




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Radcliffe College Monographs

No. 7

THE UNITY OF FICHTE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE

BY
ANNA BOYNTON THOMPSON

WITH AN INTRODUCTION

By JOSIAH ROYCE, Ph.D.,


PROFESSOR OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY


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TO

ALICE MARY LONGFELLOW,

Associate of Radcliffe College,

I DEDICATE THIS WORK

AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE AFFECTION AND GRATITUDE I BEAR HER,

FOR FRIENDSHIP,

FOR UNFAILING SYMPATHY,

FOR PROFOUND HELP IN THOUGHT AND LIFE.

P R E F A C E.

THE following paper is a portion of an exposition of Fichte's Doctrine of Knowledge upon which the writer is at work. It was read before the Graduate Philosophical Seminary of Harvard University in the winter of 1893-94, and, as the view it presents of Fichte's system differs somewhat from the current one, it was deemed best to give the paper printed form at once, that criticism might show where it must be mended before falling into final shape. The exposition is the result of several years' study of Philosophy under the stimulating guidance of Professor Josiah Royce of Harvard University: its central thought, the unity of Fichte's system, has been much influenced by his criticism. For opportunity to do work of a kind impossible elsewhere, a debt of gratitude has long been owed to the authorities of Radcliffe College, which renews itself year by year and which can never be adequately acknowledged. To the College thanks must again be given for the use of its imprimatur. The many friends who have patiently listened and kindly criticised when Fichte's views have been thrust upon them, have had large share in helping the writer to see his deeper meaning. To one of these friends, whose daily living has been perpetual preparation for the comprehension of the most spiritual doctrine, whose forgetfulness of self gives that depth of insight which is promised to the pure in heart, and whose generosity of nature makes the giving of help an unconscious office, much in this paper is due.

He who knows Fichte knows that the essentials of Fichte's system could be "bounded by a nut-shell," and to him the length of the paper will be a prophecy of the repetition it contains. But efforts toward exposition have made evident to the writer that Fichte's point of view is so subtle and so elusive as to be kept before the mind only by restatement at every turn of the argument. The thinker who grasps it at once and holds it fast is begged to forgive what to him must seem wearisome prolixity.

The citations in the appendix will, it is hoped, lead the student to a closer study of Fichte's works. The proofs of the German text have had the advantage of revision by Dr. Max F. Blau. For this friendly assistance the writer owes hearty thanks.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

October 27, 1894.

INTRODUCTION.

I HAVE learned so much from following the growth of this monograph as it has taken shape in the author's mind, and am so much indebted to its ingenuity and scholarship for new light upon Fichte's doctrine, that my little task in writing this introduction limits itself to an acknowledgment of my own debt to the author, and to the statement of a few considerations that may help to prepare the reader to face its problem. Miss Thompson's presentation, I think, speaks for itself. It is an historical study, and has aimed only to be faithful to Fichte's thought. Yet faithfulness is in general the road to originality; and Miss Thompson's interpretation will be found to be, in plan and in execution, as independent and original, within the limits possible in an expository essay, as it is devoted and painstaking. For my own part, in following the growth of this essay, I have, indeed, suggested from time to time criticisms as to matters of detail, and have discussed some of the problems at considerable length with the author; but the outcome has been in many ways an unexpected one to me, and as instructive as unexpected. Accepting, as I now do, the main theses of this exposition of Fichte as being a fair presentation of his central thought, and avoiding at present any discussion of the actual finality of Fichte's own form of idealistic doctrine, I may still venture to indicate, in general terms, the historical and philosophical interest of the whole enterprise.

Fichte always asserted that he had, from the beginning of his independent labors as a philosophical teacher, to the very close of his career, but one system, always called by himself the *Wissenschaftslehre*. He admitted that his own comprehension of its

significance was a growing thing, or, as he once stated the case, that this doctrine had done much to alter him, as a thinker and as a man, since first he held and taught its main principles. But this alteration produced *by* the doctrine was not, he declared, a real alteration *of* the doctrine; for he strenuously denied that the essential insight upon which the whole was founded had itself ever changed since first he reached this central idea. To be sure, his own statement of the sense in which his doctrine is stable and continuous is subject to certain fluctuations. In his correspondence with Schelling¹ there are two passages which, when compared, illustrate how, even in the earlier half of his philosophical career, he could already vary in his own account of the degree to which the *Wissenschaftslehre* itself was to be viewed as identical in its various successive presentations. For in one of these passages, occurring in a letter to Schelling, dated Dec. 27, 1800, Fichte, looking back, of course, upon his own productions up to that time, admits that there are certain important propositions stated in Schelling's immediately previous letter which Fichte himself has long understood, while, as he adds, "I believe that these propositions do not follow from the principles of Transcendentalism as heretofore stated, but are, on the contrary, in opposition thereto, and that they can only be demonstrated through a still wider extension of the transcendental philosophy, *even in its principles* [the italics are Fichte's], — an extension which, for the rest, the need of the present time most urgently demands of us. I," continues Fichte, "have not yet been able to bring these more extensive principles into scientific form. The plainest indications in regard to them occur in the third book of my 'Vocation of Man.' Their development will be my first work so soon as I have completed the new exposition of the Doctrine of Knowledge. In a word, I lack still a transcendental system of the intelligible world." Fichte here adds a few words which Schelling was disposed to regard as an approximation to his own theory of the Absolute. But less than six months later, Fichte, of whose concession Schelling had naturally taken a dialectical advantage, —

¹ I cite from *Fichte's und Schelling's Philosophischer Briefwechsel*, hrsg. v. I. H. Fichte und K. Fr. A. Schelling (Stuttgart, 1856).

Fichte himself, forgetting, with characteristic indifference to the letter, his own previous form of expression, complains, under date of May 31, 1801, of Schelling's method of reply. "I haven't your letter at hand," says Fichte, "but if I remember rightly you said in that letter that I admit that certain questions are not disposed of by the principles heretofore stated. Now, I don't admit that at all. The Doctrine of Knowledge is not at all lacking in its principles. What it does lack is completeness. The highest synthesis is not yet accomplished, — the synthesis of the spiritual realm [*Geisterwelt*, identical, of course, with the "intelligible world" of the former letter]. When I undertook to accomplish this synthesis, the cry of atheism was raised."

Thus Fichte does indeed waver in his expressions as to the degree of his own fidelity to the system with which he introduced himself to the public. Certain it is at any rate that he admitted the necessity of supplementing the first exposition, or rather of substituting for it a far completer expression of his system. Certain, on the other hand, it is that, whether the needed supplement was to concern "principles," or only the application of principles, Fichte felt always sure that the old foundations would not be done away with in making the needed alterations. There was held to be a "unity" in his doctrine, from one end of his career to the other; this, at all events, was his own thesis.

It is well known that this thesis has received comparatively little support from the historians of philosophy. Few philosophers have suffered more from the influence of mere cant phrases than Fichte has done. Not without his own fault, but surely against his own intention, he very early laid himself open to the deadly dangers of seeming too comprehensible as to the general outline of his system. The whole of his philosophy, as he first expounded it, came to be reduced, in the minds of his average critics, to the one proposition, "The Ego creates the world." No other of the thinkers of his generation suggested any summary of such a fatal simplicity. Kant, Schelling, Hegel, nobody could pretend to reduce to any single phrase. But Fichte, — him any one could understand, and refute, in five minutes. One could state this theory "succinctly" and even "in French." Having stated the supposed

dogma of Fichte, one was absolved from asking of him any further explanations, or from listening if he made any. He vociferated in vain, he issued "Sunclear Expositions" in vain, he proclaimed against the charge of atheism in vain, he wrote in vain upon "Faith," upon the "Blessed Life," upon the Absolute. Why should one ponder all these things? One knew better than Fichte the inevitable outcome, — "The Ego makes the world." Now the Ego is, to everybody who has ever learned how to take care of himself, an extremely familiar principle. If a philosopher assigns the world-creation to this most familiar of principles, — well, then any reader must know what he means, and needs no account of the "Blessed Life" to help one out.

Or again, since, in his later treatises, Fichte no longer chose to speak so freely of the Ego, but talked of God, of the Absolute, of Being, and cited the Fourth Gospel, — surely it must be manifest to any reader, however superficial, that, since such phrases and names as the philosopher now preferred to use were themselves also old friends, and were obviously out of place in that endlessly simple system whose principle was, "The Ego creates the world," it followed that Fichte had changed his system, after about 1800, or a little later, and was, henceforth, either a Schellingian, or else merely a popular lecturer on philosophy, with no characteristic system of his own at all. So the popular opinion has run, — an opinion usually founded upon nothing but a shamefully slavish repetition of mere phrases.

The professional students of philosophy in Fichte's day and later had no excuse for being thus deceived by the current phrases. Unfortunately, however, there were circumstances of a more serious nature which long prevented most of even such students from approaching the facts of the case in a spirit sufficiently far removed from the foregoing errors. The first circumstance lay in the fact that the *Wissenschaftslehre*, as presented in 1794, remained to the end of Fichte's life the principal published expression of his systematic views. The "Darstellung" of 1801 never appeared until the publication of the complete works, a generation later, long after Fichte's stronger influence was a thing of the seemingly irrevocable past. As a fact, the principal later

publications of Fichte related either to applied, or to popularized, or, worst of all for the correction of such errors, to polemical philosophy. Polemic may be a good weapon against foes, when a doctrine is already well understood; it is seldom a good device for correcting current and widespread misunderstandings. By polemic you may protect a thesis; you can almost never set aside a general misinterpretation. Popular philosophizing, on the other hand, is never favorable to the finer estimate of technical distinctions between one doctrine and another. For practical applications, meanwhile, the public may be thankful to the philosopher; but they never repay him for such services by trying to understand his theories. Why should they? Nobody cares what is in such cases applied. The public interest is only in the apparent patness of the application. Thus Fichte's technical influence over professional students was almost unaided by his other publications, and was very nearly limited, during his lifetime, to the influence exerted by the "Grundlage" of 1794. Now the inadequacy of this "Grundlage" lay in the unnecessary emphasis therein placed upon certain aspects of the doctrine. Miss Thompson has, indeed, tried to show that, in the "Grundlage," all the essential factors upon which Fichte later lays stress, in those various technical expositions of his system which he wrote but never lived to publish, are, in some degree, indicated and used. But there can be no question that some of these fundamental factors are not emphasized in the "Grundlage" as they later came to be. Nor can the most careful of Fichte's contemporary critics be blamed for failing to notice the real significance of such of the elements in the exposition of the "Grundlage" as only a careful comparison with the posthumously published expositions has enabled Miss Thompson to identify, while the full importance of these elements is actually only to be learned from these later expositions. In short, then, Fichte's professional contemporaries could not be expected to see the full value of considerations which, if present in the "Grundlage," had still not disclosed their own entire weight to Fichte's own mind when he wrote this first exposition. So it came to pass that Fichte's historical influence, even over those who knew him best, and who were best able to understand what the

maligned principle called the "Ego" really meant, was still an influence founded upon the reading of his least finished and most immature technical treatise. When Fichte the son published the complete works, he almost in vain tried to call the attention of the historians to the necessity of rewriting that chapter of the history of modern philosophy which dealt with his father's thought. The influence of Fichte was itself by that time a matter of history, and had been almost wholly dependent on the "Grundlage" of 1794. It seemed vain to correct an old tradition by new documents that had played no part in the controversies of their own day. The Fichte of the "Grundlage" remained the typical Fichte; and the new documents therefore only seemed the more to contain, not the supplement and interpretation of the "Grundlage," but the work of another and a later Fichte, who had possessed no noteworthy historical influence.

The other circumstances of most moment in establishing the tradition as to Fichte's doctrine were two. One was the fact that Hegel, in his early essay on the "Difference between the Philosophies of Fichte and Schelling," had reduced the contrast between the two thinkers to a conveniently schematic form, which, without being in any wise as trivial as the popular interpretation of Fichte, was still wholly based, so far as Fichte was concerned, upon the "Grundlage" of 1794, and, as now appears, was unfair even to that. This schematic account of Fichte remained the basis of all Hegel's later criticisms of the elder thinker, in numerous passages of Hegel's works, and became, accordingly, generally authoritative in the Hegelian School. The other circumstance was the fact that, after the personal estrangement between Fichte and Schelling, the latter, with characteristic bitterness, accused Fichte of having plagiarized Schelling's own ideas in the "Way to the Blessed Life," and in his other popular lectures. The accusation (made in 1806) was founded upon the sharpest possible insistence upon the contrast between Fichte's earlier and later teachings. Few have been influenced by the bitter tone of Schelling so far as to share his estimate that here was conscious plagiarism. But it has been customary to consider Fichte as under the more or less unconscious influence of the spirit of the Romantic movement. And thus even

the younger Fichte calls attention to the change in his father's practical attitude, as regards ethical and religious questions, between 1804 and the lectures of the three closing years of his life. All these circumstances, then, have contributed to fix attention upon one line of tradition regarding Fichte.

There have not been altogether wanting voices in favor of Fichte's own opinion concerning the unity of his development. Notably Harms, in his history of philosophy, insists upon such an unity, and to the end of indicating where it lay, is indisposed to make the "Grundlage" of 1794 central in his exposition. On the other hand, nearly all expositions still favor the "Grundlage" to an extraordinary degree, despite Fichte's own frequent admissions of its incompleteness. That it is possible thus to found one's exposition, in the main, upon the text of the "Grundlage," and still to see unity in Fichte's development, and to reject the notion of "two systems," is evidenced by Professor Everett's well known volume on Fichte. But I fancy that Miss Thompson's method of explicitly interpreting the earlier in the light of the later expositions has several arguments in its favor, and is worthy of a fair trial.

The result of Miss Thompson's study is substantially the thesis that Fichte's one system is stable in a form consistent with the real meaning of all of his principal expositions. If I may attempt to restate Miss Thompson's view in my own way, I should find, according to her, that Fichte's doctrine contains the following central assertions: (1) The world is no *Ding an sich*, since a *Ding an sich* is logically impossible. On the contrary, the world may primarily be defined as a point of view, which of itself determines whatever appears to experience and to thought from that point of view. So far, and if this statement were the whole of it, the doctrine would seem a subjectivism, — bald, sceptical, Protagorean. The world here, as with Schopenhauer, is *meine Vorstellung*; for whoever occupies the point of view can use exactly that phrase, if *Vorstellung* be taken to include thinking as well as mere seeing. But now: (2) There is, logically speaking, but one possible and consistent point of view, and what is seen and thought from this point of view is consequently fixed, eternal, free from caprice, in a word, absolute. That this is true, the system proposes to demon-

strate, by a process of passing from lower, inconsistent, and transient points of view to a certain highest point of view that justifies itself as such. The world is only as it is known. Being is not conceivable as prior to or as apart from knowing. And the world is what it is known as,— nothing else. Only knowing, in order to be self-consistent, has to get one form, and one only. What form, the system of philosophy must discover by showing that other forms are self-contradictory. And the knowing, when it gets this one absolute form, will have an absolute content. (3) This absolute content of the absolute knowing, when found, is first to be defined as a Life, — self-contained, complete, simple, yet infinitely full. That this is what knowledge alone can know, *i. e.*, can experience and think, if knowledge is to be consistent with itself, this the system is to prove by experiment, *viz.*, by trying to know what is primarily given, and then by finding what the knowing of this primary datum implies. (4) This one Absolute Life is known, however, that is, is experienced and thought, as something manifesting itself in the form of finite beings, who necessarily aim to live in the sight of laws, *i. e.*, who either live under the dominion of natural laws, or who live in free, *i. e.*, voluntary accordance with an absolute moral law. This world of manifested life can only be consistently conceived as the manifestation of the One Life, *viz.*, that of the Absolute. Yet in no one of the finite lives, in so far as they are lived alone, can the absolute life get any true expression. Thus, from the absolute point of view, the one life is thought of as something absolutely self-possessed, but is directly seen only as something endlessly engaged in expressing itself. Hence, the finite lives are to be conceived as an endless series, whose system is that of the spiritual world. The absolute life itself is to be consistently conceived as that of God, who is seen nowhere in the finite world, but who is thought of as its principle. (5) The sole evidence for this doctrine, yes, the sole truth of it, lies in the one central consideration that only thus can the truth consistently be viewed. Take experience and think out its meaning, and only this one consistent way of thinking its meaning will finally come out. At the end, as at the beginning, there is but the point of view, which of itself determines its own contents. To

be sure, Fichte distinguishes, in the absolute point of view, between what is content of direct experience, or *Anschauung*, and what is content for thought, *Denken*. It is true, according to him, that the concrete fulfilment of the absolute life in a completed conscious system of finite lives cannot possibly be directly seen from any point of view. But the true view thinks as well as sees. It thinks God, it sees His expression everywhere. (6) The terms of the absolute point of view are thus indeed the Ego, as the subjective aspect or principle of knowing, and its object the World, as that which is known. But *this* Ego is not the empirical individual, who as such is merely one of the objects in the finite world; nor is the Ego itself any sort of *Ding an sich*. If made the object of knowledge, it at once appears as life or will. The world itself is the manifestation of God, but only of course in so far as it is necessarily thought to be so. God as the absolute, thought but never directly beheld, manifesting Himself everywhere, but never finally manifested, is so far conceived as the unattainable basis of life, the incomprehensible in which all comprehension is rooted. Yet God; too, is no *Ding an sich*, only the object which is thought of from a certain inevitable point of view, — a point of view to which all others are reduced if only you think out their meanings. And viewed in His manifestation in the world, God is indeed viewed as the best known of objects, *viz.*, the life of all things, and consequently as exemplified by all of them, and by their all-pervading system.

This extremely interesting development of the doctrine of the necessities of thinking viewed solely as inner necessities, and of the objects of thinking viewed solely as relative to these necessities, — this elaborate system whose central word is, "It is as if," — this expression of what Fichte called *absolutes Durch* (*i. e.*, absolute relativity), — this it is which Miss Thompson has endeavored to work out with great detail as the inner meaning of the misunderstood phrase concerning the "Ego" that "makes the world." The posthumous lectures have constituted her most useful key. I need hardly say that I am here neither defending nor attacking this highly ingenious form of idealism. Surely it is well that this form should come to its rights. An effort to remove, absolutely

and forever, every shade of capriciousness and of changeableness from a doctrine which still asserts the total relativity of thinking and its objects, has its own reason for existence, and deserves a more careful study than has ever been given to this particular form of the doctrine.

I may conclude by calling attention to one passage, in the correspondence already cited, in which Fichte is trying, in a last desperate effort, to convey to Schelling the essence of Fichte's own conception of the Absolute. Schelling, so Fichte supposes (in the latter's letters of 1800-1801), falsely views the Absolute as something that is to be real or true or absolute independently of the thought of it. But meanwhile Fichte himself, as he also endlessly reiterates, does *not* view the Absolute, or any other truth, *e. g.*, the truth of nature, as in any wise dependent upon the mere subjective thoughts of this or that individual. There is to be no question, however, of this or of that separate point of view. There is but one right point of view, because there is but one logical, consistent, internally clear point of view; and Fichte's thesis is that the Absolute exists *for* that point of view, and has no other existence. So too with nature, with mathematical truth, with moral truth.

"One must not begin" (says Fichte, on p. 84 of the mentioned correspondence, under date of May 31, 1801) "with a Being, but with a Seeing." "Consider," he continues, "your consciousness that there is only one straight line to be drawn between two points. For the first, you have in this case your own self-comprehension and your full self-possession, — the act that gives the assurance of the truth. This for me is the basis. You assume, you assert, that this principle holds *of* all possible lines, and *for* all possible intelligences. And this occurs to you in the following way: In respect of the first point [*viz.*, that this holds *of* all possible lines] you regard your consciousness as determined content. In respect of the second point, you regard yourself as a consciousness that is determinable [*i. e.*, that is yet to be determined]. The first consideration gives you (in the end) the individual. The second, in regard to which you merely posit the empty form of selfhood, gives you, further on, the spiritual world [*i. e.*, the world of intelli-

gences in general]. Finite consciousness in general is consequently the absolute union of a consciousness of the world of intelligences as a whole, with the consciousness of the individual. The consciousness of the individual is the logical reason (*Idealgrund*) for the consciousness of the world of intelligences as a whole. But the latter world is the real reason (never to be fully comprehended and exhaustively possessed) of the latter." [So far one has a total relativity. Where I know myself well, I do so by appealing to the universal insight of all. And the universal insight of all is here known in so far as it is appealed to.] "But," continues Fichte, "you asserted your own comprehension, your case of the union of subject and object, as something determinate. Now this assertion [that I know this universal truth] is made in the absolute consciousness, which no consciousness can further transcend and reflect upon. Your determinate character, in this case, is consequently something absolute, upon which no consciousness can reflect, which none can further possess, and herein this something resembles a datum, a reality, Being (for Being is — Seeing that cannot further comprehend or possess itself)."

Thus Fichte tries to exemplify what the comprehension of an absolute truth implies. Such comprehension, where it comes, implies the double insight, (1) that "I must so view this," and (2) that the indeterminate but "determinable" Self called "all intelligences" must so view this. These two insights are correlative. Each means the other. I experience the one *must*, I think the other *must*. But neither of these, the experienced *must* and the conceived *must*, can be viewed apart from the other. If the first *must* were conceived to hold only for me, it would be thought as a necessary delusion, as a mere feeling, as nothing to be viewed as a truth. If the second *must* were not exemplified by my own case, it would never occur to me to believe it. In illustrating this consideration Fichte continues (p. 87) by saying: "Unser keiner denkt ihm selber, noch wähnt er, ihm selber zu denken, so gewiss er — denkt." No one of us thinks unto himself, nor does he fancy that he does so, so long as he thinks at all. Thought conceives itself as under absolute standards.

Thus, then, nothing can be thought as really true for me, with-

out being conceived as, in some aspect, expressive of an absolute truth for all. Where I really know myself, I presuppose the *Geisterwelt*, and *vice versa*. "My relatively empirical self, with its experiences, is thus," continues Fichte, "the *object* of a consciousness whose form is absolute. And now this conception, that what is true is universally true, and that my truth is known as my truth by virtue of an absolute consciousness thereof,—this inevitably leads us to a conception of a *System der Geisterwelt*, with a *Realgrund* for the relations of individual experiences therein, and an '*ideales Band Aller = Gott*.'" But now, Fichte insists, this God who is conceived as the spiritual tie of the conceived world of truth, is he now to be defined as a dead truth? You can call him *reines Seyn* if you will. He is certainly the Absolute. But (p. 88): "Dieses Seyn ist an sich nicht etwa Compression, sondern es ist durchaus Agilität, reine Durchsichtigkeit, Licht, nicht das Licht zurückwerfender Körper." The Absolute is thus the principle of the conceived unity of the truth as conceived. It is the conceived light whereby the truth is seen. It is known as such light. It has no presence but this. "I asserted," says Fichte, in a still later letter (*id.* p. 124), "that the Absolute of philosophy remains always a Seeing. You replied that it can then be no seeing of anything. You are right. I did not deny the fact. And therewith the matter must rest. . . . The Absolute has only one manifestation, simple, eternal; and this is absolute Knowledge. The Absolute itself is no Being, no knowledge, nor yet [Schelling's] Identity or Indifference of the two. It is just the Absolute."

Thus Fichte struggled, in manifold obscurities, to express to Schelling his thesis of absolute relativity. It is well for those who conceive Fichte's "later system" as derived from Schelling, to have such passages in mind while they read Miss Thompson's exposition of the substance of this remarkable and stubbornly misunderstood doctrine, as well as the elaborate verification which, in her appendix, she has undertaken for each point of the exposition.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

UNITY OF FICHTE'S DOCTRINE OF KNOWLEDGE.

PERHAPS no philosophic system given the world has been more generally or more completely misunderstood than Fichte's doctrine of knowledge. During Fichte's lifetime we have no evidence that any one approached a comprehension of its central thought. Fichte is keenly alive to the prevailing misconception and exclaims again and again in despair that he shall never live to be understood. Since his death his system has been hardly more fortunate: its expounders have seized, now one partial aspect, now another; but they fail to grasp it in its entirety and its proper subordination of parts. Hence the world has, as common possession, not Fichte's doctrine of knowledge, but distorted fragments, which Fichte himself would be the first to condemn as crude, self-contradictory, abortive.

Such misapprehension is peculiarly unfortunate in the case of Fichte, for his one conscious aim as author was intelligibility of expression: he laid claim at first to no originality, but took upon himself the task of so explaining Kant that Kant should appeal to the general public, and become with them a moral force. His wish was to be the absolutely transparent intermedium by which spiritual truth might be revealed to the masses, and humanity purified and lifted; no man ever desired more honestly effacement of self and loss of personality in the truth to be taught. But instead of the simple, lucid writer he sought to be, he is in style perhaps the most crabbed, the most difficult, of all philosophers: his dialectic method is repulsive to many and awakens their inherent obstinacy; his pedantic attachment to form, leading him to work out his conclusions in what he calls an "artistic synthesis," is wearisome and perplexing; his phraseology is highly technical

and infinitely variable,—such words as “being,” “the absolute,” “thought,” “perception,” etc., are used with every signification which in the history of thought has been attached to them; he lacks all art-sense; his Teutonic cumbrousness is unrelieved by any touch of humor or of grace; he is heavy, and plain, and plodding; he is exasperatingly thorough; he is slow and obscure and wordy; indeed he has no excellence of style except that which arises from honesty and earnestness; his works are great, uncouth fragments, formidable and repelling piles; yet in them is to be found the central thought of Idealism in its full development.

In this infelicity of style, rather than in any intrinsic abstruseness of thought, lies the secret of the misunderstanding of Fichte's doctrine. His critics have not had the unwearied patience in disentangling his text which is necessary. Full comprehension of Fichte can be gained only by tracking his thought through all its hiding-places, by collating his rugged phrases, and wresting from them their common meaning. This painstaking drudgery is repulsive, and a rough and ready criticism which dispenses with reading his works is an easier way of disposing of his system.

The misconceptions resulting from inadequate reading may be classed under three general heads: the first one charges Fichte with setting forth a dogmatic, fanciful, and contradictory doctrine of self-creation by the Ego; the second one accuses him of teaching subjective idealism, or solipsism, that is, that the individual knows nothing but the content of his individual mind; the third asserts that Fichte has not one system, but two, that in the Jena period the ego was all in all for his philosophy, but that later he taught God to be the only reality and the ego his passive image.

The object of this paper is to meet these accusations. Of these, the first is, perhaps, the most difficult to refute. To do so we must show that Fichte's theory is no theory of a creation, of a process, but the exposition of an organic, all-inclusive thought which, at a given moment, is the content of the mind of the Fichtean thinker; this thought, since it is an organism, must be grasped as a whole if it would be understood; any single fact is meaningless alone, as is always an isolated member of an organism, and acquires significance only in its relation to the whole; if the parts are looked upon as successive, instead of as coexistent, the view that results utterly misses the truth, and is so ludicrously inadequate that it seems like the travesty of an enemy; he who should

describe an individual man as a temporal succession of his various members, — his heart, lungs, digestive organs, etc., — and should leave out the simultaneous interrelation of these members, and the central personality, will, mind, which is the truth of man, would fail no more signally in his description than he who presents Fichte's theory as setting forth a process.

But unfortunately, the expositor who would present Fichte's theory as that of an organic whole must do so in words, and words, since they are successive, mislead when their task is to set before the mind something whose only existence is co-existence, something which excludes successive development of its members, because its being consists in the relation of simultaneously existing members; the medium of presentation must, from its very nature, contradict at every moment the truth which it should set forth. That the reader may guard himself against this constant danger, we beg him to keep in mind at every moment that our final result, the theory which Fichte held as to the nature of the universe, is not the conception of a process, but of a simultaneous content, which, under certain conditions, the mind must hold at one and the same moment.

The second accusation will be met by showing that Fichte's Ego is universal consciousness in its fullest conceivable extent, that the individual is only member of the true Ego and subject to its laws, that he does not create, but finds, a world of fixed fact, and that he is forced to know a multiplicity of egos, as a condition of knowing self.

The third charge will be answered by pointing out that the same general outline can be discerned in each of Fichte's treatises. Such analysis of Fichte's works is of great interest, and is most satisfactory in result to the student who has once gained that "Totalblick" of Fichte's doctrine which Fichte himself asserts again and again to be absolutely essential to an understanding of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.

Our immediate aim is, then, to grasp Fichte's system as a whole. This we can best do if we try to follow the thought of Fichte as he worked it out, reminding ourselves at every step that the result reached is not one of a series of events which we are describing, but, instead, a component element of a complex whole whose parts reciprocally involve one another. The only process is the process of thinking the system out, of disentangling the constituents into

which a given entity, upon examination, resolves itself. We must, however, not only follow Fichte, but we must follow him with sympathy. Criticism cannot precede comprehension, and comprehension, when a doctrine is the result of the life-long thought of a subtle, profound, and fearless thinker, is gained only by surrender of self; we must for the moment think and feel with the master from whom we would learn. To identify ourselves thus with Fichte we should understand Fichte's nature; when we see its tendencies and feel its needs, we shall be impelled with him to the thought in which he found full satisfaction, and which it was his life's task to express. Thus his system will gradually shape itself in us, and for the moment it will be our system.

I. FICHTE'S TEMPERAMENT.

FICHTE inherited, from ancestors who had fought as zealous Lutherans in the Thirty Years' War, a strong moral nature. This nature was developed by the precepts and example of pious parents: they taught him that it lay in his power at every moment to choose the right, and treated him as a free-will agent with moral responsibility. Their teaching and treatment harmonized with his inherited instincts. Furthermore his temperament was one of great activity and energy: it inclined him to independent action, self-direction, self-assertion; he did not accept contentedly the present, or look to authority, but, equally in the region of fact and of thought, his impulse was to struggle earnestly and fearlessly that he might bring the existing into harmony with his independent ideal. One side of his nature then could find satisfaction only in such conception of the world as has room for freedom: his universe must allow the exercise of free will if some of the deepest wants of his nature were to be satisfied.

On the other hand, even in earliest childhood, Fichte showed an extraordinary tendency toward reflection. His son tells us that he used to stand by the hour gazing into the distance, till, as darkness came on, the shepherds would lead him home. Fichte himself, when a man, speaks of these hours as the time in which his spirit developed most strongly and most surely. He stood then at the entrance of a new world, the world of reflection, where the laws of thought reign. Later in life he discovered that the formal

side of his nature was strong: he could not accept the facts of existence as isolated phenomena, but demanded a world-formula which should embrace them all in its ordered unity: explanation, and law as a condition of explanation, became a recognized need.

We have now found in Fichte's nature two contradictory tendencies,—one toward freedom, one toward necessity. Must one of these be sacrificed, or would such ideal development be possible, as should allow free play to each, and yet include both as two aspects of one nature? Can Fichte in any way look upon himself as wholly free and yet as wholly under the dominion of law? This problem proved to be his life-problem. He solves it in his philosophic system, and its solution we are now to work out with him. Let us see in what shape it first consciously appeared to him. To do this we must enter his student life.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE: DETERMINISM.

At the Universities of Jena and Leipsic, Fichte, less perhaps from inclination than from prudential motives, studied theology. Formal theology was then, as now, unsatisfactory. To a mind like Fichte's, which, we have seen, demanded as the essential of clear understanding a consistent theory springing from one principle and embracing in its logical development all the facts of life, the contradictions in the dogmas of the Church were unendurable. His first philosophic investigations, he says explicitly, sprang from a desire to formulate for himself a tenable creed, one which should explain the higher questions of theology in a rationally consistent manner. In particular the problem of freedom and necessity which, we have found, lay implicit in his nature as two contradictory tendencies, now formally appeared in his mind as a problem, and to it he devoted his first earnest thought. His temperament and moral sense, of course, inclined him toward the doctrine of Free Will, but the formal side of his nature triumphed, and his first unaided thought led him to Determinism. Later a friend directed him to Spinoza, and in him he found confirmation of his individual views. The conclusiveness of Determinism for him at this period is expressed in the first part of one of his popular works, "Die Bestimmung des Menschen." He conceived nature as an interlacing whole of cause and effect, of which man is a mere

manifestation, determined by the total system of the universe ; the individual does not act, but nature acts in him : he lives under the inexorable power of rigid necessity, and must become fool or wise man, sinner or saint, as she destines ; there is neither merit nor blame for him or for nature because there is freedom for neither ; he stands under her laws and she under her own. This conclusion filled him with sadness, for it contradicted his aspirations and his deepest wants.

We of the nineteenth century, who live after the work of the German Idealists, are keenly alive to the central defect of all deterministic theories. They have no place for reflective ideas. Even if by means of the assumption of the existence of mind and of matter, and of the validity of the law of cause and effect, they can account for our successive states, yet they can give no reason why at any point in the succession the mind should abstract itself from the immediate sensation, mount above itself to reflect upon itself as receiving the sensation, again mount above itself to reflect upon itself reflecting upon itself, and so indefinitely. Causality theories have no explanation for self-consciousness. The deterministic philosopher, in welding the chain of cause and effect, every link of which shall be indissolubly connected with every other link, and whose completed whole shall encompass the universe, cannot include within the chain the subjective I, through whose activity he sees the chain ; the power of the ego defies his calculation and transcends every system that he can frame.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF FICHTE : IDEALISM.

THE study of Kant fixed the instant and exclusive attention of Fichte upon this ego that had so long been neglected. Kant taught him that the forms of the perceived, and nature as a system of necessary laws, may be regarded as having their ground and origin in the categories of the mind. Fichte straightway sprang upon the thought that all knowledge is the product of the activity of the Ego, and carried this thought to its farthest possible reaches.

(a) *The Ego is an Absolute, therefore Free.*

He gained a foundation for the thought by empirical observation. He saw that in the known sense-world, the *stuff* of every

object shows itself upon examination to be ego-stuff, for the ego perceives the object only by becoming conscious of certain states of self, which it calls hot, cold, sweet, sour, resistance, non-resistance, pleasure, pain, etc. Though the ego assumes that these states are produced through the affection of its external senses by the stuff of a foreign object, it cannot prove that there is such foreign stuff, for proof must be received through another affection of self, and that there is anything more than this affection again demands proof, and so on to infinity. The *forms* of every known object must, before the perception of the object, lie, at least as latent, in the ego, for the ego could not receive these forms into itself, if its nature had no provision for their reception. Now, how can we know but these ego-forms are the only forms? We assume, to be sure, a parallel reality lying outside the ego, but to know that there is such reality involves the ego's perceiving its forms, which it does, again, by its own forms, and the original problem reappears. Hence the existence of every known object has no other testimony than the report of the powers of the ego, and the ego can never leave these powers behind and go forth to discover if they have told the truth. Every object of consciousness plainly is what it is for the ego only because the ego recognizes it as such, and other existence than for the ego it cannot be proved to have. Behind the object of knowledge is always the activity of knowing. Whatever is found by the ego involves the ego's act of finding, and it is impossible to prove that the act of finding does not produce it, for to show that it exists before the ego knows it, involves knowing it before it is known. Clearly, then, we cannot prove that the known world of sense has other existence than as product of the activity of the ego.

But in the unexplored world of sense, may there not be an object that obviously cannot be a product of knowledge since it has never been known by man? May there not be in the Pleiades a piece of lava? And is it not impossible that this piece of lava is the result of the activity of the ego since the ego has never known it? We cannot reply that there is a possibility of the existence of such a piece of lava unknown to mind, for there cannot be its possibility unless all its conditions exist, and if all the conditions exist, the piece itself must exist. If we reply that such a piece of lava does exist we supply the mind that now sees its existence, and how can we prove that this existence has a reality beyond our

seeing it? Existence is plainly a relative term, and means existence of object for subject. It is impossible to conceive objective existence apart from a subject, for in conceiving it we supply the subject. If, then, existence can be known only through the act of conception by the ego, it is impossible to prove that this act is not the sole source of existence.

The world of spirit, even more obviously than the world of sense, admits no proof of reality except the ego's proof, and perhaps this proof is its only reality.

Wherever we turn, then, whether to sense, or to reason, or to spirit, we find only the Ego; we cannot escape its activity, we cannot flee from its presence. If we seek the uttermost parts of the world it is there; if we ascend up into heaven, it is there. Everywhere we find self, the affections, the activity, the products of self. All reality, all existence, whatever we can know or conceive, we see lying within self as boundary and matrix.

This empirical result, that the ego finds everywhere self, seemed to Fichte, at first, so self-evident for the thinker that he did not deem its formal exposition necessary. In his earliest work, the "Grundlage," he disposes of the matter summarily: he simply says that A is A by virtue of a law in the Ego which so pronounces it; hence in seeing that A is A the Ego is seeing its own law or self. A stands, of course, for the objective world; therefore in the few words just given Fichte is asserting the whole Idealistic creed, — that the ego sees everywhere self. Later, the need of an explanation of this creed is forced upon him, and he gives it in many places, notably: 1. in the "Grundriss," where the process of knowledge is exhaustively analyzed and shown to be always a knowledge of self; 2. in the "Darstellung," of 1801, where knowledge is represented under the figure of an eye turned ever inward upon self, and the total content of knowledge is expounded by means of a series of reflections upon self; 3. in the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," of 1810-11; 4. and most fully of all in the "Transcendental Logic," where the details of experience are minutely analyzed and shown to be always ego-stuff in ego-forms.

If now the ego, accepting the empirical result, the omnipresence of self, as basis, reason from it, and seek by unfolding its implications to define its own nature, Fichte thinks that it must come to the following conclusions: Since the activity of the ego

in seeing, knowing, recognizing, is the condition of all existence for the ego, therefore of its own existence, the ego is activity. Since it sees always self, it is the activity of identifying subject and object, of apperception, of subsumption; that is, it subsumes under the general concept of self, or the I, every particular. Since it can never transcend self to find an Other, but whatever it finds must, through the act of finding, become self, it concludes that "existence" is a predicate of itself, means existence of the object for the subject, hence only self exists. If only self exists, self as a whole is unrelated, unconditioned, absolute. It is also uncaused by an Other, for there is no Other to cause it. If it is uncaused by an Other, since it exists it must be *causa sui*. It cannot be *causa sui* in the sense that its nature is such that it forces it to exist, as with Spinoza's Substance, for then we separate the nature from that of which it is nature, and see the nature compelling the substance as foreign law. It can be truly *causa sui* only if it is a will which can will whether to be or not, a free will. If it is a will which can will its own existence, we are forced to conceive it as existing before it does exist, or, rather to assume two stages of existence, one of which is the mere possibility of the other; one of which is potential will, the other, actual will. The stage of possibility, the potential will to exist or not to exist, which is not yet actual existence, has none of the determinations of actual existence: it is as yet wholly unlimited, wholly free. We name it Freedom, signifying by that term complete absence of all the determinations of actual existence, but complete liberty at any moment to assume them, for it is not freedom unless it can assume them, just as it is not freedom if it must assume them. We also name it Power, for freedom can be freedom only as power to be or not to be all things. Again, we name it Principle, for it, in its act of willing to be, is the vital Principle of actual existence.

At this point, therefore, the ego concludes itself to be an Absolute of Free Will, a potential Principle which freely becomes the source of actual existence.

This conclusion that the ego is a Free Will Absolute, is a logical conclusion in the mind of the ego. It has been reached by accepting as premise the result of empirical observation that the ego finds everywhere its own activity, and by reasoning from this premise as to what the ego must be, and what this nature involves as its condition. This conclusion has for Fichte the

validity and reality of a logical conclusion, and no other reality. That behind this conclusion there is a real, potential Free Will apart from the consciousness that conceives it, and a real free-will act that precedes consciousness and creates it, Fichte never for a moment asserts. We are not describing a reality or a process. There is no real creator and no real process of creation. The Free Will Absolute and its acts of creation are only present products of the mind, originated by their conception, just as is *das Ding an sich*. That is, for the thinker who unfolds the logical conditions underlying empirical consciousness, underlying the daily facts that red is red, and A is A, the final conclusion is, Fichte thinks, a potential free-will principle that wills its appearance as actuality. But this principle and its act of willing its appearance as actuality have existence in the mind of the thinker, and cannot be proved to have other existence: they are a part of the content of his consciousness, the necessary thought-correlate of his material world, the inseparable complement for him of sense-facts, one necessary element in that complex whole which the totality of his consciousness will prove itself to be when he has finished his analysis. Indeed, one of the chief results of Fichte's theory is to show that certainty of the existence of realities corresponding to conclusions of the mind is impossible: the Absolute Ego is a conclusion of the mind, and that it has any other reality than as a conclusion of the mind we can never know.

We have now taken with Fichte one step in the development of his doctrine. Its result was partially set forth in the first section of the "Grundlage," where the conclusion is reached that the Ego appears as an Absolute. The freedom of the ego seems to Fichte to follow so closely and so inevitably from its absoluteness that he does not think it necessary here to state explicitly that if the ego seems to itself Absolute, it must seem to itself free. But the doctrine of freedom, as we have given it, can be discerned in the practical part of the "Grundlage." In the "Sittenlehre," of 1798, consciousness of self as free will is deduced as the condition of all consciousness, and the notion freedom receives, perhaps, the most careful analysis ever given it. In the "Darstellung," of 1801, freedom is shown to be one of the necessary elements of the Absolute. In the later works, freedom is constantly expounded as merely formal freedom; *i. e.*, an inference of the mind from the form of the ego as apperception.

The conclusion reached in the "Grundlage" that the ego appears as an Absolute, and therefore as unrelated to an *extra-mentem* creator, awaked, as is well known, great philosophic scandal. People misunderstood Fichte's form of expression, paused here, and asserted that Fichte taught that the ego creates itself. But Fichte's phraseology, method, and system as a whole, all make it impossible that he for a moment should have held such doctrine. If we examine his phraseology we find that Fichte says, not that the ego *is* absolute, but that the ego "*posits*" itself as absolute. The ego "*posits*" means with Fichte, "the ego recognizes as true, accepts something as valid, whether sense fact, or logical result." Anything that at any moment appears as conclusive, or as undeniable reality, to the ego, the ego is said to posit. Now, accepting as premise the empirical result that the ego finds everywhere self, and reasoning from this premise, the ego, in Fichte's eyes, is forced to conceive itself as a Free Will Absolute, that wills its own actual existence, and this present conception in the mind is the only creation: creation is a logical conclusion, not a temporal fact. This logical conclusion Fichte means to expound as logical conclusion and as nothing else. It seems almost like an ironical comment upon the necessary unintelligibility of philosophic expression that the very paragraph in which Fichte is setting forth the absoluteness of the ego, its complete lack of provable relation to anything outside it, the impossibility of transcending self to find reality beyond, should be thought to maintain that there is a pre-actual ego-power capable of existing apart from the actual ego, and standing in the relation to it of creator. Small wonder that Fichte exclaims again and again in despair, "Das werde ich nicht erleben dass man dies versteht."

But even if Fichte in the first section of the "Grundlage" teaches explicitly that the ego creates itself, we should know from the teaching's appearing in the first section that it is not his real doctrine, for his method renders it impossible to accept any isolated conclusion of his as correct. This method is usually described by the words "thesis, antithesis, synthesis," and is understood as the provisional acceptance of a fact or result only for the purpose of showing that, because of some inherent contradiction, the present position is untenable, and its two contradictory aspects, or thesis and antithesis, must be reconciled in a higher synthesis. Hence, even with this understanding of the method, we should expect

the first section of the "Grundlage" to be modified, whatever its substance. But Fichte's method, when employed in full, is not adequately described in what we have just said of it. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, are only the results for him of the essential of his method, which is a succession of returns of the ego upon itself to examine in each return its activity in bringing forth the product it has just evolved, and from the results of these examinations to conclude as to the real nature of itself: each result is a partial result, and in so far false, and must be corrected by the next return upon self: any two successive results stand to each other as thesis and antithesis, and the later ascent above self which beholds the results of the first and the second ascent, and reconciles them, is the synthesis.

That we may fully grasp the method, let us consider what Fichte has already done, for his whole process is simply an exhaustive repetition of his present procedure. As a student he thought out Determinism, unmindful of the self that was thinking it out. Kant directed his attention to this self; straightway he examined the self in its activity in bringing forth a given product, as Determinism, or A is A, and from the nature of this activity, reached the conclusion that the self is a Free Will Absolute. Just this process he is now to repeat. He is to mount above the self that has been thinking out the nature of the self, consider it in its activity of thinking out this nature, and by means of the conclusion to which this second sight drives him, correct his first result of an absolute free self. Again he will mount above the self that has corrected the first by the second conclusion, consider its nature, etc. This power of returning upon self to see and to judge self is for Fichte the essential power of the ego, for it is the power of self-consciousness; hence its continual exercise seems to him a process eminently fitted for developing the doctrine of knowledge, or the content of the ego. For the same reason this return upon self must, Fichte thinks, be the easiest of acts for the mind. But from some cause, people failed to see what Fichte was doing, and he exclaims again and again in vexation at their blindness, "Sie wären lieber ein Stück Lava im Monde als ein Ich." It is a repetition of this act that Fichte is demanding when he constantly says, in speaking of a given result, "It is now for us, but not for the I." He means that we, as the ego, have thought it out, but since the ego is self-

consciousness, this result does not exist for it as a part of itself, until it has become aware that it has produced it and knows how it has produced it. A consciousness of the exact processes by which the activity of the ego has brought forth a given result is the condition of the result's being for the ego, and to gain this consciousness the ego must ascend above itself to watch itself working out the result.

(b) The Ego is confronted by Law, therefore neither absolute nor free.

We are now ready to take with Fichte the second step in the development of his doctrine by ascending a second time with him above the self to view the self. We are to mount above the ego, which has just, from the empirical fact that it sees always self, concluded that it is absolute and free, and examine the processes by which it has reached the conclusion, freedom. In Fichte's eyes it has obviously done so by following the laws of thought: inference, logical deduction, force the ego, Fichte thinks, to the judgment that it is free. *Laws* of thought!! *Force* the ego!! Then the ego is subject to law! Then the ego is not free, and our first conclusion of freedom is error! Let us resort once more to empirical observation, and see if it shows us in the ego's world the presence of law. Plainly, the so-called objective world, the one described by Spinoza, is a complex of law: it is divided, perforce, into ego and non-ego; the two act and react upon each other with inexorable compulsion; the forms of feeling, perception, thought, are prescribed and cannot be evaded. If now we enter the world of self-consciousness revealed when the ego turned its view upon self, we discern equally here, both in form and content, the realm of law: its form of subject objectivity is imposed upon it; it is through necessity that it perceives everywhere self; without its conscious will, and it knows not why, it finds itself an I, and must see all things in the I form. Since from this form its freedom is deduced, its very freedom is necessity: the ego is forced to see itself as free, since, as eternal apperception, it can find no Other to control it: its freedom is a product of the laws of thought, a freedom fashioned and maintained by law, the last link in the chain of law. The content of the world of self-consciousness is pure thought, which exists only as it bodies forth the laws of thought.

The result of our second view of self is, then, that the ego feels everywhere the control of law, and that escape from it is as impossible as escape from self. Form, content, activity, every aspect of its actual existence, is held and shaped by necessity. Here, surely, we have found an Other that limits the ego. Hence our present conclusion contradicts the one to which our first view of self led us. We no longer see an ego that is absolute and free, but one confronted by an Other and the mere creature of necessity.

The view of the ego which sees the compulsion that the ego feels in all the spheres of its activity is variously expressed by Fichte. In the "Grundlage" it appears in section 2 as the recognition of the "non-ego," where the term "non-ego" includes the whole stubborn world of empirical fact. But this empirical world, when exhaustively analyzed in the succeeding sections of the "Grundlage," resolves itself into a self limited by an unseizable check (Anstoss), a law that there shall be for it an objective world of given sort. This Anstoss, or law, we can never grasp, for strive as we may we find never law itself, but always some case in which law exemplifies itself, as for instance our conception of law. Hence the object is not even a meeting of self and the Anstoss (*i. e.*, law), but is the meeting of two directions of the activity of the ego, one direction (*i. e.*, attention) given by the ego itself as freedom, and one direction controlled by law (*i. e.*, perception of the object, which perception is attention shaped by law as an object flowing back to the ego). The union of these two opposite directions of the activity of the ego is for us an object, and the compelling force of the object comes from law, which checks and shapes the ego's activity whenever the ego acts. In the "Darstellung," of 1801, the ego appears as Freedom, and the compulsion of law as *Seyn*. Knowledge is the interpretation of the two. In the posthumous works Fichte says distinctly that the philosopher, instead of believing in the plain man's being and the constraint of an *extra-mentem* reality, recognizes that he knows only the coercive power of law forcing him to see, feel, think, in given fashion.

