative to all the rest of the "outer" world. While they succeed in eliminating discontinuities in nature, they also obliterate fundamental differences. Possibly the notion of perspective might be applied to all individuals that could also be said to have a life strategy or economy; but one might then be committed to allowing them "experience" and consequently a cumulative nature. In any case, by not allowing the notion of perspective applicability to all things natural, we do not render the human nonnatural. Human nature is characterized by perspective (among other traits), as other phases of nature are characterized by binary fission, by oxidation, by tidal ebb and flow, by hibernation, by mineral deposits. It is enough that the distinction of "inner" and "outer" be redefined and kept

under control, and that it avoid the unaccountable ontologic fixity of foreground and background. It is not necessary to combat the bifurcation of nature by the total humanization of nature.

V

Those who in effect seek to equate meaning with one manifestation of it, or who place one form of meaning at the top of a hierarchy of legitimacy, fancy their standard to be a concrete furtherance of ideals in place of chaos and illusion. Scientifically-minded philosophers who look condescendingly on the presence in philosophy of "noncognitive" meanings are not alone and have not been first in the legislation of what is meaningful. Many an artist has arrogated to art the discovery of the "inner meaning" of things, and many a philosopher from the beginning of speculation has been convinced that natural science moves on the surface of existence. Actually all such positions are not primarily determinations of value but self-revelations, or definitions of a sphere of interest. Each succeeds not in purifying query but in promoting its own form of query by affirming the validity of its own vocation. It seems that every man in the course of his life acquires a predominating bias in favor of doing, of making, or of saying. This in itself is a good, as the history of query shows; for query ordinarily flourishes through the intensification of one mode of judgment. But to favor one mode of judgment in the pursuit of query, and to deny to other modes any possible meaning in that form of query, are very different. The progress of science depended upon the acceptance of doing and making, in the form of experi-

mentation, as conditions of its own technique of saying. Philosophy would have a different and more meager historical character had not philosophers like Plato, Spinoza, and Whitehead combined strong perception of the meaning of science with strong perception of the role of aesthetic order. The heritage of art would be less rich were the meaning of human action and the meaning of critical discourse ineffectual in the results of making. Metaphysicians whose query is wide enough to include a disparagement of logic do not thereby evade logic, and logicians whose query is wide enough to include a disparagement of metaphysics tacitly accept a metaphysics of their own. Artists whose query cannot exclude an expression of contempt for the value of discourse, discourse on this subject copiously, and with copious generalization. But human history, the communal and temporal scene of human experience, testifies to the diversity and the complexity of utterance in nature. Formulation, contrivance, and action, though they need to be distinguished, are inseparable in the coming to be of events and movements, values and ideals. If it is insufficiently decisive to regard man as the animal that judges, it may be sufficient to regard him as the animal that cannot help judging in more than one mode.

NOTES

1. "Lady Eleanore's Mantle" in *Twice-Told Tales.*
2. John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation,* Chicago, 1939, p. 5.
3. See Evelyn Urban Shirk, *Adventurous Idealism: The Philosophy of Alfred Lloyd,* Ann Arbor, 1952, p. 124.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations,* Oxford, 1953, pp. 48–49.
5. John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding,* III, i, 1.
6. George Berkeley, *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,* Introd., sec. 20.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* Part I, Book II, sec. 48.
8. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* Second part of Part II, Question 60, First Article.
9. John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,* New York, 1938, p. 121. (Cf. Dewey, *How We Think,* rev. ed., New York, 1933, Chap. 8, and *Logic,* Chap. 7.)
10. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Chap. 8.
11. Locke, *Essay,* III, xiv.
12. Henry James, *The Portrait of a Lady,* Chap. 3. (See also James, *The Ambassadors,* Chap. 29.)
13. Jane Austen, *Emma,* Chap. 10 (of Vol. I, in the early editions).
14. James, *The Portrait of a Lady,* Chap. 3.
15. Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park,* Chap. 13 (of Vol. I, in the early editions).
16. Cecil Gray, *History of Music,* rev. ed., New York, 1931, p. 154.
17. John Dewey, *Art as Experience,* New York, 1934, p. 46.
18. John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization,* New York, 1931, pp. 102–3.

19. Preface to the *Great Instauration.*
20. Locke, *Essay,* I, i, 10.
21. Dewey, *Logic,* p. 179. Professor R. Bruce Raup and his associates have analyzed in great detail the methodology of "judgments of practice." It is clear, however, that in their sense, too, a "judgment" is cogitative and assertive, whether practical or "factual." A practical judgment begins in "irresolution" on the part of the judger. It has "at least three phases," which are: "(1) The projection in imaginative construction of a desirable state of affairs, (2) the examination of existing conditions . . . and (3) the formulation of a plan, a program, and a purposed next step in action. . . ." (Raup, "Method in Judgments of Practice," *Journal of Philosophy,* XLVI (1949), 806.) See also Raup, *et al., The Discipline of Practical Judgment,* Ann Arbor, 1943; rev. ed., New York, 1950, under the title *The Improvement of Practical Intelligence.*
22. John Dewey, *Essays in Experimental Logic,* Chicago, 1916, p. 335.
23. John Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* New York, 1929 edition, pp. 3–4.
24. *Ibid.,* pp. 4a–1.
25. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* New York, 1929, p. 79.
26. Dewey, *Art as Experience,* p. 35.
27. George Santayana, *Reason in Society,* New York, 1905, pp. 1–2.
28. Mary Scrutton, review of various books, *New Statesman and Nation,* Feb. 14, 1953, p. 184.
29. Dewey, *Art as Experience,* Chap. 3.
30. Dewey, *Experience and Nature,* p. 140.
31. John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* New York, 1920, p. 86. Likewise, in *Art as Experience,* Dewey says: "To put one's hand in the fire that consumes it is not necessarily to have an experience. The action and its consequence must be joined in *perception*" (p. 44; italics added).
32. Dewey, *Art as Experience,* pp. 44–45.

33. Toward the end of his essay "Qualitative Thought" (in *Philosophy and Civilization*), Dewey uses the term "assimilation," in the following sense: *"Sheer* assimilation results in the presence of a single object of apprehension. To identify a seen thing as a promontory is a case of assimilation" (p. 115).
34. In particular, the presence of "significant symbols." See George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society,* ed. C. W. Morris, Chicago, 1934.
35. Chapter I, section i; Chapter III, section iv; Chapter II, section iv.
36. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Chap. 4. It may or may not be significant that Freud, in whose conception of the relation between the individual and society there are so many points of resemblance to Hobbes, also declares (to take one of many instances): "Philosophers stretch the meaning of words until they retain scarcely anything of their original sense" (*The Future of an Illusion,* tr. D. Robson-Scott, London, 1928, p. 57). Hobbes's "sense . . . they are ordained for" and Freud's "original sense," like the current veneration of "ordinary language," are myths that dignify private preferences. Had Freud obeyed his own dictum and not "stretched" the meaning, say, of "sexuality," the study of man would be the poorer.
37. Locke, *Essay,* II, xiv, 1.
38. Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Chap. 5 (italics added).

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