The third stage in the development of the doctrine is reached by ascending with Fichte for a third time above the ego to examine the processes by which the ego has come to its present conclusion of an all-pervading necessity. The result of the third ascent is to re-establish, at least in part, the freedom and the abso-

luteness of the ego. We see that it has reached the result, necessity, through turning thought and attention in a certain direction: it is through the exertion of the activity of the ego in perceiving and concluding that law is for it: the existence for the ego of the limiting Other depends upon the act of the ego: let the ego refuse to perceive, to know, to think, and it escapes from the limitations of the world of actual existence into the freedom of non-existence: at every point the ego is free to know or not to know, hence to find actual existence with its laws, or freedom from all law: if it perceive and think, it is bound by the necessity of fact and of logic; if it choose inaction it escapes compulsion. Freedom always lies within its grasp. Further, whatever the ego sees is within itself, for it can see only self. Hence law is enfolded within it, it originates and ends in the ego; it is not a foreign force that masters the ego, but something whose existence depends upon the ego, and whose existence must be in the ego. Hence the ego still controls content, and is therefore free, still is the circumference of all being, and is therefore absolute.

The view of the final absoluteness of the ego and of its being the ultimate ground of its content is expounded in the third section of the "Grundlage," and its substance is expressed in the proposition, "the ego *opposits in* the ego a divisible non-ego to a divisible ego." Later in the "Grundlage" it is forcibly restated. In the discussion of the Anstoss, *i. e.*, law that there shall be for the ego an objective world of given sort, Fichte tells us that the Anstoss, or law, has no objective existence of its own apart from the ego: it does not exist without the action of the ego, but is always directed upon the activity of the ego in becoming conscious: it occurs only in so far as the ego is active, and is a check only in so far as the ego is active: its possibility is conditioned by the activity of the ego: no activity of the ego, no law (I. 212). In Fichte's later works his perpetual thesis is, "the activity of the ego is the ground of existence," and the final point which he reaches in every series of reflections is the all-inclusive circle of the ego's will so to reflect, the absoluteness of the ego which freely originates, through its own act, its content.

We need no longer continue the process of returning upon self, for we shall find at each return a repetition of one of the results already gained: we shall see either an ego determined by law in

form and content, or a free and absolute ego holding within its attention and thought the determined ego. Hence thesis and antithesis, in their final form, stand before us, as a free ego and a determined ego, and our task is to find some higher synthesis that will reconcile them, some great central truth of which each is a true but partial view, of which Freedom is one aspect and Necessity another.

(c) Reconciliation of a Free and a Limited Ego as Holy Will or a God of Love.

This central truth of double aspect may be approached from either of its two points of view. We may ask, "How can a free will see itself as in any aspect conditioned by law? How can freedom be freedom and yet be ruled by necessity? How can an Other exist for an Absolute?" The obvious answer to this form of the problem is that freedom remains freedom and yet appears in the form of law if it voluntarily submits to law. If freedom choose to become law it is law and freedom at the same time. In that case the Other which the Absolute sees is only another aspect of self.

Or we may state the problem from the side of law and ask how law can be at the same time freedom. That law can be freedom for which the only substantial existence is a free will which freely appears in its forms. If there is a law which can find concrete expression only in the substance of a free will, such law is at once law and freedom: it is law in form and freedom in stuff, in actual existence: it cannot be without being what it is, or law; it cannot be unless a free will gives it being, and therefore unless it is freedom. Such law is the Moral Law. The Moral Law finds objective existence only in the free will which voluntarily submits to it.

The two results are identical: the central truth behind actual existence, of which law is one expression, and freedom another, is a free will voluntarily submitting to law. The correction of our two partial and seemingly contradictory views of the ego, first as freedom and then as necessity, through their synthesis, has given us now a view of the true nature of the ego: we see it as Will-stuff freely becoming law and thereby appearing as the world of consciousness.

Since we have several times broken Fichte's train of reasoning by discursive remarks, let us now summarize it that we may have the present status of the argument clearly in mind.

Fichte, through empirical observation, and reasoning founded upon this observation, reached the conclusion that the ego in its true nature is a free will that wills its own actual existence as the world of consciousness. But in examining the world of consciousness he found everywhere law which the actual ego cannot evade: instead of being a free-will creator who brings forth at pleasure the products of its own devising, the ego appears in the actual world as the passive beholder of a great opposeless force, as the mere recipient of impressions made by an Other, as the creature of necessity. The only rational solution of these two contradictory views of the ego is, in Fichte's eyes, the assumption that a free will which as freedom is the power and possibility of anything, of law or of not-law, of existence or of non-existence, wills to be, or, in other words, to appear as law; for actual existence is the concrete cases in which law manifests itself. Hereupon the phenomenal world, the totality of consciousness, becomes visible. This world is Freedom appearing as the world of consciousness with its laws. Hence the phenomenal world may be defined as Will-stuff freely becoming law: in substance it is Will, in form it is Necessity. Any other form might be assumed, for the substance is absolutely free with the unthinkable freedom of indifference, caprice. But it chooses to renounce this freedom and appear as the world of consciousness with its laws: in the world of consciousness is no freedom except in so far as this world is that which has freely willed to be not free: consciousness is merely the appearance of Freedom in law forms, the passive and fixed result of a free-will act in a preconscious sphere; hence freedom, action, will, is excluded from it. This matter will be more fully discussed in the ethical part of Fichte's system: for the present it is sufficient if we realize that consciousness is only the passive appearance of a power behind it.

We must keep in mind that this synthetic conclusion as to the real nature of the ego is, just as was the conclusion of freedom reached by the first view of the ego, only a logical conclusion. We must not imagine a realm of actual existence when there is a Free Will and a free-will act of submission to law, that results in the world of consciousness, for such conception is self-contradictory.

dictory. We must recognize the truth that the Free Will and its act exist only in the mind of the thinker, to satisfy the demands of reason. The thinker finds himself within the world of consciousness. From this world he cannot escape in order to discover its origin and its significance. But within this world, and in accordance with its laws, he analyzes it. He, through thought, resolves it into two *logical* constituents, Freedom and Law, and further determines their relations. But these constituents are *only* logical constituents, that is, they are sundered only in the mind: they have no real existence as separate entities. The world of consciousness, in its complex wholeness, is all that there is, after the labor of the thinker as before: Freedom and Law have not been found standing apart in a realm of their own, where Freedom bows its neck to Law and nature appears: the facts of life remain forever the same, and they are forever an inextricable tangle of freedom and law; all that the thinker has done is to enrich them by one new aspect, to view the whole machinery of consciousness, which is all that there is, as Free-Will stuff which freely appears as law, to see existence as the act of existing by a free Power.

The significance of our conclusion that the origin of existence is Will-stuff becoming law, in its relation to the laws of thought, is that the conceptions of freedom and of necessity are inseparable: the final World Cause which the mind reaches in its analysis of existence is the interpenetration of freedom and law as primal elements, and the Absolute must be for us in its every aspect a fusion of the two. It is impossible for us to conceive freedom alone, or law alone. The conception of the one involves the conception of the other and of the whole world of consciousness. Let us see. Freedom is conceived by the laws of thought which define it, therefore limit it, therefore hinder it from being free and bind it by law. Freedom, as freedom, is clearly unthinkable, for thinking is limitation by law. Freedom involves power of choice, power of choice involves an alternative which confronts freedom as a not-I, for if there is only self there is not full power of choice; a not-I involves limitation, which again hinders freedom from being free and binds it with necessity. In freedom viewing the alternative and hovering in the moment of choice, we have subject viewing object, or the world of consciousness with its laws. Law, upon examination, transforms itself in like manner into a duality, becoming the unseizable subjective which in the ego we call free-

dom, and involving that external expression which we call the objective, for pursue law forever and forever and we never find it: we grasp only the concrete cases in which it exists, among which concrete cases our own conception of law is one. In other words, law involves a conception of law which is subjective, the product of attention and thought, and concrete cases of law: neither can exist without the other. Hence law involves the world of consciousness, which we have found to be a union of freedom and of necessity. Or, again, from the proposition, "law shapes the first thought," let us deduce the nature of law. Law is either thought or not-thought. Suppose law is thought. Since it shapes the first thought it must itself be the first thought shaping itself. Hence law is primal thought shaping self. But it does not shape self if its form is imposed upon it: it can shape self only if it is a free will which gives to itself the form law. Hence if law is thought it is free will voluntarily appearing as law. Suppose law is not-thought: law exists only as an abstraction from facts, only as a deduction of the mind; therefore it is a not-thought involving thought; but the conception of not-thought involving thought is the conception of the world of consciousness in which we have been forced to postulate freedom. Hence if law is not-thought it involves the conception of freedom. Law, then, in all cases, involves the conception of freedom and of the whole world of consciousness. Law and freedom alike turn upon examination into a fusion of subjective freedom and objective compulsion. Freedom when pushed to the uttermost becomes Law, and law when pursued insistently becomes the freedom that ever eludes, the freedom that is never bound by the determinations of actual existence. Law and freedom, equally, involve the whole world of consciousness, and each involves the existence of the other, as the condition of its own existence.

We now return to our last result, which, in order to account for the facts of consciousness, postulated a sphere of potential existence containing Free Will, Law, and the act of voluntary submission by Free Will to Law.

The spheres of potential existence and of actual existence stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, for the act of Freedom in willing to be, causes its appearance as consciousness. Hence potential existence, Freedom, may be termed the reality,

the true being; and its result, the phenomenal world, may be called mere appearance, mere image of the truth behind. Very early in the history of thought men grasped the relation of the two spheres. The postulated sphere was intuitively felt to be one of Freedom whose fiat alone was sufficient to bring forth the world of consciousness, which was apprehended as the image of its Creator. "And God said let us make man in our own image, after our likeness." This statement expresses in figurative language the philosophic doctrine which Fichte would teach, but for the clear understanding of the Biblical text we must know what is meant by God, and what by Man. To the rational unfolding of these two ideas Fichte devotes himself: his philosophic system is an attempt to give a consistent explanation of the natures and of the relation of the two.

Henceforth we may designate these two spheres, not only as Freedom and Consciousness, but also as Being and Existence, or Reality and Appearance, or God and Image, meaning by Freedom, Being, Reality, God, that which we are forced to postulate as cause of phenomena, and by Consciousness, Existence, Appearance, Image, the result of this cause, *i. e.*, the world of phenomena, the world of consciousness.

In speaking of the relation of these two spheres we may, at different points in our paper, seem to hold contradictory language. We shall say at times that the sphere of existence is God and at times that it is not God. The apparent contradiction is reconciled, however, by recognizing the exact sense in which the word "is" is used in each proposition. When we say that existence is God, "is" denotes the act of appearing as the world of consciousness, the taking on of image form, "ex-isting," or standing forth from God as his reflection; we mean by this proposition that existence, or the world of consciousness, is the form in which God himself appears when he makes himself known; existence is God coming into the form of knowledge or consciousness, God living, subjecting himself to the laws of life. In this sense we are the living God, or God willing to live: we are what God is when Freedom has subjected itself to Law: God *exists* or *is* in man: the world of consciousness is God existing. When we say that existence is not God and never can be God, *is* denotes identity. Existence never can be identical with God because its very essence is diremption. Existence is God in ego form, hence it

sees itself as eternal separation of subject and object, and though it pursue forever the subjective self which reason says must be the Reality of which the objective self is image, it can never find it. The very condition of existence is separation from God in that existence is not God, but his image: in that existence is the existence of a world of consciousness. The proposition "existence is identical with God" is self-contradictory, for existence means "standing forth from God as the image of his reality: eternally separate from God as image must be from reality." When the image is absolutely identical with the imaged there is no image; if existence were absolutely identical with God, there would be no existence, no standing forth as separate.

The two spheres, God and his Appearance as the world of consciousness, are for Fichte, we have seen, a logical whole, each involving the other: if one is given, he must from it, if he allows thought free play, deduce the other; the existence of the world of consciousness forces him to postulate the preconscious as its cause, and the preconscious exists only in the human mind: for him, if there is man there must be God, and if there is God there must be man.

The two spheres, with their relation to each other, which we shall later develop as a third sphere, obviously include all that the mind of man can conceive, for his thought can never pass beyond existence and its First Cause. Hence we now have before us the totality of consciousness both in its widest possible extent and in its possible duplicity. Consciousness may consist of two spheres of diverse content and of fixed relation and each may be deduced from the other. In these two spheres as contained in Fichte's mind, we have the Absolute Ego, or the sphere of actual existence beholding itself springing from an unlike sphere which it calls non-existence, knowledge seeing itself as resting upon not-knowledge. These two spheres are in their totality the widest conceivable circumference of the ego.

Here Fichte gives us in the ego beholding itself the only conception of an Absolute that is not self-destructive. By the "Absolute" we mean "capable of being conceived by itself alone." It follows that, if the mind try to conceive other Absolute than itself, it tries to conceive that which through its own nature is unrelated, and yet must be, through the act of conception, related to the mind. If, on the contrary, it view the sum total of its own

consciousness as an unconditioned, it sees that which, though seen, appears unrelated.

Now that the limits of the Absolute Ego have been drawn for us, our task is clearly defined.

The Wissenschaftslehre deals primarily, as the name signifies, with the world of knowledge, of actual existence; but since actual existence is the mere appearance of a reality behind, the mere image of God, we must, that we may grasp the true significance of actual existence, understand the nature of God. Our last analysis showed us as First Cause a Freedom which voluntarily subjects itself to law, thereby appearing as actual existence. The question arises, why does Freedom subject itself to law? Since we know only Freedom and law, if Freedom choose law, we can conceive no other end in its so doing than law itself. Or, more fully: the mind cannot extend beyond actual existence and its postulated cause, Freedom: actual existence is the realm of law, everything within it is ideal law, or the realization of law; Freedom, as Freedom, is undetermined; if now Freedom choose to renounce itself and become Law, Law must, for us, be its end, as we can conceive no other end: Freedom obeys law for the sake of law. But that will which chooses law for the sake of law we call Holy Will, and describe it as "doing what it ought because it ought." The motive power of will is desire: a free will that chooses must choose from preference, otherwise there is no will and no choice, but blind chance. Hence Holy Will chooses law because it loves law, and we have a God of whose nature the ultimate fact is Love.¹ Love desires that an other shall freely yield itself and become one with the lover. But nothing but God, or Love, exists. Hence the other must be a second aspect of self. So God, or Love, enters the form of consciousness, apperception: he reflects upon self, whom he throws off as the world of consciousness, imaging his inseparable union of freedom and law in that consciousness which at every moment feels itself free and responsible, and yet at every moment recognizes itself as the subject of law, — a self in image form, and thus an other made an other and sundered in two only by the form reflection, but very one in being and reality. In this ego form are three direct glimpses of God: one as foundation and true life of its existence, one as summit and crowning product of its

¹ Anweisung zum seligen Leben.

thought, the third as direct revelation of the concrete form God would take upon earth. The first is given in the determinations of sense, the second in the pure notion of God, the third in the command of duty as heard in the heart of each. The Inconceivable, whose nature we are deducing, and putting before us as a notion, and the world of consciousness, his objective self, are inseparably linked by love:— He threw off the world of consciousness that it might freely yield itself to him; He loves it with an everlasting love, and draws it with loving kindness; He encompasses it round about, offers himself incessantly to its regards, calls it from every object of nature, from every height and depth of thought; He implores it continually to give itself to Him who brought it forth and fashioned it,— to become one with Him in will and life. His love, which is the very fibre of its existence, which is its only substance, stirs in its midst, in the hearts of man, moving them to know the Divine Lover, importuning them for their love in return. Nought can separate us from the love of God, neither height nor depth, nor things present, nor things to come, for it is the very stuff of which he has formed us. And the world of consciousness hears the call and feels after Him, if haply it might find Him: it rests in no object, it pauses in no thought: incessantly it is impelled forward in inextinguishable desire for Him who calls. But He ever flies: He escapes sense and eludes thought: He lies always just beyond the furthest reach, and is seen forever through a veil darkly: sense presses from pleasure to pleasure because it finds nowhere the satisfied self it seeks, which it can reach only in oneness with Him: reason pursues Him beyond all determinate and comprehensible existence, beyond the whole world of thought, to admit at last that inconceivable love, pure, absolute, unthinkable love, is higher than all reason, is itself the fountain of reason, and the root of existence. This love which binds together the subjective God and the objective world, appears as life, as the ego: it appears as the oneness of a duality which is not thereby destroyed, but is eternally subsistent: the ego is in its very essence love, for the ego is forever two who are yet one: the stuff of the phenomenal world, which we have before defined as Will-stuff freely becoming a law, is the Will of love, is love, love of law showing itself as Will for law, as activity which produces law by itself becoming law: this Love, as substance, and life, and ultimate truth of

the phenomenal world, thought looks upon as God, and it conceives the world as His tangible, sensible appearance.

We have now developed our notion of the postulated sphere of consciousness which we call God as fully as Fichte thinks possible by means of the direct consideration of this sphere. His reason for this judgment is as follows: our first knowledge of the sphere is derived by deduction from the facts of consciousness; this deduction ascribes to God two elements, Freedom and Necessity. We contemplate directly these two elements as elements of God, and ask how they can be welded into the oneness of His nature. Reason answers, "By Freedom's voluntary submission to Necessity," or by the conception of Holy Will. The conception of Will drives us to Desire, and our final result is a God of Love. Further direct contemplation of God, Fichte thinks, is impossible, for we have no content to contemplate. For additional knowledge of Him, we must again betake us to the second sphere, the world of consciousness which is His image.

In this image His nature is expressed truly and wholly, and He is in it as He is in Himself, for He and it are thought-correlates: the one stands for cause of all that is, and is reached by reasoning back from its perceived results; the other stands for result of the postulated Cause, and must exactly balance it, since the Cause is postulated only to account for it. He who sees that God is a deduction of the mind from the facts of life, and that other existence of God than as a logical conclusion is unprovable, must see that this God is fully expressed in these facts. In the image lies everything which is in the Reality, but as image, utterance, not as Reality. The appearance is the immediate revelation which Being gives of itself, and is truth because it is the visibility of real Being.

IV. THE UNITY OF FICHTE'S SYSTEM.

Now that we have before us Fichte's notion of God in a fully developed form, we are in position to judge the justness of the charge that he had not one system, but two. This charge, it will be remembered, asserts that Fichte in his early treatises recognized no God, teaching that the ego is sufficient unto itself, but in later years preached a mysticism in which all reality was swallowed up

in God. This charge is not true. For Fichte there was always a God: He appears in all the earlier cosmological works, though in these His nature is not fully developed, as in the later so-called religious treatises: in the "Grundlage" He is the *unabhängige Thätigkeit* with its two elements, one corresponding to the consciousness, or freedom of reflection, of the ego, the other, to the compulsion, or law, of the object; in the "Grundriss," He is seen as the *Freie Kräfte* (Freedom and Law) of which everything in the ego is manifestation; in the "Darstellung," of 1801, He is the Absolute, which is explained as the union of the two elemental qualities, freedom and law, in the formal unity of thought. And Fichte's conception of the nature of this God never changed: he is always for him a product of thought, with only logical existence, the result of the analysis by the thinker, of the world of consciousness into its ultimates; his existence, his nature, his every attribute, is deduced by what seems to Fichte an indivisible chain of logical inference: from the empirical facts of freedom and necessity, Holy Will is deduced, and from Holy Will, Love; no element of fancy, or dogmatism, or personal preference enters the notion.

For Fichte the Eternal can be apprehended only by thought, and in no other way is approachable by us: the One and Unchangeable is conceived as the explanation of ourselves, and of the world; and this in a double aspect: partly as the cause whereby all things have come into existence; partly that in Him and His essential nature, as we are forced to conceive it, is contained the cause why all things exist as they are and in no other way. God is a thought to explain the world: that is, man sees the sense world, seeks its rational explanation and finds it in the notion God. We must banish forever the idea of an *extra-mentem* God and an *extra-mentem* creation with its time-series, its process of evolution, its law of progress. God did not *first* exist and *then* create the world of nature and *then* fashion man within it. Neither does Force gradually evolve and differentiate itself into variously complex organisms until it finally reaches its highest manifestations in man. There is no evolution; there is no law of progress: there is only the One and Unchangeable existence which is the truth of thought. Evolution, and progress, and process are merely our forms of seeing, the fashions in which we apprehend; they are the laws of consciousness forcing it to perceive in a given way. Consciousness is

compelled to see in forms of time and space: these forms are of great interest as forms, and we study them in the Natural Sciences, in History, in Mathematics: in short, the so-called knowledge of the world, its collection of facts and laws, is a collection of facts and laws of the forms of perception. But we must always hold fast to the truth that it is consciousness that we are studying, and not an *extra-mentem* reality; it is our own mind that we are exploring, and not a *Ding an sich*; and as the boundary and circumference of consciousness or mind we find God, a thought coexistent with the universe, in which the universe finds explanation. This thought of God is not a late result, a last and highest form of the evolution of man's mind: humanity did not exist for ages without coming to the notion God, and then finally reach it. The thought God is present where any bit of consciousness is present. If you ask, "Suppose there were only animals upon the earth; since God is a notion of mind, and animals do not conceive God, would God then exist?" in asking the question you supply the notion God, just as in supposing object without subject you supply subject. It is impossible to think a world without God, for thought involves God: follow thought along its lines and you find God in it: the thought that thinks the world must think causation, and causation leads to God. In one and the same moment that the world of consciousness appears, the thinking consciousness that sees the world is forced, Fichte thinks, to postulate the sphere of potential existence which we have described, as its cause. Neither is before the other. Both as inseparably united, come into being at once. The perception of the external world and the idea of God are, in Fichte's eyes, indivisibly one, in that neither can exist without the other, neither precedes or follows the other, neither is cause of the other; or, rather, both are equally cause and effect of each other, just as are the members of an organism, in that each involves the other and depends for existence upon the other. The inkbottle is in Fichte's eyes as much the cause of God as God is cause of the inkbottle, for the existence of the inkbottle, as an example of the sense-world, causes the thinker to engage in that process of thought which, if carried to its logical results, issues in the thought God, and God cannot exist without the consciousness that contains the sense-world. God and the actual world are two contemporary and coextensive regions of the thinker's mind. This is no First Cause as objective reality, the only First Cause is a mental image pro-

duced by reason to satisfy its causal instinct. There is no real creation, real *werden*: creation and *werden* are again mental images brought forth to satisfy a mental desire to trace things to a beginning, to see them becoming, arising. Genesis is an explanation which the mind makes to itself, as the process by which things are produced, and this explanation is the only genesis. No cosmology is historical in the sense that it sets before us a reality, for the mind can contain only mental images. Existence is, it does not become, — it is the eternal Being of God in the eternal act of existing; hence it is eternal, unchangeable Unity. It is as God is, for existence and the Being of God are merged inseparably into one; hence is immutable, without variation or shadow of turning. But existence, in explaining itself to itself, must enter the forms of thought, obey its laws, appear in connection of cause and effect: creation, development, change, and all other terms which express process, are merely the forms of consciousness, the train of images in which the ego sees self. The *Wissenschaftslehre* pretends to be no more real than any other like attempt: it is only more rational. It does not set before us an actual process of creation, it gives us a mental figment which is in harmony with the laws of reason, and consistent with the rational forms of the material world. It unfolds with inflexible logic the implications of any fact of consciousness, and shows what the image of God and the image of Creation must be to be rationally consistent with the image of the material world and of self: if red is red to the plain man, let him trace the conditions which this appearing involves, and he will, Fichte thinks, develop the *Wissenschaftslehre*, for the *Wissenschaftslehre* is simply the picture of the total web of consciousness in its widest circumference; it is the survey of the whole of that image-world whose first stage is the physical universe; it is the recognition of the entire content of the knowledge of man as those laws must shape it which give to him the facts of every-day life. Fichte's system is an exposition of the laws of self-consciousness: it is an answer to the question "How shall a self-conscious being conceive himself?" it is a discussion of the character of egohood, a formulation of the law of self-seeing. If the ego look at self persistently and seek an explanation of its own nature it must finally, Fichte thinks, see itself grounded in God, and coming forth as His appearance in accordance with the laws which he chooses shall control this appearance.

The only difference between Fichte's earlier and Fichte's later teaching is that in his earlier years he was chiefly interested in working out the results, in developing the whole extent of consciousness as a harmonious and rational unity, while in later years his mind was fixed upon the thought that, after all, his result was only a mental result, and was a necessary mental result. He realized with ever-increasing distinctness that the mind knows only its own mental images: it is incapable of grasping any reality that may lie behind these images: it knows nothing but appearances: That Which Appears, it cannot even name, for if it call it God, Reality, Truth, Absolute Being, Freedom, Principal, Force, these are not it, for these are mental images: if the mind make infinite efforts to define its nature, after each effort it is forced to say, "It is not that, it is not that:" only one positive predicate does it allow, — "it is that which appears." It can be seized only as it enters the form visibility. It can be seen only as image and never as reality, for the mind turns everything it touches into mental image. Hence in his posthumous works, after any new result of thought which he develops, Fichte cautions the reader to remember that it is only a mental product, that it has no reality in the sense of extra-mental existence, that there *is* no such Reality, Creator, Creation, *werden*, except in so far as "is" predicates image-being of its subject. Again, these images are necessarily what they are. Reason is forced to see given products as the results of its activity. There is no actual freedom anywhere. Everything is fixed, even the assumption of freedom. The ego is passive beholder of an activity which it ascribes to itself, but which, since it is ordained for it, is not its own; and of results of this activity whose natures are determined by that which brings them forth. While in the "Grundlage" attention was fastened upon the activity and its results, now Fichte watches the ego watching the activity and admitting that it knows not whence it comes, for it can never transcend this activity. Hence the ego seems the passive instrument of a Power beyond knowledge.

One great cause of the failure to grasp the unity of Fichte's system lies in a peculiarity of his exposition: we have seen that his doctrine is of such organic nature that, in it, separation of God, morality, and phenomena, is impossible because each is only a different aspect of the one sole existence, and because a God of

love is deduced from the facts of the world by an unbroken chain of reasoning : yet Fichte, in his treatises, insists upon drawing a sharp line between his discussions of Religion, Ethics, and Science ; and, as his ethical and scientific works are far more numerous than his religious, we hear comparatively little of a God of love. Since for Fichte the result of God's Holy Will in choosing law for the sake of law is the world of consciousness, his usual thesis is "Soll ist der grund des Seyns." This thesis has both material and moral significance. Of its material significance we are already possessed. The *origin* of all things is for Fichte a moral act, or obedience to law for the sake of law. The *continued existence* of all things is, even for the plain man, dependent upon their obedience to law. An atom of hydrogen exists as hydrogen only because it obeys the laws of hydrogen : in all cases it must be true to its own nature and comport itself according to the laws of that nature, or it ceases to be hydrogen. Loss of existence is the penalty of disobedience to law. But the plain man looks upon this obedience as passive obedience. The world for him is lifeless matter which in some mysterious way has been put under the dominion of law, and its inertness prevents change of condition. The material world can have no moral aspect ; it is a machine framed by a cunning artificer, and it works as he has contrived it to work. For Fichte, however, the material universe presents at every moment the spectacle of active obedience through its own free will to law : it is will-stuff, absolute freedom whose form and content depend only upon self : if it appears as continuity of law it is because it is continuity of moral choice. Every moment of the existence of the world is proof of its morality, for the condition of its existence is obedience to law for the sake of law. The material world is wholly and always moral.

In the so-called world of human conduct we shall find that the proposition "Soll ist der grund des Seyns" has great practical import. In this world Man is to do consciously what the pre-conscious will of God has done in bringing forth the material world ; that is, he is, through free obedience to the Moral Law, to become the source of his own existence ; for his real existence is the holy will which he sees in himself. This holy will thus seen is the visibility of God, according to Fichte. He reasons as follows : Since actual existence is the appearance

of freedom, which is holy will, actual existence must appear as holy will, that is, holy will must be visible to man, and he must see that it is the end of existence. Such sight of holy will is gained in the self-consciousness of a moral humanity. When it sees itself looking upon the sense world and feeling its allurements, but resisting these allurements to do what it ought because it ought, it sees that its conduct is controlled by a sight of holy will as the end of existence; it realizes that the sense world and the empirical ego exist only that the righteous act of will may take place; it feels that the sight of the holy choice within itself is the highest expression that existence can find, the culmination to which it all tends, the final cause of its being. The sight by man of holy will within self is the true appearance of freedom, true image of God; it is an appearance because seen, that is, by man; it is an appearance of freedom because seen as holy will. It is the only phenomenon that has intrinsic worth; everything else has worth only in so far as it is a means towards the sight of holy will, and whatever is not such means is in itself *gar nichts*, as Fichte never wearies in telling us. The individual and the sense world are an opportunity of making visible the moral aspect of the world, and are without value except as such opportunity. The world is in its core morality, it must appear as morality, and all its parts are but means to morality.

Once more do we repeat the warning with which we accompany every step. Do not apply the category of actuality to the thesis "Soll ist der grund des Seyns." Do not look upon the Divine Will as a *Ding an sich*. The repetition of this caution is necessary, for the temptation to disregard it is bound up in the very nature of reason, is a result of the instrument we are forced to use. We are trying to discover by the help of reason what the logical conditions of present facts must be; we discover them, — they are such and such; if they *are* they have being, and straightway we look upon them as actualities. But we must always hold in mind that there are two stages of being, one the actual, the other the logical, that is, the sphere of conditions and pre-suppositions which the rationalizing of facts demands. When we accept the thesis "Soll ist der grund des Seyns," we must not fancy that at one time an actual Divine Will saw actual

law, actually willed to obey it, and then and only then appeared as the world of consciousness, for the very obvious reason that the first supposition, "an actual will," involves the whole world of consciousness, as Fichte is forever telling us; every bit involves the whole: the whole is in every bit, and the notion that a will to be or not to be, existed alone by itself and was the cause of being, is absolute absurdity and self-contradiction; the notion of freedom involves the whole notion of the world of consciousness with all its necessity. What "Soll ist der grund des Seyns" means, is that the moral man, in beholding the moral will now present in himself, and in seeking its explanation, is forced to come upon, as ultimate condition of his will, a Divine Will which is holy. This Divine Will exists only as a conception of the mind to explain its own holy will. The sight of holy will in holy men is all the holy will there is. It is the Divine Will, the one organic will seen as self at an infinite number of points of view called individuals, and there is no other holy will. Humanity's view of will is all the will there is.

This caution is necessary, and necessary here, though it comes for the thousandth time. The student of Fichte after years of study finds himself again and again resting in the dead idea of a past, of an extra-mundane God, of a temporal creation, when the very soul and essence of Fichte's teaching is an eternal "now," a God who *is* the world, an ever-present creation. We are at this moment, in Fichte's eyes, all that there *is*, and we are infinite might, majesty, and power, and possibility, and these have no other existence than in conception. The birth-place and abiding place of these conceptions is the human soul; as they expand they lift it ever with them, as their circumference, their substantial and enveloping tissue, for it is they; it soars and dares and does with them. What the heart of man conceives, that he is. The thoughts of the heart are the things of life; if they mount aloft and sing and soar in worship, Thought is the God to whom the *Te Deums* and *Benedicites* are chanted. We are what thought makes us.

Fichte's argument at present stands as follows: The Absolute Ego sees itself as the world of actual existence springing

from a Power behind. This Power it views as freedom submitting to law for the love of law, or Holy Will. The world of actual existence is in its eyes the result of this free will act, and is the appearance of the Power. Since this Power is Holy Will, and actual existence is its appearance, actual existence must appear as Holy Will. Actual existence appears as Holy Will in man's seeing self making a holy choice to resist the sense-world, and to do what he ought because he ought. Hence the true nature of actual existence is to be found in its moral aspect, and its various elements are merely means to morality. These elements are: the sense-world, the moral command, the individual, as containing both; and they are valueless unless they fulfil their end by issuing in a moral choice.

V. FAITH.

Now that we have before us the outline of Fichte's doctrine and see that, in his view, knowledge can never be transcended, that the web of consciousness is all there is, and no *extra-mentem* God can exist, since existence means a being within the mind, the question naturally arises where in the system is there room for the faith of which Fichte speaks so often.

Faith is the very essence of the system; and he who understands the system, sees that men live their daily life by faith and faith alone. Fichte's philosophic point of view is that nothing but mind exists, that mind is the only truth, and being, and reality, and that mind in its every aspect, is truth, being, reality; if the mind in obedience to its own laws reach a result, that result has universal validity for thinking beings, and such universal validity is objective reality. Mind has faith in itself, and this faith is the creator of reality.

We, as individuals, are to become conscious of this faith. We are to feel faith in the results of thought and to abide steadfastly by these results. Thought has developed for us the whole content of consciousness, divided it into two spheres, and established the relation between these spheres: one sphere, God, it declares to be the only Reality, the only True Being, the Life, the Light, the Love, of all that is; the other sphere exists only

to make God manifest, only as a field for the concrete realization of the Divine Idea. We are to hold fast to this relation which thought has revealed to us, to grasp it with faith and believe it; it is to be ever present to consciousness, and we are to be absolutely true to it. It must be the guiding principle of our lives, shaping every action. We are to believe and know that we, in our true nature, are God incarnated, God working among the facts of life through love of law and righteousness; we are to know that the holy man is God walking upon earth. Every deed of ours should be a God deed, should be that which reason tells us God himself wills in this given time and place. So may the Eternal Word become flesh in every individual who gives up his personal life to the Divine Life within him, precisely as it became incarnate in Jesus Christ. Christ is the one man who has immediately seen and felt, and has unfalteringly lived the truth that Man and God are one, and he tells us that only by eating his flesh and drinking his blood, that is, by becoming absolutely identical in life with him, by being with him the life of the One and the indivisible God, can we follow him.

This faith we are to take with us into daily life and with it we are to confront its facts. If we look at these as mere facts they are opaque, unintelligible; they give no reason in themselves why they are what they are, why so stubborn, and slow, and stupid, why brutal, sensual, devilish. They seem to be a hostile power of equal and of independent strength; they have laws of their own which we must learn if we would conquer them, and in learning these laws we seemingly subject ourselves to them instead of dominating them. In understanding them, we must take on, for the moment, their nature, that we may overcome them; subjection of the Spirit instead of sovereignty of the Spirit seems to be the rule of the world. These hostile facts persist in their natures; they are obstinate, hard, inflexible; struggle against them seems unavailing, the struggle of years, of generations. Evil is as vigorous and prolific now as when the first holy man armed himself to do battle with it. Our weakness is the one and only truth that the world of fact teaches, weakness in will, in wisdom, and in material force.

These facts, so unintelligible in themselves, take on a meaning only when the eye of faith looks at them. Faith recognizes them as the material in which the true image of God shall be

made to appear; it sees that its task is to go among them with eye fixed upon the Divine Ideal, and to work out the realization of that ideal, to make God's kingdom come and God's will be done in their midst. They are no longer unintelligible. Their opaqueness is perceived to be the necessary means by which the ideal of intelligence becomes visible; their laws are seen to exist that we may learn to conquer through law, for man's proper work is the handling of laws, his life's task is to disentangle the complex of laws infolded within his consciousness, to grasp them in their relation to one another, to learn to set one off against the other and nullify the lower by the interposition of the higher, to work continually that which in a given plane seems a miracle because it is a direct contradiction of the laws of that plane, but which from a higher point of view is apprehended as merely the intelligent comprehension of a vast system of laws and the control of one by the intervention of another. Man is by nature the miracle-worker, for he is by nature intelligence; the miracle is the expression of his true being, and to the Absolute Ego all things are possible at all times, for the Absolute Ego is complete comprehension of law. The stubbornness of facts is seen to be a warrant that man is engaged in a God-struggle with God-forces; he has the strength of the Infinite but he must meet infinite resistance, or he will never know the fulness of his own strength. The weakness of man is discerned as weakness in strength; it seems weakness only because at any moment is beheld with the eye of intelligence the whole of the struggle, while to the individual, as an existence in time and space, is granted limited power; but the resistance which meets him is also limited by time and space, and is never greater than his strength. Man has the whole God-head upon which to draw, Holy Will always triumphs, life is a continual overcoming.

Faith, for Fichte, is faith in reason and a complete surrender of self to reason's last logical deduction. The loftiest flight of thought of which the mind is capable reveals to us a God of Love, who is the life of every man and who may come to conscious life in every man; then, bids Fichte, abide continually in this high thought, believe it utterly, act always in conformity with it, control life through it, be true at every moment to reason. A system of Philosophy which is thus exclusively loyal to reason, and which finds God and union with God only through the

severest thought, is as far removed from the irrational fanaticism and dogmatic statement of mysticism as is zenith from nadir; it is as clear-cut and transparent as mysticism is vague and obscure; for it the way of life is logic, not feeling, and the Doctrine of Blessedness is a doctrine of knowledge. Man's well-being depends, according to it, not upon illogical emotions, but upon his holding a definite, rational conclusion as to himself and the world, that is, that they both proceed from the essential self-contained Divine Nature, and are merely the passive instruments of the appearing of this nature.

This rational conclusion faith transforms into reality, for faith is the only creator of reality in every sphere of existence. The objective world is real to man only because the ego thinks it so; any other reality than that given by perfect faith in the concept reality, it cannot be proved to have. This lowest kind of faith is the birth-gift of every man and makes for him a firm and abiding world; he wakes every morning with the certainty of finding a realm of realities; he goes forth and labors in it sure that it will yield to him real results, and in this conviction of reality, reality of world and of results consists. This faith, since it is a birth-gift, is not a conscious product of the individual, but must be looked upon as born of that postulated subjection of self by Freedom to Law which we have called Holy Will, and described as taking place in a pre-conscious sphere. When Freedom voluntarily subjects itself to law from love of law it has full faith that the law it loves becomes real, that real existence results, and man, as part of this existence and involved in its law, shares in the faith; the faith is so complete that it is not perceived as faith, but its result is unquestionably accepted as fact. The primal act of faith in the primal creation of reality is unseen by the natural man.

But in another realm, and to the spiritual eye, the creative power of faith must become visible, for, since existence is an ego, and an ego is seeing self, all within the ego, and, among the rest, faith and its works, must appear. It does so appear in the perfect man; he sees an inward faith bringing forth an outward reality, a conscious faith giving objective existence to the spiritual ideal within him. Thus he becomes a creator through faith, and is shaped into the very image of the creative God; or, rather, he sees within self God, is absolutely sure that this God can

work his will in the material world, and does his holy deed in His strength.

This deed is the test of his faith, — if he does the God-deed then does he truly believe that God is One with him, and thereby is his spiritual conception made an external truth; faith then becomes a seen and manifested creator of reality as it is always its unseen creator. If he does not do the deed then has he not the faith, — words do not avail, — the withered arm is stretched forth, regardless of all thought of possibility or impossibility, if there is belief in the heart. The man does, he does instantly and instinctively; this doing is faith, and nothing else is faith. The faith that is real, acts, for faith is action, and the action is the reality of faith, the real making by faith, the creative power in faith to produce reality. Faith is the action of the ego in conscious effort to complete itself; it is the going forth of the ego, as God, fully conscious of its power, in endless activity, energy, power, to create the real; it is the most strenuous activity of which God or Man is capable, for it an issuing into the realm of nothingness and night to plant there reality, life, light, the infinite and eternal prolificness of Love and Will. Where I have faith I do, and my doing is my faith; if this Divine energy does not burst forth in my life I have no faith, for faith is God's energy in creating reality manifested through man. Faith is action, and action is faith.

VI. THE SENSE WORLD.

Two immediate duties devolve upon the expositor: he must, with Fichte, enter the sense world and the moral world and so explain the facts of each that they shall be seen to be in harmony with the theory of their origin just developed. To this task we now address ourselves.

The most obvious description of the sense world that suggests itself to the beholder is that it is a world in which a multitude of distinct objects, each with distinct qualities of its own, are seen. Fichte has told us that these objects are ego-stuff submitting to law. The question at once arises, submitting to what law? What is the law that forces the ego to see itself as

a multitude of facts with a multitude of qualities? Our first problem, then, is to seek the fundamental law of sight or of perception.

Let us take the simplest possible perception, for instance, that A is A, and ask what it involves. One thing, at least, it involves, a sense of sameness; it is recognized as identical from moment to moment. It could not be so recognized unless there were in the mind a permanent concept under which A is classed and thereby known. Knowing, therefore, appears as a relating by the individual of that which he finds to a concept already within the mind. But the deeper problem at once comes to view, How is this concept known? The simplest aspect under which the given concept presents itself is as "this concept;" hence its knowledge involves a knowledge of "this," and our ultimate question becomes "How does the mind know 'this'?" By hypothesis "this" is denuded of all qualities except "thisness," hence it can be known by no other quality or qualities. What, then, is "this" eternally and forever for the mind? By what may the mind identify it and recognize constancy in its own meanings? What is its mark and token? We are denied all positive predicates as means of identification, for we have voluntarily stripped them from "this" in order to discover its essential nature, hence the mind can know it only through negation: "this" is "not that," or "this" is not "not-this." We know only by holding together in the mind two contradictories, two mentally exclusive concepts, "this" and "not this," and perceiving what results from their union. The result is for us an "object" of knowledge. Hence the ultimate law of Perception may be superficially described as a law of negativity. But negativity is found upon examination to be dependent upon positive existence, to be possible only in the midst of a complex of relations, and to be an urging which pushes us from one member to another in endless quest of the reality of the first. We can describe "this" as "not that" only because the mind sees itself as holding within itself a sum-total of inter-related parts, whose determinations individually are fixed by the whole and the other parts. Hence the fundamental law of perception is the law of reciprocal determination by the parts of an organic entity.

Now that we have grasped the fundamental law of perception we see why we were forced, when we were first investigating the nature of the ego, to view it as something which in itself is essentially self-contradictory. We said that its true being lies within a sphere of potentiality where it is freedom, therefore without the determinations of actual existence, yet with the power of assuming them at any moment. In short, we found it to be the power of existence or of non-existence. But the idea of freedom, or of a power of existence or of non-existence, contradicts itself. Suppose the power choose non-existence. Then it *is* a power which *does not exist*. It is and it is not at the same moment. Yes, freedom can be conceived only as a holding together of opposites. If it is *freedom* it can be limited by none of the determinations of actual existence, therefore it cannot exist, for all actual existence is determined; but if it *is* freedom it exists as freedom. Hence we must always conceive freedom as hovering between actual existence and non-existence, and refusing to be wholly either that it may be.

We were driven to this self-contradictory conception in our ultimate analysis of the ego by our desire to see the ego in its essential being. The law of perception is that the object perceived is the result of the holding together of two mutually exclusive conceptions. Hence the ego must always see itself as the blending of contradictories, — of existence and non-existence, of freedom and necessity, of mind and matter, of God and Man, of the finite and the Infinite.

This holding together of opposites, this seizing of relations, this perception of an object by means of relations, which Fichte terms the law of reciprocal determination, is for him the essential truth of thought and of imagination; hence he constantly pictures both as a hovering between contradictories, a grasping of opposites, a seizing and a joining of a positive and a negative. And this law is his chief instrument in developing his system; for, given one fact, from its connotation, through the law of opposites, he deduces the whole universe of thought.

The law of reciprocal determination measures for him the circumference of consciousness, divides its content into interdependent spheres, and subdivides each sphere into an infinite correlation of members. The limits of consciousness are not given to him with actual existence, but the sphere of actual exist-

ence determines, and is determined by, a sphere of potential existence: it determines such sphere, for actual existence forces him to postulate its opposite, as a non-existence, which is potential existence; it is determined by such sphere as being thought of as its result, and in being conceived only by means of opposition to it. Again, actual existence is divided into two worlds which reciprocally determine each other: the merely physical world in which the ground of its existence, that primal obedience to Law for the sake of Law which Freedom yields in a pre-conscious sphere, is unseen; and the moral world in which this ground of being is always visible as obedience to the Moral Law. Again, the physical world and the moral world each is subdivided into infinitely complex details, all of which reciprocally determine and involve one another as being members of a definite organic entity.

The comprehension that the fundamental law of thought is perception through the holding together of opposites puts us in position to meet the problem of the essential difference between presentations and representations. The problem may be stated as follows: Suppose we grant the world to be only a world of knowledge, nothing beyond the images of the mind, which are ego-stuff shaped by law. Why, then, if this is true, do we so persistently separate these images into two great classes, with the ineradicable conviction that one class, which we call the material phenomena of the world, or presentations, is not mind, but matter, and that the other class, or representations, is merely a system of images?

Because, Fichte replies, in the former class we have a union of sensation and thought, and in the latter we have pure thought.

What is sensation, and how does it differ from thought? Sensation is the not-understood which understanding brings with it as its necessary counterpart: the universe, as self-conscious thought, is the understanding of understanding, consciousness seeing itself, and explaining itself to itself: now the law of reciprocal determinism which we have just formulated teaches us that understanding can be understood only through the presence of its opposite; hence the I, or understanding, must from

its very nature, bring with it the inexplicable; this inexplicable the plain man calls sensation, and wonders that he cannot understand it as he does the conclusions of thought, not knowing that this very inexplicability is the condition of his having any understanding at all; why red and green should be just what they are, why we have not other senses, and why exactly these, must remain forever unknown. The plain man, blindly obeying the laws of thought, adds to understanding and sensation, substance as bearer and cause. To this substance, which is a mere concept of the mind, his inborn faith gives a real existence: he calls it matter, and fancies it an independent entity which has separate existence of its own apart from mind. The philosopher rises to a point where he unifies mind and matter as necessary opposites out of whose union existence is born, necessary correlates of a whole which in one aspect is understanding, in the other, the not-understood. They are the two contradictories which, held together in eternal antagonism, produce the world. Or, more simply, knowledge knows itself, therefore it must know its boundary where it spring from not-knowledge; this not-knowledge whence knowledge springs is called sensation. Sensations "are the boundaries of our thoughts, beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of these ideas."

Sensation is where the Absolute meets man; it is what it is because it is, and for no other reason. Hence the plain man feels absolutely sure of the testimony of his senses: if he sees and feels an object he laughs at the philosopher who seeks other proof of its existence. Sensation is the mysterious law that mind shall perceive in such and such fashion; it is the first point of interpretation of freedom and necessity; it is born of the reflex action of the Ego and the Other, and is the earliest manifestation of God, of the Inconceivable.

But mark. Sensation always appears in the form of thought. The ego knows, not sensation in general, but the this and that of special sensation, and determination is a function of thought. Since the qualitative can appear only in thought-forms, it may be called empirical thinking. The sense world in its myriad determinations is the first aspect in which the thought of the One Originating Thinker appears, and in it are to be found the pos-

sibilities of all further developments of thought; it is thought in the concrete, thought solidified by faith, which faith is again to resolve into its elements, to establish in proper relations, to view as the plastic stuff in which to work out the will of God.

If presentations are inseparable union of sensation and thought, are the real thinking, what then is the so-called pure thought? We have said that the world appears in ego-form, as a self-seeing, as consciousness which sees itself seeing a world: pure thought is the form of such seeing, as sensation is the stuff seen. The one dominating, all-including, omnipresent form is the ego-form; within it are unalterably fixed a multitude of lesser forms. These forms, in their totality, are again, as is sensation, the immediate presence of the Divine Life existing as the laws it loves. God becomes visible as the laws of thought shaping and supporting consciousness; maintaining it in existence, making its existence possible. The One Divine Life, perfect and complete in itself, is manifested in the one absolute, fundamental form of conception, likewise perfect and complete in itself, the ego-form, apperception with its net-work of included laws. Since these included laws, as concepts of thought, shape an object, establish its nature, they can be called the laws of the object, the condition of conceiving an object; when something does not accord with a given concept it is not a given object; if it accord with no concept it has no existence. Here again we see that real thinking is the material universe, perception, or the inseparable union of sensation and thought. After this union has come to pass, thought possesses the power of tearing itself loose from the sense world and reflecting it in empty images. Such reflections only, the plain man calls thought, but we view them as the mere copy, the imitation, of real thought.

In sensation and thought, in stuff and form of presentation and representation, we have a direct giving of Himself by God as visibility. But sensation and thought are only the visibility of Him, not Himself; try to seize sense or thought and it vanishes leaving only an image of a fancied reality of a moment before, — the reality, and the moment, and we who pursue, are the stuff that dreams are made of, — mere image of that whose reality is also image.

The general truth that in beholding all these parts of the sense world the ego sees only self has been proved to Fichte's satisfaction, but he deems it a matter of importance to show what aspect of self each great phenomenon or class of phenomena represent. In other words, he seeks to deduce the facts of the world from the nature of the ego. These deductions are often ingenious, and though they are the details, rather than the essentials of his system, a few of them may be of interest.

Space. Man sees the world lying in space because space symbolizes his nature as a whole: for just as the true Being of the Ego or Freedom, is an Infinite which presents itself to view in finite form, so we must conceive space as an infinite which is seen only in finite parts; just as the ego is possibility of determination by law, so is space possibility of determination by objects; since the ego sees its nature as activity which involves succession, the ego must see itself in a field which allows successive activity; such field is space. Space, then, from any point of view, is that empirical image which most truly expresses the nature of the ego, and it may be looked upon as the visibility, the external symbol, of the ego.

Time. It will be remembered that the ego, in its first analysis of its own nature, found it impossible to transcend itself to find an Other, hence it judged itself to be a Free Will Absolute which wills its own existence, or *causa sui*; causation involves a succession of cause and effect, but this succession differs from space-succession in that the latter is co-extensive, whereas the members of the former reciprocally exclude each other: a succession of reciprocally excluding members is empirically presented in time; hence we may say that time is the externalization of the ego as pure cause.

Matter is the fixation of the construction of the ego by faith: the ego can find no other constructor of the world than its own activity, search as it may; certain of the images it constructs we have seen to be an interpenetration of sensation and thought; such images are fixed firm and stable by faith which believes matter to be behind them.

In *organisms* the organic unity of thought images itself.

The *Laws of Nature* are merely the ground forms of thought divorced from their concrete filling.

The personal Ego. The same law of thought which forces

the plain man to postulate *das Ding an sich* behind his presentations and an *extra-mentem* God behind the world, leads him to assume a substantial ego behind the activity of which he is conscious. There is no ego-in-itself which can act or refrain from acting, any more than there is a thing-in-itself; both are products of thought, as is all substance. What man sees when he fancies that he sees the ego is an activity which affirms that a specific momentary perception is identical with the concept of a general undetermined ego; hence apperception is founded upon subsumption, and the ego is living Logic.

The truth of the individual may be expressed as follows: there is One Absolute Thinking and only One; this Thinking, in obedience to the laws of thought, becomes conscious of itself at an infinite number of points. If, at each of the points, the Thinking think about the point where thinking is perceived, it is forced by the laws of thought to add to the point the concept of being; that is, to conceive the point as a substance that thinks or as an individual ego; the individual exists only in this thought of it as individual by the One Absolute Thinking. The individual is only a point of sight of the Divine Thought and has separate existence only as the Divine Thought thinks him as a distinct point of sight of itself. Each, in his individuality, is only a thought of God, and a thought which God thinks of as reflecting, imaging, his own being.

Here we see plainly how absurd is the charge of solipsism which was brought against Fichte. Fichte instead of asserting that he, as Johann Gottlieb, originates the world and God, asserts that he has no independent existence of his own, that he exists only as held in the thought of the One Absolute Thinking. The cause of the accusation and of the general misapprehension of Fichte is the persistency with which the natural mind clings to the concept of *das Ding an sich* as an *extra-mentem* reality, and the inevitableness with which it adds it to a thought of whose truth it is convinced. Against this false notion Fichte waged the war of a lifetime. He declared *das Ding an sich* to be the arch-enemy of Philosophy, the Satan of metaphysics, the origin and source of all error. To hold to this notion is to be guilty of the unpardonable sin which excludes forever from the true kingdom, for in that kingdom nothing *extra-mentem* can enter; the kingdom is of spirit, and

they who enter must enter it in spirit only. In this battle of his lifetime Fichte found himself met by the enemy at every turn, for to every position which he took to prove that there was no *Ding an sich*, men added the *Ding an sich* and confronted him with it as an absurd production of his own. First, Fichte tries to show men that the plain man's God is thought, and not a *Ding an sich*. God is the thought which the One Absolute Thinking holds when it thinks of its own nature; that is, if the plain man start from any of the facts of life and reason correctly from them he will arrive at the notion of God as origin and creator of these facts. The plain man, in so far as he reasons correctly, is not the plain man as isolated person, but is a point at which the One Absolute Thinking comes to consciousness and speculates upon itself; in so speculating, it is forced by its own laws to add the concept of being to its own activity which it sees, and to think of a substantial God who creates the visible universe; this substantial God is the thought of God by the One Absolute Thinking. God is thought, and has no other substance than thought. He is not a *Ding an sich* who could exist without acting; instead, he is the activity of thought which sees itself as God, and this seeing self as God is all the God there is; if there were no thought there would be no God. Fichte now calls upon the world to acknowledge that God is thought, spirit, and not brute *extra-mentem* fact. But the world replies by adding the *Ding an sich* to Fichte himself, and by saying "You, as Fichte, say that you think out God, that God is your notion, held in your mind; then he is less than your mind, and is its product; then you, Johann Gottlieb, create God and his result, the world." "No," Fichte shouts, "I, as Johann Gottlieb, have no separate existence, I am not a *Ding an sich*, — there is no *Ding an sich*, — there is only thought, and the thought of the One Absolute Thinking. I, as Johann Gottlieb, am a thought of this One Thinking, and instead of creating it, creating God, I am merely the sight of him and of his thought, Johann Gottlieb." We, as individuals, are in thought: the One Absolute and Only Thinking thinks each of us, and each has this thought as his existence. Individuality is a thought by God of a given reflection of himself; it is the addition of the concept of being to the concept of sight of Thought by itself. Given Absolute Thought seeing self, add to the concept of its

totality the concept of being, and you have God; add to the concept of its sight of self from one point of view the concept of being, and you have the individual. God and the individual are Father and Son because they are of exactly the same nature: both are thought: God is the thought of the totality as embracing and sustaining all thought; the individual is the thought of the potential totality seen from one point of view as having distinct existence.

If this doctrine be true each individual is, in his true nature, perfect, for each is the entering of thought-forms, the coming to self-consciousness under Time and Space limitations, by the Absolute. An individual is where God chooses to manifest himself as thought. Hence the only function of the individual is to be conscious of self as the self-consciousness of God's perfection.

But a question comes straightway to the mind of the plain man, who still clings to the *Ding an sich* as the ultimate test of all things: "If God and the individual are only thought, have they any reality?" Certainly, for reality is only thought: there is no reality except the thought of reality. God, then, as the thought of the source of all reality, is reality *κατ' ἐξοχήν*: he is the completion and fulfilment of all reality, since we are forced to postulate him as the condition of real things; he is the highest category, which contains within itself all other categories, — hence he has, at least, all their reality. God, though only thought, has true being, for being is only thought: there is no being but the thought of being or the being of thought: God, then, as that thought of being to which all being leads and from which it issues, is the being of being, has the only true being. God, though only thought, is truth, for truth is the harmony of thought with itself: that which, when the whole content of the mind is rationalized, persists in its place is true; that which is by such harmonious ordering thrust from its place is false; objective validity and truth mean the harmonious consistency of thought with itself. God, then, is truth, for God is the thought to which the rationalization of existence leads.

From what has been said, we see that, though there is no *extra-mentem* test of the correctness of thought, we yet have an infallible test; and that though universality is this test, yet Athanasius may be right against the world: the standard of truth, we have just said, is consistency within the totality of thought as shaped by its

own laws, or, as we express it when we add the concept of being to the activity of thought, the standard is the thought of the One Absolute Thinker. Suppose the processes of mathematics were not in the least understood, but the problem 4×2 were presented to the world; suppose one man proclaimed that he had a belief, an insight, for which he could give no reason except that it was a faith within him that the result is 8, and suppose all the rest of the world insisted that the result is 9. We know that the one man holds the truth, and that the rest of the world are in the wrong, because the processes of thought which enable the world to recognize the elements of the problem, or 4×2 , will, if developed according to their own laws, issue in the result 8, and not 9. Athanasius is right against the world when the One Absolute Activity of Thinking comes to self-consciousness in Athanasius. It may come to self-consciousness in him at an advanced point, and the connecting links may not yet be seen; but if his insight is the self-consciousness of the One Absolute Thinking, when these links come to view the correctness of his position is demonstrated against the world.

The individual has truth, being, and reality, as does God; for he, like God, is a thought of truth, being, and reality, connected by the One Absolute Thinking with its own activity as seen at a certain point.

Our puzzle of the finite and the infinite ego is now solved. Infinity and finiteness are thoughts which the Absolute Thinking, in obedience to its own law of reciprocal determination, correlates and connects with its activity. Every appearance of Thinking, which we call an individual, is seen to be infinite in so far as it is the appearance of Absolute Thinking, and finite in so far as it is only a partial appearance. The individual is the finite ego when he fails to identify himself wholly with the One Absolute Activity, and is the Infinite Ego when he sees himself as the manifestation of this Absolute Activity. Our finiteness is the thought of our finiteness, and our infiniteness is the thought of self as infinite.

A multiplicity of individuals is a necessary fact of consciousness, without which consciousness is impossible. There is no Universal Consciousness: the Absolute Ego does not see itself empirically as one personality, for both logical and psychological reasons: a logical reason is that consciousness of one involves consciousness

of the whole series of numbers ; one implies limitation, and an individual as subject and object can be limited only by another subject and object, or by another individual ; hence the perception of one individual involves the perception of an infinite number of individuals : a psychological reason is that the child is waked to a knowledge of its own faculties only by seeing in another certain powers which it feels that it can imitate ; if it grew to old age in solitude it would never reach the point of reflection upon self ; the presence, therefore, of any individual who is conscious of self as an individual is irrefragable proof of the existence of other individuals.

The following questions immediately arise: (1) What is the origin of the multiplicity of individuals? (2) In what do individuals differ from one another? (3) How far does this difference extend? (4) What is the significance of the fact that the same sum-total of humanity appears in every man's consciousness? (5) What is the moral import of a multiplicity of egos?

1. *Origin.* The ego form we have shown to be produced by the reflection of the Absolute Ego upon itself. The infinite repetition of such acts of reflection is the origin of the multiplicity of egos. With each act comes the absolute certainty of individual identity and existence, exactly as with the sensation "red" comes the certainty that it is red ; the two convictions are absolute facts of the same class, and belong to the not-understood of sensation.

2. *Difference.* These egos are alike in form, *i. e.*, in subject-objectivity, and laws of thought ; and in content, *i. e.*, the same objective self, which we call the world of sense, is reflected upon. They differ only in the centring of the feeling of selfhood about different determinations of thought and sensation.

3. *Degree of Difference.* But determinations belong only to the form of consciousness, *i. e.*, anything to become visible to consciousness must appear before it in the forms of Time, Space, Matter, etc. Since the difference between individuals results only from the difference of determinations, it is mere formal difference, and does not enter reality on the other side of consciousness. We are all one in God. Again, the multiplicity of egos depends wholly upon Freedom, for it is the result of reflection ; but Freedom is only form, not reality ; now a mere form can have no power to bring forth reality, hence the new individual that Freedom seems to create is new only in form : it is the One Life appearing at another

point. Nature well may be careless of the individual, for when she destroys him she breaks only the empty form.

4. *The Unity of the Human World.* The significance of the appearance of the same community of individuals in every one's consciousness is identical with that of the appearance of the same material universe, — it is evidence that in all of us the One Divine Life (by which image we vainly try to express the Inconceivable lying behind knowledge) comes to consciousness at different points of view: the One Life sees itself as picturing the same physical world, and as looking at it with myriad eyes. How erroneous is that doctrine which teaches a fundamental difference between soul and body, degrades the body to exalt the soul, tells of the death of the one and of the immortality of the other! There is no body, there is no soul, as separable entity, but there are various aspects of the One Life: the first we call physical world, the second reflection: neither is higher nor lower than the other, but both are one and the same; neither can exist or perish without the other; this or that special form may sink from sight, but the One Life is always equal to itself, and, if it appears, it appears as the totality of consciousness intact in every member; for its appearance is an organic whole, and each part is essential to every other part. If there is spiritual life there must be what the plain man calls physical life, for that, too, is spiritual; nothing but spirit exists; and sensation caught in the web of thought is as truly mind as the empty forms of logic, or the moral activity of the good man; only it is that part of spirit which is seen as means to the rest.

From the doctrine of the One Life conclusions of practical import can be drawn. Only in individuality does the One Life break forth into consciousness, self-presentation: God can act only in the form of the individual: the individual does not exist, only God exists in individual form: since the individual is only a form of the One Life there is no real separation between individuals: the One Life is unchanging and eternal in its manifold forms: since in every individual the One Life appears, heredity and environment have no compelling power: the One Life can act only in its wholeness, hence the individual works with the power of God amid those determinations of Space, Time, Matter, to which the individual form binds him.

But the view of the One Life which the thought of the sum-total of humanity presents is, as yet, far from an adequate view, for it shows only a mechanical unity, whereas, in its other aspect, the physical world, we see organic unity. Humanity is not the image of God until consciousness beholds it freely shaping itself into one organic whole which shall mirror him. This, then, is our next task, — to discover how mankind may be looked upon as freely forming that organic whole which is the image of God. This task, with our last question, "What is the moral significance of a multiplicity of egos?" leads us at once to the moral world.

VII. THE MORAL WORLD.

(a) *The Freedom of the Individual.*

HERE, at the very beginning of our discussion of ethics, let us summarize what we have already said in disjointed fashion of Fichte's theory of the freedom and the moral responsibility of the individual, for this is always the first problem which meets us in ethics.

It will be remembered that in the sphere of potential existence which we postulate as cause of actual existence and call God, we distinguish a Free Will that voluntarily subjects itself to Law: this act of subjection we look upon as the immediate appearance of the world of consciousness.

If we keep in mind two truths about this act, we have at once Fichte's doctrine of the Will. The first truth is that in the sphere of potential existence Freedom is Freedom as the plain man understands the word: it is indeterminate, the Freedom of indifference, of caprice; its act is uncaused, a first act, a beginning; its choice is incalculable and is affected by nothing; it is absolutely without law or limitation; it is an unthinkable self-contradiction; it can choose not to yield to law or to yield: if it does not yield it remains forever free with the inconceivable freedom of not being, bound by no self, no nature, no existence; if it does yield it appears as the stuff of the concrete cases in which law manifests itself as being, with the necessity of being.

The second truth is that the act of will which takes place in the sphere of potential existence, and which has for its result the

totality of consciousness, is the sole act of free will that reason can discover in the universe ; for nothing precedes it, and what results from it — the universe of thought — is unalterably fixed in its smallest particular by that law to which Freedom has submitted. Thought can conceive but one free act, — that which decrees thought ; and this free act excludes freedom forever, for it establishes the dominion of the laws of thought. The person, as such, has no liberty of choice ; that which seems freedom to him is the empty image of the one transcendent choice that fixes actuality.

Let us reconsider the nature of consciousness, and we shall see that the person, in his isolation, must be absolutely without freedom. The world of consciousness is the appearance of Holy Will as creator of existence, and its various parts and relations are determined by the necessities of such appearance. Some of these necessities are as follows: That Holy Will may appear as creator of existence, absence of the existence created must first be seen, and later the appearance of such existence through the act of will ; but absence of existence is perceived only in opposition to existence, for the law of reciprocal determination governs perception ; hence, in order that Holy Will may appear as creator, there must be primarily given a certain sphere of existence which is seen to lack another kind of existence : the given sphere we call the sense world ; the lacking sphere, the moral character of man ; both the given sphere with its lack and the act of creation of character by Holy Will may rise to self-consciousness, for such possibility is a necessary element in the world of consciousness : the given sphere with its lack becomes self-conscious in the natural man who perceives himself as a part of the sense world and without moral character ; the act of creation of moral character by Holy Will becomes self-conscious in men who see themselves resisting the sense world that they may choose the right for the sake of the right. Both classes of men are absolutely necessary for the appearance of Holy Will, the one as field for the appearance, the other as the appearance itself ; they must exist, and exist just as they are, if consciousness exists ; neither class, as class, has the slightest freedom, is in any wise responsible for its existence or for the kind of existence that is shown forth in it. The One Divine Will wills always that which appears, and how it shall appear ; it works always in its wholeness, and it cannot be compelled ; the person as isolated unit has no power to constrain its higher or its lower

manifestation in himself ; he is the passive instrument of its visibility, whether it show itself in him only as rudimentary possibility or as completion, as highest truth, as the beauty of holiness ; the appearance of Good and of Evil is absolutely given, just as are the facts of sense and the forms of thought.

Men, however, seem to themselves free, for this view of self is a necessary condition of the appearance of will : the natural man seems consciously and deliberately to choose to dwell in sense and to refuse obedience to the higher law which bids him, through holy choice, create character ; but it is only seeming : we call him evil because we look at his lack ; yet in so far as he is, *i. e.*, an opportunity for the display of Holy Will, is he good : we call him evil because we view him alone, out of connection with the whole ; but, as a necessary element of that great complex which is the appearance of Holy Will or consciousness, his evil is holiness : everything that appears is the appearance of God, and from this point of view not only good, but perfect ; the good man seems to rise of his own free will from the realm of nature into the spiritual world, but such is not the case : the birth of the Spirit in man is just as little his work as his birth into the natural world : the wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but cannot tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth : so is every one that is born of the Spirit. Of himself man is nothing : personal merit and blame are the short-sighted judgments of ignorance : persons as independent integers have no power and no existence, for power and existence are attributes of the One and Only Reality which we conceive beyond the appearance.

But, though each in his phenomenal limitation is mere creature and means, yet as rooted in the Divine Will the individual has its infinite might and its creative power : as it, he is the author of his own being and responsible for the quality of that being ; as it, he can choose whether he shall remain in the world of sense, or lift himself to fuller being in a higher sphere. The causal, the generative, the life-begetting power of choice to be, is present at every moment in all existence. Just as the primal Holy Will to obey law for the sake of law issues in permanent, tangible, conscious existence, so persistence of holy will in conscious existence, and its choice to do what it ought because it ought, issues in completer existence, for the successive stages of spiritual development are merely fuller, richer, more perfect life.

Let us trace the successive stages that man can consciously create for himself.

1. If, when the Superactual Ego, as Divine Freedom, wills to be, and the universe, primarily grasped as the sense world, appears, — if then, in any point of this universe, *i. e.*, a given individual, the Will pause and will no further to be, the individual remains stationary, he does not enlarge his being, he rests a part of the sense world. But if the activity of Freedom presses on to more and more intimate union with law, man enters the realm of thought and creates a new being for himself: if his divine power of activity offer itself ever anew for the imprint of law, if in unceasingly toiling he unceasingly furnish that substance in which alone law can become visible and stand as objective, recognized truth, he produces a content of mind which is a new existence, he discovers the laws of phenomena, and formulates science as this content. In so doing he adds the realm of law to that of feeling, and has now two worlds, — sense and thought. The mind of the thinker is a new sphere of existence which the will to think adds to the world of facts.

2. If human activity does not rest content with these two spheres, but wills still further to subject itself to law in obeying the laws of thought and pressing on to deduce from the given spheres their origin and first cause, it creates a third sphere for itself, — the notion of God and his attributes, and the notion of his relation to the world. It sees God as the sole Reality, and the world as his image whose only end is to give concrete form and expression to the divine ideal. Hence it looks upon life as an endless striving to body forth the Infinite, as struggle to accomplish a given task and to fulfil duty. The moral sphere is now created, and the mind of man, in freely subjecting its activity to law, in willing to think out relations in obedience to the laws of thought, has possessed itself of three worlds.

3. If the activity of thought subject itself still further to law, and seek a rational explanation of the exact connection between God and his image, its three worlds are unified into one new world, which becomes the kingdom of Heaven. The world of consciousness is seen to be God becoming conscious of himself. He appears in his actual, true, immediate life in us, — or rather, we *are* his immediate life, we are God living and breathing, feeling and thinking, working and fashioning, the God-activity in time and place. Our

function is the doing of God's deeds; we are his power of action, his appearance as the force that brings to pass in the finite world: our only office is to receive his energy, allow it to fill our pulses and to direct our action. There is no striving, no individual struggle, there is no raising of self to a higher sphere, no toilsome working out of his image, but the Holy, the True, the Beautiful, are the immediate appearance of the being of God in us. This world is heaven, in which God utters and expresses himself as he is in his inner nature, and we have the infinite bliss of being this world, this expression, this living God. His freedom is our freedom, his strength is our strength; his Will for Truth, and Beauty, and Holiness, and productive power, and enduring creation which shall stand forever a monument of his might, is our Will; and since his Will is resistless, Truth, and Beauty, and Holiness, and Freedom of expression, and productive power, and creative strength for fair and lasting works, shall be brought to pass in us. There is no height we shall not reach, there is no power we shall not possess, there is no glory we shall not put on, for the heights of power and of glory are his, and we are He.

Here in this new world which religious thought creates we have Fichte's whole doctrine of freedom of will: The One Divine Will wills to obey Law, or to be in the uttermost degree of being; it is, and again it is in fuller degree, and still again and again; in each stage it is the One Divine Will pressing on to union with law, yielding its freedom to more perfect service, seeking new being and still new being — "urge and urge and urge, ever the procreant urge" of the Will. All activity is the activity of this One Will; all life with its pulses of desire, its reaches of thought, its uplifting of moral striving, its fervor of religious aspiration, is the one inseparable, indivisible, indestructible Life. Men are merely points at which this life is conscious of itself, sometimes as the one sense world, sometimes as universality of law, again as the one organic moral will of humanity, yet again as the one God, and still again as the one all-inclusive Mind with its ordered unity. Men are nothing in themselves: they are points of sight, eyes turned inward on the One Life in its appearance. But again they are points of *the One Life*, and hence its fulness dwells in them; they are what it is, — freedom and might and all that is, the great "I am that I am."

Thus the individual does make his world through his will as part of the Divine Will, and he as self-consciousness of the Will must ascribe will to himself: his world is the stage in which in him the Will pauses, and he sees the will of the stage as his will. In and through all the stages is the divine freedom to be or not to be, and the individual in each stage is forced to postulate his will as the cause of his being in that stage: the causal instinct can rest only in free will as cause: for the mind, only the uncaused can be true cause. Just as behind the sense world is seen by the thinker the will of God as its genesis, so behind each one of the higher stages and as its origin the man who finds himself in that stage must as the self-consciousness of God's will, conceive an act of his own free will by which he raised his being to this point of view. The thinker who finds law as the uttermost truth sees that he has done so by freely choosing to reflect upon the facts of life, and he conceives that the content of his mind, as expressing the truth of existence, in other words, his mental being, is the result of his free-will in choosing to think. So the moral man sees that his morality is conditioned by his own free choice to resist evil and to do good. To the religious man is accorded the insight that all the individual wills are merely points of self-consciousness of the One Divine Will; hence as distinct and sundered wills they do not exist: their only reality is as manifold expressions of an all-pervading unity. The individual has no will and has all will; he has no unrelated independent power of his own, but he is grounded in the total Will, and can draw its living energy to be and to do into himself, and by it raise and expand himself to the uttermost bounds of being.

Being, both the fact of being and the quality of being, must, for the thinker, says Fichte, be the result of free will, for thought can pause only in the uncaused. Being must be freedom choosing that its activity and motive power be the minister of law. Being is freedom consecrated to the service of law and made its bearer, and holder, and objective support. Freedom alone is unproductive, it flits hither and thither and plays endlessly. Enduring result comes only through law. Persistent being which shall remain as nucleus for the addition of other lasting products must be a bodying forth of law. Each one of us is the divine Freedom, the vital energy that lies at the heart of being. If this energy is left lawless, if it is directed only by caprice, it hovers, flits, and disappears

forever as individual form. If it subject itself to law and thereby become the vehicle and substance in which the permanent may project itself, an everlasting life results, eternal being, which is the interpenetration of freedom and law. If, then, Freedom love life, and immortality, and enduring form, let it hasten to find Law, and run and not be weary, and eagerly offer itself; let the search of each moment be for the law of each moment, that, ever transfused by law, no atom of its true being may be lost, but it may attain the full and fair and free completion of the perfect life.

And above and beyond all, as the condition of effective living and forceful action, we must wake, says Fichte, to the consciousness of our true nature. We are God's power to do God's work. Each has the Infinite upon which to draw. Each is wholly and solely to blame in so far as he falls short of the highest, for his position in the universe depends only upon his will: the power is his to swing himself up to the highest that man can conceive; he can do it, and he ought to do it; that he does not do it is his fault. But here lies the incomprehensible mystery; he sees only through a glass darkly, and is not conscious of his power: he imagines himself poor, and weak, and alone: he thinks himself the slave of nature, and heredity, and habit: he does not know his divine birthright of freedom, but crouches servilely before the phantoms whose dominion would fade away forever if he should assert himself as their creator and controller: he does not see his greatness. Sight and light are what he needs, then will he have life and have it more abundantly.

Fichte bids him open his eyes now, test his strength at this moment. What task presents itself to him whose accomplishment would seem noble if it did not seem impossible. Let him address himself to it at once, regardless of its impossibility. He can at least advance towards it; and when he is close, his eyes will discern the rift in the rock through which the way shall be opened to attainment. Do your task, bids Fichte. No new truth shall be granted till the truth now seen is lived. Act your insight, and then a higher insight shall be yours. Do the noble thing that now you only dream, and it shall be revealed to you in what true nobility consists. Be generous, and pure, and true, and the eternal beauty, of which generosity, and purity, and truth are only forms, shall be poured upon you, and you, with them, shall be a form in which eternal beauty appears. Lead the strenuous life, dread inaction as

death; God is ceaseless activity, and you are God: only as the divine energy bursts forth in action, is it in you: do the will, and you shall know the doctrine.

But, again, sight and light are gifts. Only that man sees in whom the One Life comes to self-consciousness, and its coming cannot be compelled. Hence we have no right to condemn another. He is to blame only from the point of view of one who sees, and he is blind. Since his only existence, as an ego, is self-consciousness, he has no real existence, for he sees none in himself: he is not yet life, but only opportunity for life, hence he cannot sin: he does not exist in the spiritual kingdom of God, and how can the non-existent disturb the kingdom, and confuse the divine plan? Christ is the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world since he reveals that he is the Life because he is one with the Father, that only those live who like him are one with God, and that, as the dead cannot sin, there is no sin. Sin is a figment of faulty intelligence which does not understand the truth of relations: it is not sin, but opportunity for holiness.

If there is no fundamental difference between Good and Evil, but both are points of view of the observer, if the moral responsibility of the individual is an idle dream, if what appears is the perfect because it is God visible, wherein are Fichte's ethics unlike Spinoza's? In several essential points: In the first place, with Fichte, man is not the slave of the laws of nature, he is not a calculable part of the world-formula, as with Spinoza; but nature is man's empty image, and is therefore dependent upon him for existence, is shaped by his being. To the moralist who asks how it is possible that within a given and finished nature he can interfere with extra-natural volition and work out his own ends, Fichte says, "Man is free and more than free, for he gives law to nature. Nature is his objective self, its laws have their ground and origin in the categories of his mind; if his being were altered, nature would be altered. Surely nature cannot control its own original. Instead of man's being a part of nature, nature is a part of man."

Again, man is free and responsible as having his roots in that supersensible Freedom whose act is the world. He is, in his true being, behind the veil of appearance, the One and Only Will, and in so far is free with its freedom and responsible with its responsibility. This Will chooses eternally to become the world we see,

the world where evil is as strong and active as it is foul and deformed, where struggle is the law of life, where defeat and despair, every passion and every pain, are always present: the Will wills that the Law it loves shall conquer, that righteousness shall prevail: hence it furnishes for conquest field and opponent, it becomes itself a weaker antagonist that it may behold the triumph it longs for, it appears as Evil that Holiness may overcome: and the evil and the struggle are only appearance, for the sole Reality is Holy Will. The world, which is man, is, as Will, free, and responsible for itself; and each individual, as member of the World, which is Man, has share in its responsibility.

And, again, Fichte's doctrine does not in the least diminish the necessity and the duty of individual effort, for it teaches that God always works according to the laws of the ego, and the fundamental law of the ego is seeing itself as free: hence, what God effects must appear to be wrought by man's free will; Man must ever seem to himself to labor upon himself, and then God is working in him.

We have dwelt upon this subject of individual freedom because Fichte's point of view in his different treatises varies, and hence his statements seem conflicting. We meet constant assertions of man's freedom, of his power to pass from a lower to a higher stage of existence, and just as many declarations that he is absolutely passive before the Will whose mere visibility he is. Both these statements are correct, for each is the expression of a different aspect of man: as grounded in the primordial Will, man has all power, as individual he is impotent; as the energy of the Divine Life he is almighty, as part, and therefore as negation of the whole, he is helpless: man is always weakness in strength, and both his weakness and his strength are infinite; his weakness appears when he is separated from that Life of which he is branch; his strength, when he abides in the wholeness and might of that Life.

Here again we come upon a point where inadequate comprehension of Fichte leads the critic to accuse him of change of doctrine. The impassioned fervor with which Fichte preaches the doctrine of man's being in his true nature one with God, and without him nothing, is called mysticism, and is described as a divergence from his earlier teachings. If the critic would remember that the law of reciprocal determination governs Fichte's universe he would know that there is no truth for Fichte whose contradictory is not,

from some point of view, equally true, and that the final unity of his system lies in a synthesis which embraces within itself all possible contradictions. Fichte preaches to-day with deepest ardor one gospel, and to-morrow seems to hold just as vehemently its opposite, yet he is always true to himself; his doctrine is one and unchangeable, but it is so vast in its comprehensiveness that it gathers within itself all partial views as true, yet inadequate, expressions of the one all-inclusive truth.

Another question arises: if Fichte teaches that we are God appearing as the world of consciousness, what is the difference between his doctrine and pantheism? All the difference in the world: pantheism teaches that there is an *extra-mentem* God, that this *extra-mentem* God is the only reality, that he is the world, and that man is his accident; Fichte teaches that God is the activity of thought seeing itself as God, that this subjective God has no reality outside consciousness, that he appears as the world because reason says that he does, that God, together with all the content of man's mind, is the accident of the ego, for if the ego refuse to think, God and mind-content will not appear. In Fichte's eyes the ego is the only reality, the only truth, the only ultimate. Not pantheism but egoism is the substance of Fichte's doctrine. For Fichte, God does not exist through his own being independent of man, but he exists through man's realization of him, because the ego sees that He must stand in this relation to self if the ego is to be a true self, *i. e.*, a rationally consistent self-consciousness which sees its whole being and the exact relations and dependencies of the different parts of that being. Fichte's system may be reduced to three terms: First, he bids the plain man tell him what God is, and the plain man describes an infinite being who is the creator, upholder, and including circumference of all existence. Second, Fichte then bids the plain man recognize that the God he has described is a notion of God, and can be proved to have no other existence than as notion; if notion, it is held in the mind, therefore less than the mind, therefore not infinite; if projected by the mind, it is the creature of the mind, not its creator. Here, then, we have two contradictories: God and his claims as all-creative and all-inclusive, and the mind and its claims as all-creative and all-inclusive. These two contradictories are reconciled by Fichte's grand synthesis, which declares that the mind in its fullest being is God

knowing himself as God: the mind in its farthest reaches is God conscious of himself and declaring his divine nature with its infinite creative power. The Mind is with Fichte the Alpha and the Omega: at the beginning of philosophic inquiry we have only the mind, and at its end only the mind, but in the course of the inquiry the Mind has declared itself to be God appearing. Hence our ultimate truth is that the Absolute Ego is the visibility of God, the Godhead made manifest. God is the Absolute Ego knowing itself as it is known. The mind is the self-consciousness of God, consciousness is always image, hence we are the image of God. Since all existence is the existence of consciousness, and since consciousness is always image, we may say that we *are* God, for this assertion means that we are the image of God, as we have said before.

The ego is always producing principle for Fichte, it brings forth its own being through reflection, differentiates this being, establishes the relations between its parts, and has faith in the reality of its productions. God is for Fichte pre-eminently a God of faith, a God whom reason deliberately and consciously frames for itself, and deliberately and consciously has faith in as a reality. Fichte says, "I cannot be I unless I am the appearance of God, for only a God-being can adequately account for the facts of self: then I will believe with all my heart, and with all my soul, and with all my mind, and with all my strength, that I am God's appearance, and I will act this belief." In so acting man produces as reality what he sees as ideal, and faith is creative: by doing every moment the Godlike act he makes himself, in the same manner as Christ, very God of very God. Fichte's doctrine, beyond that of any other, is one of rational faith. A God of reason and a faith in reason are Fichte's creed, not a God of whom reason is an accident. Reason believes in itself with such intensity that its faith makes its conclusions realities.

Fichte's doctrine is as far removed from mysticism as from Pantheism, and for the same reason. Mysticism, like Pantheism, teaches absorption in another: we yield ourselves to an *extramentem* God, who has an independent existence of his own. Fichte's God is thought conscious of its own nature and attributes, is mind in its largest aspect, is the greater self, in whom the lesser selves live and move and have their being.

The possibility that at this stage of the argument there can arise

the question, "What is the difference between Fichte's doctrine and pantheism?" proves that our monotonous warning has not been given too often. We must remember that every conclusion reached is only a logical conclusion, therefore a part of the mind of the thinker, not an external reality. Even when we prove that nothing but God exists, we must not forget that the proof and its God are concepts of mind. In studying Fichte we find ourselves doing thousands of times what the world has done thousands of years, — we forget the ego: we look upon its products as independent realities: we apply the category of actuality beyond its legitimate sphere and exalt its creation into its creator. When God is all in all for us it is because the ego convinces itself that God is all in all. The ego, its freedom, its activity, its faith, is the ultimate of ultimates. "There is nothing beyond the ego and the ego is God" is Fichte's creed. Fichte's doctrine is an Egoism which faith turns into a Pantheism. Reason and faith, faith in reason, is the heart of Fichte's teaching.

What we have said about the difference between the *Wissenschaftslehre* and pantheism may be summarized by saying that Fichte's philosophy is the philosophy of consciousness as such. Pantheism rests in its own product without knowing that it is only product. Fichte sees always self behind that which the self advances as ultimate truth. Hence Fichte's philosophy is just twice as comprehensive as pantheism. Pantheism pauses at law as an ultimate, for though, like Duns Scotus, the pantheist may conceive a God in whom indeterminateness of will is an essential, he does so in obedience to the laws which govern his activity in thinking; and since he rests in the result of law he does not pass beyond law. Fichte, in seeing always the free activity of the thinker in choosing to work out results in obedience to law, finds as ultimate, an inseparable union of freedom and law. Fichte's doctrine has all of pantheism for its one side, but correlates this side with another, and the union of the two produces a whole with elements found in neither of the parts.

The vital principle of Fichteism, as the philosophy of consciousness, its first and last and central truth, is reflection. He who misses this misses everything, and can never grasp the essence of Fichte's doctrine. Fichte conceives that the fundamental characteristic of every fact of our world, whether material phenomenon

or logical conclusion, is that it is "reflexible," *i. e.*, that after being perceived it permits us to reflect upon the act of perception and to see behind the percept the ego as the cause of its appearing in consciousness. This fact of "reflexibility," so long ignored by philosophy, Fichte takes for his corner-stone, and all that he builds rests upon it as foundation. No result is final till supplemented by the comment "I, the ego, thought thus." At every step Fichte demands from the ego the reflection upon self in its immediately preceding activity, and the recognition that what has just been perceived, whether world, or law, or God, is a seeing of self as such product, a seeing of a content of the mind as a given reality. The word "as" is the key of his system, and expresses the eternal diremption and eternal identification of existence: it is the focus of the law of self-consciousness: that which is seen is seen *as if it were* reality or objective truth, or *extra-mentem* fact, or what-not, and that which is beyond the "as if it were" we can never seize or see. The deepest analysis can never penetrate beyond the image-form: we have just said that all seeing is a seeing of self *as* such, because it is a seeing of a mind-content; but even the self is not seen, for a second analysis shows us that that which is seen is seen *as if it were* self. "Die Erscheinung erscheint sich als sich erscheinend." The seer is never seized: the reality of self is just as inconceivable and elusive as the reality of God. Image and image of image are all we can find: we conceive a God as Origin, Uncaused Cause, then we see that this God, as notion of the mind, is an image that self holds within its circumference, and therefore a part of self; but next we are forced to recognize that the mind with the image of God embraced within itself is not even the real self, for the real self has just escaped, and mounted above it to view it; the mind with its content is only seen *as if it were* self; but again the self that mounted to view is not the real self, for that again has escaped to view the viewed *as if it were* self, and so infinitely. Human consciousness can never break through the image-form, for that is the law of its existence: if it is not image, it is not, for it is the law that it shall either not be or be an image unto itself.

The analysis of the different image-forms in which consciousness sees, is the task of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. These forms are, in the main, the physical world, the ego, law, God. Each is looked upon by the plain man as a fact-in-itself, which has an existence

independent of any consciousness of it ; and it is the work of Fichte to show that each is only a perception by consciousness *as* world, or ego, or law, or God. Fichte's system is an analysis of the law of consciousness, of the forms which govern seeing, of the character of ego-hood. His problem is, "How must a self-conscious being conceive existence?" His solution is his philosophy in its various stages, the final conclusion of which is that the ego is forced to see existence as self, and self as a mind-content which discloses itself to be God manifest in the flesh, God appearing as the world of consciousness.

The fact that Fichte's philosophy is the philosophy of consciousness and its image-forms, involves another difference between it and Pantheism. Pantheism teaches that existence and God are identical. Fichte teaches that existence is only "image," is in itself utterly devoid of reality, mere emptiness, nullity, "*gar nichts*;" the word "is" means "image of being:" the expression "we are God" means "we are the appearance, the image, the self-consciousness of God, who is the only reality." And just here a little reflection will show us Fichte's exact service in the evolution of religious thought. He has made possible to the thinker rational faith in the reality of God, which Kant had destroyed. The different stages of men's thought may be roughly summarized as follows: Man is born into the first stage, where sensation is inseparably mixed with pure thought and accompanied by the conviction of reality, *i. e.* the conviction that behind the sensation is a *Ding an sich* which has an existence of its own, independent of man: whatever appears as sensation is instinctively and with absolute certainty pronounced to be real; for the plain man reality means sense-perception.

The second stage man has developed by thinking; it is a region of pure thought, the notion of God. In the devout man the conviction of reality adds itself to this notion, and he believes in a real God who is a *Ding an sich*, and exists through himself, independent of man.

The third stage was evolved by Kant, who pointed out that "reality" is a category of the mind, that it is legitimately applied to the sense-world and nowhere else: only that which is perceived by the senses can, according to Kant, be affirmed to have a *Ding an sich* behind it, and, therefore, to have real existence. That there is such a *Ding an sich* behind God, we can never

know, for his existence is merely a logical conclusion: we can only postulate his real being, and act as if our postulate were fact. Kant's position is, then, that the circumference of consciousness is divided into two spheres, — one of sense, one of pure thought: behind the sense-sphere is a *Ding an sich*, therefore this sphere is real; behind the pure thought of God we can never know that there is a *Ding an sich*, but we must act as if there were, — we must have a faith without reason.

The fourth stage is developed by Fichte. Fichte says with Kant that the circumference of consciousness is divided into two spheres, — one of sense, one of pure thought, — but there is no *Ding an sich* behind either. "Reality" is only a concept of the mind, and nothing more. For the natural man the sense-world is merely a certain form of consciousness plus the concept of reality, and God is a certain form of consciousness minus the concept of reality. But it is the duty of the natural man to raise himself to a different apprehension of those two spheres through the use of reason: he should examine their relation in the light of reason, and he will discover that God must be the cause of the sense-world and the sense-world his image; if this is so, God must be the reality, the true being, and the sense-world without him an empty dream; man should have full faith in this decision of reason, and transfer, in obedience to it, the concept of reality from the sense-world, where he finds it at birth, to the realm of pure thought, or God; this transference marks for him a second birth, for the casting of reality upon a sphere of thought is what "birth" means; then he should dwell in the realm of reality, or God, with abiding faith in the judgment of reason, that it is the sole reality, the only true being, and that all else has image-existence; he should formulate by reason the fitting relation in which this image-existence, or sense-world, should stand to the reality, God, and then proceed to put it in this relation: every thought, every act of life, should be governed by faith in reason.

The steps by which Fichte reaches a rational faith in God we have formulated as four: (1) reason says there is no *Ding an sich*; (2) "reality" is a concept which the natural man attaches to the sense-world; (3) but reason shows us that the cause of the sense-world is God; (4) hence man should sever the concept "reality" from the sense-world, and attach it to God. Fichte, then, makes possible to the thinker the belief in the reality of God

which the devout man has ; but it is a belief illumined by understanding, and one which can give a reason for itself.

(b) *The Form of the Moral Law.*

The second problem that meets us in Fichte's ethical system is the form of the moral law as given to humanity. Is it the empty, categorical imperative "Obey law for the sake of law"? No. The moral law is a command to make visible God. God is Freedom interpenetrated by law, and is therefore as manifold in the involutions of his nature as the world-content; as fully specified in every particular as is the empirical world, for the empirical world is the empty form of his image: this infinitely complex and highly differentiated nature the world of consciousness is commanded to make manifest. But consciousness exists only in finite individuals, and finiteness cannot receive the command in its wholeness: hence the law cannot appear as the revelation of a definite ideal which is to be realized by men upon earth, for no human mind can contain it; it appears primarily in its formal relation to the individual, as addressing an eternal "ought" to his will in regard to some definite act to be performed. Only because of the limitations of man does it appear in this partial form: in its reality it is a command addressed to humanity to work out upon earth a concrete task whose parts and relations are given by superactual law: the empty formula "Will what you ought because you ought" is the barest and most general expression of the relation of man to a specific task; and even this general formula, we shall see in the discussion that immediately follows, is capable of more exact determination.

(c) *Whence the Moral Law derives its Authority.*

A problem that presents difficulties in other ethical systems is the ground of moral obligation. Why should I do right? If I do right for the result thereby gained, I am not doing right, I am making a commercial venture. I do right only when I do the right act for the sake of right. But why do right for the sake of right? What is there in the nature of "right" that authorizes it to subject me to itself? Why have not my natural desires an equally valid claim to obedience? If the moralist tells me that the command of duty has authority because it is the expression of the will of God, I ask why my will should yield to God's will? As mere will and whim, one is as good as the other.

We have already indicated Fichte's answer; but we repeat it because it is here approached from a different side, and because the question is asked again and again.

Doing right for the sake of right is finding fuller and more perfect being. Right is in itself result, and the highest result that existence can yield. The *Wissenschaftslehre* unites the utilitarian and the transcendental view in teaching that morality is being and being morality.

Let us see. Suppose a man in the midst of a moral struggle. He holds in his mind two mental pictures: one of self yielding to desire and tasting the pleasure of its gratification; one of self resisting desire and doing right for right's sake. Whichever picture he make actual, he is, according to Fichte, a manifestation of God's will. Why, then, if he had the power to choose, should he prefer the second actuality to the first? For the same reason that would lead him to choose to be wise and rich and powerful, if he could,—because thereby he would find fuller being: the higher choice is the natural urge of being toward the fulfilment of itself, towards its own complete expression. If he yield to desire, he is the primary and incomplete manifestation of the Divine Will, that which is only a means to a higher revelation; if he does right, he includes within himself the primary stage, or sense-world, as the necessary condition of right action, and adds to it the second stage of being, the moral world; from mere means he becomes accomplished end, the actual appearance of Holy Will as the moral deed. In the moral choice, being completes itself, and reaches the perfection of which it is capable.

Suppose the man in the moral struggle put the question to himself in a slightly different form,—suppose he look upon the two mental pictures as the sight of two wills, and ask why his natural will should yield to the moral will. The answer is the same: natural will is only rudimentary will, partial will, the first step in the appearance of will; moral will is the fully developed will in that perfection which includes natural desire as its member and means: it is fitting that the means should minister to its only end,—yield obedience to it.

But we must beware of considering these two mental pictures as the sight of two wills. If we do so, we wholly misapprehend Fichte's theory of will and his theory of sight. Of his theory of will we have already said enough: there is only one will, as there

is only one physical world, one mind, one humanity; and individuals are merely points of sight of this one will, world, mind, humanity: the organism sees itself with myriad eyes. Fichte's theory of sight is that sight is always the perception of action and not of a *Ding an sich*,—not of inert, quiescent being: the sight of the physical world is the sight of the act of perceiving such world, the sight of the truths of thought is the sight of thinking those truths, the sight of the Holy Will is the sight of the actual willing of the holy deed. We do not see the higher will unless we see its act of willing. If we fancy that we see it, and that we choose to disregard it, we see, not it, but its empty image. Will is action; it is not a *Ding an sich* upon which we can gaze as it lies quiescent: only in the act do we see the will. Our concept of the noble deed which the will might do in us, but does not, is not a view of the will itself, it is only an empty picture of it. We see it face to face in the deed that we do, and by the deed we know what degree of sight is vouchsafed to us.

Sight is action. With equal truth, action is only sight. The individual never acts, but he sees the whole act in him as nature, as mind, as will, and this whole with its activity he can never seize. At most he gets the image of that which has just fled: the image of action, not action itself, is all that is granted to man.

What we have said above is tantamount to saying that the moral law is nothing more than the law which reason itself imposes upon the will, or that in man's own nature as a rational being lies the authority of the "ought." We have said that the end of right action is right action, which is fuller being; fuller being is more complete realization of law, for being is, only as it is the concrete cases in which law manifests itself; realized law is realized reason, hence the end of morality is obedience to reason as the truth of man's nature. No other result could be reached by Fichte: he set out to find the explanation of the universe through reasoning, and reason finds only herself wherever she turns; she is always her own end and authority, her own supreme judge: for him who reasons, reason must be the end of all activity, whether of God or man. Fichte frames the sort of God that reason demands: Holy Will is the ultimate which reason is forced to find in seeking its own origin; hence obedience to Holy Will, or doing right for the sake of right, is obedience to reason: the rationality of God's will, or the moral law, is its authority. Indeed, "authority"

itself is a product of reason, a notion that a rational being has ; to ask the authority of the moral law is to ask the reason of rationality.

(d) Morality, as End of Action in God and Man, identical with Self-Consciousness as End.

The charge of lack in unity in Fichte's system is sometimes supported by the statement that in his earlier works he makes self-consciousness, knowledge, the end of the Absolute Ego, and the final cause of the appearance of the finite world ; while in his later period the Absolute Ego is transformed into Holy Will, whose end is law for the sake of law, or morality.

Such criticism betokens shallow thought. Consciousness and morality are identical with Fichte, as the reader of this paper must have long since seen. The consciousness of any object is dependent upon the unswerving obedience of the object to the laws of its own nature, or, since the object is, according to Fichte, will-stuff obeying law for the sake of law, upon the morality of the object. How is any knowledge possible ? Take the simplest example: how is it possible for me to be conscious that A is A ? Only because A is true from moment to moment to the laws of A. If it swerved, it would no longer be A, and my consciousness of it would be impossible. We know, only because there is no variation or shadow of turning in the world of consciousness, but continuity of law everywhere. The world is grandly moral ; hence it is a world of consciousness, of knowledge. Morality is knowledge, and not-morality is not-knowledge in a deeper sense than Socrates thought it, for not-morality is not-being. In the Absolute Ego of the Grundlage who seeks self-consciousness through a finite world, in the God of the later works whose aim is law for the sake of law, and in the holy man whose end is morality, we have the same final cause directing activity ; and this final cause may be expressed as self-consciousness, or morality, or the development of being, or the appearing of God as existence, for all these phases are identical in meaning.

(e) Why the Moral Will of Humanity is the Image of God.

One final problem remains for our solution. It may be stated as follows: Consciousness is the appearance of Holy Will ; Holy Will is one and indivisible ; but we have shown that there is no universal consciousness including all individuals in its one person-

ality ; and, further, in the good man we have spoken only of successive acts of holy choice : how can this broken, disintegrated, multitudinous consciousness of humanity be looked upon as the likeness of the one God ?

Let us attack the question from the side of the individual first, and see if it is possible to unify the will of the good man. His will can become one and indivisible if by a supreme act he resolve once for all to obey without hesitation the moral law in whatever form it may appear in the world of perception. Then and only then is his will a part of the eternal will of God. By this act he creates his true being, the visibility of Holy Will as image of God. Self has been annihilated, and he is a passive beholder of the life of God. For him there is now no law, for he has become law ; his will has freely transformed itself into constancy of relation, which is the essence of law. Special commands to do this and that cannot be addressed to him, for the natural development of himself, as Holy Will, embraces and determines all these special cases.

Such an I has personal immortality. It does not believe, or hope, or expect it, but has it immediately, at every moment ; for its personality is the will of God seeing itself unfold itself in all eternity. Eternal life is qualitative rather than quantitative.

Our categorical imperative has now revealed itself in a more specific form : it stands at present as "See thyself with eternal, unchangeable will to do duty for duty's sake." But this formula is insufficient, for, instead of that unity which alone can image God, the world presents at this stage of the argument a multiplicity of good men, each singly, willing duty. That the one image of the one God may be evolved, good men must transform themselves into one Good Will : every moral man must will the morality of all. If he does so, since morality is willing duty because it is duty, all wills will be formally alike and constitute but one will. But this one will will have for its subject a composite man ; it will be an organic unity each part of which is the centre of the whole and necessary to the whole. Henceforth the true I will be recognized as the community, and the supreme characteristic by which the moral man will be distinguished is that he lives in the whole. The natural man looks upon himself as standing alone, as the single soul of his world-system ; and such a man is a bit of nature, as are stocks and stones. He attains real being only as part of the

whole, and as subjecting himself to the order of the whole, for only the whole has reality as image of God. We see this truth exemplified in science. Every scientific insight acknowledges reason to be one and consistent with itself, and claims a being of its own only so far as it is a part of this universal reason. Science has no individuality: it lifts isolated facts above their isolation into the universality of law. So the true I lifts each out of the petty, personal self into the One Man whose manifold features are men, and henceforth action and causality in each have for their aim to make manifest his unity in each of his members: the same spirit must be seen in all, a spirit developed to the highest degree that the given point of time allows: every one must strive to make his knowledge, his insight, his skill, the possession of all, and to gain for himself every excellence that his neighbor may have. When all are indeed one, then we may hope a new revelation of God. Our problem has now found a solution: consciousness sees itself as image of God in seeing itself freely forming itself into one, eternal, organic, Moral Will.

It follows that "ought" is addressed to the community: there is no individual duty as such; there is only the duty of the whole, of the community. This duty is the bringing forth of a given world-order which we cannot conceive *à priori*, because it reveals itself immediately. The revelation comes to the individual, since there is no universal consciousness; his first task is to make known his view to all and to learn what insight has been granted to them, that he and they may recognize the common truth and throw away the personal illusion. The special, spiritual individuality of each is the medium through which the common truth is transmitted; and the blending of all these individualities into one in the shape which the common truth finally assumes, is the individuality of the community.

The task, then, of the present world is to shape the one composite man to whom, in future existence, will be given the totality of the image of God as world-creative concept. Here he must be formed into the instrument that can realize it; hence each member of the multiform man must work upon himself and upon others, for, in doing the one, he does the other. Reciprocity is the only truth, since community is the only being.

Here, again, we see how necessary to the realization of God's image is the immortality of every good man; each is a member of

the one organic man, who cannot set about his task maimed and imperfect. Not one good will can perish, for it is a component part of the good will of God.

We are now prepared to answer the question, What is the moral significance of a multiplicity of egos? Its significance is that it affords to consciousness an opportunity for seeing itself *freely* organizing that unity of Holy Will which is the image of God. God *freely* subjects himself to law, thereby giving to himself a nature which appears as infinite diversity in unity; this freedom of Holy Will is to be made visible, and it is visible in that community of men who voluntarily submit themselves to a law whereby they become one. If consciousness were given as a unity, it could not see its own freedom in bringing forth unity; hence it is given as a multiplicity of egos, and this multiplicity is to weld itself into one organic will.

The one organic Holy Will of humanity is the visibility of the Absolute Ego in its lofty unity, which transcends all multiplicity. The ego in its true nature is One, One as God; the oneness wills its appearance as multiplicity, and this multiplicity, that it may image God, freely rises again to oneness in the Moral Will of the world: God, by free will, differentiates himself, through law, into many, and the many, by free will, unite themselves, through law, into One. Through the Moral Will man returns into the truth of his own nature; the Abiding, the Unchangeable, the Eternal, in the phantasmagoria of fleeting forms, is the Good Will.

“Ob alles in ewigem Wechsel kreist,
Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist.”

(f) *Universality and Individuality.*

Since, as there is no collective consciousness, the revelation of the concrete shape of the image of God comes only to the individual, and since the individual is, of necessity, partial and incomplete, the question of the relation of the individual view to the truth arises. The truth is the one revelation seen through an infinite number of individuals, each individuality yielding some phase of the whole, which but for it would not appear, each individuality being some part of the truth, for there is nothing but individuality.

When all these images are comprehended by one another, their unity and specific difference out of one principle is clear, and the

common image reflected in all is the true image. Hence the concrete image of God may be described as that soul which differentiates itself into a closed circle of souls, each one of which is the centre of the whole and potentially the whole; or, as the world of that self whose essence it is to be potentially an expression of the whole truth from every point of view.

That the image seen by each may be comprehended by all, each must live it; thereby it becomes objective truth.

We may form for ourselves a sensuous image of this closed circle, which, though it will be as far from the truth as image must always be from the reality it images, yet may help us approach Fichte's conception. Imagine a glass globe whose circumference is filled with millions of eyes all looking inward. All the eyes see the same content, though each from its own special point; and into the view of each eye the view of the others is received, though from its own particular angle. Now suppose that the substance of the globe, instead of glass, is merely the sight projected from each eye, that without the eyes and their sight nothing whatever of the globe would exist. We then have in the globe a unity of blended individualities where the individualities may be looked upon as essential, for without them there is nothing; individuality is all that there is, and the ultimate reality is a blending of all individualities. So in the world of truth there is no truth except as seen by individuals, and the totality of all the views of all the individuals is the totality of truth. The substance of the individual mind, or its free activity shaped by the laws of thought, is truth, — truth from one point of view; and the union of all minds in all minds gives us ultimate truth.

The ideal globe, as God's mind, exists in perfect development. Each eye does see the whole truth, and falls in no wise short of its potential vision: each individual is all that he can be, or the whole with the coloring, and accent, and relation of parts given by his temperament: he is the sum-total with a new arrangement, a new tint and tone. Again, all the fully developed individuals, as they blend with each other, give to each point of the whole full and complete expression; for if it is subordinated in one, it is emphasized in another: no atom of God's truth suffers warping through the necessarily partial expression of individuality: no accent of the Holy Ghost is lost. Rather does each point of the whole find myriad-voiced utterance, whereby its empty unity as point becomes

the richly complex unity of a harmony, its singleness as point finds its infinite divisibility in the individuals in whom it exists. The individual attains his perfect stature through gathering all truth within himself, and the truth attains adequate expression through manifesting itself in all individuals. The individuals enclose the whole, and the whole exists only in the multiplicity of individuals.

The task of man is to give real content to this ideal, and the task must be worked out by individuals. It has for each a twofold aspect: first, he must strive to be the perfectly developed point of view of the one truth, *i. e.*, he must see all the truth and only truth. That he may see only truth, he must discard the whimsical and capricious, the merely personal element, and identify himself with the mind of the Absolute Ego as manifested in humanity: he must make its laws his laws, and become universal. In so becoming he seeks the universal in others, and values men as they subject themselves to law and embody principle. Universality, identity, the common element, the one truth, is his quest. That he may see all truth he must strive to gather within himself all knowledge and all wisdom, for he is ideally and potentially the whole: he must know all points of view, those of others as well as his own, see the various aspects truth has assumed in the various ages and peoples, the ideals and realizations of the epochs, the form which it takes in the mind of his friend and of his enemy: he must grasp truth in its myriad expressions, knowing that the manifoldness of its expression is the essential fulness of its nature and the condition of its existence. Duty on this side is not done till he has projected self along all the lines of being, and gathered them into one rational whole. Self-development through exhaustive knowledge of the truth is the only means by which his ideal being can be realized.

But, secondly, the universal, when found, he must transmit to others, colored with his own individuality; for his temperamental view of the universal is his permanent contribution to truth, and truth is not complete without it. To discover his own view in its purity is pre-eminently the task of his life, since he exists for no other purpose than to set forth this view. Its discovery requires the full exercise of all his powers. He must hold up to his inner self the world-view which he has gained through study and observation, question rigorously this inner self as to the righteousness of the world-view, listen greatly for its answer, and allow it no rest

till the answer is given. The answer is the view which the individual takes of the universal, and is his part in the manifestation of the whole truth ; for the inner self, in its convictions and judgments and in the conduct consistent with them, is the realization of the ideal, and the real being of the individual who is one view of God's being by Himself. The unfolding and bringing forth to light of this inner self in its judgments upon the universal is the temperamental utterance by each of his view of the truth, and that necessary part of the whole truth which it is his function to supply. Any other utterance by the individual than that of the inner self is an imaginary one, as empty as air, which has no part in the eternal whole. The judgments of the inner self are immediate, and are given only to that individual whose task it is to make them manifest : they appear to him as commands of duty, and another cannot declare them for him : his own conviction as to right and wrong within the limits of law, his own knowledge as to what universally possible deed he ought to do and what withhold from doing, must be his ultimate guide ; and conduct shaped by obedience to the inner voice is the realization of his ideal life hid in God.

It behoves us, then, to cherish our individuality as that which is sacred within us. The *condition* of individuality, we have seen, is rationality, for the individual is the not-divided : he is not sundered from the common mind of humanity, but is only a new coloring thrown upon the universality of law, or rather he is the manifestation of reason in individual form. Hence the inner self will always appear as a will whose maxim might become universal law, and any inward movement that cannot translate itself into public, universal terms does not come from the inner self. But the *completion* of individuality is self-trust, — trust in the inner self who bids what content to put within the empty form of universal law, and thereby reveals to each his meaning and his place in the eternal thought, and the sole condition upon which he may find life.

(g) *The Many and the One.*

In the conception of Fichte of the ultimate nature of existence as a closed circle of an infinite number of points of view, we have his solution of the problem of the One and the Many, which is as old as thought. The problem, when most baldly stated, asks whether the reality behind phenomena is the One or the Many.

Fichte tells us that this reality exists only in thought, that thought in apprehending it must obey its own laws; and therefore, since the fundamental law of thought is the law of reciprocal determination, or the establishment of whatever is through the inseparable presence of its opposite, the ultimate reality can be apprehended as the One only by being at the same time apprehended as the Many, and as the Many only by the being grasped as the One. The "ultimate reality" is merely a mental concept, which, like every concept, is a double, a holding together of two opposites and a hovering between them: it is One only through being at the same time Many, and Many only through being One. To talk of its being either alone is an evident absurdity, since "alone" cannot be conceived alone: "alone" is one half of a mental concept which is inseparably united with its other half, "together," through whose negation it obtains meaning. From the point of view of consciousness, also, either division is absurd: suppose you decide that the ultimate reality is the Many, your mind, as the One, enfolds it and reduces it to unity; suppose you decide that it is the One, your mind as the other, making with it a plurality, confronts it; suppose you decide that it is the One Absolute Ego beholding itself, then you have in it as ego the eternal diremption into Subject and Object which produces plurality. The Many and the One are inseparable aspects of an identity, and the necessary conditions each of the other; and when the ego in its furthest reach of thought finds itself as the encircling orb of all being, hence as the ultimate reality, it must find itself as the Many in One and the One in Many. Again, since the ego finds self as the Many, and since self is consciousness of self, the Many must also be self-conscious, conscious of its manifold as a self as is the encircling One who finds self the orb of being. Hence if thought exist, thought must discover, as ultimate reality, spirit, whose essence and sum-total and only existence is an infinite number of points of view of a self, while the self has no other atom, or element, or essence, than the organic unity of the different points of view, its oneness being only a oneness of a manifold, and the manifoldness being the manifoldness of aspect of a unity.

We have seen that when the moral man wills the morality of all, he wills a closed system of egos that shall image the unity of God. But the system cannot be closed till all its members have appeared. Therefore this world, in which new individuals are con-

stantly coming forth, must pass away, and another with fixed number — the race completed in its unity — must take its place: then it will begin its true task, the realization of the specific image of God which will fully appear to it. Hence the present world is only one of the lower degrees of visibility and the condition of the possibility of the true world-in-itself. Here we have the form of the image given us, — the willing of the eternal morality of all; hereafter the qualitative content of the image in its infinitely rich complexity will be vouchsafed, and we shall set about its realization. But the Infinite cannot be realized in the finite terms of space and time; hence our task is an endless one, requiring an infinite progress of worlds. To the moral man, therefore, appears world above world rising in endless series.

But we must guard against thinking of the series of worlds with their different tasks, in which the good man spends an immortal life, as a *Ding an sich*. Such time-series is a necessary form of consciousness if we follow thought to its furthest limits, and nothing more: when man speculates upon self he is forced to see self passing through a time-series, through such time-series, Fichte thinks, as has been indicated, and his seeing is the only passing: it is the task of the *Wissenschaftslehre* to describe the forms of consciousness in all their aspects; it is forced to describe them successively, to set before us first one form and then another, and we are in constant danger of thinking of the succession as an *extra-mentem* fact. But we shall never know or experience more of this series of worlds than we do at present: at every moment of existence we shall see self in a present, with a past and a future; for seeing, knowing, involves time with its three terms. If we explore the past, thought forms it into our past life, our parents and their ancestors, the creation of the world, God; if we explore the future, thought shapes it as a series of worlds in which our perfected selves will realize the ideal. But the extremes, the creation and the realized perfection, find their only existence in the now, as its implications and conditions. What we have is existence. The having of any of it involves the having of the whole; but existence appears in time-forms, as the possessed and the not-possessed, or the present with the past and the future. The law of reciprocal determination rules here as everywhere. Existence means the immutable seeing of the immutable as the mutable, the perception of eternity as time, the apprehension of the One and Unchangeable as sequence:

existence means the conception of the Infinite as having a beginning and an end, a creation and an attained goal of perfection: wherever there is existence, there are these conceptions, and we never were, and we never shall be, any nearer either than we are now. They are merely the conditions and inseparable correlates of a "now."

We have said that we are compelled to conceive self in terms of time. Equally are we compelled to conceive self as the timeless. Kant's very doctrine that the ego is forced to think in the categories of time and space involves the thought of the timeless and spaceless, which enters the forms of space and time. The law of reciprocal determination will not let us conceive one without the other. If we think of self as passing through a series of worlds, we think of the self as the reality which passes, the Being that puts on time and space as a garment, and hides himself in them. From every conception, from every side of thought, we are driven to think of the reality of man as the God in whose likeness he appears. Man in time is only the image of God in eternity. The two are thought-correlates which involve each other.

Thus, through the consciousness of time as form, we escape from time: we get beyond it as a whole, and see it as the visibility into which That Which Appears enters: we add the timeless to our life, and may live in it if we will. We may feel at every moment that we enter now, fresh from God, the world, to work in it the Divine Will. We may wake every morning with the assurance that we are just born and have all the possibilities of young life before us. We are, if we will. The new birth and eternal youth are found in the consciousness that time is put on out of time, and that we may translate the putting-on into the time-term "now" as appropriately as into the term "in the beginning." We find ourselves in hard and fast surroundings which we fancy our past life has fixed hopelessly upon us. But our past life has no more fixed them than the life of our parents determined our environment at the moment of natural birth. Instead of vainly wishing that we could live our lives over again and avoid our mistakes, we may begin now to live them over. There is no past, there is no future; there is only existence, opportunity for the exercise of will. Now is the moment of creation if we choose, and the realization of the Divine Ideal.

(h) Charges against Fichte.

We have now before us the general outlines of Fichte's system, and this *Totalblick* carries with it the refutation of the popular charges against Fichte which we mentioned at the beginning of our paper. The world, for him, instead of being the capricious creation of the individual, is, in origin and construction, shaped by unalterable law: every detail is a fixed "is" just as the plain man sees it. Fichte neither doubts nor denies the categorical nature of fact: the smallest and most insignificant phenomenon is, and cannot but be, and every individual is forced to recognize it. Fichte's material world is just as obtrusive, self-assertive, and compelling as that of the veriest materialist. How, then, does it differ from the world of the materialist? In that it is a system of mental images shaped by law, instead of being a *Ding an sich* which causes mental images: in that the being behind the appearance is concept and not *extra-mentem* reality, a product of the casual instinct of man, and not an independent substance which exists in itself whether mind perceives it or not. Fichte's physical world is one absolute first thinking which appears in all individuals, thus unifying them in the one absolute mind, giving validity to men's thoughts, justifying their claim to know truth. Fichte's religious world is just as real and just as omnipotent as that of the humblest saint; it differs from that of the saint in that the God whom the saint beholds from afar is enriched by the insight that the saint's view of God is God beholding himself; God is an absolute second thinking which must appear in all individuals willing to think, thus unifying them in the one absolute being, giving reality to their image-life, justifying their right to exist in that they are the necessary means for the complete expression of this being.

The charge of solipsism — *i. e.*, that Fichte believes that only Johann Gottlieb Fichte exists, and that other people are simply ideas in his mind — is so manifestly absurd that it does not deserve serious attempt at refutation. We have shown that the acme and summit of Fichte's theory — the organic moral will which is the imaging by humanity of God as one who freely submits to law for the sake of law — rests upon, as essential foundation, without which it is impossible, the presence in the world of a multiplicity of individuals.

The third charge is that Fichte's doctrine lacks unity. The general outline of the doctrine, which has been given above, shows

an exceedingly complex whole, with many points of view, but always a whole, an organic whole, every part of which involves every other part. He who does not see the unity of Fichte's doctrine has missed the very essence and soul of the doctrine, and his criticism is valueless until further study reveals to him the underlying, all-comprehensive thought which unites its many aspects as different views of one and the same truth.

A more intelligent criticism than the popular brings subtler charges against Fichte. It says that the W.-L. cannot be the final philosophy, for it fails to satisfy human needs in at least these several directions: (1) it recognizes no value in human emotions; (2) it precludes the possibility of human help in vital matters; (3) it denies to God universal consciousness; (4) it relieves the individual of moral responsibility and shifts his sin upon God. What is the force of these objections severally?

I.

We can best judge the value of emotions in Fichte's theory if we reconsider briefly its view of the vocation of man. The vocation of man is, it tells us, to give adequate expression to the Divine Life that seeks in us consciousness of its own power and excellence. Such an expression demands a double appearance within consciousness, — an ideal appearance, and a realized appearance:

(1) The ideal appearance is shaped by reason: reason in reflecting upon life sees it to be a network of relations; these relations it concludes to be a highly specified view of the law which Freedom chooses from love of law; it seeks to discover the details of this law by forming an ideal of the harmonious adjustment of all relations. The formulation of this ideal tasks the utmost powers of man, and is never completed: the ideal is always a-making, and those races and individuals whose ethical discoveries have most contributed to shape it we count as our greatest benefactors. Each man is responsible for its further development: this responsibility he discharges in part by working out and holding before himself the highest possible ideal of his own life viewed as a recognition and a fulfilment of all its relations. For the elaboration of this ideal he needs the broadest thought, the keenest discrimination,

the nicest sense of values, for he is dealing with relations ; he must seize the largest aspect of his life, its connections and reaches in every direction ; within this compass he must distinguish between the essential and the non-essential, and provide that opportunity for the domination of the self by the essential which can be given only by the rigorous subordination of the non-essential. In so doing, he puts before himself a fair and harmonious picture of his life, an ideal of the manner in which reason would shape his various relations ; by thus rationalizing the ideal of his own life, he lends his powers to the development of the common ideal.

(2) But the appearance of the ideal in pure thought alone does not give adequate expression to the life within us. The ideal must be realized. This realization is effected through fidelity to those relations which reason has shown to be the substance of our existence. Noble living resolves itself into the recognition and fulfilment of our essential relations, or into the choice of law for the sake of law.

In such a theory of existence there is scant room for the emotions : personal loves and hates it counts for nothing in the real values of life : law for the sake of law is the only measure of worth it knows. In its view the business of life is the harmonious adjustment of existence, the measuring of all co-existent relations and the adjudging to each of its exact due, the dealing justice to others' claims, the establishment of symmetry, the recognition of the organic nature of life, and the constant solicitude that each member of the organism shall receive due consideration. Fichte's theory makes reason the guide of life and realized reason the result of life : law is its ideal, and conduct controlled by law its reality.

Would the man who lived this theory lose anything of worth, and would he not gain everything ?

He surely would gain himself, — his own perfect individuality ; for individuality is the undivided whole of truth as viewed through a given temperament : it is the sight of one's own life in its relation to the sum-total of life as grasped from one point of view : in so far as we ignore relations, in so far do we cramp individuality : the true self is the result of the interaction of the one, and the whole ; it is a fatal mistake to think that it is found in tastes and aptitudes alone, they are only one of its elements : the character formed by the manner in which these tastes and aptitudes fulfil the relations of life is the true nature and the completed expression

of each. That just this nature, just this individuality may be evolved, the given temperament is placed in the given circumstances. Not for nothing does each find himself what he is and where he is, but that through his temperament, in the fulfilment of its relations, a special accent may be given to the truth, which would reveal itself in him. The struggle is the true expression of the man; if he shuns it, he deserts himself.

The fear that the individuality may be lost through fidelity to relations seems very idle when we consider that individuality is the only means of expression which the Infinite chooses, and in order that its infiniteness may utter itself fully, the complete individualization of the members of its organic whole is necessary. Individuality is of priceless worth to the heart of being; it is its first and last and supreme care, and the temporal means by which it brings it about is the pressure of essential relations upon infinitely varied temperaments. The command and the promise to each is, "Perform your functions in the Whole, and your individuality shall complete itself." Each may safely leave to the Unseen Power the care of his development, while he fixes his eye singly upon the relations to which he should be faithful. The Organism takes care of the individuality of its members, for its own richness of life depends upon their specification.

He who lives this theory gains in intensity of emotion what he may lose in variety. When he has recognized within himself the Divine Power, and knows that the self has been thrown forth by it through love, that in it it may behold its own excellence, and live, and utter itself, the supreme love of life is aroused, and, like a consuming fire, burns away all meaner passions: to live in constant consciousness of the Power, to respond to its slightest movement, to find fair and noble thought and deed in which it may fitly express itself becomes his absorbing desire; duty is done with passion, for doing duty is the expression of oneness with the Power with whom he wills to be one, and the means of closer and still closer union: daily living is a daily uttering of the love of the heart, for in every thought and act self is yielded to the Divine Will as its instrument. He may not say that he loves this Will beyond every other object of love, for he loves only it: it alone is the source of all his joy, the spring of all his thoughts, and acts, and aspirations. Only for it does he desire to live, and life without it would be hateful.

II.

Does any free-will system allow the possibility of human help in vital matters? If the destiny of each depends upon his free-will choice, can any man do good to another in the highest sense? Let us see what the standard of good is in a free-will system, and then we can judge if another can help us to the good. We may best do this by first considering the standard of good in the sense-world where, apparently, there is no freedom. Here the appetites of each creature fix the ends that it seeks. These ends seem to it good because they gratify desire, and means to these ends seem also good as helping towards gratification. Hence in the purely physical world "good" is a relative term, and is applied to anything that stands in a helpful relation towards the satisfaction of desire. It follows that here there seems to be no fixed standard of good, for it varies with desire; and no one good, but as many goods as there are desires.

In addition to this world of sense, the free-will philosopher postulates a world of freedom where the activity of man can be directed by his free will instead of by his appetites. In this world of freedom are there also an infinite number of ends suggested by varying caprices instead of by varying appetites, or is the nature of the free will such that it allows only one end and only one good? To answer this question we must examine the free will. That will only is free which directs itself, which chooses its own end. If the end toward which the activity is directed be a natural good, we cannot assert freedom of the will, for in pursuing the end the will may be governed by the laws of the physical world. The only end that allows us to think that the will seeking it may be free, is freedom, freedom from the subjection of the laws of the physical world. The end of the free will must be free will. But free will, if it is to be, must have a nature, a being, of its own, and be true to that being: in other words, in order to be, it must obey the law of its being. Hence free will, in seeking free will, is seeking the law of its own being. What is the law of free will? What is the law of any object? The law of an object is that ultimate principle obedience to which secures the fullest possible existence of the object. This ultimate principle in all objects will be found to be law for the sake of law.

It becomes evident that this statement is true if we consider what the principle "law for the sake of law" involves. It involves that whatever is accepted as law should contain within itself the principle of its own perpetuation, and should be chosen because it is capable of so maintaining itself. It is accepted because its nature is such that it can be forever and forever law: it can command and be obeyed, and command and be obeyed eternally. Suppose we adopt some rule of living, not for the sake of law, but for the sake of its result; for instance, "Thou shalt lie." If this maxim of the will were made universal, it would destroy itself in making lies impossible through the destruction of that trust which is the necessary condition of deception by a lie. Every maxim which seeks a material end, as "Thou shalt gather gold," we find to be equally self-destructive, for the limited amount of the material in existence causes obedience to the law finally to render compliance with it impossible. In choosing the maxims of the will, law for the sake of law is the only rational guide of choice, otherwise our choice destroys itself: obedience to the maxims must furnish continually the conditions for further obedience, and thus insure their perpetual existence as universally active laws. The quality of being law, *i. e.*, the quality of expressing the nature of perpetual existence, is the only rational end. In choosing "law for the sake of law," we, in effect, choose that the special form in which such law is embodied, whether rule of conduct or material object, should continue to exist through its inherent quality. No end can be intelligently chosen as end, as the constant goal of activity, which is not the embodiment of "law for the sake of law," for otherwise we choose an end which destroys itself: in apparently choosing an end we choose a not-end, and we contradict ourselves.

But the existence of law is possible only in a world of consciousness divided between subject and object, where in the objective world we find the concrete cases from which the subjective concept "law" is abstracted. Law for the sake of law as end, means the world of consciousness, existence, as end. Fichte has already told us this in describing the Divine Will, whose end is an image of itself, or the world of consciousness, as Holy Will, which seeks law for the sake of law.

Now we see clearly that whoever seeks with the fullest intelligence any object as end can do so only by seeking law for the sake of law. Suppose gold is my end, gold exists only in the existence of the world of consciousness, and can be sought only by such means as are consonant with the existence of the world of consciousness. But the world of consciousness exists only through the continuity of law, and in seeking it I must seek those laws that are consonant with themselves, those laws whose essence is perpetual law, or law for the sake of law. In the intelligent seeking of gold, I seek the law of gold, and the law of gold involves in itself the law of the whole world of consciousness, which is, that existence shall be of such nature as to exist, that law shall be that which may continue as law, and therefore without contradiction or self-destructive principle. The fact that the rational pursuit of any end is the pursuit of all ends is one of the chief points of Fichte's system. His fundamental assertion is that any bit of the world of consciousness involves the existence of the whole of consciousness, and that no bit can exist without the whole. This existence of the whole is secured only by the rule of law which contains within itself the vital principle of law, and can perpetuate itself, — or by choosing as end law for the sake of law.

If reason now re-enter the sense-world and accept for its end the gratification of desire she reaches the same result. If "the gratification of desire" is end, it cannot be end that "the gratification of desire" should destroy itself, but rather that it should perpetuate itself in order that it may be perpetual end. If, then, it is to be end, its nature must be understood, its law so grasped that obedience to it shall introduce no principle of self-destruction, but rather insure its eternal existence, — *i. e.*, the law of "the gratification of desire" must be sought as law, law as law must be end. We see here that reason shows the sense-world to be, when rationally considered, subject to the same laws as the moral world, or, rather, both to be different aspects of the one truth of existence.

The course of our argument has brought us to the conclusion that the only good which the free will recognizes is the free will, or the will that chooses law for the sake of law. Can one man give this good to another, or even help him towards it? The will, in order to be free, must be absolutely uninfluenced: in so far as it

is influenced it is not free and is without worth: the so-called good influence with which we seek to surround another may form his habits and tastes, or teach him to value the results of moral conduct, or lead him through personal love of his educators to imitate their lives; but conduct controlled by habit, or results, or personal love, is subject to the laws of the natural world, is not free, and therefore is without worth. Only one thing in life is of worth, the absolutely uninfluenced choice by the individual of law for the sake of law. Since influence, if successful, binds us still more firmly in the lower world of natural law, is not our highest duty towards our neighbor to strive to be wholly without influence upon him, — to respect his freedom so perfectly that we would present no possible inducement for its foregoal?

May not the lacks of the world, whether material or spiritual, be finally reduced to lack of will, — the one lack which it is impossible to supply? Noble men who give their lives in effort to make good the terrible needs of humanity, needs of poverty, of ignorance, of wickedness, at last are forced sorrowfully to admit that the cure for evil lies beyond their power, and must be sought by the sufferer within himself. Philanthropists tell us that the ultimate cause of the misery of the poor is lack of will to remove its causes: if the poor of the world should inflexibly will a higher standard of living for themselves, and use the means within their power to accomplish it, it would be brought about within a generation: instead they prefer the gratifications of sense which inevitably result in their present degradation. Educators, who seek to raise the level of intelligence in our great democracies, by pushing its children towards a broader training, find their chief obstacle in the lack of will of the people. The people do not will intellectual insight for themselves, but rather material pleasures. The cause of ignorance is not lack of opportunity, but lack of will for knowledge. The spiritual teacher who longs to see men entering the estate of freemen, choosing the right for the sake of the right, finds that the only obstacle to their so doing is their not willing it. Want of will is the great want, the only want, of the world. We have what we will to have. Seek and ye shall find is the law of life. The will creates its world, and the reason that, at the present moment, each is in no higher stage of existence, is that he does not will to be in a higher stage. Our condition is the measure of our will.

Now will is exactly what another cannot give us. He can furnish us with opportunities and furbish up our sinews of war, but the resolution to use what is given can come only from within. Can real help, then, ever be given by one man to another? It is the noblest natures who ask this question with the greatest sadness, for the essence of the good is to propagate itself; it has the generative force of perfect being, and urges towards more being, towards fuller and fuller expression of itself on every side. Only the good knows how much evil lacks, for it only has the positive quantity by which evil may be measured: its fuller consciousness can comprehend the greatness of the sin, for it knows through possession the exact amount of being the sin forfeits. Hence it is the good who bear the sins of the world, know them in their awful waste, suffer vicariously for them. Christ is God made manifest in the flesh, for he is the fulness of life measuring itself against its lack, bearing the knowledge of what it might be and is not, yearning to appear in each as his full stature, crucified unto death in each in so far as he is denied the possibility living in him. Can Christ help free-will beings?

Yes, there is room for help in the world of consciousness,—for indirect help through knowledge. There are two ways in which it can be given. The simpler, and perhaps the more effective way is for the holy man to live his own life in all its fulness and in its highest truth. In so doing, he develops within the knowledge of beholders an image of the perfection of being, a concrete manifestation of God; he causes a conception of the possibilities latent in human life to enter their consciousness; they know what man can do and be, and freely, because their own will moves thereto, they may will to be in the fullest sense. Each of us can best help the world by taking his own life just where it lies at this moment with its various relations, and living it with perfect fidelity. Ask what God would do if he were in your form of flesh at your point of time and space, and then do it. So ask and so do continuously. Then shall you make manifest God, and the beauty of holiness shall shine in you: men, in seeing, shall know how divine a thing human life may be, and they, through knowledge of the truth, may likewise will to be free.

The second way is to enter through sympathy the lives of others, and to show them what the Good Will would will if it should ap-

pear in them, in their environment. It is an insoluble mystery why immediate revelation of the highest truth is not given in all directions, and at all times, to each. We only know that it is not. Mind chooses here and there an individual as the mouthpiece of its messages, and other men must learn from him. The truths of Mathematics, and Metaphysics, and Science, the harmonies of Music and Poetry, communicate themselves immediately only to the few, and by them are given to the multitude. So it is with the Will. The masses do not see the immutable relations between men which Holy Will has decreed: to Moses and to Christ they are revealed, and our lesser wills find their own true nature through their teachings. So in every community there are more highly spiritual wills who can see truths of conduct which are hidden from the many. By making their special insight a common possession the sight of the right is given the lesser will, and, seeing, they may will it for its own sake.

Our duty to our neighbor, then, in Fichte's system, resolves itself into a duty to introduce into his knowledge the concept of the highest possible development of existence as shown in holy will. This we must do always by the concrete example of our own perfect lives, and may do, under certain circumstances, through sympathetic interpretation of his life and duty. Here our duty ends: further help we are absolutely powerless to give: he must will alone whether or not to lift himself to the higher plane of existence we have shown him: our task ends with showing him the plane, with setting the alternative before him. If we add the further incentive of approval, or displeasure, or bribe, we give him no real help, but rather hold him in the lower plane by increasing the pressure of natural desire. Our duty is bounded by the dispassionate enlargement of his consciousness through placing before him, in the two spheres of life disclosed to him, the moral and the natural, the opportunity for a free choice, which we must leave him to make.

III.

It is true that Fichte's God has not universal consciousness, but does he the less satisfy human need on this account? Let us see. The orthodox notion of God is that he is an all-knowing Father, who sees the hearts of men, is conscious of their wants,

hears them when they approach him in supplication or repentance, and in infinite wisdom accords or withholds what they ask. The idea of his perfect knowledge is as essential as that of his perfect love; upon it depend the possibility of his justice, and the confidence with which men turn to him: he knows, if no one else does, the purity of motive and the honesty of the mistake, or the inborn frailty that palliates the sin; he knows the struggle and the weakness, and can forgive because he knows. His knowledge is the condition of his wisdom, his justice, his intelligent love.

Such conception is absolutely foreign to Fichte's system, for according to him nothing but consciousness exists, consciousness appears only in individuals, and no individual knows the whole content of the minds of other men. When Fichte says that there is no Universal Consciousness, he simply says that no person holds within his consciousness the content of the knowledge of all other persons: no one individual personality belongs to God, but he expresses himself in all personalities. In Fichte's eyes the Christian conception must be false, for it pictures a God who is a *Ding an sich*, and can exist apart from man, whereas every intelligent man must say that man's God is man's notion of God, and other existence than as notion man can never prove him to have.

Fichte's notion of God, we have seen, is that he is a power which seeks expression of himself in man, finds self-conscious existence only in man, becomes a person only in and through man. The power is infinite, it seeks infinite expression, and presses forward in each individual to nobler form, loftier manifestation. It would make of each a true individual, *i. e.*, an undivided expression of its whole might. In the conceptions of the prophets and Christ, of the poets and the thinkers, and in the realization of these conceptions, it finds its highest existence. God is, according to Fichte, the subconscious power which flows forth in the form of consciousness, as man, and thinks God and obeys the thought. Man is God welling up into consciousness. What I call my sins are a recognition that the power within me is capable of higher manifestation than it has yet found in me; the form of my consciousness does not suit its content, and this content is, in the moment in which I recognize my sins, urging toward fitter shape. For I know sin only as a lack, and I know a lack only by contrasting

a lesser positive quantity with a greater positive quantity. I see sin in me because I see at the same moment in me a goodness which I have not yet realized. Instead of praying to an *extra-mentem* God for forgiveness, and promising him to try again, I see rise within myself a higher possible self with conceptions of infinite perfections in infinite directions, and I feel flowing into my consciousness, into the Ego form which I call I, the power to realize this self. My God, who forgives my sin, is the divine power of development in me, in that I am the image of the Infinite. The wounds of spirit heal and leave no scar, because that so-called mistake which would be fatal in a *Ding an sich* is in the power of thought only a stage of development, a lesser stage which gives way to a greater. The form in which I see this power, the form of consciousness in which the Power appears in each man, is a pressing on by the Power to a fuller and more perfect assertion of itself. Surely here we have a hope within us at least equal to that given by the orthodox notion of God, for within, bodying itself forth in us, is an unimaginable force which must express all its greatness in man. Man is to reach the perfect stature that God reaches, for God finds stature only in the mind of man, only as thought. Our life is expressing God in individual form, and the fulness of life for each man is that man's individuality should find its completion in being God's individuality, in being the flawless image-form in which the Power fully appears. Surely the thought, "I am the self-consciousness of God, the image in which he sees his perfections reflected" is as inspiring and hopeful as any so-called orthodox notion. With this thought as our guide, life has only one task for us, to keep the eye fixed upon the Power, to let it take what shape it will in us, first as conception of perfection, then as concrete realization of this conception. The consciousness that we are thus, at every moment, the reflection of God's being is our true being. All else is only dream of being.

Such is Fichte's notion of God.

Though there is now no universal consciousness, the full development of each man as a point of God's self-consciousness would make of each that perfection of knowledge which the orthodox conceives his God to be. The attainment by each of universality of knowledge may be the ultimate goal of humanity, and the

concrete manifestation of God. There are perhaps already dim indications of the manner in which the goal may be reached: education helps toward community of mind content; hypnotism, mind-reading, and experiences in the lives of all suggest that there may be as yet undiscovered means of gathering within one individuality the content of many selves.

Even without hypnotism, in a moment of exaltation we sometimes catch sight of these different coexistent selves with their different coexistent contents: we see at the same moment one self busy with the details of life, leading down the street and into the market place, and by its side, step by step, goes the self that loves and hates, and rejoices and sorrows, and with them both as inseparable companion, the self that knows the all-encompassing love of God and the philosophic truths of life, and over them all floats the including self that says, "All these are I," that sees them act contemporaneously, and knows that below them and above them are an infinite number of other selves who also are I at this moment, and whose coexistent activity is the condition of there being an I. This is the experience of one instant of time. It is not successive perception, but for one second we take in the different layers of selves and see their contemporaneous activities. Another common experience is to awake and with this waking self watch the self that dreams, let it dream on, and follow its adventures with the interest which one gives to a novel or a journey.

Now this outermost self which sees self as differentiated into many selves, each with a content of its own, is like Fichte's conception of God, — "the spirit which differentiates itself into an infinite number of points of view." Hypnotism would, in Fichte's eyes, confirm more fully than ever the truth that man is made in God's image. But as yet there is no universal consciousness, for the world of consciousness has not discovered the secret by which the mind of the individual can hold consciously at one and the same moment the contents of the minds of all other individuals, and consciousness appears only in individuals. We gain through Fichte the empty form of universal consciousness; modern research is showing us how content may be given it, but now we see, as image of God, only a sum total of distinct, private consciousnesses.

IV.

Instead of relieving the individual of moral responsibility, Fichte's doctrine puts upon him the most tremendous responsibility conceivable, for it makes him responsible, not for himself alone, but for God. He can no longer feel that God has a sure and safe existence of his own as a God apart from man, with certain fixed attributes which are unaltered by man's concepts and conduct. God's attributes are those that the thoughts of man give him, for attributes are not *Dinge an sich*, but thoughts, and thoughts exist only in mind, and mind appears only in man. If God finds noble and adequate existence only as men express him, each is bound by loyalty and truth and honor not to belie the Power that seeks to body forth in him a fitting likeness. Every time we fail to think the highest thoughts, to seek the noblest aspects of our lives, and to be true to them, we have wronged, not only ourself, and our neighbor, but the sub-conscious power that presses in us towards its highest manifestations. The individual cannot escape blame by the plea that the Whole Will does not will to utter itself fully in him, for he is potentially the Whole Will. He, as individual, is forced to see himself as a point at which the Whole Will presses to appear, and to see his individuality, what he calls I, as the power to draw forth at this point the Whole Will and express it in image form. His superactual, potential self is a part of the superactual Will, free with its unthinkable freedom: his superactual individuality is that part of the superactual Will which has the power to express the Whole Will within a concept of self: that special potential activity of the Will which throws forth its image, and can, when fully exerted, draw into the image form, into the visible expression, the whole power of the Will, thought isolates by attaching to it the concept of being, and views it as an individual. The individual must view himself as that part of the superactual Will whose function it is to say to the rest of the Will, "Come forth, appear;" and again, "Come forth in still higher perfection;" and again, "Come forth, till the whole appears." In so far as this potential function of forth-calling is not made actual, the individual sins and the individual alone, — *i. e.* only that part of the superactual Will which bids the rest appear. The rest presses to rush forth, but it must await the activity which we call

the individual will. This activity of the Will it is which fails when man sins, and since this activity, as isolated, is the self, he, as self, sins. Not the Will as a whole, but the self, sins in man. The individual, as the expression of the Will, sins, in that he is not a true individual, not an undivided Whole: the sin lies in him as separate utterance, in the expression, not in that which is expressed. And this sin is only lack, the lack to express fully that which presses for expression. Each man must say, in reckoning his sins, "My power is the power of the Whole, my sin is the sin of the self."

If it be urged that, since the will of the individual is part of the One Organic Will, when the will of the individual is faulty, the Whole Will must contain some element of evil, Fichte would reply with the law of reciprocal determination: we live in a universe of thought, the law of thought rules consciousness, this law ordains that every concept shall exist only through the presence and the denial of its opposite: we conceive good only through the presence of evil; holiness is the rejection of unholiness; that we may have a good God who is infinite there must be in him evil which he eternally negatives. Holy Will means a will whose weaker and rejected half is unholy will; this weaker and rejected portion appears as the wills of wicked men.

The attempt of the individual to evade responsibility by shifting it upon the Total Will arises from his misconception of the Total Will as a *Ding an sich*. Even at this moment, after having read Fichte to this point, he finds himself fancying that God's will exists apart from him, that at a past moment in time it willed his nature, and by this past act he is irrecoverably bound. But the will as seen in individuals is all the will there is, and it wills only now for there is no past, there is only the present notion of the past. This will in reasoning upon its own nature concludes that, just as there is one organic physical world, one organic humanity, one organic mind, so there is one organic Will which appears as a community of wills, and of which each individual is a point of sight. But all the willing there *is*, is done in the individuals, and if they do not will there is no will. The doctrine of the one organic will no more releases man from the necessity of willing than the doctrine of the one organic mind relieves him from the necessity of study. We do not lie back with our minds because we are the points of sight of the one Mind, and it does everything for us and in us, and through us, but we feel that individual effort is necessary if we

are to be personally conscious of as much of the One Mind as is possible. I study that I may see within my personal horizon the details of the working of the One Mind. My best way to study is to banish self, with its personal interest and surroundings, yield my mind as the passive substance in which the laws of thought may work, mark their working and the results they attain. Such marking we call concentration, attention, and without it intellectual results are impossible: the individual must do his part or they cannot appear. Still the true student knows that the results are not his results: he cannot command the mathematical insight or the poetic vision, or the synthetic imagination which marks the genius. What comes is given whence he knows not, he only knows that it is not his. It is a gracious illumination afforded him: it is his because the Mind whose working can be neither compelled nor controlled has chosen to bring it to pass in him. So with our work in the Will. I am curious to know the details of the Will. I wish to grasp within my personal consciousness all of its manifestations that may be accorded me. Just as to know mathematics I must abstract my mind from its merely personal cares and give it to the working of the laws of pure mathematics, so, to be righteous, I must abstract my will from its merely personal desires, banish and forget them, that I may yield it the passive substance in which the One Divine Will may work. Abstraction and attention are as necessary here as there, and without them results are impossible. As in the one case I learn what the One Mind thinks about the relations of numbers, so in the other I learn what the One Will wills about the conduct of life. I fill my will with universal and everlasting relations by yielding to the One Will as I do my mind by obeying the laws of the One Mind. The One Will is for action what the One Mind is for thought: it is the harmonizer, the revealer of truth and beauty. But we are forced to see that the power to permit the appearance of the harmony, truth, and beauty of Will and Mind lies in the individual, and if he do not perform his function they cannot appear. The individual sees himself to be that function of the Will which should will at his point of existence the appearance of the Total Will.

LIST OF FICHTE'S WORKS UPON WHICH THIS
PAPER IS FOUNDED.

1790. Aphorismen über Religion und Deismus. W. V. 1-8.
1792. Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung. W. V. 9-174.
1792. Recension des Aenesidemus. W. I. 1-25.
1793. Recension von Creuzer's skeptischen Betrachtungen über die
Freiheit des Willens. W. VIII. 409-417.
1794. Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 27-81.
1794. Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 83-328.
1794. Ueber die Würde des Menschen. W. I. 412-416.
1794. Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. W.
VI. 289-346.
1795. Grundriss des Eigenthümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre. W. I.
329-411.
1796. Grundlage des Naturrechts. W. III. 1-385.
1797. Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 417-449.
1797. Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. W. I. 451-518.
1797. Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. I.
519-534.
1798. Das System der Sittenlehre. W. IV. 1-365.
1798. Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregie-
rung. W. V. 175-189.
1799. (Anfang des Jahres.) Rückerinnerungen, Antworten, Fragen.
W. V. 335-373.
1799. Appellation an das Publicum. W. V. 191-238.
1799. Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften gegen die Anklage des
Atheismus. W. V. 239-333.
1800. Aus einem Privatschreiben. W. V. 375-396.
1800. Die Bestimmung des Menschen. W. II. 165-319.
1801. Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 1-163.
1801. Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publicum über das eigent-
liche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie. W. II. 321-420.

1804. Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314.
1805. Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten. W. VI. 347-448.
1806. Bericht über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre, etc. W. VIII. 361-407.
1806. Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580.
1810. Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umriss. W. II. 693-709.
- 1810-11. Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. W. II. 535-691.
1811. Fünf Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. Ngl. W. III. 145-208.
1812. Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492.
1812. (Ostern bis Michaelis.) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 1-118.
1812. (Ostern bis Michaelis.) Das System der Rechtslehre. Ngl. W. II. 493-652.
1812. (Michaelis bis Weihnachten.) Ueber das Verhältniss der Logik zur Philosophie oder transcendente Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400.
1813. (Anfang des Jahres.) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseins. Ngl. W. I. 401-574.
1813. (Frühjahr.) Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 1-86.
1813. (Sommer.) Die Staatslehre. W. IV. 367-600.
1813. (Herbst.) Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I. 1-102.
- 1830, 1862. Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel von seinem Sohne Immanuel Hermann Fichte. 2 vols.

APPENDIX.



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It is the purpose of the writer, in the longer work upon Fichte which is to follow, to examine his various treatises and to show that the outline drawn in this paper can be discerned, in whole or in part, in each. For the present the student may be helped to verify statements by a few references to the text. As the reconciliation of Freedom and Necessity is the central point of the outline, this reconciliation must first be substantiated. We can best do so by putting before the reader passages which assert the freedom of the ego and passages which deny it, and by then indicating those places in which their reconciliation is most clearly expressed. The references are to the "Sämmtliche Werke," edited by I. H. Fichte, Berlin, 1845, and to the "Nachgelassene Werke," edited by I. H. Fichte, Bonn, 1834.

FREEDOM.

(1810-11) *Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.* W. II. 535-691.

. . . dem Triebe folgend, ist das Individuum durchaus nicht frei, sondern es steht unter einem unwiderstehlichen Gesetze, und in dieser Region hat das Leben, seiner blossen Form nach, als reines Leben, durchaus keine Casualität. — Wiederum : bestimmt von der anderen Seite das Individuum sich durch das Sittengesetz, so ist es abermals nicht frei, und das Leben, als solches, hat abermals keine Causalität ; denn diese eben wird unter Freiheit verstanden. Hat es denn nun überhaupt keine? Allerdings, im Uebergange, in der Erhebung von der Natur zur Sittlichkeit. (671.)

Brief an Johanna Rahm, den 5 Sept., 1790. *Leben* I. 80-85.

Sage Deinem theuern Vater. . . Ich sei jetzt gänzlich überzeugt, dass der menschliche Wille frei sei, etc. (82, etc.).

Similar statements may be found : —

- (1800) Die Bestimmung des Menschen. W. II. 283 ff., 299 ff., 308.
- (1806) Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 513, 530.
- (1810) Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. W. II. 693-709.
- (1812) Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, etc.
- (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 208-220.
- (1813) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 449, 462-464, 467-478, 496, 510, etc.
- (1813) Die Staatslehre. W. IV. 382-398.
- (1813) Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I. 9-40.

NECESSITY.

THE passages which deny the freedom of the individual are equally strong : —

(1812) *Das System der Sittenlehre.* Ngl. W. III. 1-118.

Durch sich kann der Mensch Nichts thun : sich nicht sittlich machen, sondern er muss es erwarten, dass das göttliche Bild in ihm herausbreche. Dieser Glaube an eigenes Vermögen und Kraft, sich sittlich zu machen, ist vielmehr das sichere Zeichen dass das göttliche Bild noch nicht herausgekommen sei und das grösste Hinderniss dagegen ; denn es ist Widersetzlichkeit gegen das wahre Leben. — Ueberdies ist eine solche Lehre unsittlich, und das Princip aller Unsittlichkeit. Jene selbstständige Kraft — was ist sie denn eigentlich ? die Kraft des Widerstandes : das sich Losreissen, und sich widerspenstig als ein Eigenes Hinsetzen des Ich (45). Es zeigte sich darum hier, was ohne dies sich versteht und bekannt ist, dass Keiner sich selbst sittlich machen könne, sondern dass er es eben werden muss, schlechtweg : dass diese Wiedergeburt eben so wenig ein Werk der Freiheit ist, als es die erste fleischliche ist (41).

Dass der Mensch Nichts sei . . . dass Keiner, so wenig er sich in der Sinnenwelt selbst gebären konnte, sich wiedergebären kann zur sittlichen Erscheinung, sondern, dass diese Wiedergeburt durch die Kraft des Begriffs oder Gottes geschehen muss ; sehe ich so tief ein, als Einer, und ich habe mich bestrebt, es Ihnen klar darzuthun, und auch in Ihnen diese Einsicht zu erzeugen (58).

Similar passages may be found scattered through this work, also in

(1801) *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre.* W. II. 127-132.

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre.* Ngl. W. II. 337-346, 425-435, 485, 491.

The negative evidence on the side of necessity is even stronger than the passages which we have quoted. Let the reader study with the utmost attention the early works, "Grundlage," "Grundriss," "Sittenlehre" of 1798, seeking to find room for freedom in Fichte's system, and he can find it only in one place — in not-being : the potential Ego can will whether to be or not.

Sometimes in the same year we find two different treatises, one laying stress upon the freedom of initiative of the individual, while the other holds

before our view the abnegation of selfhood which Holy Will demands. We have already referred to a course of lectures which Fichte delivered in the beginning of 1813, upon the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," and which were published in his posthumous works (*Ngl. W.* I. 401-574). In these lectures Fichte deals with the moral world, and shows the moral responsibility of the individual as isolated individual to be mere appearance. The essential of moral act ("y") is that it does not appear in the uninterrupted chain of phenomenal cause and effect, but appears as something new (433 ff., 441 ff., 476, 479, 506 etc.), as an "Anfangen des Ereignisses, so ist die Freiheit zu denken, so von uns gedacht. Alles andere ist reiner Nichtsinn" (*W.* IV. 383, 384), as a free act (*Ngl. W.* I. 548), as "ein gewordenes" (433, 442, 447, 469, 504-506, 537, 538, 542, etc.). Fichte's favorite term to express this apparent freedom of a moral act is "werden" (548, etc., 436, 437, 441-443, 447, 448, 449, etc., 481, 505, 508, 509, etc., 529, 542, etc.), and "werden" as the characteristic of the moral act is dwelt upon in almost every page. "Absolutes Werden oder Freiheit" (*W.* II. 17). But we are emphatically told again and again, and over and over, that there is no real "werden": everything is eternally as it is: "werden" is only the image form in which the Inconceivable appears in the world of consciousness: Freedom is a mere mental image: man sees himself as a free moral agent, capable of free acts, but only *sees* himself as such, for reality lies as far beyond Freedom as it lies beyond Necessity (219, 414, 415, 421-424, 437, 438, 447, 469, 470, 479, 522, 537, 538, 542, 565-574). The Inconceivable appears as Principle (519, 522); Power (535, 537); Will (461, 462, 474, 542, 543); Freedom (19, 537, etc.); Life (19, 423, 536, 537); but all these are only appearance, mental images, concepts of thought; there is no *real* Freedom, Will, Power, etc. (423, 424, 414, 415, 447, etc., 537, etc.).

Enleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre, Ngl. W. I. 1-102, written in the same year, says that the Wissenschaftslehre is an elevation of man beyond his natural being, which is governed by necessity, into the region of freedom and the consciousness of freedom (9-40).

Sometimes in the same work passages will be found which, to one who has not yet the key, seem absurdly contradictory, as in the "Anweisung zum seligen Leben" (*W.* V. 470, 475, 476, 512, 513, 524, 530, 531), in the "Darstellung" of 1801, in the "Thatsachen" of 1810-1811. This apparent contradiction is specially noticeable in the "Bestimmung des Menschen" (*W.* II. 165-319): — the very kernel of the last section is freedom of the will: Fichte again and again affirms it with exultation, — "Mein Wille ist mein, und er ist das einige, das ganz mein ist, und vollkommen von mir selbst abhängt, und durch ihn bin ich schon jetzt ein Mitbürger des Reiches der

Freiheit und der Vernunftthätigkeit durch sich selbst" (283, 284). "Aber was ich selbst seyn solle in dieser Harmonie der Geister, muss ich wissen; denn nur ich selbst kann mich dazu machen, und es wird mir unmittelbar offenbaret durch eine Stimme, die aus jener Welt zu mir herüberönt. So stehe ich mit dem Einem, *das da ist*, in Verbindung, und nehme Theil an seinem Seyn. Es ist nichts wahrhaft Reelles, Dauerndes, Unvergängliches an mir, als diese beiden Stücke: die Stimme meines Gewissens und mein freier Gehorsam. Durch die erste neigt die geistige Welt sich zu mir herab, und umfasst mich, als eins ihrer Glieder; durch den zweiten erhebe ich mich selbst in diese Welt, ergreife sie und wirke in ihr. Jener unendliche Wille aber ist der Vermittler zwischen ihr und mir; denn er selbst ist der Urquell von ihr und von mir (299). And yet, a little later, the absolute impotence of bad men to be good is affirmed, "Die Verkehrtheit, dass sie das Gute hassten, weil es gut ist, und das Böse beförderten, aus reiner Liebe zum Bösen, als solchem. . . diese Verkehrtheit schreibe ich keinem zu, der menschliches Angesicht trägt; denn ich weiss, dass dieselbe nicht in der menschlichen Natur liegt. Ich weiss, dass es für alle, die so handeln, inwiefern sie so handeln, überhaupt kein Böses oder Gutes, sondern lediglich ein Angenehmes oder Unangenehmes giebt; dass sie überhaupt nicht unter ihrer eigenen Botmässigkeit, sondern unter der Gewalt der Natur stehen, und dass nicht sie selbst es sind, sondern diese Natur in ihnen, die das erstere mit aller ihrer Macht sucht, und das letztere flieht, ohne Rücksicht, ob es übrigens gut oder böse sey. Ich weiss, dass sie, nachdem sie nun einmal sind, was sie sind, nicht um das Mindeste anders handeln können, als sie handeln; und ich bin weit entfernt, gegen die Nothwendigkeit mich zu entrüsten, oder mit der blinden und willenlosen Natur zu zürnen. Allerdings liegt darin eben ihre Schuld und ihre Unwürde, dass sie sind, was sie sind, und dass sie, anstatt frei, und etwas für sich zu seyn, sich dem Strome der blinden Natur hingeben. Dies allein könnte es sein, das meinen Unwillen erregte; aber ich falle hier mitten in das absolut Unbegreifliche hinein. Ich kann ihnen ihren Mangel an Freiheit nicht zurechnen, ohne sie schon vorauszusetzen als frei, um sich frei zu machen. Ich will mich über sie erzürnen und finde keinen Gegenstand für meinen Zorn. Was sie wirklich sind, verdient diesen Zorn nicht; was ihn verdiente, sind sie nicht, und sie würden ihn abermals nicht verdienen wenn sie es wären. Mein Unwille träfe ein offenbares Nichts. . . Und so kann es allerdings geschehen, dass ich mit einer edlen Entrüstung, als ob sie frei wären, gegen sie mich kehre . . . die ich selbst in meinem Innern vernünftigerweise nie empfinden kann. Nur der handelnde Mensch der Gesellschaft in mir ist es, der der Unvernunft und dem Laster zürnt, nicht der auf sich selbst ruhende und in sich selbst vollendete, betrachtende Mensch" (313-315).

RECONCILIATION OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY.

THE reconciliation that man, as the visible appearance of God, who is Free Will willing to appear as Law, has freedom in so far as he is this Will, and is without freedom in so far as he is mere appearance, can be found everywhere, — in the earlier works as well as in the later. Freedom, from “Grundlage” to the last “Wissenschaftslehre,” which death interrupted, is always our conception of the freedom of the Absolute Ego to be or not to be, our conception of the superactual power of choice on the other side of existence, which is the ground of existence; and strict necessity always governs the world of existence which results from this choice. We indicate some of the various forms in which the reconciliation finds expression, first quoting in full a succinct statement in a letter to Jacobi: —

Fichte an Jacobi, Berlin, den 3. Mai, 1810. Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Leben und literarischer Briefwechsel, v. II. 179–184 . . . scheint mir eine wirkliche und die Hauptdifferenz zwischen Ihnen und mir ausgesprochen zu sein S. 68 Ihrer Schrift: “Die Vereinigung von Naturnothwendigkeit und Freiheit in einem und demselben Wesen ist ein schlechterdings unbegreifliches Factum, ein der Schöpfung gleiches Wunder und Geheimniss. Wer die Schöpfung begriffe, würde dieses Factum begreifen, wer dieses Factum, die Schöpfung und Gott selbst.”

“Meine Philosophie begreift zwar weder Gott selbst, noch dasjenige, was ich Schöpfung nennen würde, wenn ich dieses Wortes mich bedienen müsste; die letztere ist ihr ein absolutes Factum: — und dieses nicht zwar, als ob in Gott oder jenem Factum etwas läge, das dem Begreifen positiv zuwider wäre, sondern weil das Factum des Begreifens Gott und das absolute Factum seines Erscheinens voraussetzt und das Begreifen innerhalb seines factischen Seins nicht die Wurzel seines Seins vernichten kann. Aber die Vereinigung von Naturnothwendigkeit und Freiheit in einem begreift nicht sowol diese Philosophie, da sie vielmehr die Nichtigkeit der ganzen Unterscheidung und des vermeinten Widerstreites deutlich begreift und darlegt, indem sie das eine Glied des Gegensatzes ganz aufhebt.

Ein Widerstreit könnte entstehen nur unter der Voraussetzung dass man beiden, der Freiheit sowie der Naturnothwendigkeit, die gleiche Realität zuschriebe. Die Wissenschaftslehre ist weit davon entfernt, diese Voraussetzung zuzugeben.

Nur das absolute Schema Gottes, sowie es ist, schlechthin durch das blosser Erscheinen Gottes, ist nach ihr das Reale in der Erscheinung. Dieses ist schlechthin wie es ist, durch sich selbst, ohne allen äussern Grund, einfach, unveränderlich, zeitlos, unter keine Anschauungs- oder Denkform zu bringen: — das Freie, d. i. Selbständige und Absolute in der Erscheinung. *So ist es an und für sich.* Indem es aber *erblickt* wird und in seiner Beziehung auf das sich selbst erblickende Vermögen (das Ich) erblickt wird, bricht nach darzulegenden Gesetzen jene Einheit sich in eine Mannichfaltigkeit; der *Zusammenhang* aber dieses Mannichfaltigen (vermittelt dessen allein die Rückkehr des Blicks auf die Einheit möglich ist) ist die *Nothwendigkeit*. Und so ist denn alle Nothwendigkeit durchaus nichts Reales, sondern nur die Anschauungsform des einen wahrhaft Realen in der Erscheinung.

Man kann, dies verfolgend, sagen: Nur durch das Werden zum absoluten Schema Gottes (zu einem *Willen*) wird das Vermögen (das Ich, der Mensch) wirklich real; ohne dies ist er gar nicht, weder frei, noch nothwendig, sondern eben nichts. Dieses an sich und in seiner Unsichtbarkeit einfache Sein ist dem aus einem Mannichfaltigen es herausconstruirenden Blicke und durch diesen Blick das absolut Nothwendige, das aus dem Totalzusammenhange des Mannichfaltigen als resultirend Erscheinende. Und so ist denn das Erzeugniss der absoluten Freiheit (das Leben in Gott) eben dadurch, dass es dies ist, zugleich auch das Nothwendige in der soeben erklärten Bedeutung des Wortes.

Ist das Vermögen (das Ich, der Mensch) nicht dies, so ist es in der That gar nicht; es ist nicht einmal Schema (Gottes nämlich, was allein es zu *sein* vermag) sondern Schema des Schemas, vielleicht vom Schema u. s. f. — eine blosser leere Ansicht und Truggestalt (seiner selbst, wie dies nicht anders sein kann). Das Materiale dieser Ansicht ist weder das *Freie* (Absolute der Erscheinung) noch auch das *Nothwendige*. In der letzten Rücksicht ist es zwar immer *Zusammenhang* irgendeiner Region der Mannichfaltigkeit und nothwendiges Resultat *dieser* Region, Ordnung, Reihe (z. B. das aus der sinnlichen Individualität in einem solchen Systeme sinnlicher Individuen erfolgende) keineswegs aber Resultat der gesammten und erschöpften Mannichfaltigkeit (wie in dem erst beschriebenen Falle) indem auf diesem Standpunkte ganze Reihen der Mannichfaltigkeit dem Blicke verborgen bleiben und in seine Organisation nicht mit eintreten.

Zu diesem wahrhaftigen Sein wird nun das Vermögen nicht durch irgendeine ausser ihm liegende Kraft emporgehoben oder davon zurückgehalten, sondern beides schlechthin nur durch sich selbst: und dies ist die *formale* Freiheit, die innere Selbständigkeit der Erscheinung als solcher, die auch ein Leben ist, keineswegs ein todttes und geschlossenes Sein. Und da sind nur zwei Fälle möglich; entweder es ist dies, so ist es dasselbe ganz, au

immer, hinweg über die Zeit und ihren Wechsel, der nur noch in dem Blicke liegt, keineswegs im Sein; oder es ist es nicht, so ist es eben nichts, und es ist ganz gleichgültig, wie dieses Nichts gefärbt sei.

Ueber dieses unser wahres Wesen kann uns nun keine factische Selbstbeobachtung Aufschluss geben; denn gegeben (worauf doch allein die Beobachtung geht) werden wir uns in diesem Zustande nie; sondern wir können uns dazu nur *machen*, indem wir uns selbst ja nur als Leben, keineswegs als ein todes Sein gegeben sind; und dieses *Machen* findet nur statt zufolge einer Erkenntniss, die hier eine rein apriorische, nur durch Intelligiren zu erwerbende ist.

Und dieses führt mich denn auf den zweiten Punkt unserer wirklichen Differenz, der formalen, über das Wesen, den Werth und den Erfolg des Philosophirens.

Seite 15, 16 Ihrer Schrift: "Wenn ein Wesen ein von uns vollständig begriffener Gegenstand werden soll, so müssen wir es objectiv, als für sich bestehend, in Gedanken aufheben, um es ein blosses Schema werden zu lassen." Richtig und trefflich ausgedrückt. In dieser Verwandlung der dichten Wesen in durchsichtige Schatten besteht allerdings das Geschäft der Speculation. Aber wie ist doch dem Menschen dieses wunderbare Vermögen zu Theil geworden? Warum ist er nicht lieber gleich durch seine Natur in die Objectivität fest hineingebannt, also dass ihm jener Muthwille vergehen müsse? Da er speculiren *kann*, so muss er wol speculiren *sollen*; und da dies in seinem ursprünglichen Vermögen liegt, so muss auch wol die Entwicklung dieses Vermögens zur vollständigen Entwicklung seines Wesens gehören. Der Grund davon findet sich auch bald. Wir werden durch unsere natürliche Geburt keineswegs in eine Welt der Wahrheit, sondern in eine Schatten- und Nebelwelt hineingeboren. Um diesen *unfreien* Schematismus abzustreifen, erhielten wir das freie Vermögen zu schematisiren, damit wir die Schemen, die wir ohnedies nicht dafür ansehen, durch andere, die wir als solche erkennen, auflösen.

Dieses Verfahren der Speculation durchgeführt kann freilich nur damit endigen, *dass das höchste für sich Bestehende* (als das absolute Factum der Erscheinung Gottes) vernichtet und in ein blosses Schema verwandelt werde (nicht Erscheinung schlechtweg, *schema primum*, bleibe, sondern Erscheinung der Erscheinung, *schema secundum* werde). Nun wird aber hoffentlich unser Philosoph wissen, was er selbst getrieben hat, und nicht dieses letztere, sein Product, sondern das erste für das Wahre und Rechte halten und diesem sich hingeben. Er wird nicht das Wissen an die Stelle des Lebens setzen und durch dieses sich mit dem Leben abfinden wollen, sondern gerade zufolge seiner Erkenntniss vom Wesen des Wissens eben leben. Dies, das wahre Leben leben, könnte er nun ohne sein Wissen gar nicht; denn das vollendete Leben der Erscheinung ist nothwendig ein

sich selbst erscheinendes, durchsichtiges, klares, von sich durchdrungenes. Und so zeigt sich denn die Speculation als eine durchaus nothwendige Bestimmung des Lebens selbst, als der wahre Paraklet, auf den das Christenthum, das nur unter gewissen Zeitbedingungen, die dermalen durch dasselbe selbst vernichtet zu sein scheinen, etwas vermochte, „vertröstet hat” (180-184).

In this letter Fichte's doctrine lies in a nutshell. In the longer treatises the kernel is always the same, however hidden by cumbrous envelopment of words. The aim of the following summaries of these treatises from the point of view of the reconciliation, is to set before the reader the various forms in which Fichte expressed the doctrine; in them we support statements by reference to volume and page, or by quotations. But before we reach these treatises we find the reconciliation already in Fichte's mind, giving stuff and form to the ego. Even in 1792 the ego was for him an absolute, therefore *what* it is *because* it is, or a union of necessity and freedom: —

(1792) *Recension des Aenesidemus*. W. I. 1-25. “Wenn nemlich, — um die Momente jener Schlussart in ihrer höchsten Abstraction darzustellen, — wenn das Ich in der intellectuellen Anschauung *ist, weil* es ist, und *ist, was* es ist; so ist es in sofern *sich selbst setzend*, schlechthin selbständig und unabhängig (22).

. . . das Gemüth . . . ist . . . transcendente Idee; die aber von allen andern dadurch sich unterscheidet, dass wir sie durch intellectuelle Anschauung, durch das *Ich bin*, und zwar: *ich bin schlechthin, weil ich bin*, realisiren. Alle Ansprüche Aenesidem's gegen dieses Verfahren gründen sich bloss darauf, dass er die absolute Existenz und Autonomie des Ich — wir wissen nicht wie und für wen — *an sich* gültig machen will: da sie doch nur *für das Ich selbst* gelten soll. Das Ich ist *was* es ist, und *weil* es ist, *für* das Ich. Ueber diesen Satz hinaus kann unsre Erkenntniss nicht gehen (16).

In these propositions lie latent the “Darstellung” of 1801 (see W. II. 16, 17) and the treatises of the last period with that insistence upon the image-nature of existence which was called mysticism because it ascribed reality only to God.

(1794) *Grundlage*. W. I. 83-328.

In this first formal exposition of his doctrine Fichte begins (91-123) with the empirical world: this the plain man sees as consisting of himself and an external universe, or of a self and a not-self. Two questions immediately arise (123-149): if the self and the not-self are distinct entities, how can the

self be conscious of the not-self, how can matter migrate into mind? If, on the other hand, the self and the not-self are one and the same substance, if the non-ego is merely a fiction of the causal instinct of the ego, why does the mind so persistently separate ego and non-ego and set them against each other as the ultimate antithesis of existence? All theories so far advanced in the history of thought have failed to answer one or the other of these questions: causality, or material, theories, the former; substantiality, or ideal theories, the latter. Consciousness of a not-self, and the compulsion which this not-self exercises upon the self are unsolved problems.

To explain these problems, we are forced, Fichte thinks (149-170), to assume behind and above the self and the not-self one common nature, of which both are only two visible aspects:—the self can be conscious of the not-self only in so far as it is kindred with it, and the not-self can compel only that which is so adapted to it as to feel its compulsion: the ego and the non-ego are two manifestations of one and the same being, of an *unabhängige Thätigkeit* behind them, which, with its manifestations, must be for the mind, since for it they are the sum-total of existence, an Absolute, and therefore free (*unabhängig*). Hence rational investigation of the empirical world, and its laws of perception forces us, in Fichte's eyes, to postulate, as its ground, origin, cause, Freedom: the world of consciousness is the appearing of Free Will in the garb of Law. Though the individual is not reached in the "Grundlage" it is self-evident that if he is considered as an integral part of that Will which chooses to appear in his shape he is free; while if he is looked upon as mere, empty appearance of a power behind, he is the creature of necessity.

Later (246-285) the freedom of the *unabhängige Thätigkeit* to give birth to existence or to refuse to do so, is insisted upon. In the *unabhängige Thätigkeit* must be the two elements (149 ff. *W.* II. 66) corresponding to the two manifestations, self and not-self: the one is called the Pure Ego, the other the *Anstoss* (210-227), pure limitation, Law, the Other. No object can appear unless the Pure Ego relate its own activity with that of the limiting Other (unless Freedom freely yield to Law). Upon this relating, objective existence depends, and this relating is an absolute one, uncaused, without all ground: whether or not the objective world shall be, depends only upon the Free Will which lies behind Consciousness. In the following passage this doctrine is stated perhaps as pointedly as anywhere in the "Grundlage"—"Demnach ist X die durch das Ich in sich selbst gesetzte unendliche Thätigkeit; und diese verhält sich zur objectiven Thätigkeit des Ich, wie der Grund der Möglichkeit zu dem begründeten. Der Gegenstand wird bloss gesetzt, insofern einer Thätigkeit des Ich widerstanden wird; keine solche Thätigkeit des Ich, kein Gegenstand. Sie verhält sich, wie

das bestimmende zum bestimmten. Nur *inwiefern* jener Thätigkeit widerstanden wird, kann ein Gegenstand gesetzt werden; und inwiefern ihr nicht widerstanden wird, ist kein Gegenstand. (The ego sees its own activity of perceiving behind every object perceived) (259).

Wir betrachten jetzt diese Thätigkeit in Rücksicht ihrer Beziehung auf die des Gegenstandes. An sich betrachtet sind beide völlig unabhängig von einander, und völlig entgegengesetzt; es findet zwischen ihnen gar keine Beziehung statt. Soll aber, laut der Forderung, ein Object gesetzt werden, so müssen sie doch durch das ein Object setzende Ich auf einander bezogen werden. Von dieser Beziehung hängt gleichfalls das Setzen eines Objects überhaupt ab; insofern ein Object gesetzt wird, werden sie bezogen, und inwiefern sie nicht bezogen werden, wird kein Object gesetzt. Ferner, da das Object absolut, schlechthin und ohne allen Grund (der Handlung des Setzens bloss als solcher) gesetzt wird, so geschieht auch die Beziehung schlechthin und ohne allen Grund; und erst jetzt ist völlig erklärt, inwiefern das Setzen eines Nicht-Ich absolut sey: es ist absolut, inwiefern es sich auf jene lediglich vom Ich abhängende Beziehung gründet. Sie werden schlechthin bezogen, heisst: sie werden schlechthin gleich gesetzt. Da sie aber, so gewiss ein Object gesetzt werden soll, nicht gleich sind, so lässt sich nur sagen, ihre Gleichheit werde schlechthin gefordert: sie *sollen* schlechthin gleich seyn. — Da sie aber wirklich nicht gleich sind, so bleibt immer die Frage, welches von beiden sich nach dem anderen richten, und in welchem der Grund der Gleichung angenommen werden solle? — Es ist sogleich einleuchtend, wie diese Frage beantwortet werden müsse. So wie das Ich gesetzt ist, ist alle Realität gesetzt; im Ich soll alles gesetzt seyn; das Ich soll schlechthin unabhängig, Alles aber soll von ihm abhängig seyn; (*i. e.*, the ego can never transcend itself to find an Other: — it finds all reality included within its own circumference as perceiver of the reality.) Also, es wird die Uebereinstimmung des Objects mit dem Ich gefordert; und das absolute Ich, gerade um seines absoluten Seyns willen, ist es, welches sie fordert (259, 260).

Kant's kategorischer Imperativ. Wird es irgendwo klar, dass Kant seinem kritischen Verfahren, nur stillschweigend, gerade die Prämissen zu Grunde legte, welche die Wissenschaftslehre aufstellt, so ist es hier. Wie hätte er jemals auf einen kategorischen Imperativ, als absolutes Postulat der Uebereinstimmung mit dem reinen Ich, kommen können, ohne aus der Voraussetzung eines absoluten Seyns des Ich, durch welches alles gesetzt wäre, und, inwiefern es nicht *ist*, wenigstens seyn *sollte*. . . . Nur *weil* und *inwiefern* das Ich selbst absolut ist, hat es das Recht, absolut zu postuliren; und dieses Recht erstreckt sich denn auch nicht weiter, als auf ein Postulat dieses seines absoluten Seyns, aus welchem denn freilich noch manches andere sich dürfte *deduciren* lassen (260, note).

(1795) *Grundriss*. W. I. 329-411.

Existence with its laws is persistently explored until its very laws force us into a region of *freie Kräfte* (390-396) as source of these laws.

(1798) *Sittenlehre*. W. IV. 1-365.

The ego, in reflection upon itself (1-49) finds itself *forced* to view itself as *free*, hence it must view itself as free and constrained, at one and the same moment. How explain this seeming contradiction in such wise that both the freedom and the compulsion of the ego shall be preserved, and the facts of consciousness adequately accounted for? Obviously the compulsion must be of such sort as shall allow freedom. Such compulsion is found only in the Moral Law (45-49, 51-53). The ego finds its existence rationally explicable only as a moral fact: the laws of its being are merely a moral necessity which addresses itself to Superactual Freedom as an "ought." Superactual Freedom obeys, and the world of consciousness with its objective laws results, — laws which, though seemingly imposed from without, are really taken freely upon itself by the real being of the ego, or Superactual Freedom. Hence the world of strict necessity is grounded in freedom, the continuity of law is the result of the continuity of free choice, and every phenomenon as rooted in the One Will is rooted in its freedom, while, as result of the will it is only creature of law (1-62). Next, the conception of Superactual Freedom which we have now gained is shown to involve realization of self by Freedom as the world of consciousness, hence to involve its laws, or necessity (75-122).

We add two quotations from the same work which recognize and express sharply the two points of view of man's freedom: — (1) that in his original being he is free; (2) that as actual phenomenon he is the creature of necessity. Remember that these passages occur in the "*Sittenlehre*" of 1798, which every critic acknowledges to belong to Fichte's first period. Yet they express the very doctrine which, expounded in the later works, caused Fichte to be accused of change of system, of having deserted Philosophy for Mysticism.

"*Wenn der Mensch auf diesem Reflectionspuncte stehen bleibt, so ist es nicht anders möglich, als dass er diese Maxime habe. Er kann unter dieser Bedingung keine bessere haben. Aus dem vorausgesetzten Reflectionspuncte also lässt die Maxime sich theoretisch ableiten. Aber dass er auf diesem Reflectionspuncte stehen bleibt, ist gar nicht nothwendig, sondern hängt ab von seiner Freiheit; er sollte schlechthin sich auf einen höheren schwingen, und könnte es auch. Dass er es nicht thut ist seine Schuld; mithin ist die untaugliche Maxime, die daher fließt, gleichfalls seine Schuld. Auf welchem Reflexionspuncte das Individuum stehen werde, lässt also sich nicht vorher sagen; denn dieser folgt aus keinem theoretischen Gesetze.*"

Es ist sonach ganz richtig, wenn man urtheilt: in dieser Lage, d. h. bei dieser Denkart und Charakter, konnte der Mensch schlechthin nicht anders handeln, als er gehandelt hat. Es würde aber unrichtig seyn, wenn man hierbei mit seinem Urtheile stehen bleiben and behaupten wollte, er könne auch keinen anderen Character haben, als er habe. Er soll schlechthin sich einen anderen bilden, wenn sein gegenwärtiger nichts taugt, und er kann es; denn dies hängt schlechthin ab von seiner Freiheit (181).

Hier ist etwas unbegreifliches; und es kann nicht anders seyn, weil wir an der Grenze aller Begreiflichkeit, bei der Lehre von der Freiheit in Anwendung auf das empirische Subject, stehen. Nämlich, so lange ich in dem höheren Reflectionspuncte noch nicht stehe, ist er für mich gar nicht da; ich kann sonach von dem, was ich sollte, keinen Begriff haben, ehe ich es wirklich thue. Dennoch bleibt es dabei, dass ich es absolut thun soll: nämlich ich soll es in Beziehung auf einen anderen Beurtheiler, der diesen Punct kennt, und in Beziehung auf mich selbst, wenn ich ihn einst kennen werde. Ich werde mich alsdann nicht mit dem Unvermögen entschuldigen, sondern mich darüber anklagen, dass ich es nicht schon längst gethan habe. Ich soll es in Beziehung auf meinen ursprünglichen Character, welcher aber selbst nur eine Idee ist (181, 182).

Anders kann es auch gar nicht seyn; denn ein Act der Freiheit ist schlechthin, weil er ist, und ist ein absolut erstes das sich an nichts anders anknüpfen und daraus erklären lässt. . . . *Begreifen* heisst ein Denken an ein anderes anknüpfen, das erstere vermittelt des letzteren denken. Wo eine solche Vermittelung möglich ist, da ist nicht Freiheit, sondern Mechanismus. Einen Act der Freiheit begreifen wollen, ist absolut widersprechend. Eben wenn sie es begreifen könnten, wäre es nicht Freiheit (182).

. . . Man denke sich den Menschen in dem beschriebenen Zustande. Da er überhaupt seinem ursprünglichen Wesen nach, wenngleich nicht in der Wirklichkeit, frei ist und unabhängig von der Natur, so soll er immer aus diesem Zustande sich losreißen; und *kann* es auch, wenn man ihn als absolut frei betrachtet: aber ehe er durch Freiheit sich losreißen kann, muss er erst frei seyn. Nun ist es gerade seine Freiheit selbst, welche gefesselt ist; die Kraft durch die er sich helfen soll, ist gegen ihn im Bunde. Es ist da gar kein Gleichgewicht errichtet; sondern es ist ein Gewicht seiner Natur da, das ihn hält, und gar kein Gegengewicht des Sittengesetzes. Nun ist zwar wahr dass er absolut in die andere Wagschale treten und jenen Schritt entscheiden *soll*; es ist wahr, dass er auch wirklich Kraft in sich hat, uns unendliche sich soviel Gewicht zu geben, als nöthig ist um seine Trägheit zu überwiegen: und dass er in jedem Augenblicke durch einen Druck auf sich selbst, durch den blossen Willen diese Kraft aus sich herausheben kann; aber wie soll er auch nur zu diesem Willen und zu diesem ersten

Drucke auf sich selbst kommen? Aus seinem Zustande geht ein solcher keinesweges hervor, sondern vielmehr das Gegentheil das ihn hält und fesselt. Nun ist auch dies wahr, dass dieser erste Anstoss daraus nicht hervorgehen soll, noch kann, sondern absolut aus seiner Selbstthätigkeit. Aber wo ist denn in seinem *Zustande* die Stelle, aus welcher er jene Kraft hervorbringen könnte? — Absolut nirgends. Sieht man die Sache natürlich an, so ist es schlechthin unmöglich, dass der Mensch sich selbst helfe; so kann er gar nicht besser werden. Nur ein Wunder, das er selbst zu thun hätte, könnte ihn retten. (Diejenigen sonach, welche ein *servum arbitrium* behaupteten, und den Menschen als einen Stock und Klotz characterisirten, der durch eigene Kraft sich nicht aus der Stelle bewegen könnte, sondern durch eine höhere Kraft angeregt werden müsste, hatten vollkommen recht, und waren consequent, wenn sie vom *natürlichen Menschen* redeten: wie sie denn thaten) (201).

(1801) *Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. W. II. 1-163.*

This treatise deals more directly than any other with the problem of Freedom and Necessity: subordinate questions are neglected: the *Erster Theil* is devoted to setting forth the rationality of the view that the world of consciousness is the appearance of Superactual Freedom in the form of Necessity, while the *Zweiter Theil* deduces from the interpenetration of Freedom and Necessity the forms of existence. We transcribe a passage from the closing pages where Fichte's characterization of Freedom is unusually clear: —

Dieses ist nun die *Freiheit*, und hier zwar die absolute, die Indifferenz in Bezug auf das absolute, ganze (nicht dieses oder jenes) Wissen selbst. a) Die Freiheit κατ' ἐξοχήν ist daher ein Gedanke und nur in ihm, der selbst mit Freiheit zu Stande gebracht ist, wie sich versteht. b) Sie ist, negativ gefasst, nichts anderes als der Gedanke von der *Zufälligkeit* des absoluten Wissens. (Man beachte wohl den scheinbaren Widerspruch: das Wissen nemlich ist das absolut Zufällige, oder das zufällige Absolute — die Seite der Zufälligkeit (früher: Accidentalität) des Absoluten — eben weil es in die Quantität und die absolute Grundform derselben, die unendliche Zeitfolge, hineinfällt.) *Positiv* gefasst, ist die Freiheit der Gedanke der Absolutheit des Wissens, dass es eben sich *selbst* setzt durch sich verwirklichende Freiheit. Das Verschmelzen beider Bestimmungen ist der Begriff der Freiheit in seinem idealen und realen Momente. c) Dieser Gedanke der Freiheit des Wissens ist nicht ohne sein Seyn (so wie überhaupt kein Denken ohne Anschauung: es ist dieselbe durchgreifende Verbindung, wie in den früheren Synthesen). Nun ist dies die Freiheit κατ' ἐξοχήν, und alle andere Freiheit ist nur eine untergeordnete Art. Sonach: keine Freiheit ohne Seyn (Gebundenheit, Nothwendigkeit) und umgekehrt. Die Zeit

fällt unter das Band dieser Nothwendigkeit, nur Denken ist frei. Nur nach vollendeter Zeit wäre die Intelligenz ganz und durchaus Freiheit: dann aber wäre sie Nichts; sie wäre ein unwirkliches (seynloses) Abstractum, und so bleibt es dabei, dass das Wissen seiner Substanz nach Freiheit, immer jedoch in bestimmter Weise (in bestimmten Reflexionspunkten) *gebundene Freiheit* ist (158, 159).

2) *Hauptsatz*: Es ist absoluter formaler Charakter des Wissens, dass es reines Entspringen sey; wo es daher zum Wissen kommt, kommt es durchaus nothwendig zum Wissen von der *Freiheit*. Die tiefste Potenz im Principe der Wahrnehmung ist das blosse Analogon des Denkens, — das *Gefühl*. Jedes Individuum fühlt sich wenigstens frei. *Zusatz*: Dies Gefühl der Freiheit ist aber nicht ohne eines der Gebundenheit (159).

Folgesatz: Durchaus alle Freiheit ist daher eine Abstraction von irgend einer, in irgend einem Maasse gesetzten Realität: ein blosses Schematisiren derselben (159).

3) In jeder niederen Potenz der Freiheit ist für das Individuum eine höhere reale mitenthalten, die er selbst nicht erkennt, die ihm aber ein Anderer anmuthen kann, und die für ihn eine Gebundenheit, Concretion seiner selbst ist. — Z. B. die gedachte Freiheit in ihrer niederen Potenz haben wir kennen lernen als den Begriff eines beliebig zu fassenden sinnlichen Zweckes. Das Allgemeine dazu ist jene Freiheit, auf das sinnliche Object, über dem der Zweckbegriff schwebt, zu reflectiren oder auch nicht (wo Nothwendigkeit und Freiheit schlechthin in einen Punkt zusammenfallen). Hier setzt das Wissen sich als frei, indifferent, nur gegen dieses bestimmte Object; — in der Wahrnehmung überhaupt aber ist es befangen, und in ihrem ganzen Geiste und ihrer Sinnesart, ohne dies zu merken, — und dies ist eben der Zustand des sinnlichen Menschen. Jeder, der höher steht, kann ihm sagen, dass er frei sey, sich auch darüber zu erheben: nur er selbst nicht" (159, 160.)

Another noteworthy passage is the following: — "Der letzte Grund des jedesmaligen Zustandes der Welt ist nun aufgegangen: er ist das Seyn und Ruhen des Gesamtwissens im Absoluten. Dadurch wird freilich auch der, wenn auch nicht immer deutlich bemerkte Zustand jedes Einzelnen bestimmt, der von seiner Seite wieder den Gesamtzustand bestimmt. Dieser Grund aber, und seine Folge, könnte in jedem Augenblicke anders seyn, und kann in jedem Momente der Zukunft anders werden, als er ist. Das höchste Gesetz des Seyns, das da Gesetze trägt, ist kein Naturgesetz (Gesetz eines materialen Seyns), sondern ein Freiheitsgesetz, auszudrücken in dieser Formel: Es *ist* eben Alles, wie die Freiheit es macht, und wird nicht anders, wenn sie es nicht anders macht (*W.* II. 113, 114; see also pp. 23, 24, 25, 30, etc.).

In this treatise Fichte never wearies in telling us that the world which

we see is Freedom-stuff, is Freedom in the act of willing to exist: — it arises “aus der *vollzogenen* Freiheit” (54); “durch absolute Vollziehung der Freiheit” (61); “absolute Freiheit das Wissen, und das absolute Wissen Freiheit” (32); “die Freiheit als Substrat des Accidens, kann seyn oder auch nicht; ist sie aber, so ist sie durch das absolute Seyn, als die Substanz, unveränderlich bestimmt” (69). “Wenn einmal ein Wissen ist, so ist dasselbe nothwendig frei (gebundene Freiheit); denn in der Freiheit besteht eben sein Wesen. *Dass* aber überhaupt eins sey, hängt nur ab von absoluter Freiheit, und es könnte daher eben sowohl auch keines seyn (52), etc., etc.

The complete absence of empirical freedom is expounded in § 41, 127-132.

(1804) *Die Wissenschaftslehre, Ngl. W. II.* 87-314. See summary under “The Absolute,” Appendix, pages 150-159, especially the discussion of Idealism and Realism (*Ngl. W. II.* 170-212); of Soll (212-238); of Freedom (310, 311).

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V.* 397-580.

One of the clearest expressions of the truth that the individual, as the appearance of God, has all His freedom and power, even though being subject to empirical law, is to be found in this popular work: — It tells us that God is thought, “Das reine Denken ist selbst das göttliche Daseyn; und umgekehrt, das göttliche Daseyn in seiner Unmittelbarkeit ist nichts anderes, denn das reine Denken (418-419, 410, 411); He is our notion of Freedom: “Freiheit ist gewiss und wahrhaftig da, und sie ist selber die Wurzel des Daseyns: doch ist sie nicht unmittelbar real; denn die Realität geht in ihr nur bis zur Möglichkeit” (513). Yet He appears, as Necessity, as Seyn with its laws (403-406, 438-443), (*i. e.*, as a notion which Reason forms of him) which again appears as Daseyn with its laws (442, 443) (*i. e.*, Reason tells us that existence is the appearing of God); in this appearance is he present with his full and complete power and to this appearance belongs all that which he, inwardly and through his essential nature, is: in this very necessity is his very freedom, for the necessity is his freedom choosing to be necessity, and every individual and atom of it is at once freedom and necessity, the freedom of the Divine Will and the necessity which this Divine Will wills that itself shall be. “Das reale Leben des Wissens ist daher, in seiner Wurzel, das innere Seyn und Wesen des Absoluten selber und nichts anderes; und es ist zwischen dem Absoluten oder Gott, und dem Wissen in seiner tiefsten Lebenswurzel, gar keine Trennung, sondern beide gehen völlig ineinander auf” (443). Die Sache steht so: Inwiefern das göttliche

Daseyn unmittelbar sein lebendiges und kräftiges Daseyn ist, — Daseyn sage ich, gleichsam einen Act des Daseyns bezeichnend, — ist es dem inneren Seyn gleich, und ist darum eine unveränderliche, unwandelbare und der Mannigfaltigkeit durchaus unfähige Eins . . . (451).

(1) Was das absolute Seyn, oder Gott, ist, das ist er schlechthin und unmittelbar durch und von sich: nun ist er unter anderm auch da; äussert und offenbaret sich: dieses Daseyn, — dies ist der Punct, auf den es ankommt, — dieses Daseyn ist er daher auch von sich, und nur — im Vonsichseyn unmittelbar, das ist im unmittelbaren Leben und Werden. Er ist, in seinem Existiren, mit seiner ganzen Kraft zu existiren dabei; und nur in diesem seinem kräftigen und lebendigen Existiren besteht seine unmittelbare Existenz: und in dieser Rücksicht ist sie ganz, eins, unveränderlich (452).

(2) Hierin nun ist Seyn und Daseyn völlig in einander aufgegangen, und mit einander verschmolzen und vermischt; denn zu seinem Seyn von sich und durch sich gehört sein Daseyn, und einen anderen Grund kann dieses Daseyn nicht haben: wiederum zu *seinem* Daseyn gehört alles dasjenige was er innerlich und durch sein Wesen ist. Der ganze in der vorigen Stunde aufgezeigte Unterschied zwischen Seyn und Daseyn, und der Nichtzusammenhang zwischen beiden, zeigt sich hier als nur für uns, und nur als eine Folge unserer Beschränkung seyend: keinesweges aber als an sich und unmittelbar in dem göttlichen Daseyn seyend (452).

See also 441.

(1810) *Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse. W. II.*
693-709.

Soll nun das Wissen dennoch seyn, und nicht Gott selbst seyn, so kann es, da nichts ist denn Gott, doch nur Gott selbst seyn, aber ausser ihm selber; Gottes Seyn ausser seinem Seyn; seine Aeusserung, in der er ganz sey, wie er ist, und doch in ihm selbst auch ganz bleibe, wie er ist. Aber eine solche Aeusserung ist ein Bild oder Schema (696).

Nemlich dieses Seyn schlechtweg ausser Gott kann keinesweges ein in sich gebundenes, fertiges und todtes Seyn seyn, wie denn auch Gott kein solches todtes Seyn ist, vielmehr Leben; sondern es muss seyn ein blosses reines Vermögen, indem gerade ein Vermögen das formale Schema des Lebens ist. Und zwar kann es seyn Vermögen zur Verwirklichung nur dessen, was in ihm liegt, eines Schema. Da dieses Vermögen ein bestimmtes Seyn ausdrückt, das Schema des göttlichen Lebens, so ist es freilich bestimmt, aber nur auf die Weise, wie ein absolutes Vermögen bestimmt seyn kann, durch Gesetze, und zwar durch bedingte Gesetze. Soll das und das wirklich werden, so muss unter dieser Bedingung das Vermögen so und so wirken (697).

Zuvörderst also: zu einem wirklichen Seyn ausser Gott kommt es nur

durch die Sich-Vollziehung des absoluten Vermögens; dieses aber kann vollziehen nur Schemen, die durch ein zusammengesetztes Verfahren mit ihnen zu einem wirklichen Wissen werden. Was daher ausser Gott da ist, ist da nur durch das absolut freie Vermögen, als Wissen dieses Vermögens, und in seinem Wissen; und ein anderes Seyn ausser dem wirklich in Gott verborgenen Seyn ist schlechthin unmöglich (697).

(1810-11) *Die Thatssachen des Bewusstseyns.* W. II. 535-691.

Consciousness, upon examination, proves itself to be a Leben involving the conception of a Seyn, or God, of whom it is only utterance, image (680-685). This Seyn has Freedom (683). "Weiteres nun, als dass es sey das Absolute, und dass es nicht sey Anschauung oder irgend etwas Anderes, das in der Anschauung zufolge ihrer Lebendigkeit liegt, lässt sich von demselben in diesem seinem blossen Begriffe nicht aussagen. Dies aber ist die bloss Form seines Seyns, und zwar bloss im Gegensatze mit dem Seyn der Erscheinung. Was Gott wirklich an und in sich ist, erscheint in der Anschauung; diese drückt ihn ganz aus, und er ist in derselben, wie er innerlich ist in ihm selbst; aber diese Anschauung wird nicht wieder angeschaut, sondern sie äussert sich nur durch die mit ihr verknüpfte Freiheit. Also sein Wesen, sowie es in ihm selbst ist, äussert sich in alle Unendlichkeit fort, zunächst und unmittelbar in der Anschauung des ewigen Endzwecks. Das Leben darum in seinem eigentlichen Seyn ist Bild Gottes, so wie er ist schlechthin in sich selbst (684, 685).

The world of consciousness is the image of God and expresses His being fully; He is freedom, therefore it is freedom; it is law, therefore He is a freedom which is Law, or a Moral Will: the sight of the moral will in humanity is His immediate visibility in which His nature utters itself unchangeably in all eternity.

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre.* Ngl. W. II. 315-492.

In this treatise the problem of Freedom and Necessity is explicitly treated, and Fichte gives us his solution in the clearest terms possible to him. His statement may be summarized as follows: The world of consciousness is called the *Erscheinung* because it is the appearance of God. God is Freedom. Hence the *Erscheinung* must appear as Freedom. It does so appear: it appears as the freedom of reflection, or as the ego form (382, 488, 489). This freedom to reflect or not to reflect upon a given self images exactly God who is necessity and freedom, *i. e.*, who is and who yet has freedom. These two elements in God, freedom and necessity, are reconciled by his freedom's being a freedom to reflect upon self or not; since His self is, His self has being or is governed by law; hence if freedom

reflects upon it, freedom subjects itself to law; by so reflecting Freedom images the being of God, and becomes the world of consciousness. Now the freedom of reflection always remains. It is at any moment God's freedom, therefore can at any moment continue to reflect or cease reflecting. If it should cease reflecting the world of consciousness would fade away. As a fact, it does reflect: it exists only for the purpose of reflecting, and it chooses to fulfil the purpose of its existence: it chooses to be Holy Will. It appears as a totality of individuals. They, as isolated points, have no power, but as points of self-consciousness of God's freedom ascribe this freedom to themselves. We quote passages to confirm this synopsis: —

THE ERSCHEINUNG IS THE APPEARING OF GOD. Die Erscheinung ist *Erscheinung Gottes* (388). "Wir haben darum, was wir wollten, eine doppelte Form der einen und selbigen Erscheinung. (1) Die Erscheinung *ist* schlechthweg, und insofern erscheint in ihr das Absolute, wie es ist in ihm selber. Insofern, und wenn man in diesem Sinne von der Erscheinung redet, ist sie, wie sie ist, ganz, sich selbst gleich, keiner Veränderung, keines Zuwachses und keiner Abnahme fähig. Zu ihr wird Nichts und vergeht Nichts, und die Genesis ist aus ihrem innern Sein durchaus herauszudenken. (2) Diese eine Erscheinung nun erscheint auch eben so schlechthin, als sie ist, sich selbst in sich selbst, — diese selbige, sage ich, seiend und bleibend dasselbige. . . . Ist klar, dass in dem: sie *erscheint* sich, als Verbum, ausgesprochen wird ein Leben und eigene Thätigkeit, also allerdings eine Genesis und Eintreten in die Genesis des, in der ersten Form der Genesis durchaus unempfindlichen Seins (337, 338).

Verdeutlichung. In dem ersten Sinne und Form ist die Erscheinung *schlechthin Nichts durch sich*: Sie ist da, formaliter, durch das absolute Erscheinen Gottes, und ist qualitativ, was sie ist, dadurch Gott so ist. Dieses ihr Sein ist nun unwandelbar und unveränderlich, und kann nicht durch irgend eine andere Form geändert oder modificirt werden; denn es ist ihr absolutes Sein. Dieses, also als unveränderlich festzuhaltende, erscheint nun wieder in einem *neuen* Bilde, welches eben die unveränderliche Erscheinung *ist durch sich selbst*, und in ihr selbst, indem sie dadurch erscheint *sich*. Das Bild, das absolute, das Urschema, Schema I., bildet *sich*. In dem ersten ist kein Wandel: in dem zweiten, dem neuen Bilde von dem dauernden Urbilde, mag wohl ein unendlicher Wandel sein. Jenes ist und bleibt die Grundlage alles Bildens in der zweiten Potenz: es tritt aber selbst in die zweite Potenz schlechthin niemals ein, indem in ihr ja nicht ist das Bild unmittelbar, sondern schlechthin nur das Bild vom Bilde. (Jenes Seiende, als Sein, bildet sich) . . . Das Sein des Bildes ist Eins; und insofern starres und unveränderliches Sein: dieses ist nun zugleich ein sich *abbildendes Leben*, sich in jenem unveränderlichen Sein. Das Bild

ist in sich selbst nicht lebendig, noch selbstständig, sondern es ist, wie es ist, durch Gott. Das Leben und zwar keinesweges ein reales, sondern nur ein schematisirendes Leben tritt zu jenem ersten Sein hinzu, und empfängt von ihm das Gesetz. (Es kann nicht bilden, ausser nach dem Urbilde.) So nicht das *Absolute*, welches *in ihm selbst* lebendig und selbstständig ist, und kein beschränkendes Gesetz annehmen kann (338, 339).

THE ERSCHEINUNG APPEARS AS FREEDOM. "Zufolge der Reflexion, und diese gesetzt, erhält die Erscheinung ein absolut *freies* und *selbstständiges Leben* in der That und Wahrheit: nicht Erscheinung, sondern *Grund* der Erscheinung; (eben auf dem Gebiete der Reflexion). Diese Freiheit hat ein *Gesetz* der Freiheit; * sie soll ins Werk gerichtet werden, damit *Wahrheit* sei, damit die Erscheinung als *solche* erkannt werde, und hinter ihr Gott. Umgekehrt: soll die Erscheinung *als solche*, und so Gott in seiner Reinheit erscheinen, so muss die *Freiheit* sein: denn nur das freie und selbstständige Leben kann sich reflektiren. Jenes Gesetz * ist *Realgrund der Freiheit* † (377).

Wir haben damit eigentlich die Aufgabe gelöst: Wie erscheint die *Erscheinung als Princip*, indem wir ein noch Höheres gefunden haben, als wir suchten, eine *reale Freiheit* der Erscheinung. Wir selbst von unserm Standpunkte der Wissenschaftslehre aus erblicken sie als absolut reales und lebendiges Princip in ihr selbst. Als Reflexionsvermögen ihrer eigenen Erscheinung ist sie nämlich dieses (378, 379).

Was ist nun jene Reflexibilität und was liegt in ihr? Wir gehen zur Analyse der Reflexibilität, die ganz getreten ist an die Stelle des *Sich*, das wir vorher analysirten. Auch sie ist *Sich*, aber ein *Sich* mit *Freiheit*. . . *Sich* ist verwandelt in *Reflexibilität*; ein freies *Sich*. Alles frühere nur Hinleitung zu diesem Begriffe. Mit dessen Analyse wird die Deduktion der Wissenschaftslehre enden; wie Sie sehen, liegen darin die zwei Welten, die der *Gesetzmässigkeit*, in welche die *Freiheit* selbst mit aufgenommen worden, und die der *Freiheit* selbst (379).

. . . giebt es wirklich ausser Gott eine Freiheit, eine Selbstbestimmung aus sich, von sich, durch sich? Wir haben dieselbe schon ganz klar und unumwunden mit JA beantwortet. Bringen wir jedoch damit nicht ein absolutes Aus sich, Durch sich in die Erscheinung, die doch schlechthin *nicht* durch sich ist; also einen *Widerspruch*? Wir verlangen nur recht verstanden zu sein. Die Erscheinung ist allerdings frei; sie ist ein *Leben* überhaupt, nicht von *sich*, sondern durch *Gott*: selbst aber *bestimmend* dieses Leben *durch* sich. Sie ist darum in der letzten Bedeutung allerdings selbstständiger Grund von Etwas, das ohne sie durchaus nicht ist: aber von keinem Sein, da sie ja selbst dies nicht ist, sondern von *Erscheinungen*.

* Moral Law.

† Soll ist der Grund des Seyns.

So frei ferner ist sie nach dem *Gesetze*, das das Erscheinen Gottes ihr giebt : sie *soll* frei sein ; und alle die Aeusserungen ihrer Freiheit, die durch das Gesetz bedingt sind, und in ihm liegen, *sollen* sein. Nur kann das Gesetz sich nicht durch sich selbst zur Wirklichkeit bringen ; sondern die Verwirklichung liegt in der Freiheit. Die Freiheit ist darum eine lediglich *formale* : nicht Grund des *Was*, denn dies ist das Gesetz, sondern Grund des *Dass*. Eine Freiheit des *Was*, qualitativ, ist schlechterdings ungereimt. *Ob* sie überhaupt sei, oder nicht, hängt von ihr selbst ab. *Was* sie dann wird, und *wovon* der Grund, liegt im Gesetze (379, 380).

Diese Freiheit ist nun nach ihrem Gehalte Reflexibilität und durchaus nichts weiter : *Besinnungsvermögen* über die durch das absolut (mechanisch) gebietende Gesetz herbeigeführte Erscheinung : also Grund eines gewissen Erscheinens der absolut gegebenen Erscheinung, welches Erstere sich eben, wenn nur die Form der Besinnung durch absolute Freiheit eintritt, selbst macht durch das Gesetz. Also Resultat der Freiheit ist eine blossе Ansicht dessen, was schlechthin ist und sich selbst macht. Wie nun das, was uns als Freiheit erscheint, das Wirken, das sittliche nämlich, (denn ausserdem, wenn uns das empirische Wirken auch als Freiheit erscheint, sind wir ganz im Irrthume) : und das Höchste, der Wille, denn doch auch nur sind eine gewisse bestimmte Form der Besinnung, werden wir eben nachweisen müssen. Grund aller Realität in der Erscheinung ist diese Freiheit ; die eigentliche und einzige Wurzel des Realen in der Erscheinung (380).

Jetzt haben wir den Satz : dass die Erscheinung eben *frei* sei, in seiner Grundeinheit eingesehen und dies ist das Wichtigste. (381).

Wenn dies nun so ist, dass die *einzig*e wahre Freiheit der Erscheinung die sei, zu reflektiren : — so lässt sich dem Menschen nichts anmuthen, als sich eben *vollständig zu besinnen* : dies aber lässt sich auch Allen anmuthen. Mit jenem hat er Alles (381).

Wir sagten : die Reflexibilität, oder die Freiheit, gehört zum *absoluten Sein* der Erscheinung : und dieses ganze Sein ist durch dieselbe begriffen. Ist so sehr unser Ernst, dass wir durch die blossе Erschöpfung der Reflexibilität auch das *Wesen* der Erscheinung zu erschöpfen glauben (382).

Die Reflexibilität gehört zum Wesen : dies gründet sich auf den frühern Satz : das Absolute soll erscheinen *als solches*. Dies kann es nun schlechthin nicht durch einen blossen *Mechanismus* des Sicherscheins, sondern nur durch *Reflexion* auf denselben in seiner *Gegebenheit*, die ein Leben innerhalb des Lebens, und so *Freiheit* ist. Die Erscheinung *muss* darum frei sein, so gewiss das Absolute, *als solches*, in ihr erscheinen soll : sie ist nothwendig frei (382).

Gott macht sich nicht unmittelbar zum Erscheinenden, sondern nur mittelbar *in* und *vermöge* der Freiheit der Erscheinung : seine wirkliche Erscheinung ist ein Produkt der Erscheinung vermittelt der ihr zu diesem

Behufe einwohnenden Freiheit. Er kann *erscheinen* nur in einem Freien (382, 383).

Die Erscheinung ist darum schlechthin ein *Freies*; durch und an Gott, ein blosses, reines Vermögen, zu erscheinen und sichtbar zu machen *so Sich wie Gott*. Dieses ist ihr *ideales* Sein durch Gott (383).

So viel im Allgemeinen über die Reflexibilität als *Freiheit*, als absolute Selbständigkeit, Leben aus sich und von sich der Erscheinung (384, 385).

(1) Die Erscheinung ist *Erscheinung Gottes*. Was sie als solche ist, ist sie eben durch *Gott* selbst. Dies ist offenbar nicht *a priori* einzusehen sondern aus dem Erscheinen Gottes zu erwarten. Es ist das *Reale* in der Erscheinung. (2) Ist sie eben *Erscheinung*, nicht *Gott* selbst: was ist sie nun als solche, was setzt sie dadurch zu dem *Realen* zu? Sie ist *Sicherscheinung*, somit Reflexibilität; falls dies *erschöpft* ist, so kennen wir den Zusatz, die *Form*, in welche von ihr das *Reale* aufgenommen wird (388).

Welche Form wird durch die Reflexibilität der Erscheinung gesetzt?

(1) Sie setzt, oder ist *Freiheit* der Erscheinung: reale Kraft und Vermögen der weiteren *Fortbestimmung* des, durch ihr blosses Sein aus Gott in ihr gesetzten Lebens. . . (2) Die Reflexibilität ist aber nicht unbeschränkte, sondern *beschränkte* Freiheit: zuvörderst nicht des Seins, sondern der Erscheinung überhaupt, *also* zu erscheinen, zu bilden. Darum nicht *qualitative* (ein Sein und Schaffen), sondern *formale*. Sodann *insbesonders* Freiheit zu reflektiren; ein Bild, das als Sache gesehen wurde, durch Freiheit sich sichtbar zu machen als Bild (388, 389).

Dies ist *der Grundbegriff der Reflexion*: die Sichtbarmachung des Seienden als Bild (389).

See also 400-424.

THE EMPIRICAL WORLD APPEARS THROUGH FREEDOM'S FREELY YIELDING ITSELF TO LAW. Dass eine faktische Welt sei, hängt überhaupt ab von dem sich Hingeben der Freiheit der Erscheinung an das Gesetz * (430).

Die ganze faktische Welt gründet sich auf absolute Freiheit, und auf ein Gesetz * an diese (431).

Darum alles wirkliche Leben ist bedingt durch eine Bestimmung der absoluten Freiheit; und zwar hebt diese Bestimmung nothwendig an vom sich Hingeben, indem die entgegengesetzte, das sich Losreissen, bedingt ist durch die Hingegenheit. Auf diesem Akte der Freiheit beruht nun *alles* Sehen, welches es auch sei, als dem Grunde seiner Wirklichkeit. Aus dem absoluten selbst, dem *Realen*, geht nur hervor die Sichtbarkeit; d. i. eben die beschriebene Freiheit, und nichts mehr (432).

Diese Freiheit hat ein *Gesetz* der Freiheit; * sie soll ins Werk gerichtet

* Moral Law.

werden, damit *Wahrheit* sei, damit die Erscheinung als *solche* erkannt werde, und hinter ihr, Gott. Umgekehrt: soll die Erscheinung *als solche*, und so Gott in seiner Reinheit erscheinen, so muss die *Freiheit* sein: denn nur das freie und selbstständige Leben kann sich reflektiren. Jenes Gesetz ist *Realgrund der Freiheit*. So gewiss die Erscheinung ist, so gewiss *soll* sie sich *als* Erscheinung erkennen; und so eine *neue* Form des Gesetzes (377. See 380).

Giebt sie (die Freiheit) sich nicht hin (an das faktische Gesetz) so kommt es überhaupt zu gar keiner Anschauung (431).

. . . zu einem Blicke gehört ein Gesetz, und die Freiheit des sich Hingebens. Es giebt aber zwei Grundgesetzgebungen der Blicke, als höhere und niedere Welt. Welche eintrete, hängt ab vom Hingeben der Freiheit. Wenn darum die Frage so gestellt wird: nicht, warum ist dieser oder jener Blick *möglich*? denn sie sind alle gleich möglich, — sondern: warum ist er *wirklich*? so muss der Grund gesucht werden in der Freiheit. Sie ist der Grund der Wirklichkeit alles Bewusstseins. In ihr liegt der Disjunctionsgrund; dieser darum jenseits der Wirklichkeit: alles wirkliche Bewusstsein aber liegt *innerhalb* der Disjunction. . . . In der Freiheit ist darum das Grundgesetz der wirklichen Bestimmtheit aufzusuchen, und zwar in einem an sie gerichteten Gesetze (433).

THE LAW TO WHICH FREEDOM YIELDS IS THE MORAL LAW. Giebt es nun etwa wiederum ein Gesetz dieses Hingebens? Dass die Freiheit nicht *muss* sich hingeben, ist klar; ausserdem wäre sie nicht Freiheit. (Späterhin werde ich doch das Gesetz an die Freiheit hinstellen als ein faktisches Gesetz, indem ich den faktischen Blick betrachte als den *Schöpfer* der Freiheit selbst. — *Wie* dies? ist ein schwerer Punkt!) (The parenthesis signifies that the command of duty to reflect until freedom in God to do right for the sake of right is discovered, is an empirical fact within the breast of every one, absolutely given just as are red and green. Reflection discovers this Freiheit, whose only existence is in consciousness as a logical conclusion, hence der faktische Blick ist der Schöpfer der Freiheit selbst.) Das gesuchte Gesetz ist darum kein faktisches, mit Nothwendigkeit gebietendes. Erst nachdem die Freiheit sich hingegen und dadurch sich als Freiheit aufgehoben und vernichtet hat, tritt dieses faktische Gesetz ein. Was für eins nun? Wir haben gesehen, dass durch das faktische Sehen die Anschauung des Realen, des absoluten Von Sich bedingt sei. Gesetzt nun es sollte zu diesem Sehen kommen, das Absolute machte sich sichtbar, so müsste, da dies unter dieser Bedingung nur möglich ist, die Freiheit sich hingegen sollen an das faktische Gesetz. Giebt sie sich nicht hin, so kommt es überhaupt zu gar keiner Anschauung. Aber es soll dazu kommen. Die Freiheit soll darum sich hingegen. Die ganze faktische Welt

gründet sich auf absolute Freiheit, und auf ein Gesetz an diese; nicht zwar so weit wir bisjetzt sehen, auf ein qualitatives und materiales, denn dieses hat sie in sich selbst, sondern auf ein bloss *Formales* des Hingebens. (Dies dürfte bedeutend werden; es dürfte uns schon hier ein Eingang eröffnet sein zur Einsicht in das Gesetz einer faktischen Welt überhaupt) (430, 431).

Allgemeine Uebersicht. Wo stehen wir? Was haben wir für den Zweck unserer Untersuchung gewonnen? (1) Durch die ganze Anschauung haben wir uns gestellt in den Zusammenhangspunkt der beiden Welten, der faktischen und überfaktischen. Da wir auf die Einsicht des Einheits- und Grundpunktes jener Disjunction ausgehen, so ist dies ohne Zweifel ganz richtig. (2) Der letzte bedeutende Fund war: eine Freiheit, frei zu bleiben, oder auch sich hinzugeben an ein, die Freiheit bindendes Gesetz. Diese Freiheit ist jetzt weiter bestimmt, und ein Irrthum abgeschnitten. Sie ist keinesweges ein an sich reales Princip, sondern sie ist lediglich Princip verschiedenartigen *Sehens*. Sie ist in sich selber durchaus nicht das Reale selbst, sondern sie ist nur das aus der Anschaubarkeit des Realen schlechthin erfolgende, und durch dieselbe abgesetzte Vermögen, das Reale anzuschauen. *Frei* ist dieses Princip, als Bestimmungsgrund verschiedener Weisen des *Sehens*. (Es ist darum, dieser Ansicht zufolge, in ihm ein wirklich realer Kern, der kein Sehen ist, sondern Grund eines Sehens jenseits alles Sehens: nicht wirkliches Sehen, sondern nur *Sichtbarkeit des wahrhaft Realen*.) . . . Will man doch das wirkliche Sehen, das hier lediglich von der Freiheit abhängt, mit dem Realen durch ein Gesetz verbinden; so kann man nur sagen: das Reale *soll* gesehen werden: Die Freiheit *soll* darum sich hingeben an das faktische Gesetz; die absolute Freiheit selbst wird erblickt unter einem Gesetze, und zwar einem Freiheitsgesetze, einem blossen *Soll* (431, 432).

See also *Ngl. W.* II. 377, 380.

HENCE THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD IS A MORAL FACT. Das Sehen ist gar nicht schlechtweg faktisch, sondern es ist dies um seiner höhern Bestimmung willen: seine Bestimmung ist der eigentliche Sitz seines Seins. Es ist frei und *soll*. Es ist, wenn man so will, durch und durch praktisch und moralisch. (Dies ist die Spitze und der reinste Ausdruck des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre, zu dem ich durch frühere Sätze vorbereiten wollte) (470).

Nach uns erhält die Natur auch nur eine sittliche Beziehung: sie ist in gewisser Weise die Darstellung der Sittlichkeit, und diese der Grund ihres Seins (398).

Also das absolute Leben = A ist nicht sichtbar, ohne ein B (substantial I) im Gesichte zu setzen, was nun *lediglich* ist dessen Sichtbarkeit: aber wiederum B ist nicht sichtbar, ohne ein C (empirical I) zu setzen, das nun

abermals ist die Sichtbarkeit dieses B, welches selbst lediglich ist die Sichtbarkeit des A, das *allein* mehr ist, als blosser Sichtbarkeit (427).

See also *Ngl. W.* I. 457, II. 485; *W.* II., 87, 90, 150-157, 657, 702-709.

FICHTE'S VIEW OF THE PHENOMENON OF WILLING is clearly expressed in this treatise: its substance is that the individual, as isolated self, never wills; he is only a point of self-consciousness of the Total Will. We adduce texts:

Setze nun, das also Hingegebene reisse sich los (i. e. the individual abjures the sense-world that he may do right for the sake of right): so erblickt es sich als sich absolut schaffend. Nun aber haben wir gesehen, dass dieses ganze, hier eintretende Ich gar nichts Wahres und Reales ist, sondern dass bloss die wirkliche Anschauung des absolut Realen, des Von sich, diese Glieder mit sich bringt. In der Wahrheit schafft darum nicht das Ich, die Freiheit sich, sondern sie wird durch die Losreissung wirklich die Anschauung des *Realen*, welche durch ihr Sein ein solches Ich, in dieser Form, mit sich bringt. Also durch das Sichlosreissen wird die Freiheit abermals hingegeben, oder giebt sich hin einem faktischen Gesetze, dem der Anschauung des Von sich, wie einem andern, dem der Einfachheit und Wahrheit: da es in dem andern, faktischen Gesetze hingegeben war der Mannigfaltigkeit, und nicht der Wahrheit, sondern der blossen *Sichtbarkeit* der Wahrheit. Wie wir oben die Freiheit in Beziehung auf die niedere Welt, als ein blosses Hingeben, nannten *Receptivität, Sinn*: so finden wir, dass auch in Beziehung auf die höhere Welt, ungeachtet aller Vorspiegelung von Freiheit des Denkens, welches ja die blosser Anschauungsform ist, sie auch nichts mehr ist, denn *Sinn* und *Receptivität*. Auch diese Anschauung macht die Freiheit nicht, sondern diese macht sich ihr, nur unter der Bedingung, dass sie sich losreisse von der niedern des concreten Mannigfaltigen (*Ngl. W.* II. 432, 433).

Davon erwarten wir nun eben auch eine tiefere Charakteristik der beiden Welten (the world of Trieb and the world of Soll). Die alte ist verschwunden. Bisher nämlich bezeichneten wir die faktische als die *Gebundenheit* des Sehens, die höhere als die Freiheit; — aber die Freiheit hat sich jetzt gefunden als durchaus nicht die des Sehens, sondern eines absolut Sichtbaren, *jenseits* des Sehens. *Beides* ist darum *Receptivität* und *Sinn*. Denken und faktischer Blick, vorher entgegengesetzt, jetzt beides *Sinn*. Es bleibt bei diesem Resultate, weil wir tief genug gedrungen sind. Es anders zu nehmen, ist ein Halten auf der Oberfläche (434).

Man setze, diese Möglichkeit solle zur Wirklichkeit übergehen; was würde geschehen müssen? Die absolute Construction (explained page 482 in the following terms: "Alles Sehen aber entsteht durch eine That des absoluten Constructionsvermögens (des, das eben ist, des allgemeinen. —

Bemerken Sie wohl, dass ich hier noch nicht sage: des Ich; — haben wir so etwas als unabtrennlich eingemischt, so ist hier der Ort, wo wir es ablegen müssen) — dieselbe, von der wir oben redeten, nicht das Ich — müsste sich eben beschränken auf das Gesetz des ursprünglichen Construirens; mithin sich losreissen von dem ersten, bloss faktischen Gesetze, als das Sehen allein *bestimmendes*. Dies müsste es thun durchaus ohne ersichtlichen Grund; indem ja hier das eigentliche Sehen erst angeht, also schlechtweg. Was würde dadurch im Sehen entstehen? Das *Ich*, das gegebene faktische, ist der unmittelbare Reflex jener Construction; also dieses, seiner sich bewusste Ich würde sich erblicken, als mit seiner bekannten, schon im Bilde gegebenen Freiheit sich losreissend von jenem faktischen Gesetze, das auch als *Trieb* angeschaut ist. Mit der bekannten, sage ich, d. i. mit der in der faktischen Welt zwischen einem vorausgegebenen Mannigfaltigen schwebenden Freiheit: also mit der, die da kann, oder auch nicht, mit der Freiheit in Indifferenz. So, sage ich, wird das sichtbare, *individuelle Ich* (denn nur dieses ist faktisch gesehen) sich erscheinen im Reflexe. Wie es sich in der That verhält, sehen wir. Nicht *es* reisst sich los, sondern die absolute Sehkraft reisst sich los, und dieses wahrhafte Losreissen reflektirt sich nur als freies Losreissen des Ich (485).

Das sittliche Ich vollzieht das *Gesetz* durchaus *um des Gesetzes willen*. Der Wille ist darum lediglich Erscheinung der durch das absolute Gesetz bestimmten faktischen Ich-anschauung; der Reflex der Bestimmung der faktischen Construction (see 482) durch das Gesetz, und für uns, die wir *uns* anschauen, das Unterpfand, dass wir ergriffen sind vom Gesetze der Sittlichkeit (487).

Auch bürgt diese Ergriffenheit durch das Gesetz für die Ewigkeit und Unendlichkeit des Ich, und des Willens. Das Gesetz in seiner Einheit entwickelt nach seinem innern Wesen sich nothwendig fort in unendlicher Gestaltung, und dies eben ist das Gesetz und seine Einheit, und der Reflex, der es führt bis in die faktische Welt. Ich aber und Wille ist ja nichts weiter, denn der Reflex dieser Fortentwicklung den jene nothwendig bei sich führt (487).

See also 380, 415, 416. *Ngl. W.* III. 69, etc.

(1812) *Das System der Sittenlehre.* *Ngl. W.* III. 1-118. (See under "Begriff," Appendix, pages 182-184.)

(1812) *Transcendentale Logic.* *Ngl. W.* I. 103-400.

Logic deals with the forms of thought. Thought is, with Fichte, in its primary appearance, the empirical world. Hence Transcendental Logic

deals with phenomena, or with the form of consciousness and its laws. Examination of these phenomena shows that the only place in which the notion of freedom can be introduced is the point of transition from potential existence to actual existence, when That Which Appears takes on the form of consciousness, or the ego-form. "Es bleibe darum der Freiheit der Construction Nichts übrig, als sich zu machen zum Ich, zu einem solchen Sein, das sein Bild von sich mitbringt" (218). "In dem Erscheinen des Absoluten selbst liegt das: Ich bin nicht, wie wir wohl gesehen haben. In ihr liegt nur Inhalt und nichts weiter; in ihm nicht, heisst in der *Erscheinung* selbst, und da dies hier begriffen ist als ein durchaus freies Princip; so heisst es, die Ichform liegt in der Freiheit. . . . Was bleibt also der Freiheit übrig für die Construction eines Unconstruirbaren? Der Gehalt zu construiren nicht; denn setzest du die Ichform nicht, so ist kein Gehalt, setzest du sie aber, so ist das Bild nach dem *Gesetze*, und da hat die Freiheit ihr Ende erreicht. Wo lässt sich hier also ein Construiren noch denken? Wie wenn es wäre in dem Sichsetzen der Erscheinung in der Ichform selbst?" (219.) The only conception of Freedom which it is possible for us to entertain is the conception of a free potential Ego which voluntarily renounces its freedom and yields itself to law, or to existence as an actual ego: which voluntarily appears in the ego form, or as the world of consciousness. The ego images itself as free to be not free. "Bedenken Sie: Die Erscheinung macht sich selbst zu einem Ich, setzt sich in diese Form, haben wir gesagt. Nennen wir diesen Satz = O. Mit diesem Satze ist es nun allerdings seinem Inhalte nach unser voller Ernst, und dabei soll es bleiben. Ferner sagen wir: — von diesem ihrem Machen hat sie nun ein Bild; von *ihrem* Machen, sage ich, also sie, die für sich schon ist, macht sich; also sie hat schon ein Ich vor dem Ich, das hier gemacht wird, welchem das Machen im Bilde eben zugeschrieben wird. Jetzt soll es sich machen zu einem nicht freien, zu einem solchen, welches zum Bilde wird durch Nothwendigkeit, durch sein Sein. Also es müsste sich bilden als aufgebend seine Freiheit, also sich *hingeben* an das sich selbst machende Sein; es bildet sich also dies Ich als frei zum *Nichtfreisein*, als schlechthin sich bestimmen könnend zum sich nicht machenden und bestimmenden. So und nicht anders muss es im Bilde erscheinen" (219, 220).

This Treatise has abundant room for the recognition of God in its "Bild des Seyns" which occurs on almost every page, but it confines itself to material phenomena.

(1813) *Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseins*. Ngl. W. I. 401-574. See Appendix, page 98; also under "Begriff," Appendix, pages 184-186.

(1813) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II.* 1-86.

Consciousness examines itself by means of a series of returns upon itself, and reaches the conclusion that it is Absolute Principle of itself (54-60), therefore an Absolute (33), (therefore free). Further examination forces it to see that it is an Absolute Principle under Law (60-68). At this point the treatise was interrupted by the war and was never completed (see also summary under "Seyn," Appendix, pages 171-175).

(1813) *Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I.* 1-102. See under "Leben and Endzweck," Appendix, page 181 and Seyn," Appendix, pages 175-177.

HOLY WILL.

WE have given as the two main points of Fichte's creed: (1) that consciousness can never know God as a *Ding an sich*: instead it sees only its own conception of him, a bit of consciousness itself, a mental image; (2) that the most truthful image of God which thought, in obedience to its laws, can frame, is a notion of an infinite Holy Will. We refer to the text:—

CONSCIOUSNESS NEVER FINDS GOD.

(1800) *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*. W. II. 165-319.

Wie du für dich selbst bist, und dir selbst erscheinst, kann ich nie einsehen, so gewiss ich nie du selbst werden kann. Nach tausendmal tausend durchlebten Geisterleben werde ich dich noch ebensowenig begreifen als jetzt, in dieser Hütte von Erde. — Was ich begreife, wird durch mein blosses Begreifen zum Endlichen; und dieses lässt auch durch unendliche Steigerung und Erhöhung sich nie ins Unendliche umwandeln. Du bist vom Endlichen nicht dem Grade, sondern der Art nach verschieden. Sie machen dich durch jene Steigerung nur zu einem grösseren Menschen, und immer zu einem grösseren; nie aber zum Gotte, zum Unendlichen, der keines Maasses fähig ist. — Ich habe nur dieses discursiv fortschreitende Bewusstseyn, und kann kein anderes mir denken. Wie dürfte ich dieses dir zuschreiben? In dem Begriffe der Persönlichkeit liegen Schranken. Wie könnte ich jenen auf dich übertragen ohne diese? etc. (304, 305. See also: W. II. 13, 22, 27, 30, 35, 85, 87, 106, 111, 147, 684, 685; W. V. 453, 454, 458, 461, 539, 540; *Ngl. W.* I. 45, 78, 148, 376, 377, 414, 415, 537, 563, 564; *Ngl. W.* II. 3, 4, 383, 440, 443; *Leben* II. 181).

GOD FOR CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE HOLY WILL.

In the (1800) "Bestimmung des Menschen," W. II. 165-319, the fullest expression is given to Fichte's conception of God as an Organic Moral Will (294-319). Of this Organic Will the individual wills are members, and move and determine it (298). This popular work is so generally known that it is unnecessary to quote from it.

(1798) *Das System der Sittenlehre. W. IV. 1-365.* The pure I is freedom (1-39). The pure I is "über alle Zeit und alle Veränderung in der Zeit erhaben" (169), or a God-element. The pure I appears as necessity (46-49). The only reconciliation of the pure I's being at the same time freedom and necessity is that the necessity which rules it is one that allows the exercise of freedom, or that it is a moral necessity. The pure I in appearing as necessity is obeying the Moral Law (39-49, 49-75), or is Holy Will.

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 397-580.* God is Will: — es (das Seyn des Daseyns, Gott,) ist der stehende, ewige, und unveränderliche *Wille* der absoluten Realität, so sich fort zu entwickeln, wie sie nothwendig sich entwickeln muss (517. See 516-523).

God as Will must be Holy Will in Fichte's eyes, for he tells us continually that the will of the holy man is identical with God's Will. "So wie durch den höchsten Act der Freiheit und durch die Vollendung derselben dieser Glaube schwindet, fällt das gewesene Ich hinein in das reine göttliche Daseyn, und man kann der Strenge nach nicht einmal sagen: dass der Affect, die Liebe und der Wille dieses göttlichen Daseyns die seinigen würden; indem überhaupt gar nicht mehr Zweie, sondern nur Eins, und nicht mehr zwei Willen, sondern überhaupt nur noch Einer und ebender-selbe Wille Alles in Allem ist" (518. See 519, 522, etc.).

The same result can be reached by correlating the various statements about God which this work contains: for instance, God is Will (516-523); God is Seyn (403-407, 438, 439); Seyn loves itself for its own sake (525, 498, 517, 540-550); Seyn must be concrete law, or it would not be Seyn; "itself" is the law of its being (see under "Seyn," Appendix, pages 164-167). Hence God is a Will moved by desire for law, or Holy Will.

(1810) *Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umriss. W. II. 693-709.* The world of consciousness, or knowledge, is the "Bild," "Schema" of God (696). The holy will of humanity is the actual Schema of God (707-709).

(1812) *Das System der Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 1-118.* The substance of this work is that moral humanity is the direct appearance of God: we are constantly told that the moral man is "das Leben des Begriffs." The reading of this work alone convinces the student that Fichte's notion of God is the notion of an organic Holy Will.

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre*. *Ngl. W.* II. 315-492. See extracts above, Appendix, pages 112-120.

(1813) *Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns*. *Ngl. W.* I. 401-574. The substance of this treatise is that the *Erscheinung*, as the image of God, must see itself willing to throw forth the image of God, since God wills to throw forth his image. The image of God which it throws forth is a free will doing what it ought because it ought, or a multiplicity of egos freely organizing themselves into the unity of One Moral Will (516-574. See Appendix, pages 184-186).

GOD.

THE term "God" is used loosely by Fichte. Its three chief uses may be summarized as follows: (1) sometimes it stands for the Inconceivable, for that which allows no predicates, and is unthinkable, for that which, when we seek the cause of consciousness, we are forced to postulate as lying beyond consciousness and generating it, but which by this very act of postulating we make part of consciousness; (2) sometimes it denotes the ultimate image which reason forms of this Inconceivable; (3) and again it is used as an identical expression for those appearances in consciousness for which reason can find no explanation, as the this and that of sensation, the commands of duty, the activity that thinks, etc. Besides these technical senses of the word, Fichte often employs it in a merely conventional way, attaching to it no sharply defined signification.

We give references to the text, preceding them by a quotation which states briefly the relations of God and existence as Fichte conceived them, and which shows that for him the terms "God," "Seyn," "the Absolute," and "Leben" are interchangeable.

(1805) *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten.* W. VI. 347-448.

(1) Das Seyn, durchaus und schlechthin als Seyn, ist lebendig und in sich thätig, und es giebt kein anderes Seyn, als das Leben; keinesweges aber ist es todt, stehend und innerlich ruhend . . . (361).

(2) Das einzige Leben, durchaus von sich, aus sich, durch sich, ist das Leben Gottes oder des Absoluten, welche beide Worte eins und dasselbe bedeuten; und wenn wir sagen: das Leben *des* Absoluten, so ist dies auch nur eine Weise zu reden; indem in der Wahrheit das Absolute das Leben, und das Leben das Absolute ist (361).

(3) Dieses göttliche Leben ist an und für sich rein in sich selber verborgen, es hat seinen Sitz in sich selber, und bleibt in sich selbst, rein aufgehend in sich selbst, zugänglich nur sich selber. Es ist—alles Seyn, und ausser ihm ist kein Seyn. Es ist darum durchaus ohne Veränderung oder Wandel (361, 362).

(4) Nun *äussert* sich dieses göttliche Leben, tritt heraus, erscheint und stellt sich dar, als solches, als göttliches Leben: und diese Darstellung, oder sein Daseyn und äusserliche Existenz ist die Welt. Nehmen Sie das

gesagte strenge ; es stellt sich dar, sich selber, so wie es innerlich wirklich ist und lebt, und kann sich nicht anders darstellen ; es tritt daher zwischen sein wahres inneres Seyn, und seine äussere Darstellung keinesweges etwa eine grundlose Willkür in die Mitte, zufolge welcher es sich nur theilweise hergäbe, theilweise aber verbärgte ; sondern seine Darstellung, d. h. die Welt ist lediglich durch die zwei Glieder, sein eigenes inneres Wesen an sich, und die unveränderlichen Gesetze seiner Aeusserung und Darstellung überhaupt, bedingt, und unveränderlich bestimmt. Gott stellt sich dar, wie Gott sich darstellen kann. Sein ganzes, an sich unbegreifliches Wesen, tritt heraus, ungetheilet und ohne Rückhalt, so wie es in einer blossen Darstellung heraustreten kann (361, 362).

(5) Das göttliche Leben an sich ist eine durchaus in sich geschlossene Einheit, ohne aller Veränderlichkeit oder Wandel, sagten wir oben. In der Darstellung wird Dasselbe, aus einem begreiflichen nur hier nicht auseinanderzusetzenden Grunde, ein ins unendliche sich fortentwickelndes und immer höher steigendes Leben in einem Zeitflusse, der kein Ende hat. Zuvörderst : es bleibt in der Darstellung Leben, haben wir gesagt. Das Lebendige kann keinesweges dargestellt werden in dem Todten, denn diese beiden sind durchaus entgegengesetzt, und darum, so wie das Seyn nur Leben ist, ebenso ist das wahre und eigentliche Daseyn auch nur lebendig, und das Todte *ist* weder, noch ist es, im höheren Sinne des Wortes, *da*. Dieses lebendige Daseyn in der Erscheinung nun nennen wir das menschliche Geschlecht. Also allein das menschliche Geschlecht ist *da*. So wie das Seyn aufgeht und erschöpft ist in dem göttlichen Leben, so gehet das Daseyn, oder die Darstellung jenes göttlichen Lebens auf in dem gesammten menschlichen Leben, und ist durch dasselbe rein und ganz erschöpft. Sodann : das göttliche Leben wird in seiner Darstellung zu einem ins unendliche sich fortentwickelnden, und nach dem Grade der inneren Lebendigkeit und Kraft immer höher steigenden Leben. Daher, — welche Folgerung wichtig ist : daher ist das Leben in der Darstellung, in allen Zeitpuncten seines Daseyns, im Gegensatze mit dem göttlichen Leben beschränkt, d. h. zum Theile nicht lebendig, und noch nicht zum Leben hindurchgedrungen, sondern insofern todt. Diese Schranken soll es nun immer fort durch sein steigendes Leben durchbrechen, entfernen, und in Leben verwandeln (362, 363).

Sie haben an dem soeben aufgestellten Begriffe der Schranken, . . . den Begriff der objectiven und materiellen Welt ; oder der sogenannten Natur (363).

Fichte in attaching, in the passage quoted above, predicates to God, is not describing a *Ding an sich*, but is showing us in what form the notion "God" must appear in consciousness. We subjoin another passage which describes the action of consciousness in presenting in image-form.

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben*. W. V. 397-580.

. . . wir begreifen zu allernächst und selber nicht, wie wir an sich sind: und dass wir das Absolute nicht begreifen, davon liegt der Grund nicht in dem Absoluten, sondern er liegt in dem Begriffe selber, der sogar sich nicht begreift. Vermöchte er nur sich zu begreifen, so vermöchte er ebensowohl das Absolute zu begreifen; denn in seinem Seyn jenseits des Begriffes ist er das Absolute selber (453, 454).

Also das Bewusstseyn, als ein Unterscheiden, ist es, in welchem das ursprüngliche Wesen des göttlichen Seyns und Daseyns — eine Verwandlung erfährt. Welches ist nun der absolut Eine und unveränderliche Grundcharakter dieser Verwandlung? (454).

Bedenken Sie folgendes: Das Wissen als ein Unterscheiden, ist ein Charakterisiren der Unterschiedenen; alle Charakteristik aber setzt durch sich selbst das stehende und ruhende Seyn und Vorhandenseyn des charakterisirt werdenden voraus. Also, durch den Begriff wird zu einem stehenden und vorhandenen Seyn (die Schule würde hinzusetzen, zu einem Objectiven, welches aber selbst aus dem ersten folgt, und nicht umgekehrt) dasjenige, was an sich unmittelbar das göttliche Leben im Leben ist, und oben auch also beschrieben wurde. Also: das lebendige Leben ist es, *was* da verwandelt wird; und ein stehendes und ruhendes Seyn ist die *Gestalt*, welche es in dieser Verwandlung annimmt, oder: die Verwandlung des unmittelbaren Lebens in ein stehendes und todtes Seyn ist der gesuchte Grundcharakter derjenigen Verwandlung, welche der Begriff mit dem Daseyn vornimmt. — Jenes stehende Vorhandenseyn ist der Charakter desjenigen, was wir die Welt nennen; der Begriff daher ist der eigentliche Weltschöpfer, vermittelt der aus seinem inneren Charakter erfolgenden Verwandlung des göttlichen Lebens in ein stehendes Seyn, und nur für den Begriff und im Begriffe ist eine Welt, als die nothwendige Erscheinung des Lebens im Begriffe; jenseits des Begriffes aber, d. h. wahrhaftig und an sich, ist nichts und wird in alle Ewigkeit nichts, denn der lebendige Gott in seiner Lebendigkeit (454).

Die Welt hat in ihrem Grundcharakter sich gezeigt, als hervorgehend aus dem Begriffe; welcher Begriff wiederum nichts ist, denn das Als zum göttlichen Seyn und Daseyn (454).

This passage, taken in connection with the three preceding pages already quoted in part (*W. V.* 451, 452, 453), shows that Fichte's "Seyn Gottes," here as everywhere, is a notion, and not a *Ding an sich*. God exists only in the consciousness of thinking men (see also *W. I.* 498, 499; *Ngl. W. I.* 42-45, 78).

GOD IS THE INCONCEIVABLE.

(1813) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II.* 1-86. "Wir haben immer gesagt: Gott, oder das Absolute erscheint, bildet sich ab. Können wir noch so sagen? Nein. Das Absolute erscheint gar nicht so unmittelbar, sondern nur in der Ableitung dieser Glieder. Das Sein des Absoluten ist Gesetz für eine bestimmte *Freiheit* des Verstandes, für die Verständlichkeit seiner selbst, nämlich als Bild Gottes" (46).

(1813) *Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I.* 1-102. "Selbst in deinem Begriffe von Gott siehst du dein Begreifen: in dem Bilde seines Lebens dein eigenes Bilden dieses Lebens. Was du siehst, bist immer du selbst" (78).

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II.* 315-492. Nun erscheint zwar auch nach uns alles Sein: nämlich Gottes, und das ideale Sein der Erscheinung (das Letztere in der Aeußerung der Freiheit). Nun *erscheint* es nicht, wie es *ist*, die Erscheinung bringt das Ihrige mit hinzu. Diese Sonderung soll nun hier gemacht werden, damit Gott nach Abzug der Bildform in seiner ursprünglichen Reinheit erscheine. So erhellet recht die Freiheit als Grund der Erscheinungen, qualitativ genommen: indem jenseits ihrer Aeußerung durchaus keine qualitative Erscheinung ist. Ihrer Aeußerung zusehen, heisst darum allerdings sich in den Werdepunkt der Wirklichkeit stellen, der Schöpfung der Welt zuschauen, die hier nur eine andere Bedeutung bekommt, als gewöhnlich (383).

See also: —

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|--|-----------------------------------|
| (1798) Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung. | W. V. 179, 180, 187, 188. |
| (1799) Gerichtliche Verantwortung gegen die Anklage des Atheismus. | W. V. 258-267. |
| (1800) Bestimmung des Menschen. | W. II. 304, 305. |
| (1801) Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. | W. II. 61. |
| (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. | W. V. 461. |
| (1810, 11) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. | W. II. 684, 685. |
| (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. | Ngl. W. II. 315-492. ¹ |

¹ In this work is developed more fully than in any other the interrelation of the two spheres of consciousness, God and the world. Fichte constantly reminds us that the consideration of the one member involves the postulating

- (1812) Die Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 4, 25, 36, 72.¹
 (1812) Die Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 376, 377.
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I. 414, 415.

See also references under "Holy Will," "Consciousness never finds God," Appendix, page 123. The two sets of references, since they concern the same subject, have much in common.

GOD IS CONSCIOUSNESS VIEWING ITSELF AS GOD, THEREFORE A NOTION.

In the following passages determinations of God are given, hence Fichte is obviously dealing with the notion which reason is forced to form of God.

- (1792) Recension des Aenesidemus. W. I. 23.
 (1794) Grundlage. W. I. 278, note.
 (1779) Appellation an das Publicum. W. V. 208, 214, 216.
 (1799) Ruckerinnerungen, Antworten,
 Fragen. W. V. 348-352, 369.
 (1800) Aus einem Privatschreiben. W. V. 394-395.
 (1804) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 146, 223, 313, 314.
 (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. W. V. 406, 411, 418, 419, 443, 444, 448,
 449, 450, 452, 455, 471, 472, 475-491,
 510, 511, 540.
 (1810) Umriss. W. II. 696, 697.
 (1812) Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III. 13, 42, 50, 58, 79, 92, 111,
 117.
 (1812) Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 138.
 (1812) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 334, 339, 343-346, 348, 354,
 361, 365, 377, 380, 383, 388, 389.
 (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusst-
 seyns. Ngl. W. I. 408, 409, 420, 421, 446, 447,
 448, 449, 481, 515, 522, 530, 535, 536,
 537, 540, 541, 542, 554, 555, 556, 564.
 (1813) Einleitung. Ngl. W. I. 42-45.
 (1813) Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 13.

of the other. Since both are confessedly spheres of consciousness, whenever the name God is mentioned, there is a tacit admission that he is notion. Yet our instinct forces us to add to the recognized notion the notion of a Reality behind, of which it is notion. Hence the Inconceivable hovers constantly on the verge of the mind. It is impossible to separate the image from its reality which through recognition becomes — image.

¹ A careful consideration of these passages will convince the student that in them God is recognized as the Inconceivable: the Begriff is creator of the world, hence the plain man's God, but the Begriff is in the texts said to be only image.

GOD AS IMMEDIACY.

The Inconceivable and the determined notion of God are deductions of pure thought. Besides this mediate appearance God gives himself to us immediately at every moment in forms which we do not recognize as God. These forms may be classified under three heads: (1) our being as consciousness, or that which thinks within us, and the law by which it thinks; (2) sensation; (3) moral conduct, beauty, genius, etc.

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben.* W. V. 397–580.

(1) das Bewusstseyn, oder auch wir selber, — ist das göttliche Daseyn selber, und schlechthin Eins mit ihm. In diesem Seyn fasst es sich nun, und wird dadurch Bewusstseyn; und sein eigenes oder auch das göttliche, wahrhaftige Seyn, wird ihm zur Welt. . . . Nun aber, — wo ist denn jenes unmittelbare göttliche Leben, welches in seiner Unmittelbarkeit das Bewusstseyn ja seyn soll, — wo ist es denn hingeschwunden, da es laut unseres eigenen, durch unsere Sätze durchaus nothwendig gewordenen Geständnisses, — im Bewusstseyn, seiner Unmittelbarkeit nach, unwiederbringlich ausgetilgt ist? Wir antworten: es ist nicht verschwunden, sondern es ist und bleibt da, wo es allein seyn kann: im verborgenen und dem Begriffe unzugänglichen — Seyn des Bewusstseyns: in dem, was allein das Bewusstseyn trägt und es im Daseyn erhält, und es im Daseyn möglich macht. . . . Wo bleibt denn also die Eine, in sich geschlossene und vollendete Welt, als das eben abgeleitete Gegenbild des in sich selber geschlossenen göttlichen Lebens? Ich antworte: sie bleibt da, wo allein sie ist — nicht in einer einzelnen Reflexion, sondern in der absoluten und Einen Grundform des Begriffes; welche du niemals im wirklichen unmittelbaren Bewusstseyn, wohl aber in dem darüber sich erhebenden Denken wiederherstellen kannst; ebenso wie du in demselben Denken das noch weiter zurückliegende und noch tiefer verborgene göttliche Leben wiederherstellen kannst (457, 458).

(2) Unmittelbar mit seinem realen Seyn, und bildlos, ist es von jeher eingetreten im wirklichen Leben des Menschen, nur unerkant, und fährt auch, nach erlangter Erkenntnis, ebenso fort in ihm einzutreten, nur dass es noch überdies auch im Bilde anerkannt wird. Jene bildliche Form aber ist das innere Wesen des Denkens. . . . Es ist durchaus nichts im Daseyn, ausser dem unmittelbaren und lebendigen Denken. . . . ferner, das reale Leben dieses Denkens, das im Grunde das göttliche Leben ist; welche beide, jenes Denken und dieses reale Leben, zu einer inneren organischen Einheit zusammenschmelzen, so wie sie auch äusserlich eine Einheit, eine ewige Einfachheit und unveränderliche Einerleiheit sind (444, 445).

(*Anschauung und Denken*, or the stuff of special Sensations in the forms of thought: — red, green, etc.)

(1801) *Die Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre*. W. II. 1–163.

Das Wissen musste daher, als absolutes und in seiner Ursprünglichkeit schlechthin gebundenes, bezeichnet werden als das Eine . . . sich selbst gleiche, unveränderliche, ewige und unaustilgbare *Seyn schlechthin* (Gott — wenn man ihm doch ein Andenken vom Wissen und Verwandtschaft zum Wissen lassen will) und im Zustande dieser ursprünglichen Gebundenheit, als *Gefühl* (61. See 62, 64, 65).

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben*. W. V. 397–580.

(3) Es giebt durchaus kein Seyn und kein Leben ausser dem unmittelbaren göttlichen Leben. Dieses Seyn wird in dem Bewusstseyn, nach den eigenen, unaustilgbaren und in dem Wesen derselben gegründeten Gesetzen dieses Bewusstseyns, auf mannigfaltige Weise verhüllt und getrübt; frei aber von jenen Verhüllungen, und nur noch durch die Form der Unendlichkeit modificirt, tritt es wieder heraus in dem Leben und Handeln des gottergebenen Menschen. In diesem Handeln handelt nicht der Mensch, sondern Gott selber in seinem ursprünglichen inneren Seyn und Wesen ist es, der in ihm handelt, und durch den Menschen sein Wirk wirket (475, 476).

Die ganze . . . Sinnenwelt wird auf diesem Standpunkte (dem der höheren und eigentlichen Moralität) bloss und lediglich Mittel . . . Mittel, für ein wirkliches und reales Seyn. Was ist das für ein Seyn? . . . Es ist das innere Seyn Gottes selber, wie es durch sich selbst und in sich selbst schlechthin ist, unmittelbar, rein und aus der ersten Hand, ohne durch irgend eine in der Selbstständigkeit des Ich liegende, und eben darum beschränkende Form bestimmt, und dadurch verhüllt und getrübt zu seyn; nur noch in der unzerstörbaren Form der Unendlichkeit gebrochen. Da, wie schon in der vorigen Stunde sehr scharf ausgesprochen wurde, dieses Seyn nur durch das absolut in sich gegründete göttliche Wesen von der einen, und durch die im wirklichen Daseyn nie aufzulösende oder zu endende Form der Unendlichkeit von der anderen Seite, bestimmt ist, so ist klar, dass durchaus nicht mittelbar und aus einem anderen, und so *a priori*, eingesehen werden könne, wie dieses Seyn ausfallen werde; sondern dass es nur unmittelbar erfasst und erlebt, und nur auf der That seines lebendigen Ausströmens aus dem Seyn in das Daseyn ergriffen werden könne (524, 525).

Alles Seyn führt seinen Affect (498, 499, 517, 502, 503, 507) bei sich und seine Liebe; und so auch das in der Form der Unendlichkeit heraus tretende unmittelbare göttliche Seyn. Nun ist dies . . . um sein selbst

willen: . . . Und so hätten wir denn das gesuchte äussere Kriterium der göttlichen Welt, wodurch sie von der sinnlichen Welt durchaus ausgeschieden wird, gefunden. Was schlechthin durch sich selber, und zwar in dem höchsten, allen anderen Grad des Gefallens unendlich überwiegenden Grade gefällt, ist Erscheinung des unmittelbaren göttlichen Wesens in der Wirklichkeit. . . . Ich sage: Gottes inneres und absolutes Wesen tritt heraus als Schönheit; es tritt heraus als vollendete Herrschaft des Menschen über die ganze Natur; es tritt heraus als der vollkommene Staat und Staatenverhältniss; es tritt heraus als Wissenschaft, etc., etc., etc. (525-537).

See also *W. V.* 186-188, 210-212, 223, 224, 260, 261, 348, 366, 368, 371; *W. VI.* 368-371; *Ngl. W. III.* 1-118.

GOD AND THE WORLD ARE TWO MUTUALLY INVOLVING
SPHERES OF CONSCIOUSNESS OR DAS FÜNFFACHE.

THE thought that God and the World are two mutually involving spheres of consciousness underlies all Fichte's writings. With him each is the condition of the other, each is absolutely impossible without the other; God cannot exist without the world, just as the world cannot exist without God. This thought finds definite expression in the following passages: —

(1799) *Gerichtliche Verantwortungsschriften etc.* W. V. 239–301.

Es giebt eine Region des Bewusstseyns, in welcher die *sinnliche Ansicht* des einigen wahren Stoffes alles unseres Bewusstseyns, des Uebersinnlichen, begleitet von einem Gefühle (dem Sinnengeföhle, dem Eindrucke), sich uns schlechterdings aufdringt; in welcher Region sonach, ohne die Erörterungen und Ableitungen einer Transcendental-Philosophie, das sinnliche als erstes, ursprüngliches, für sich existirendes erscheint. Diese Region ist die gesammte *aussere Erfahrung*. Nur demjenigen, was in dieser Region liegt, kommen diejenigen Bestimmungen in unserem Denken zu, die wir in der Sprache durch das Prädicat des *Seyns* (Beharrens und Bestehens) bezeichnen; nur ihm die weiteren Bestimmungen dieses Seyns, Substantialität, Causalität, u. s. w. — Nur der Gegenstand der Erfahrung *ist*, und es *ist* nichts, ausser der Erfahrung (welches schlechtweg gebrauchte *ist* freilich etwas ganz anderes bedeutet, als die logische Copula: *ist*. In dieser Bedeutung bedienen wir uns in der Philosophie, für Philosophen, dieses Ausdrucks; und es ist nicht unsere Schuld, wenn Leute, die unseren Sprachgebrauch nicht gelernt haben, doch unsere Schriften lesen und beurtheilen) (260).

In dieser Region ist der Begriff *Erkenntniss*; und man nennt diesen Boden den *theoretischen* (260).

Neben dieser versinnlichten Ansicht des einigen wahren Urstoffes alles unseres Bewusstseyns, des Uebersinnlichen, und mit derselben unzertrennlich vereinigt, giebt es noch eine andere Ansicht desselben, die durch das bloss reine Denken.* Diese Ansicht giebt das unmittelbare Bewusstseyn unserer moralischen Bestimmung. Was in dieser Form, d. h. nicht durch Sinneneindruck gegeben wird, ist, den Vermunftgesetzen gemäss, nicht als Stoff im

* The italics in this paragraph to this point are our own.

Raume nach dem zweiten Schema zu construiren, und wer es so construirt, denkt vernunftwidrig; es ist als ein Handeln zu construiren, nach dem ersten Schema; und es kommt ihm kein mögliches sinnliches Prädicat, nicht das des Seyns, der Substantialität u. s. f. zu. Wer ihm ein solches Prädicat beilegt, verfährt vernunftwidrig. In Rücksicht des Einen Theils dessen, was in dieser Sphäre liegt, anerkennt man jene Bemerkung als allgemein. Niemand hat sich noch die Tugend als eine Kugel, oder als eine Pyramide gedacht; man denkt sie als eine Handlungsweise (261).

Aber der andere Theil dieser Sphäre ist das, was wir *Gott* nennen. Nur in dieser Sphäre entsteht uns die Idee des wahren Gottes. Entsteht sie in der Sphäre der sinnlichen Erfahrung, so ist sie ein Product des Aberglaubens und der Unsittlichkeit. Sonach ist diese Idee gleichfalls zu beschreiben nach dem ersten Schema; und Gott ist zu denken als eine *Ordnung von Begebenheiten*, keinesweges aber als eine *Form der Ausdehnung*. Man kann von ihm nicht sagen: er ist *Substanz*, oder dess etwas: denn dies heisst nach unserem Systeme, und nach dem nothwendigen Sprachgebrauche desselben, sagen: er ist eine ausgedehnte Materie, und lässt sich sehen, hören, fühlen, u. s. w. (261).

Rein philosophisch müsste man von Gott so reden: er ist (die logische Copula) kein Seyn, sondern ein *reines Handeln* (Leben und Princip einer übersinnlichen Weltordnung), gleichwie auch ich, endliche Intelligenz, kein Seyn, sondern ein reines Handeln bin: — pflichtmässiges Handeln, als *Glied* jener übersinnlichen Weltordnung (261).

Aus diesem Zusammenhange des Denkens ist die S. 188 * meines Aufsatzes befindliche Stelle: *der Begriff von Gott, als einer besonderen Substanz sey unmöglich und widersprechend*, zu erklären. Sie heisst in der Sprache des Gegners soviel als: der Begriff von Gott, als einem *materiellen Dinge* sey unmöglich und widersprechend. Möchte wohl der gegnerische Verstand das Gegentheil behaupten? (261, 262.)

Aus ihm ist die Forbergische Stelle zu erklären: — *Ist ein Gott?* Antw., etc. (262, 263).

In diesem Sinne ist die S. 186 † meines Aufsatzes befindliche Stelle zu erklären: “Es liegt kein Grund in der Vernunft, aus jener moralischen Weltordnung herauszugehen, und vermittelst eines Schlusses vom Begründeten auf den Grund noch ein besonderes Wesen als die Ursache desselben anzuerkennen.” Dieser Schluss vom Begründeten auf den Grund wird durch den ursprünglichen Verstand gemacht lediglich auf dem Gebiete der sinnlichen Erfahrung, um das fließende Phänomen an ein bestehendes Substrat anzuknüpfen, welches stets körperlich ist. Hier soll bei dem Fließenden, dem reinen Handeln, stehen geblieben werden; denn dies ist selbst das unmittelbare, ist das hier allein gültige Schema, und wer jenen

* Fichte's sämtliche Werke, V. 188.

† Fichte's sämtliche Werke, V. 186.

Schluss macht, sucht und erhält unvermeidlich ein bestehendes, körperliches Substrat für das reine Handeln der Gottheit (263).

Nun wird es jedoch, wenn von jenem reinen Handeln besonders geredet, und ihm, als *logischem Subjecte*, ich sage, als *logischem Subjecte*, gewisse Prädicate beigelegt werden sollen (welches alles man, meiner Meinung nach, schicklicher unterlässt, indem es zur Erbauung nichts beiträgt, und denn doch gar zu leicht theoretische Irrthümer und Aberglauben herbeiführen kann) — es wird, sage ich, dann durch die Sinnlichkeit unsers Vorstellungsvermögens nothwendig, selbst jenes reine Handeln auf etwas, zwar nicht im *Raume*, aber doch in der *Zeit* ausgedehntes (*auf eine fixirte Zeitlinie*) zu übertragen, um das, auch nur durch die Sinnlichkeit unsers Vorstellungsvermögens entstandene *Mannigfaltige* des Handelns darin, als *in seiner Einheit*, zu fixiren. Dieses lediglich durch die Zeit ausgedehnte, diese fixirte Zeitlinie nennt die Sprache *einen Geist*. Auf diesem Wege entsteht uns der Begriff unserer eigenen *Seele*, als eines Geistes; in demselben Zusammenhange des Denkens sagt man: Gott sey ein Geist (264).

Nun *ist* ein Geist nicht, in der oben erklärten Bedeutung des Worts; er ist kein *Ding*, aber nur das Ding ist. Ein Geist ist ein blosser auf dem soeben beschriebenen Wege entstandener *Begriff*. Er ist ein Nothbehelf unserer Schwäche, die nachdem sie alles eigentlich existirende weggedacht hat, doch in die leere Stelle des logischen Subjects, von dem sie spricht (und weit klüger nicht davon spräche) etwas hineinsetzt, das nicht eigentlich seyn soll, und denn doch seyn soll (264).

Der Satz: Gott ist ein Geist, hat bloss als negativer Satz, als Negation der Körperlichkeit, seinen guten, triftigen Sinn, etc. (264).

Derselbe Satz, als positiver, zur Bestimmung des göttlichen Wesens dienender Satz ist ganz unbrauchbar; denn wir wissen ebensowenig, worin das Wesen eines Geistes, als wir wissen, worin das Wesen Gottes bestehe (264, 265).

(1804) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314.*

Wie man das *Ansich* auffassen möge, so ist es doch immer bestimmt durch Negation eines ihm Entgegengesetzten, somit, als *Ansich*, selber ein relatives, Einheit einer *Zweiheit*, und umgekehrt. Freilich wohl eigentlich synthetisches und analytisches Princip zugleich, wie wir es von jeher gesucht: aber doch keine vorher selbstständige Einheit; denn die Einheit lässt sich nur fassen durch die *Zweiheit*: obwohl freilich die *Zweiheit* auch durch die Einheit sich vollkommen fassen und erklären lässt. Mit einem Worte, das *Ansich*, tiefer erwogen, ist kein *Ansich*, kein Absolutes; denn es ist keine wahre Einheit, und sogar unser Realismus ist nicht zum Absoluten durchgedrungen. Nach Strenge angesehen, ist in der *Einheit* im Hintergrunde, eine Projection des *Ansich*, und *Nichtansich*, die sich gegenseitig setzen, zur

Erklärung und Verständlichkeit, und vernichten in der Realität; und wiederum die Einheit ist eine Projection der beiden Glieder. Ferner geschieht diese Projection schlechthin unmittelbar, *per hiatus*, ohne gehörige Rechenhaftigkeit von sich ablegen zu können. Denn wie aus der Einheit, als blosser reinen Einheit, ein Ansich und Nichtansich folge, lässt sich nicht erklären; freilich, wenn sie schon vorausgesetzt wird, als Einheit des Ansich und Nichtansich; dann aber ist die Unbegreiflichkeit, und Unerklärlichkeit in dieser *Bestimmtheit* der Einheit, und sie selber wäre nur das *projectum per hiatus irrationalem*. Diese Bestimmtheit hätte kein anderes Unterpfand, als das unmittelbare Bewusstsein; und es hat, wenn wir uns rückgehend besinnen wollen, wie wir zu allem jetzt Gesagten gekommen, in der That kein anderes. "Denken Sie ein Ansich," hat es angehoben, und dieses Denken oder Bewusstseyn war *möglich*. Diese Möglichkeit nun hat unsere ganze bis jetzt geführte Forschung bestimmt; also doch auf das Bewusstsein, wenn gleich nicht in seiner Wirklichkeit, dennoch in seiner Möglichkeit haben wir uns gestützt, und in dieser Qualität es zu unserm letzten Princip gehabt. Unser höchster Realismus daher, d. h. der höchste Standpunkt unserer eigenen Spekulation, ist hier selber als ein bisher nur in seiner Wurzel verborgen gebliebener Idealismus aufgedeckt; er ist im Grunde faktisch, und *projectum per hiatus*, besteht nicht vor seinem eigenen Gericht, und ist nach der Regel, die er selbst aufstellt, aufzugeben (202, 203. See also 114-122, 138-148, 152, 156, etc.).

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben*. W. V. 397-580.

Wir haben sonach die beiden Stücke: — das Seyn, wie es innerlich und in sich ist, und die Form, welche das erstere dadurch, dass es da ist, annimmt. — Wie haben wir uns ausgedrückt? Was ist es, das eine Form annimmt? Antwort: das Seyn, wie es in sich selber ist, ohne die mindeste Veränderung seines inneren Wesens — darauf eben kommt es mir an. Was also ist — in dem Daseyn? Antwort: Durchaus nichts anderes, als das Eine, ewige und unveränderliche Seyn, ausser welchem gar nichts zu seyn vermag. Wiederum vermag denn dieses ewige Seyn dazuseyn, ausser gerade in dieser Form? Wie wäre es doch möglich, da diese Form nichts anderes ist als das Daseyn selbst; somit die Behauptung: das Seyn könne auch in einer andern Form daseyn, heissen würde: das Seyn könne daseyn, ohne doch dazuseyn. Nennen Sie das Seyn A, und die Form, die versammte Form versteht sich, in ihrer Einheit gedacht, B, so ist das wirkliche Daseyn $A \times B$ und $B \times A$. A bestimmt durch B, und gegenseitig. Bestimmt, sage ich, mit dem Accente, so dass Sie mit Ihrem Denken nicht von einem der Endpunkte, sondern vom Mittelpunkte ausgehen, und sich so verstehen; beide sind in der Wirklichkeit verwachsen und gegenseitig von einander durchdrungen, so dass sie in der Wirklichkeit, und ohne dass die Wirklichkeit des

Daseyns vernichtet werde, nicht wieder getrennt werden können. Dieses nur ist es, worauf mir alles ankommt; dies der organische Einheitspunct aller Speculation; und der in diesen eindringt, dem ist das letzte Licht aufgegangen (509, 510).

Um es noch zu verstärken — Gott selbst, d. i. das innere Wesen des Absoluten, welches nur unsere Beschränktheit von seinem äusseren Daseyn unterscheidet, kann jene absolute Verschmelzung des Wesens mit der Form nicht aufheben; denn selbst sein Daseyn, was nur dem ersten lediglich factischen Blicke als factisch und zufällig erscheint, ist ja für das allein entscheidende wahrhaftige Denken nicht zufällig, sondern, da es ist, und es ausserdem nicht sein könnte, *es muss nothwendig folgen aus dem inneren Wesen*. Zufolge Gottes innerem Wesen demnach ist dieses innere Wesen mit der Form unabtrennlich verbunden und durch sich selber eingetreten in die Form; welches für die, die es zu fassen vermögen die vom Anfange der Welt bis auf den heutigen Tag obgewaltete höchste Schwierigkeit der Speculation leicht auflöst, und etc., etc. (510).

(1812) *Das System der Sittenlehre*. Ngl. W. III. 1–118.

Die objective Anschauung des gegebenen Seins bekommt darum eigentlich zwei verschiedene Sphären: die des Ich, als blossen Principis aller Objectivität; insofern ist sie die Form des Bewusstseyns des Begriffs als Grund. Sodann die eines Nicht-Ich, Ausser-Ich; ein solches Bewusstseyn muss durch das Ich als Leben des Begriffs hervorgebracht werden, und insofern hängt das objective Bewusstseyn sowohl, das überhaupt eins ist, als was in demselben enthalten ist, ab von der Vollziehung der Principheit des Ich (19, read in connection with page 18).

(1813) *Die Wissenschaftslehre*. Ngl. W. II. 1–86.

1) . . . Bisher haben wir immer das Erscheinen hingestellt als *Accidens Gottes*, nur es durch den Verstand formiren zu lassen. In der vorigen Stunde blieb es uns unentschieden, ob wir es noch so voraussetzen dürfen. Entscheiden wir es jetzt eben kühn! ich sage: *keinesweges* dürfen wir es . . . (31).

2) Der Verstand ist also als letzter Grund des Daseyns, d. i. alles Daseyns gesetzt; als solchen wollen wir ihn sehen: mithin wollen wir ihn sehen als Nichtdasein, im Uebergehen vom Nichtdaseienden zum Dasein. Was wäre denn das für ein Bild? Man könnte sagen: das bekannte Bild eines *Vermögens*, einer blossen Möglichkeit, da zu sein. Wenn wir aber dieses Vermögen eben setzten als Anfang des Daseyns, so setzten wir es doch auch wieder objectiv nieder, objectivirten es, bejahend, in allem Ernste; gäben ihm darum auch wieder ein Sein und Daseyn, d. h. eben die ganze

Verstandesform der Duplicität des Bildes und Seins in der Einheit fände sich auch hier wieder ; und reflektirten wir darauf, so würde sich finden, dass wir nur ein *Vermögen des Vermögens* hätten : und da fände sich dieselbe Schwierigkeit. Diese besteht eigentlich darin, dass wir begehren *mit Verstand* hinauszugehen *über* allen Verstand, um den Verstand zu erklären ; und diese Schwierigkeit ist nie zu Ende, wenn sich nicht irgend wo im Verstande selbst und durch ihn eine Unterscheidung findet dessen, was in ihm gehalten werden solle für Dasein, und was nicht für Dasein, sondern für die Construction oder die Genesis des Daseins, welche die Wissenschaftslehre anstrebt (31, 32.)

Wir haben immer gesagt Gott, oder das Absolute erscheint, bildet sich ab. Können wir noch so sagen? Nein. Das Absolute erscheint gar nicht so unmittelbar, sondern nur in der Ableitung dieser Glieder. Das Sein des Absoluten ist Gesetz für eine bestimmte *Freiheit* des Verstandes, für die Verständlichkeit seiner selbst, nämlich als Bild Gottes. Aber um sich zu verstehen, muss der Verstand liefern ein Bild seiner selbst, und zwar ein solches, dass darin erkannt werden könne das Bild des Absoluten. Also zufolge dieser Verständlichkeit wird das Sein des Absoluten für den Verstand Gesetz des absoluten Sichconstruirens zu einem Bilde, welches als Bild des Absoluten verständlich sei (46).

Das Absolute hat sich nämlich gefunden in dem Exponenten des x als Bild (see page 47), und zwar lag es darin als in einem rein formalen Bilde, dem Reflexionsbilde, dass x Bild sei. Das Höchste und Letzte, die Basis selbst alles Wissens, ist darum abgeleitet aus dem Verstande (48). For “das absolute Zerfallen des Verstandes in eine doppelte Form, in die des Seins, und in die des Bildes,” see 48–54.

See also : —

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| (1805) Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten. | W. VI. 362. |
| (1810) Umriss. | W. II. 696. |
| (1810–11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. | W. II. 658–661. |
| (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. | Ngl. W. II. 333, 343–346, 361. |
| (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. | Ngl. W. I. 408, 420–429, 541. |

See also references to passages saying that God is wholly and fully expressed in the Erscheinung. The “Wissenschaftslehre” of 1812, the “Transcendentale Logik, 1812, the “Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns,” 1813, the “Einleitung” of 1813, the “Wissenschaftslehre” of 1813, are grounded upon the fact that the fundamental concept under which all thought and all existence are subsumed is a duplicity, a double sphere, one half of which is Seyn, the other half, Bild.

DAS FÜNFFACHE.

Fichte is fond of analyzing still further this double sphere of consciousness and of showing that it is a *Fünffache*. His analysis may be resumed as follows: — take any bit of existence, for instance, a stone: in the stone we seem to ourselves to have an *image of being*: analyze *being* and we find that it consists of (1) the notion, empty and formal, of pure being, which we fancy stands for (2) a reality behind it (also another concept); analyze image and we have (3) the general concept of image under which we classify (4) the special image of a stone. If we now reflect upon these four members we recognize that they are all images, are all held within the one mind, (5) the Ego. Hence consciousness, or the Ego, always appears as a *Fünffache*.

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 1–86.*

Nach dieser Darstellung spaltet sich der absolute Verstand zuvörderst in zwei Hälften, zufolge seines Gesetzes: in *Bildsein* und *Seinsein*. Die letztere Hälfte ist die blosser Negation des Bildseins, die Negation des Seins im Bilde und als abgebildetes, und die Form dieses Ganzen im Bilde oder nicht im Bilde Seins ist das absolute Princip dieser Zweiheit (47).

Diese beiden Grundhälften spalten sich aber wieder in zwei Glieder: zuvörderst die des Seyns: der Verstand, als Sein, ist Princip, und zwar unsichtbares Princip eines x (see pages 33, 36, the plain man's being, for example, a stone) und zwar eines solchen Principiates, das im Bilde *ist* unmittelbar, also welches als seiend im Bilde anschaut wird, ohne irgend ein Bild des *Principis*; welches *unmittelbar* im Bilde ist, *gegeben* ist, weil ausserdem die andere Hälfte gar nicht sein könnte. Sodann: er ist Princip eines solchen, das im Bilde sein soll und kann, nämlich der Exponent von x , als Bild des absoluten Seins (see pages 33, 36, 45). Der Verstand ist darin zugleich Princip der *Einheit* (Expon. $\times x$) dieser beiden Bilder in einem Schlage, obwohl das letztere, der Exponent, nicht in der Wirklichkeit, dennoch sicher in der Möglichkeit liegt. Man kann demnach sagen: x ist *an sich*, wenn auch noch nicht in einem *vollzogenen Bilde*, Bild des absoluten; da es schlechthin als solches *verständlich* sein soll. Sein Sein ist nichts als diese Verständlichkeit, und nur weil es diese ist, kann es, falls es zum Exponenten im Bilde kommt, darin also verstanden werden. So spaltet sich die Eine Grundhälfte des Verstandes, die des *Seins*, in x und seinen Exponenten; beide setzend in ihrer Einheit (47).

b) Aber auch die andere Grundhälfte, die des *Bildes*, spaltet sich. Nämlich in dieser Hälfte liegt die *Bildlichkeit* selbst; diese *Bildlichkeit* aber

ist schlechthin Bild ihrer selbst, und spaltet sich demnach in der Form des Bildseins von sich, in diese Duplicität ihrer selbst : Bildlichkeit subjectiv und Bildlichkeit objectiv (47).

Nun aber hangen diese beiden Grundhälften — mit ihren Nebenhälften wieder zusammen durch das dritte oder fünfte Glied, dass x *begriffen* wird eben als Bildlichkeit, und als tragend diesen Charakter. In der Hälfte liegt Bildlichkeit überhaupt ; in der andern eine gewisse Bestimmung der Bildlichkeit. Das Glied des Zusammenhanges ist darum die Evidenz, dass dies bestimmte = x ist Bild : die *Ichheit*, oder die *Apperception*. Dieses jetzt beschriebene Mannigfaltige, Drei- oder Fünffach in absolut organischer Einheit ist es nun, was durch den absoluten Verstand gesetzt ist, und unsre Analyse ist hiermit beendigt (47, 48).

GOD IS FULLY EXPRESSED IN THE ERSCHENUNG.

IF the two spheres of consciousness, God and the world, are thought-correlates involving each other, if they are necessities of reason which stand to each other as cause and effect, it follows that each must be the equal of the other. God, the cause, is postulated to explain the effect, and is postulated only in so far as there is effect to explain, while, on the other hand, the effect is effect of its cause only in so far as it displays its causality, it is the effect of that cause whose causality it makes manifest and of no greater cause as cause. Fichte reminds us constantly of this logical necessity.

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre.* Ngl. W. II. 315-492.

2) Aber denn doch ein *Bild* in der That, d. h. das Absolute, ganz so wie es in ihm selbst ist, tritt ein in's Bild. . . . Unmittelbares Urbild, durchaus genaues, treues und entsprechendes (334).

See also: —

(1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre.	Ngl. W. II. 270-278.
(1805) Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten.	W. VI. 361, 362.
(1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben.	W. V. 443.
(1810) Umriss.	W. II. 696.
(1810-11) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.	W. II. 684, 685.
(1812) Transcendentale Logik.	Ngl. W. I. 148.
(1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre.	Ngl. W. II. 337, 338.
(1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.	Ngl. W. I. 447.

This same truth is expressed in many of the passages quoted in the Appendix under different heads.

EXISTENCE IS GOD AND EXISTENCE IS NOT GOD. "IS."

BOTH these assertions occur again and again in Fichte's works. Yet they involve no contradiction if the meaning of the word "is" is understood in each. We quote Fichte's explanation of "is" in the first proposition, "Existence is God." In the second, "Existence is not God," "is" is an affirmation of identity.

"IS."

(1806) *Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben.* W. V. 397-580.

. . . unmittelbar und in der Wurzel ist — Daseyns des Seyns das — Bewusstseyn, oder die Vorstellung des Seyns, wie sie an dem Worte: *Ist*, dasselbe von irgend einem Objecte, z. B. dieser Wand, gebraucht, sich auf der Stelle klar machen können. Denn was ist nun dieses *Ist* selber in dem Satze: die Wand *ist*? Offenbar ist est nicht die Wand selber, und einerlei mit ihr; auch giebt es sich dafür gar nicht aus, sondern es scheidet durch die dritte Person diese Wand, als ein unabhängig von ihm Seyendes, aus von sich; es giebt sich also nur für ein äusseres Merkzeichen des selbstständigen Seyns, für ein Bild davon, oder, wie wir es oben aussprachen, und wie es am bestimmtesten auszusprechen ist, als das unmittelbare, äussere Daseyn der Wand, und als *ihr Seyn ausserhalb ihres Seyns.* (440.) . . . Zwar pflegt sogar dies von der gemeinen Denkart nicht bemerkt zu werden; und es kann wohl seyn, dass ich an dem Gesagten vielen etwas ganz Neues und Unerhörtes gesagt habe. Der Grund davon ist der, dass ihre Liebe und ihr Herz ohne Verzug nur sogleich zum Objecte eilt, und nur für dieses sich interessirt, in dasselbe sich wirft und nicht Zeit hat, bei dem *Ist* betrachtend zu verweilen, und so dasselbe gänzlich verliert. Daher kommt es, dass wir gewöhnlich, das Daseyn überspringend, in das Seyn selber gekommen zu seyn glauben; indess wir doch immer und ewig nur in dem Vorhofe, in dem Daseyn, verharren. (440.) . . . Das Bewusstseyn des Seyns, das *Ist* zu dem Seyn — ist unmittelbar das Daseyn. (441.) . . . Wir haben sonach im Denken darzuthun, dass das *Bewusstseyn* des Seyns, die einzigmögliche Form und Weise des *Daseyns* des Seyns, somit selber ganz unmittelbar, schlechthin und absolut dieses Daseyn des Seyns sey. (441.) . . .

Und so leuchtet es denn . . . ein, dass das Daseyn des Seyns — nothwendig ein — Selbstbewusstseyn seiner (des Daseyns) selbst, als blossen Bildes, von dem absolut in sich selber seyenden Seyn, seyn — müsse, und gar nicht anderes seyn könne (442. See *W.* II. 658, 659; *W.* V. 258–267; *Ngl. W.* I. 422, 423, 450–452, 477; *Ngl. W.* II. 130, 147, 200, 201, 249, 251, 258).

It is noteworthy that while thus recognizing that “is” is a term of existence and means “to stand forth in image-shape,” Fichte just as often connects it with Seyn and asserts that it is a predicate only of God (see *W.* V. 223, 224, 470; *Ngl. W.* I. 408, 409; *Ngl. W.* II. 331, etc.).

EXISTENCE IS GOD: Nun aber tritt Gott dennoch, wie wir dies oben fleissig auseinander gesetzt haben, ausser diesem leeren Schattenbegriffe, in seinem wirklichen wahren und unmittelbaren Leben in uns ein; oder strenger ausgedrückt, wir selbst sind dieses sein unmittelbares Leben (*W.* V. 471. See also 441–446, 448, 451–460, 474, 475–491, 509–512, 539).

Wir sind daher das Eine ungetheilte Sein selber, in sich, von sich, durch sich, das schlechthin nicht herausgehen kann zur Zweiheit (*Ngl. W.* II. 206–208. See also *Ngl. W.* II. 138, 300–314).

The innumerable passages in which Fichte tells us that the Erscheinung is the Erscheinung Gottes, certainly say that existence is God appearing.

EXISTENCE IS NOT GOD: Im consequenten Stoicismus wird die unendliche Idee des Ich genommen für das wirkliche Ich: *absolutes Seyn* und *wirkliches Daseyn* werden nicht unterschieden. Daher ist der stoische Weise allgenugsam und unbeschränkt; es werden ihm alle Prädicate beigelegt, die dem reinen Ich, oder auch Gott, zukommen. Nach der stoischen Moral sollen wir nicht Gott gleich werden, sondern wir sind selbst Gott. *Die Wissenschaftslehre unterscheidet sorgfältig absolutes Seyn und wirkliches Daseyn und legt das erstere bloss zum Grunde, um das letztere erklären zu können.* Der Stoicismus wird dadurch wiederlegt, dass gezeigt wird, er könne die Möglichkeit des Bewusstseyns nicht erklären. *Darum ist die Wissenschaftslehre auch nicht atheistisch,** wie der Stoicismus nothwendig seyn muss, wenn er consequent verfährt (*Die Grundlage. W.* I. 278 note).

Wir haben gesagt die Erscheinung ist schlechthin dadurch, dass das Absolute erscheint; sie ist das *Erscheinen* des Absoluten selbst. Nun ist doch aber diese Erscheinung nicht das Absolute selbst in seiner Verborgenen-

* The italics in this paragraph are our own.

heit und Immanenz in sich ; sondern es ist das ganz Andere und Entgegengesetzte des innern Seins, seiner Form nach (*Ngl. W. I.* 199).

Ist sie eben *Erscheinung*, nicht Gott selbst : was ist sie nun als solche, was setzt sie dadurch zu dem *Realen* zu? Sie ist *Sicherscheinung*, somit Reflexibilität ; falls dies *erschöpft* ist, so kennen wir den Zusatz, die *Form*, in welche von ihr das Reale aufgenommen wird (*Ngl. W. II.* 388).

See also : —

- | | |
|--|---|
| (1800) Bestimmung des Menschen. | W. II. 304, 305. |
| (1801) Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre. | W. II. 22. |
| (1804) Die Wissenschaftslehre. | Ngl. W. II. 147. |
| (1806) Anweisung zum seligen Leben. | W. V. 439-446, 448, 451, 452-455,
461, 516, 517, 539, 540. |
| (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. | Ngl. W. II. 331, 326-336, 383, 384. |
| (1813) Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. | Ngl. W. I. 199, 200-203, 481. |

"GOD" IN THE EARLIER WORKS.

THE unjustness of the charge that Fichte's first series of treatises left God out of consciouness, and made the Ego, as Ego, its totality, is very apparent to the careful reader. Fichte's earliest work as a disciple of Kant, the "Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung," has as one of its main points the demonstration that reason is forced to postulate a God with certain fixed attributes. We quote:—

(1792) *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung.* W. V. 9-174.

Das Sittengesetz selbst also muss, wenn es sich nicht widersprechen, und aufhören soll, ein Gesetz zu seyn, diese von ihm selbst ertheilten Rechte behaupten (*i. e.*, sich zu befriedigen); es muss mithin auch über die Natur nicht nur gebieten, sondern herrschen. Das kann es nun nicht in Wesen, die selbst von der Natur leidend afficirt werden, sondern nur in einem solchen, welches die Natur durchaus selbstthätig bestimmt; in welchem moralische Nothwendigkeit, und absolute physische Freiheit sich vereinigen. So ein Wesen nennen wir *Gott*. Eines Gottes Existenz ist mithin eben so gewiss anzunehmen, als ein Sittengesetz. — Es *ist* ein Gott. . . . Gott ist *heilig* und *selig* und . . . *allmächtig* . . . er muss *ganz gerecht* seyn. . . . Es muss also ein *ewiger* Gott seyn. . . . Diese Sätze nennen wir, als mit der Auforderung der Vernunft, uns endlichen Wesen ein praktisches *Gesetz* zu geben, unmittelbar verbunden, und von ihr unzertrennlich, *Postulate* der Vernunft. Nemlich diese Sätze werden nicht etwa durch das Gesetz *geboten*, welches ein *praktisches* Gesetz für *Theoreme* nicht kann, sondern sie müssen nothwendig angenommen werden, wenn die Vernunft gesetzgebend seyn soll. Ein solches Annehmen nun, zu dem die Möglichkeit der Anerkennung eines Gesetzes überhaupt uns nöthigt, nennen wir *ein Glauben* (40, 41).

Fichte's first work of importance after his system had taken shape in his mind was (1792) "Recension des Aenesidemus" (*W. I.* 1-25). Here God appears as an *Idee* whose existence is subjective truth even for himself. We quote the passage in full, as its substance, when taken in connection with its date, is convincing proof that the God of Fichte's later works did not break the unity of his system: his system always had a God, and this God was always "eine *Idee*," the activity of thought seeing itself as God.

(1792) *Recension des Aenesidemus*. W. I. 1-25.

Jene Vereinigung: Ein Ich das durch seine Selbstbestimmung zugleich alles Nicht-Ich bestimme (die Idee der Gottheit) ist das letzte Ziel dieses Strebens; ein solches Streben, wenn durch das intelligente Ich das Ziel desselben ausser ihm vorgestellt wird, ist ein *Glaube* (Glauben an Gott). Dies Streben kann nicht aufhören, als nach Erreichung des Ziels, d. h. die Intelligenz kann keinen Moment ihres Daseyns, in welchem dieses Ziel noch nicht erreicht ist, als den letzten annehmen (Glauben an ewige Fortdauer). An dieser Idee ist aber auch nichts Anderes, als ein *Glaube* möglich, d. h. die Intelligenz hat zum Object ihrer Vorstellung keine empirische Empfindung, sondern nur das nothwendige Streben des Ich; und in aller Ewigkeiten Ewigkeiten hinaus kann nichts anderes möglich werden. Dieser Glaube ist aber so wenig bloss eine *wahrscheinliche Meinung*, dass er vielmehr, wenigstens nach des Rec. innigster Ueberzeugung, mit dem unmittelbar gewissen: *Ich bin*, den gleichen Grad der Gewissheit hat, welche alle, erst durch das intelligente Ich mittelbar mögliche, objective Gewissheit unendlich übertrifft. — Freilich, A. will einen objectiven Beweis für die Existenz Gottes und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Was mag er sich dabei denken? Oder ob ihm die objective Gewissheit etwa ungleich vorzüglicher scheint, als die — nur — subjective? Das: *Ich bin* — selbst hat nur subjective Gewissheit; und, so viel wir uns das Selbstbewusstsein Gottes denken können, ist Gott selbst für Gott subjectiv. Und nun gar ein objectives Daseyn der Unsterblichkeit! (es sind Aenesidem's eigne Worte). Wenn irgend ein sein Daseyn in der Zeit anschauendes Wesen in einem Momente seines Daseyns sagen könnte: *nun* bin ich ewig; so wäre es *nicht* ewig (23).

The note to the "Grundlage" (W. I. 278, bottom) which we have quoted above (Appendix, page 144), shows beyond question that in the (1794) "Grundlage," Fichte's earliest formal exposition of his system, there is the same God that appears in the later works: die unabhängige Thätigkeit is a God who is the causal Being that must be postulated to explain existence, the true Seyn, das Absolute, as cause of all that appears.

The student should always read, as the last section of the "Grundlage," "Ueber die Würde des Menschen. Beim Schlusse seiner philosophischen Vorlesungen gesprochen von J. G. Fichte, 1794, which is to be found W. I. 412-416. In this address Man was put before his audience by Fichte as the appearance of a power behind, as the temple in which God dwells: to him the immortality and the series of worlds are promised which Fichte so emphasized in his later works: Man is the utterance of the great organic unity of Pure Spirit in which the individual is only member and which images itself in the One Moral Will developed by humanity. We quote: —

Hindert, vereitelt seine Pläne! — Aufhalten könnt ihr sie: aber was sind tausend und abermals tausend Jahre in dem Jahrbuche der Menschheit? — was der leichte Morgentraum ist beim Erwachen. Er dauert fort und er *wirkt* fort, und was euch Verschwinden scheint, ist bloss eine Erweiterung seiner Sphäre: was euch Tod scheint, ist seine Reife für ein höheres Leben. Die *Farben* seiner Pläne, und die *äusseren Gestalten* derselben können ihm verschwinden; sein *Plan* bleibt derselbe; und in jedem Momente seiner Existenz reisst er etwas neues ausser sich in seinen Kreis mit fort, und er wird fortfahren an sich zu reissen, bis er alles in denselben verschlinge: bis alle Materie das Gepräg seiner Einwirkung trage, und alle Geister mit seinem Geiste Einen Geist ausmachen (415).

Sollte ich nicht beben vor der Majestät im Menschenbilde; und vor der Gottheit, die vielleicht im heimlichen Dunkel — aber die doch gewiss in dem Tempel, der dessen Gepräge trägt wohnt (416).

Erd und Himmel und Zeit und Raum und alle Schranken der Sinnlichkeit schwinden mir bei diesem Gedanken; und das Individuum sollte mir nicht schwinden? Ich führe Sie nicht zu demselben zurück (416).

Alle Individuen sind in der Einen grossen Einheit des reinen Geistes eingeschlossen; dies sey das letzte Wort, wodurch ich mich Ihrem Andenken empfehle; und das Andenken zu dem ich mich Ihnen empfehle (416).

In the (1795) "Grundriss," *W.* I. 329-411, the phenomenal Ego has an accidental Anschauung X (392). This accidental Anschauung involves a necessary Anschauung Y (392, 393), (ego and non ego). The phenomenal I in now viewing the two Anschauungen includes them within itself (393-395). A new not-I or not-X + not-Y is of necessity opposed. Since I is accidental not-I is necessary; therefore not-X + not-Y = necessary X + necessary Y. We therefore have accidental X + Y in the I opposed to a necessary XY outside the I. Or all within the consciousness of the I is accident whose Substance lies without. Or all within the consciousness of the I is the mere expression of free powers without the consciousness. "Das heisst zuvörderst, es wird ihnen nach dem im vorigen § deducirten Verfahren entgegengesetzt ein nothwendiges Y und X, in Beziehung auf welche beide zufällig sind — die Substanzen, denen beide zukommen, als Accidenzen (396).

Ohne uns länger bei diesem Gliede der Untersuchung aufzuhalten, gehen wir sogleich fort zur oben gleichfalls deducirten synthetischen Vereinigung des jetzt als zufällig gesetzten mit dem ihm entgegengesetzten nothwendigen. Nämlich, das im Ich aufgefasste und insofern zufällige Y ist Erscheinung, — bewirktes, Aeusserung der nothwendig vorauszusetzenden Kraft Y: X das gleiche, und zwar beide Aeusserungen *freier* Kräfte (396).

Here in the Grundriss, Substance, Seyn, is the sphere of potentiality

where the Freie Kräfte dwell, the God-sphere ; the other sphere of phenomena is mere "Erscheinung," "Aeusserung."

In the (1798) "Sittenlehre," *W.* IV. 1-365, in "das ursprüngliche Ich," "über alle Zeit und alle Veränderung in der Zeit erhaben" (169), "in der blossen Idee bestimmten . . . Ich" (143), in "die reine absolute Thätigkeit" (140), in the Trieb, of which it is said, "Der reine Trieb ist etwas ausser allem Bewusstseyn liegendes, und blosser transcendentaler Erklärungsgrund von etwas im Bewusstseyn" (152), we have the God-element Freedom with its love for moral activity. In the "Nothwendigkeit" which the objective self displays (48, 49, 52, 53), we have the other God-element, Law.

The discussion of the ground of our belief in God forms the substance of two short articles which appeared in 1798 and 1799 : — (1798) "Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung" (*W.* V. 175-189), and (1799) "Gerichtliche Verantwortung gegen die Anklage des Atheismus" (*W.* V. 239-333).

THE ABSOLUTE.

THE Absolute must appear in all of Fichte's complete expositions of his system, for his system asserts itself to be an exhaustive analysis of existence. It is the central point of discussion in the "Wissenschaftslehre" of 1804, hence we give a summary of this work. This treatise is interesting in another respect: in it Fichte strives to give realistic expression to his doctrine: since he teaches that we are forced to conceive, as the reality of self, an Absolute Life which chooses to manifest itself as the world of consciousness, it is possible to lay stress either upon the Absolute Life itself or upon its manifestation; in his exposition of 1804 he chooses the former course, led thereto, doubtless, by the popular misconception of his system as empty idealism. In his closing pages, however, he acknowledges that the result reached, Reason as an Absolute Life, is, as empirical fact, a result, a concept, and therefore a state of the ego, and is produced by the free act of the ego in choosing to reflect. But he argues that since the ego is result of Reason, or the Absolute Life, in manifesting itself as the ego, its very freedom is result and therefore not freedom. There is no real freedom. "Rein in der *Erscheinung* aber, = dem mir nur in seinem *Princip* unzugänglichen Vernunft-Effekt, liegt . . . dass ich *frei* sei" (*NgL. W.* II. 311). The only reality is the Absolute Life, die schlechthin sich-machende Vernunft, und dieses Machen ist ihr keinesweges zufällig, sondern durchaus und schlechthin nothwendig; ihr Sein gesetzt, ist dies, und darin geht ihr Sein auf (308).

(1804) DIE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE. *NgL. W.* II. 87-314.

ERSTER THEIL (87-213).

Die reine Wahrheits- und Vernunftslehre (213).

We are the appearance (*Erscheinung*) of the Absolute (205-212).

(I. 89-97.) Philosophy seeks to reduce all multiplicity to unity. But that unity which includes all multiplicity is an Absolute. Hence the aim of Philosophy is the discovery of the Absolute, and the various systems of Philosophy differ from each other only in their respective views of the Absolute.

(II. 97-105.) The totality of the world of consciousness, which we will call *das Wissen*, appears as an Absolute, for consciousness can never transcend self to find another.

(III. 106-113.) But this absoluteness of *das Wissen* is, at present, merely an empirical fact, *i. e.*, we find upon empirical investigation that every fact of consciousness reveals, as condition of its appearance, the act of perception by the ego. Now the *Wissenschaftslehre* rests in no empirical fact, but seeks always the genesis of fact: *i. e.*, it believes in no *Ding an sich*, but looks upon existence as the appearance of activity, and in every existence it seeks to find the activity of which it is the appearance. Hence it cannot accept *das Wissen* as an existing fact, a *Ding an sich* which is an Absolute, but must discover some act which appears as *das Wissen*.

(IV. 113-122.) Since *das Wissen* is an Absolute and is sight, it can be only the act of self-seeing by a light (see Plotinus, *Enn. V. III. 6*).

(V. 122-131.) This Light, which in its self-seeing is our Absolute, is the pure unity which Philosophy seeks; but in being pure unity it excludes disjunction, or discrimination, hence is incomprehensible.

(VI. 131-140.) Let us now examine our result that "*das Wissen* is the self-seeing of a Light": — In holding this result we hold in mind two thought-correlates, *i. e.*, two notions, the Light and its self-seeing, which mutually involve each other and which the laws of thought force upon us. But this reciprocal involution forced upon us is, at present, only an empirical fact: we must find its genesis, or the activity which appears as reciprocal determination. This activity is the activity of thinking. "Also weg mit Zeichen und Wort! Es bleibt nichts übrig, als unser lebendiges Denken und Einsehen selber, das sich nicht an die Tafel zeichnen, noch auf irgend eine Art stellvertreten lässt, sondern das eben *in natura* geliefert werden muss.

"Hier kommt nun Alles darauf an, dass Jeder sich recht mit dieser Einsicht, in diesem reinen Lichte identificiere; wird er dies, so wird ihm nicht etwa einfallen, dieses Licht wieder zu verdunkeln, und es ausser sich zu setzen. Er wird einsehen, dass das Licht ja nur ist, inwiefern es lebendig in ihm einsieht, eben einsieht das Aufgestellte. Nur im lebendigen Sich-darstellen, als absolutes Einsehen, ist das Licht, und wen es nicht also ergreift und erfasst, und ihn an der Stelle erfasst, in der wir jetzo stehen, der kommt nie zu dem lebendigen Lichte, wiewohl er einen scheinbaren Stellvertreter desselben haben mag" (138).

(VII. 140-144) We now have the result that the activity of thinking appears as the holding together of two concepts, — pure Light, and its appearance as *das Wissen*. What is the genesis of the empirical result? An act of the activity of thinking which is a Life holding together the two members of a double *Denkform* or *Urbegriff*, pure being + image. At this point the Light appears as the product of thinking.

(VIII. 144-152) But is it impossible to get beyond the products of thinking which are only images? Can we reach no reality? Yes, we can find and we possess reality. This reality is the immediate activity of thinking, which, indeed, cannot be grasped, and is inconceivable, yet in its inconceivable activity is reality. "Wiederum aber behaupten wir, was die *innere* Existenz und Aeusserung des Lichtes betreffe, so sei diese ohne alle Bedingung, und hier insbesondere, ob sie eingesehen werde oder nicht, welche Einsicht ja es nur ist, die durch die erscheinende Freiheit bedingt ist, an und für sich, falls nur das Licht sei, dieselbe Eine, ewig sich gleiche, durchaus nothwendige. Wir behaupten daher, was bedeutend ist, und was ich wohl zu merken bitte, *zwei* verschiedene Weisen des Lichtes dazusein und zu leben: die eine mittelbar, und äusserlich im *Begriffe*, die zweite schlechthin unmittelbar *durch sich* selber, ob es auch Keiner *einsieht*, und der Strenge nach, dass es wirklich durchaus Keiner einsieht, sondern dieses inwendige Leben des Lichtes durchaus *unbegreiflich* wird (149).

Die Urdisjunction des Lichtes ist im Sein und Denken. Das Licht lebt schlechthin, heisst daher: es spaltet sich durchaus unsprünglich in stehenden, jedoch eben als Begriff vernichteten Begriff und Sein: welcher Spaltung nun die Einsicht allerdings folgen kann, wie sie ihr jetzo von unserer Seite folgt, *Nachconstruierend*, von der Spaltung eben in Begriff, als Begriff, und Sein, als Sein: doch aber stehen lassen müssend, als ihr undurchdringlich, die innere Spaltung selber; was nun erst, ausser der schon oben gefundenen, sehr wohl begriffenen *Form* der Unbegreiflichkeit einen ewig unbegreiflich bleibenden materialen *Inhalt des Lichtes* als reine Einheit giebt" (149, 150). At this point the Light appears as an absolute reality (151).

(IX. 153-161.) The Urbegriff, with its two mutually involving members, pure being (Light) and image, is now for us an empirical Durcheinander. We must seek the genetic connection of the two members, or the act of causality which results in two images: does pure being cause image, or does image cause pure being?

(X. 161-170) We first examine pure being or Light, and find that for the mind it is = O (163), hence we cannot predicate causality of it. We must, therefore, examine the other member, or image, to see if it is cause of pure being.

(XI.-XV. 170-212.) We cannot maintain that image is cause of being, or the idealistic theory, for if we do we are mere Empiricists:—idealism bases itself upon the fact of reflection, *i. e.*, it finds the act of reflection accompanying every perception, and it asserts that this act is the cause of the percept; the act of reflection is an empirical fact, hence idealism is merely an empirical system (180, 181, 185, 186, 189, 190, 192, 193-195, 209, 210).

On the other hand, we cannot maintain that being, or an *Ansich*, is the cause of image, or the realistic theory, for not only does realism fail to explain the connection between being and image (174, 175), but it accepts as ultimate the results of the laws of thought, knowing no ground for these laws: the realist thinks out his *Ansich*, using the methods of thought without questioning them, accepting the validity of results obtained by obedience to the laws of thought without seeking the ground of such validity; hence consciousness, in its activity and laws, is really his ultimate, and he is an idealist: in effect he says, "Consciousness is the only reality, and whatever it asserts must be so" (202, 203, 211, 212).

We have just said that the "being," or *Ansich* of realism is invalid as ultimate and absolute, because it is an empirical fact entangled in the relations of thought — the product of thought instead of an unconnected Absolute. If we abstract this "being," or *Ansich*, from all empirical thought relations, the objection will be removed. How is this possible? How can it be abstracted from thought-relations and yet be, when "being" is a thought-term? It can be abstracted from relations only as the being and life of thought itself, which thinks but is unthinkable: "wir sind daher das Eine ungetheilte Sein selber, in sich, von sich, durch sich, das schlechthin nicht herausgehen kann zur Zweiheit (205, 206). . . .

"Dass wir nun dieses *Wir* mit seinem inwendigen Leben selbst wiederum objektiviren, dessen sind wir uns, wenn wir uns recht besinnen, freilich unmittelbar bewusst: wir müssen aber einsehen, dass diese Objektivität eben so wenig, als irgend eine andere, Etwas bedeutet, und wir wissen ja, dass gar nicht von diesem *Wir an sich* (the objective I) die Rede ist, sondern lediglich von dem einen in sich selber lebenden *Wir in sich*, welches wir begreifen lediglich durch unsere eigene kräftige Vernichtung des Begreifens, das sich uns hier faktisch aufdrängte. — Jenes *Wir* im unmittelbaren Leben selber; jenes *Wir*, nicht bestimmt oder charakterisirbar durch irgend Etwas, das hier Jemandem beifallen dürfte, sondern charakterisirbar lediglich durch unmittelbares, actuelles Leben selber (206, 207, 211, 212).

"Ist das Sein im eigenen absoluten Leben befasst, und kann es nimmer daraus heraus, so ist es eben ein in sich geschlossenes Ich, und kann durchaus nichts Anderes sein, als dies, und wiederum ein in sich geschlossenes Ich ist das Sein: welches Ich wir nun auch, in der Aussicht auf eine Theilung in ihm *Wir* nennen können. *Wir* stützen uns daher hier *gar nicht auf eine empirische Wahrnehmung* unseres Lebens, welche, als eine Modifikation des Bewusstseins durchaus abzuweisen wäre; sondern auf die genetische Einsicht des Lebens und Ich, aus der Construction des Einen Seins, und umgekehrt (207).

"Wie in der erzeugten Einsicht wir selbst das Sein werden, so können wir zufolge dieser Einsicht nicht mehr zum Sein herausgehen, denn wir sind

es : und überhaupt absolut nicht aus uns herausgehen, weil das Sein nicht aus sich herausgehen kann (208). . . .

“Heute kam es uns nur darauf an, die, die reine Vernunft ausdrückende Einsicht, dass das Sein, oder das Absolute ein sich selber geschlossenes Ich sei, in ihrer Unveränderlichkeit festzustellen” (208).

ZWEITER THEIL (213, 214).

Phänomenologie (213, 208).

Deduction of the *Erscheinung*, or why the Absolute appears as the World of Consciousness (217, 218, 262, 263).

SUMMARY.

Division I. 212-238. “Soll” (if) as principle of the world of consciousness.

Division II. 238-254. The world of consciousness as self-creative, as ein absolutes Von.

Division III. 254-314. If absolute knowledge, which is everlasting life (289-292), is to appear, the world of consciousness must appear.

Result = the deduction of the *Erscheinung* is the showing that the *Erscheinung* is a necessary condition of eternal life, or of the realized image of God : the Absolute appears as the world of consciousness that the image of God may appear.

DIVISION I. 212-238. “SOLL” (IF), AS PRINCIPLE OF THE WORLD OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

(XVI. 212-221.) In Part I. we have discovered the Absolute, for we have found that “wir sind das Eine ungetheilte Sein selber” (206) ; *i. e.*, that Sein projects itself as the world of consciousness, as the Absolute Ego (207). The task remains to analyze the content of this Absolute, and our first problem is to find the principle of projection. Why does Sein project itself as consciousness, or reflect upon itself? Must it do so perforce, or is this projection, this reflection a free act for a purpose? (217, 218).

Since Sein does project itself, *i. e.*, reflect upon self, and since there is nothing but Sein, the ground of the projection, whatever it is, must be in Sein ; hence, in so far, the projection, though ideal, is real, and ideality and reality are organic members of the unity “Sein” (215).

The ground of projection, or reflection upon self, which is in Sein, we are now to seek. Let us examine our last act : we gained the result, “the ground of self-projection is in Sein.” How did we gain it? by projection or reflection. Were we forced to project? No ; not forced unconditionally, but if we wished to gain the result we were forced ; ah ! *if* (soll) ! con-

ditional necessity ! this is the ground of reflection, of self-projection ; Sein is not forced to project itself, but *if* it is to gain a certain result, for instance, image of self, Holy Will, or what-not, it *must* reflect. In *if*, then, or Soll, we have a principle at once problematic and categorical, — problematic as to actualization, categorical in actualization (218-220).

If we analyze Soll, we find that : — (1) Soll is free because problematic, if it were grounded in necessity it would be "*must*," not Soll ; (2) because free, Soll is Schöpfung aus nichts, Selbstschöpfer seines Seins, und Selbstträger seiner Dauer ; (3) if Soll is realized, a determined result follows, therefore there is in Soll a categorical and absolute, the absolute determination of its actualized being : if the result is, it must be in given fashion (219).

Hence "das Soll trägt durchaus alle Kennzeichen des im Grundsatz eingesehenen Seins an sich, ein innerlich lebendiges von sich, durch sich, in sich, schaffend und tragend sich selber, reines Ich u. s. f. ; und zwar innerlich organisirt und zusammenhaltend durchaus als solches (219, 220). Sonach dürfte wohl dieses Soll . . . die unmittelbare . . . ideale Sichconstruction des Seins selber sein . . . dass wir daher Aussicht hätten, an diesem Soll endlich ein Princip gefunden zu haben, welches in sich selber Construction und Sache, *Ideal* und *Real* ist, und Eins nicht sein kann ohne das Andere (220).

(XVII. 221-229.) It follows that between the Erscheinung and the inner being of Sein there enters Soll, freedom, or the form of the Erscheinung. In this middle member lies the analytic-synthetic principle of thought, or the law of reciprocal determination (226).

The difference between Sein and Soll is that Sein is a von sich u. s. w., while Soll is a von sich u. s. w. *als* solches, *i. e.*, Sein is reality, Soll is only image of reality: Sein acts and is, Soll *sees* activity and is as if it were (228; 229).

(XVIII. 229-238.) Soll says, "if a given result is to follow, there must, etc.": here we are in the region of ideality, of concept: but if Soll realizes itself, the given result follows as a reality; hence the complete and realized Soll involves, as its two members, the ideal and the real (230, 231).

In Soll we shall find the genesis of consciousness, or the reason why the Absolute projects itself in image-form as the Absolute Ego (231, 232).

We are realists because we see that it is Sein in and von sich that projects itself, *i. e.*, an independent Sein; we are idealists because we *see* it, because we know that we are Sein seeing self (234-236).

(XIX. 238-245.) We have found in Soll the contradiction that, while asserting a certain existence as problematic, it at the same time gives the

existence as categorical, *i. e.*, when we say, "if we are to gain a given result we must, etc.," the given result, which is assumed as non-existing, already has fully determined existence in the mind. This same contradiction meets us in consciousness: any theory which we advance as to the genesis of consciousness involves the existence of consciousness as the condition of the theory (238, 239).

In another aspect Soll is fitting type of consciousness: it seeks as end reality for a given concept; the end of conscious life is to give real existence to its higher ideals (239).

DIVISION II. 238-254. THE WORLD OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-CREATIVE,
AS EIN ABSOLUTES VON.

The contradiction mentioned above cannot lie in Sein, for Sein is indivisible unity; it must lie in the imaging of Sein. Since this imaging leaves the content unaltered it must be ungrounded or free; this freedom contradicts the absolute necessity which we have found in Sein, and we have as future task the reconciliation of freedom and necessity (239, 240).

It now devolves upon us to demonstrate the validity of causality, for our whole argument is founded upon causality. Our argument to this point may be summarized as follows: — we found that the data of consciousness, when abstracted from content, and inter-relation, and multiplicity, remain as facts of consciousness, *i. e.*, the ultimate existence of each datum is existence as a state of the ego: the ultimate after all possible abstraction is the ego or das Wissen; hence das Wissen is an absolute; but if das Wissen is an absolute and can find no other than self, its cause can be no other than self, therefore it must be self-created, *causa sui*, ein Vonsich (240), ein absolutes Von (246, 247). — In this argument it is assumed that there must be some cause for existence, and if no other cause can be found, existence must be *causa sui*; in other words, the universality and validity of causality is assumed. Suppose our opponent bid us rest satisfied with the categorical "it is" of existence, and not concern ourselves with causality, with a Von (241). We reply that we are well aware that causality and creation exist only in thought, and the very fact that we are able to think about the cause of the objective world proves that this objective world is a thought-world: if it were something foreign to thought lying outside it, we could never speculate about its cause. The ineradicable tendency of the mind to predicate cause and effect of the sense world proves that the sense-world is one aspect of a thought-world. Thought, as the Absolute Ego, as the one and only Thinking which manifests itself in us, is all that there is, and if this Thinking think causality, causality is valid, for the only test of validity is the one absolute Thinking (241-245).

(XX. 245-254.) Our present doctrine is : — (1) Causality and creation are not extra-mentem facts, they lie only in Wissen ; (2) since Wissen is causality and creation, we may call it ein absolutes Von ; (3) Wissen, in its assertion of causality and creation, is trustworthy, for Wissen is what it knows itself to be (246, 247). Our argument may be formulated as follows : —

All existence has a cause, either self or as other.

Wissen is an existence whose cause is not another.

Hence Wissen is causa sui, a Vonsich, ein absolutes Von (247, 248).

Our conclusion "Wissen is ein absolutes Von," becomes a new premise from which to draw further conclusions (248).

If the question is asked, "Why is Wissen an absolutes Von instead of something else? we reply that Wissen in its qualitative and material determinations is, of necessity, incomprehensible (this incomprehensibility is the necessary condition of comprehension as its inseparable opposite). Even if we could understand Wissen in its qualitative absoluteness we should not have compassed universal comprehension ; for if the incomprehensible hid itself no longer in the known, it would still lurk in the knower, in the unseen and unseizable seer who ever eludes. Wissen is the cause of cause, hence it is absurd to ask the cause of Wissen (249).

Von includes two members, cause and effect ; hence Wissen, which is a Von, must appear as a duality, as subject and object : in the ignorant disjunction of the two members of the organic unity Von, we have the origin of the dead "is," *i. e.*, of the conception of an extra-mentem world of matter (250-254).

DIVISION III. (254-314). IF ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE, WHICH IS EVERLASTING LIFE, IS TO APPEAR, THE WORLD OF CONSCIOUSNESS MUST APPEAR.

Genesis of Sein. XXI.-XXIV. 254-278.

We have been describing Wissen as a Von, but we must not forget that Wissen is only presupposed : — we say "if there is a Wissen, it must be ein absolutes Von, genesis, causality, self-creation" (254).

This Soll has seemed to us a possible principle of the Erscheinung for reasons already given. Soll is, in its inner being, genesis, *i. e.*, it implies that something does not yet exist, seeks the condition of its existence, and thereby demands its real existence, hence it involves real and ideal (254-259).

Accepting empirical perception as self-genesis, *i. e.*, as the constant activity of appearing as an ungrounded qualitative absolute in consciousness, we are forced by the laws of thought to postulate a principle of this genesis,

or to reduce it to not-genesis, or being. This act of thought is the genesis of the plain man's Sein (259-270).

We accept this conclusion as certain because we are certain of the validity of the results of the laws of thought. Upon what is certainty grounded? How is mental certainty justifiable? The ground of certainty is that certainty is a life which projects itself as it is inwardly, sees the exact projection, therefore is certain of what it sees: *i. e.*, certainty is the Absolute seeing self as it really is, knowing that there is no Other to invalidate, and accepting implicitly what it sees: the mind is certain of the results of the laws of thought, because these laws and their results are the ultimates of existence, therefore there is no power which can controvert them (270-276).

The fact that the ego sees only self elucidates an important point, — the apparent hiatus between the real and the ideal: in the objective world the ego sees self, but self is an absolute, hence the objective world must seem independent and unconnected (276-278).

Freedom and Necessity. XXIV., XXV. 278-292.

If we are asked to justify our statement that the ego projects and sees self we reply that if the ego predicates anything of itself it must project itself per hiatum, or appear as subject and object (278, 279).

Here again we give problematic proof: — “*if . . . so must . . .*” In this formula we have a union of freedom and necessity: — the ego is not forced to predicate of itself, therefore there is freedom, but if it does, necessity governs the result: whether or not there shall be any result is a matter of freedom; but if there is a result it is governed by the law that it shall be subject to law. This law that there shall be law we may call the absolute law (280-285).

But how is it possible that law should reign in the world of consciousness, when this world is made up wholly of images, and images are the result of the freedom of the ego? The very law of which we are talking is only image of law (285, 286).

The fact that we recognize image *as* image proves that in the image is law controlling and shaping it: if the image were not true to the law of image we should never know it to be an image: the fact that the world in which we live is a world of knowledge, of consciousness, proves that it is a world of law (286, 287).

We see now what the world of the Wissenschaftslehre is: it is not a world of capricious images or a world of Dinge an sich, but a world of images shaped by law, a world created by the interpenetration of freedom and necessity (287).

Bird's eye view of rest of system (288-292).

Genesis of Absolutes Sein. XXVI. 292-300.

If the world of consciousness is a world of images it postulates the reality of which it is image, or absolutes Sein (294, 295). But this Sein is, of course, not an extra-mentem existence: it is the Sein of consciousness, its own higher Sein, in comparison with which it denies that its lower existence has reality: it is its ideal, of which it predicates reality, and before which it asserts the nullity of its material existence (295). Hence consciousness sees itself as absolutes Sein.

Consciousness is ground of its own existence. XXVII. 300-307.

If consciousness sees itself, has an image of itself, this act of seeing, this image, involves the actual existence of consciousness. Here the ontological proof is admissible, and concept involves actual existence for consciousness is the act of seeing, and if there is the seeing, the act, or consciousness, exists: the act of seeing, or consciousness, is the ground of consciousness: in the assertion of seeing lies the inwardly grounded existence and life of consciousness (301-307).

Deduction of the Erscheinung. XXVIII. 308-314.

Our present result is that consciousness sees itself as the ground of its own existence. In this result we have not reached unity, or the goal of Philosophy, for consciousness is divided into subject and object (308). We get unity by viewing consciousness as the act which makes itself into subject viewing object. "Die Vernunft macht sich selber schlechthin intuierend. . . . In diesem sich schlechthin, in wirklicher Lebendigkeit und Existenz intuierend Machen besteht nun das rein an sich klare und durchsichtige Licht (= Vernunft), erhaben über alle *objectivirende* Intuition, als selber ihr Grund, und füllt nun durchaus den Hiatus zwischen Object und Subject, vernichtet daher beide (308, 309).

In this view, though empirically we do objectify consciousness, we abstract from objectivity (310).

If we objectify consciousness we regard this act of reflection as a free act and the resulting objective concept of consciousness as a state of the ego. This free act with the ensuing state is the result of the ego, but the ego is the result of the activity which manifests itself as an ego, hence the free act is result and not free. "Rein in der *Erscheinung* aber, = dem mir nur in seinem *Princip* unzugänglichen Vernunft-Effekt, liegt . . . das sich *frei* sei" (311).

The world of consciousness now appears as a unity. But the condition of unity is multiplicity, hence if the view of consciousness as the unity of die schlechthin sich-machende Vernunft is to be reached, the multiplicity of empirical consciousness must exist: *i. e.*, the *Erscheinung* is the condition of the appearance of Absolute Knowledge (311).

One of the chief difficulties with which the student of Fichte has to contend is Fichte's loose use of language. We give a few of his apparently contradictory statements about the Absolute.

THE ABSOLUTE IS FREEDOM: "So nicht das *Absolute*, welches in ihm selbst lebendig und selbstständig ist, und kein beschränkendes Gesetz annehmen kann (*Ngl. W.* II. 339; *W.* II. 113, 114).

THE ABSOLUTE IS NECESSITY: Sie kann nicht nicht sein, so gewiss das Absolute nicht nicht sein kann (*Ngl. W.* I. 408).

One of the ends of the *Darstellung* of 1801 is to set forth "das absolute Seyn" as necessity (*W.* II. 1-163).

THE ABSOLUTE IS BOTH FREEDOM AND NECESSITY. Denke sich der Leser zuvörderst das *Absolute*, schlechthin als solches, so wie oben sein Begriff bestimmt worden. Er wird finden, behaupten wir, dass er es nur unter folgenden zwei Merkmalen denken könne, theils dass es sey schlechthin, *was* es sey, auf und in sich selbst ruhe durchaus ohne Wandel und Wanken, fest, vollendet und in sich geschlossen, theils, dass es sey, was es sey, schlechthin *weil* es sey, von sich selbst, und durch sich selbst, ohne allen fremden Einfluss, indem neben dem Absoluten gar kein Fremdes übrig bleibt, sondern alles, was nicht das Absolute selbst ist verschwindet. . . . Wir können das erstere absolute Bestehen, ruhendes Seyn u. s. w. nennen; das letztere absolute Werden oder Freiheit (*W.* II. 16, 17, 22, 30).

THE ABSOLUTE IS NEITHER FREEDOM NOR NECESSITY. Also diese Freiheit, durch welche der Mensch, als faktisches Selbstbewusstsein, zur Sittlichkeit kommt, liegt weder im Ich, welches tief unter ihr steht, indem dieses Bild erst durch jene gebildet, und so das Ich, durch die Entwicklung des Lebens erst sich als frei erscheinen kann: noch auch liegt sie im *Absoluten*, in Gott, welches *über* ihr steht, höher denn sie; sondern sie liegt in der Form der Erscheinung selbst. . . . Wie steht es denn also? Gott liegt über alle Erscheinung hinaus, also auch über die Freiheit, die ja zur Erscheinung gehört; also die Erscheinung selbst ist dies Princip der Freiheit: ihr frei sich entwickelndes Leben ist es, welches im Individuum aus der Sinnlichkeit zur Sittlichkeit sich erhebt (*Ngl. W.* I. 414, 415. See also 423, 447, 448, 537, etc.).

Indem es (das Reale in der Erscheinung) aber *erblickt* wird und in seiner Beziehung auf das sich selbst erblickende Vermögen (das Ich) erblickt wird, bricht nach darzulegenden Gesetzen jene Einheit sich in eine Mannichfaltigkeit; der *Zusammenhang* aber dieses Mannichfaltigen (vermittelt dessen allein die Rückkehr des Blicks auf die Einheit möglich ist) ist die *Nothwendigkeit*. Und so ist denn alle Nothwendigkeit durchaus nichts Reales, sondern nur die Anschauungsform des einen wahrhaft Realen in der Erscheinung (*Leben* II. 181, etc.).

THE ABSOLUTE IS GOD. Gott, oder das Absolute *ist* und nur er ist (*Ngl. W. I.* 408, 414; *Ngl. W. II.* 13, 46; *W. II.* 61; *W. V.* 443, 452, 510; *W. VI.* 361).

THE ABSOLUTE IS A FORM OF THOUGHT. Sonach sind die beiden hier aufgezeigten Qualitäten: Seyn und Freiheit, die höchsten und absoluten Qualitäten. Daher kam es auch, dass wir sie oben als nicht weiter aufzulösende oder zu vereinigende Qualitäten *des Absoluten* fanden, welches letztere wohl selbst nichts Anderes seyn dürfte, als die Vereinigung der beiden Urqualitäten in der formellen Einheit des Denkens (*W. II.* 30, 13, 16, 17, 60, 63, 64, etc.).

All through the "Darstellung" of 1801 (*W. II.* 1-163), the terms the Absolute (60-63), Absolute Being (60), Pure Thinking (39, 40, 68), Bound Thinking (49-51, 54-56, 59, 60, 64, etc.), and Absolute Thinking (40, 43, 47, 50, 53) are interchanged.

THE ABSOLUTE IS UNKNOWABLE. Wir begreifen immer das Absolute; denn ausser ihm ist nichts Begreifbares, und wir begreifen dennoch, dass wir es nie völlig begreifen werden; denn zwischen ihm und dem Wissen liegt die unendliche Quantitabilität (*W. II.* 106).

(3) Nun aber erhebt sich das Wissen über sich selbst und diese Welt, und erst da, jenseits der Welt, ist es Wissen. Die Welt, die man nicht will, fügt sich nur ohne sein Zuthun hinzu. Jenseits jener Unmittelbarkeit aber, worauf ruht da das Wissen? Auch nicht auf dem absoluten Seyn, sondern auf einer Bestimmung der — nicht formalen, wie sich versteht, denn diese ist durchaus unbestimmbar, sondern — der *absolut realen* Freiheit durch das absolute Seyn. Das Höchste demnach ist ein synthetisches Denken (eben der Sitz der höchsten Substantialität) in welchem das absolute Seyn, nicht *für sich*, sondern als ein bestimmendes — als absolute Substanz, welches ja schon eine Form des Wissens als Denkens ist, — und als absoluter Grund, welcher dasselbe ist, vorkommt. Selbst das absolute Wissen weiss daher nur mittelbar vom ihm, dem Seyn (*W. II.* 87, 13, 30, 70, 71, 85, 111, 684, 685).

THE ABSOLUTE EXPRESSES ITS WHOLE NATURE IN THE ERSCHEINUNG (see Appendix, page 142).

THE ABSOLUTE IS NOT KNOWLEDGE. Das Absolute ist weder Wissen, noch ist es Seyn, noch ist es Identität, noch ist es Indifferenz beider, sondern es ist durchaus bloss und lediglich das Absolute (*W. II.* 13, 22, 27).

THE ABSOLUTE IS KNOWLEDGE. Oder, denke nochmals das Absolute so wie es oben beschrieben worden. Es ist schlechthin, was es ist, und ist dieses schlechthin, weil es ist. Aber dadurch ist ihm noch immer kein Auge eingesetzt, und wenn du nun fragest, für *wen* es sey . . . so magst du dich nur nach einem Auge ausser ihm umsehen; und wenn wir dir dieses Auge auch in der That schenken wollten, wie wir doch nicht können,

so wirst du ferner die Verbindung desselben mit jenem Absoluten nimmer erklären, sondern sie nur in den Tag hinein behaupten. Aber dieses Auge liegt nicht ausser ihm, sondern in ihm, und ist eben das lebendige sich Durchdringen der Absolutheit selbst (*W. II. 19*).

ABSOLUTE BEING IS LAW. Das Absolute Seyn ist im Wissen Gesetz (*W. II. 108, 64; Ngl. W. II. 46, 48*).

ABSOLUTE BEING IS THE GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE. Was da gewusst wird, hängt durchaus von der Freiheit ab; dass aber irgend *etwas* sey, und wenn es zu einem *Diesem* kommt, das es *gewusst* werde (völlig auf- und eingehe ins Wissen) ist gegründet im absoluten Seyn (*W. II. 111. Ngl. W. I. 200*).

ABSOLUTE BEING IS NOT THE GROUND OF KNOWLEDGE. Dies gäbe nun das Eine, unendliche *Wissen*, das ganze Accidens des absoluten Seyns. Aus dem Seyn geht durchaus weder die Möglichkeit noch Wirklichkeit des Wissens, wie es nach Spinoza seyn müsste, sondern auf den Fall seiner Wirklichkeit nur seine *Bestimmtheit überhaupt* hervor (*W. II. 109*).

THE ABSOLUTE IS PURE THOUGHT. Wir haben ausser dem zu Anfange aufgestellten Begriffe des Absoluten, während der letzteren Untersuchungen einen noch schärferen von der Form des Absoluten uns errungen: den, dass es, in Beziehung auf ein mögliches Wissen, ein reines, durchaus und schlechthin gebundenes Denken sey (*W. II. 60*).

THE ABSOLUTE IS CONTENT OF THE ERSCHEINUNG (QUALITATIVE SENSATIONS). In welcher Rücksicht nun die Erscheinung an sich sei, ist aus dem Obigen auch schon klar: in Rücksicht ihres Inhaltes nämlich, mit absoluter Abstraktion von der Form ihres Seins, dass sie nicht ist das Absolute selbst, sondern nur seine Erscheinung, welches nur in einem Gegensatz mit dem Sein, und darum in einem absoluten Bilde möglich ist, wovon wir jetzt noch nicht reden, sondern nur von ihrem Inhalte. Dieser Inhalt ist nun schlechthin, wie er ist, nicht durch die Erscheinung oder ihre Form, sondern durch das Absolute, indem er dessen Inhalt selbst ist, und Erscheinung ist er nur dadurch, dass er ist in dieser Form, nicht das *innere* Sein des Absoluten selbst, sondern sein Erscheinen, was dermalen uns Nichts angeht. Dieser Inhalt nun ist offenbar nicht begründet durch irgend ein Bild, nicht abzuleiten und modificirt aus irgend einem Bilde, sondern er ist, als Sein der Erscheinung, und innerer Grund und Boden derselben, durchaus absolut, ihre *Substanz* (obwohl, wenn an sie selbst der Satz des Grundes angelegt wird, sie nicht in sich begründet ist, sondern in dem Erscheinen des Absoluten, was aber hier, wo von dem Sein der Erscheinung *an sich* die Rede ist abgehalten werden muss). (*Ngl. W. I. 200, 201; W. II. 61*).

THE ABSOLUTE HAS NOTHING OUTSIDE IT. *Absolute* heisst: durchaus Nichts dem Verstande *vorausgesetzt*, Nichts neben ihn gesetzt, Nichts mit ihm in Verbindung gebracht, sondern ihn genommen als schlechthin und

durchaus ruhend auf sich selbst, als Selbstständigkeit, Immanenz in sich (*Ngl. W. II. 33; W. II. 16, 17, 19*).

THE ABSOLUTE HAS SOMETHING OUTSIDE IT. Also — ausser dem Absoluten ist da, *weil* es nun einmal da ist, sein Bild. Ist der absolut bejahende Satz der Wissenschaftslehre, von dem sie aufgeht: ihre eigentliche Seele (*Ngl. W. II. 333, 326–337; Ngl. W. I. 408, 409; W. II. 696*).

These apparently contradictory statements are always reconciled when we understand what Fichte means by the Absolute in the paragraphs under consideration: — sometimes it stands for the sphere of consciousness which we have called God, Being, etc.; sometimes it denotes both spheres of consciousness, the mind in its widest circumference viewing itself as Knowledge springing from Not-Knowledge; and again it signifies the Inconceivable which manifests itself in the totality of consciousness. In all cases, if we know from what point of view Fichte is looking we find his statement logical, and only another aspect of that which seems to contradict it.

SEYN.

THE word "Seyn" is often used by Fichte in its ordinary sense, i. e. to denote the plain man's "being." In such cases Fichte usually proceeds to show that Seyn is merely the concept of Seyn.

The truly Fichtean meaning of the word, as we have already seen, is something entirely different:— it denotes that which Fichte thinks we are forced to postulate as cause of existence, God, or the Divine Being. When this causal sphere is divided into its two elements, Freedom and Law, Law is often spoken of as "das absolute Seyn," or, more simply, "Seyn."

We point out the special use of the word in the various treatises:—

(1794) *Grundlage*. W. I. 278, note; see Appendix, page 144. Here "absolutes Seyn" is evidently an equivalent for God.

(1797) *Zweite Einleitung*. W. I. 451-518. In whatever sense Fichte uses the word "Seyn," he never means that it shall be thought of as a Ding an sich: it is always a logical conclusion of the Ego, created by its activity and existing as a part of its consciousness. In this work the opponent is supposed to ask, "Wenn ihr von keinem Seyn ausgeht, wie mögt ihr doch, ohne inconsequent zu verfahren, ein Sein ableiten können? Fichte says, Ich antworte: es wird auch allerdings kein Seyn abgeleitet in dem Sinne, wie ihr das Wort zu nehmen pflegt: kein *Seyn an sich*. Was der Philosoph vor sich nahm, ist ein nach Gesetzen Handelndes: und was er aufstellt, ist die Reihe der nothwendigen Handlungen dieses Handelnden. Unter diesen Handlungen kommt auch eine vor, welche dem Handelnden selbst als ein Seyn erscheint, und, nach aufzuweisenden Gesetzen, ihm nothwendig so erscheinen muss. Dem Philosophen, der von einem höheren Gesichtspuncte zusieht, ist es und bleibt es ein Handeln. Ein Seyn ist lediglich für das beobachtete Ich; dieses denkt realistisch: für den Philosophen ist Handeln, und nichts als Handeln; denn er denkt, als Philosoph, idealistisch (498).

Dass ich es bei dieser Veranlassung einmal ganz klar sage: darin besteht das Wesen des transcendentalen Idealismus überhaupt, und das der Darstellung in der Wissenschaftslehre insbesondere, dass der Begriff des Seyns gar nicht als ein *erster* und *ursprünglicher* Begriff angesehen, sondern lediglich als ein *abgeleiteter*, und zwar durch Gegensatz der Thätigkeit abgeleiteter,

also nur als ein *negativer* Begriff betrachtet wird. Das einzige positive ist dem Idealisten die Freiheit; Seyn ist ihm blosse Negation der ersteren (499. See 1797). Versuch einer neuen Darstellung (*W.* I. 524, 525).

(1801) *Darstellung.* *W.* II. 1-163. In this work the world of consciousness is analyzed into content and form: the content is seen to be unalterably determined and given to us as an ultimate whose existence we are absolutely certain of, and absolutely unable to change: this unchanging and compelling nature of content is indicated by the term "das absolute Seyn," often "Seyn"; the form is the Ego-form, which, since it sees only self, can see no foreign creator and controller, and is therefore called Freedom. The interpenetration beyond existence, in the sphere of potentiality, of Seyn and Freiheit, produces the world of consciousness. This sphere of interpenetration shows itself to be God in the act of creation, or a living Moral Law. We partially repeat a quotation that we may present the passage without break.

"Denke sich der Leser zuvörderst das *Absolute*, schlechthin als solches, sowie eben sein Begriff bestimmt worden. Er wird finden, behaupten wir, dass er es nur unter folgenden zwei Merkmalen denken könne, theils dass es sey schlechthin, *was* es sey, auf und in sich selbst ruhe durchaus ohne Wandel und Wanken, fest, vollendet und in sich geschlossen, theils, dass es sey, *was* es sey *weil* es sey, von sich selbst, und durch sich selbst, ohne allen fremden Einfluss, indem neben dem Absoluten gar kein Fremdes übrig bleibt, sondern alles, was nicht das Absolute selbst ist, verschwindet. (Es kann seyn, dass diese Duplicität der Merkmale, mit welcher wir das Absolute fassen, und es anders gar nicht fassen können, welche dem Absoluten gegenüber allerdings sonderbar scheint, selbst Resultat unseres Denkens, also eben eines Wissens ist, welches wir vorläufig unentschieden lassen müssen) (16, 17).

Wir können das erstere absolute Bestehen, ruhendes Seyn u. s. w. nennen; das letztere absolute Werden oder Freiheit. Beide Ausdrücke sollen, wie sich dies von einem ehrlichen und gründlichen Vortrage versteht, nichts mehr bezeichnen, als was in der bei dem Leser vorausgesetzten Anschauung der beiden Merkmale des Absoluten liegt (17).

Nun soll das Wissen absolut seyn, als Eins, eben als sich selbst gleiches, und ewig gleich bleibendes *Wissen*, als Einheit einer und eben der höchsten Anschauung, als blosse absolute Qualität. Im Wissen sonach müssten die beiden oben unterschiedenen Merkmale des Absoluten schlechthin in einander fallen und verschmelzen, so dass beide gar nicht mehr unterscheidbar wären; und eben in dieser absoluten Verschmelzung würde das Wesen des Wissens, als solchen, oder das absolute Wissen bestehen (17).

Ich sage, in dem zu einer untrennbaren Einheit Verschmelzen, und im innigsten sich Durchdringen beider, so dass beide ihren Charakter der Un-

terscheidung in der Vereinigung gänzlich aufgeben und verlieren, und als Ein Wesen, und ein durchaus neues Wesen dastehen, also in einer eigentlich *realen* Vereinigung und wahren Organisation: keinesweges aber in einem blossen Nebeneinander sich verhalten, wodurch niemand begreift, wie sie denn doch neben einander bestehen, und lediglich eine formale und negative Einheit, eine Nichtverschiedenheit entsteht, die man doch auch nur, Gott weiss aus welchem Grunde, behaupten, keinesweges aber nachweisen kann. Nicht etwa: in irgend ein, somit schon vorausgesetztes, Wissen tritt ein das ruhende Seyn, und tritt ein die Freiheit, und diese beiden treten nun in diesem Wissen zusammen, und machen in dieser ihrer Vereinigung das absolute Wissen, wodurch noch ein Wissen ausser dem absoluten Wissen, und dieses innerhalb des ersten gesetzt würde; sondern: jenseits alles Wissens, nach unserer gegenwärtigen Darstellung, treten Freiheit und Seyn zusammen, und durchdringen sich, und diese innige Durchdringung und Identificirung beider zu einem neuen Wesen giebt nun erst das Wissen, eben als Wissen, als ein absolutes *Tale*. Von der Einsicht in diesen Punct hängt alles ab, und die Vernachlässigung desselben hat die neuesten Misverständnisse veranlasst (17, 18).

Uebrigens ist noch zu bemerken, dass das absolute Wissen hier lediglich seiner *Materie* nach geschildert ist. Seyn und Freiheit, sagten wir, *treten* zusammen; *sie* also sind das Thätige, inwiefern hier nach einem Thätigen gefragt werden sollte, und sind thätig, inwiefern sie eben noch nicht Wissen, sondern Seyn und Freiheit sind. Wie sie sich aber durchdringen, ihre separaten Naturen aufgeben, um zu einer einigen, zu einem Wissen sich zu vereinigen, sind sie eben gegenseitig durch einander gebunden; denn sie sind ja nur in dieser Gebundenheit Wissen, ausser derselben aber separates Seyn und Freiheit, und sind nun in einem ruhigen Bestehen. Dieses nennen wir nun die *Materie* des absoluten Wissens oder die absolute Materie des Wissens. Es könnte seyn, dass diese zur absoluten Form desselben Wissens sich gerade so verhielte, wie ruhendes Seyn zur Freiheit in der absoluten Materie selbst (18. See 20, 24, 25, 111).

Das Wissen muss für sich seyn, schlechthin *Was* es ist, und unmittelbar *weil* es ist. In dem Weil liegt nicht zugleich die Bestimmung des *Was*: diese liegt durchaus im Seyn des Wissens. . . . Wie es aber sich erzeugend findet, so findet es zugleich unmittelbar, ohne Erzeugung, schlechthin sein *Was*, und ohne dieses *Was* findet es sich auch nicht, als sich erzeugend — und dies nicht zufolge seiner Freiheit, sondern zufolge seines absoluten Seyns (38, 39).

Das absolute Seyn ist im Wissen Gesetz (108, 109).

On almost every page of this treatise we are told that Seyn is the law that determines preception and thought when the Ego, or Freedom, chooses

to think. Later Seyn shows itself to be that sphere of consciousness which is the thought-correlate of the world, or God and his act of creation, and again God in his act of creation or Seyn is given as the living Moral Law (63, 64).

Was ist denn nun das absolute Seyn? Der im Wissen ergriffene absolute Ursprung desselben und daher das Nichtseyn des Wissens: *Seyn* — eben als im Wissen, und doch nicht Seyn des Wissens; — *absolutes* Seyn, weil das *Wissen* absolut ist. Nur der Anfang des Wissens ist *reines* Seyn; wo das Wissen Wissen schon ist, ist *sein* Seyn, und alles, was sonst noch etwa für Seyn (objectives) gehalten werden könnte, ist dieses Seyn und trägt seine Gesetze. Und so hätten wir uns von afteridealistischen Systemen zur Genüge getrennt. Das reine Wissen gedacht, als *Ursprung* für sich, und seinen Gegensatz als Nichtseyn des Wissens, weil es sonst nicht entspringen könnte, ist *reines Seyn* (63).

(Oder sage man, wenn man es nur recht verstehen will, die absolute Schöpfung, als Erschaffung, nicht etwa als Erschaffenes, ist Standpunct des absoluten Wissens; dies erschafft sich eben selbst aus seiner reinen Möglichkeit, als das einzig ihr vorausgegebene, und diese eben ist das reine Seyn) (63).

Dies nemlich ist das reine Seyn für die Wissenschaftslehre, eben weil sie *Wissens*-lehre ist, und das Seyn aus diesem als seine Negation ableitet, also eine ideale Ansicht desselben und zwar die höchste ideale Ansicht ist. Nun kann es wohl seyn, dass hier die Negation selbst die absolute Position, und unsere Position selbst in gewisser Rücksicht eine Negation ist, und dass sich in der Wissenschaftslehre, doch ihr untergeordnet, eine höchste reale Ansicht finden werde, nach der zwar das Wissen auch absolut sich selbst schafft und damit alles Geschaffene und zu Schaffende, aber nur der Form nach, der Materie nach aber nach einem absoluten Gesetze (worein sich eben das absolute Seyn verwandelt) welches Gesetz nun einiges Wissen und dadurch Seyn, als die höchste Position negirt — (Reiner Moralismus, der realistisch (praktisch) durchaus dasselbe ist, was die Wissenschaftslehre formal und idealistisch) (64).

(1804) *Die Wissenschaftslehre*. *Ngl. W.* II. 87–314. Seyn = the plain man's being (254–278). Seyn = Absolutes Seyn (292–300), God (146, 147).

(1805) *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten*. *W.* VI. 347–448. Seyn = Gctt (361–371).

(1806) *Anweisung zum seligen Leben*. *W.* V. 397–580. Seyn = Gott (403–407, 438, 439, 454, 539, etc.).

(1810) *Umriss*. *W.* II. 693-709. Here Seyn is "Gottes Seyn und Wissen, or the world of Consciousness, is "Gottes Seyn ausser seinem Seyn (696).

(1810-11) *Die Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns*. *W.* II. 535-691. Seyn = Gott (681, 684, 685).

(1812) *Sittenlehre*. *Ngl. W.* III. 1-118. In this treatise "Seyn" at first denotes the world of consciousness (4), then it is shown to be a mere concept (6), and, finally, as the world of consciousness, it sinks into the image of the real Seyn, which is God (33, 35). As the image of the real Seyn is Morality, *Sittenlehre* becomes *Seynslehre* (34).

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre*. *Ngl. W.* II. 315-492. Here the word "Seyn" is often used incidentally in its ordinary meaning, but Seyn κατ' ἐξοχήν is God (326-346, 365, 383, etc.).

(1812) *Transcendentale Logik*. *Ngl. W.* I. 103-400. This work, as its name indicates, is an analysis of thought. But, as we have already said, thought is for Fichte, in its first appearance, the empirical world; therefore *Transcendentale Logik* is an explanation of the phenomena of consciousness. The chief problem to be solved is the relation between presentations and representations. In this solution the word "Seyn" plays, of course, an important part — so important, indeed, that its discussion forms the body of the treatise. No detached quotations can give an idea of the course of the argument. We therefore append the briefest possible summary of the work.

I. The object of this work is to state the difference between two views of thought, — that of ordinary Logic and that of Transcendental Logic (105-113).

II. Ordinary Logic concerns itself primarily with the formation of concepts, or with the unification of a manifold of completed representations in one general notion. But in its process the concepts, the formation of which it pretends to explain, are assumed: for how otherwise are completed representations recognized as such? How are they distinguished from one another? How are the characteristics of each representation discriminated? How are single representations felt to be unsatisfactory till classified under general notions? Evidently by means of concepts. Not the most rudimentary knowledge, not even the stuff of special sensations is possible, we shall find, without concepts (113-119).

Transcendental Logic teaches that thinking is the form of immediate perception : man does not slowly and painfully frame concepts as ordinary logic asserts that he does ; but he is born immediately into thought, a world shaped in concepts. It is the special task of Transcendental Logic to separate the form, thought, from its filling, or *Anschauung* (119-124).

III.-IV. Transcendental Logic holds that thinking is a seizing of relations between primal concepts, which it brings with it, and empirical images, which it frames ; for example, it knows a special spot "a" only in so far as this special spot is held against the great concept, Space : it knows any individual only in so far as it is set in opposition with its universal (122-131).

The fundamental relation seized is the difference between *Seyn* and *Bild*. The very first exercise of thought recognizes the existence of physical facts as such : this recognition would be impossible if thought did not bring with it a primal notion of the difference between *Seyn* and *Bild*. Analysis can find nothing simpler : the first element of thought is a synthetic union of two images, one of *Seyn*, one of *Bild*, and a discrimination between them. Henceforth everything known to thought is subsumed under one or the other half of this double notion, everything is either *Seyn* or *Bild*. Therefore we may say that the *Begriff* of the relation between *Seyn* and *Bild* is the *Urbegriff*, *Denkform*, *Grundanschauung* (131-140).

In the analysis we have just given we are really understanding Understanding, and there is involved in this understanding, we see, not-Understanding. The importance of this truth will appear later.

V.-VIII. But a question immediately arises : the primal, double notion which we have just described is a synthesis of two images, one of *Seyn* and one of *Bild* : since they are both images, how do we distinguish them ?

The image of *Seyn* is the image of something complete in itself : the image of *Bild*, of something which refers to a cause, asserts itself to be an utterance, hence a *genesis*, *werden* (140-152).

But though the image is an utterance of the I, we must not think of it as a mere creation of the I, for this conception would lead us to empty Idealism : *Bild* involves *Seyn*. Neither must we think of *Bild* as the result of *Seyn*, in the plain man's sense, for there is no *Seyn*, as he means it : there is only the concept of *Seyn*. The truth lies in the inseparable union of *das absolute Seyn* and the I, the result of which is the double thought-form, *Seyn* and *Bild* (152-159).

An unanswerable proof that the *Bild* is not the sole work of the I is the presence of the qualitative : why red, why green, admits no explanation ; we can only say that the content of the Absolute is such that its image must appear as qualitatively determined. The stuff of the qualitative is something very different from *Bild*, but must appear in *Bild*-form to enter the I,

hence it comes as the material of Bild, a flow of sensations. Specific Sensations are the Other caught in Bild form (152-171).

This flow of sensations is unified into Bild by the I's perceiving at every point of Sensation that it is one and the same I (171-180).

We have now gained a general idea of Bild — we see that its form is the I, its content sensation. We have next to consider the relation of the I to Bild.

IX.-XXIII. The I is forced to see the Bild, but the Bild is itself: hence the I is the law of Subject Objectivity (184-195).

The Bild is of such nature that it cannot be conceived as Bild alone, it involves the notion of Seyn: on the other hand Seyn cannot be conceived without Bild, it must enter the mind as Bild. Hence Bild involves Seyn and Seyn involves Bild. The conception of Seyn which is derived from Bild is pure thought or Denken: the Bild which results from Seyn is Anschauung; hence every Bild is an organic union of Denken and Anschauung (195-208).

Bild and Seyn exist as such only in so far as Thought classifies them under the concepts of Bild and Seyn, hence the I is free and they are its creation. But Seyn — Sensation — is forced upon the I; hence the I is not free. How can the same I be free and not free? By freely choosing to be not free: a free I chooses to submit to Law (208-220).

The link which inseparably unites Bild and Seyn is a double one, a free, and a necessary one: given either and Denken, if it choose, can deduce the other as a logical necessity, hence we have in Denken the free link; Anschauung is forced to make the connection, for in Anschauung there is a melting together of subject and object, a losing of both in one only and single consciousness (220-232).

Sensation involves the I's seeing itself as a sphere of determinability, which involves Space, and a judgment that the undetermined general I is identified with a determined Sense I (232-253, 289).

The reason that Seyn and Bild are inseparably connected is that nothing exists but the understanding of Understanding, which involves the simultaneous presentation of the Understood, or Denken, and the Not-Understood, or the stuff of special sensations — Anschauung. Hence consciousness appears as an inseparable and mutually involving union of Denken and Anschauung, or Bild and Seyn, or what the plain man calls "recognition of object," "consciousness of sensation" (289-319).

XXIII.-XXXI. We have now shown the view which Transcendental Logic takes of thought: It sees as its fundamental, ultimate-form, which is incapable of further analysis, a double form, one half of which is Bild, the other half Seyn: or it considers it as an inseparable union of what the plain man calls Denken and Anschauung, Denken here meaning the pure

empty form of thought, and Anschauung the stuff of special sensation. Neither can exist without the other: their union, or consciousness of the sense-world, may be called "das empirische Denken." There remains for us a task parallel to that of ordinary Logic, *i. e.*, the explanation of concepts, judgments, conclusions, etc. (319-400). Lack of space forbids our following Fichte here.

Logic, of course, stops short of Religion; therefore Fichte does not pursue Seyn beyond the empirical world. In that world he has shown it to be a notion. The development of this notion gives a religious Lehre. Such a Lehre we have in the "Anweisung zum seligen Leben."

(1813) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W.* II. 1-86. Here, as in the "Transcendentale Logik" and in the "Einleitung," the analysis of Seyn forms the body of the treatise. We therefore give a summary of the work.

The problem of Knowledge may be stated as "What is Understanding?" (14, 16.) As starting-point and object of the first analysis the plain man's view, that Understanding is only formal Understanding, or pure thought, is accepted (16-19). If Understanding is formal, the question immediately arises, "what is its content?" (19, 20.) Its content is Seyn; but, of course, only image of Seyn, since formal Understanding can contain only image (20). But if Seyn is only image, how does it differ from image pure and simple? Only in that Understanding labels it Seyn: it is an image which is asserted to be Seyn, *i. e.*, it is a union of image of image and image of Seyn (20, 21). We can go no further in our analysis; as the ultimate of Understanding, as Grundanschauung, Denkform, Urbegriff, we find a double image, an image formed by union of two images, one of image and one of Seyn. In this Denkform all existence must appear (20-25).

But so far we have analyzed only formal Understanding, and have left out that which the plain man thinks is the Seyn itself, — that which he conceives to lie behind Understanding and to be mirrored by it (27, 28). Now the Wissenschaftslehre declares that all Seyn is the product of the Understanding. It must, therefore, show that that Seyn which the Understanding seems only to find and to mirror, is, in reality, produced by it. This it does by showing us Understanding as an Absolute, including within itself all the world of Consciousness viewing itself (32, 33): — this Absolute Understanding has two functions, an unconscious and a conscious; its essential nature is *to understand, i. e.*, to be what the plain man calls mind (35); but that it may understand, it must have something to understand, therefore, as means to the end of its being, *i. e.*, understanding something, it, through its own being, posits something to understand, or the so-called "external Seyn" (35);

(it does not really posit, God in it posits; but it sees itself as positing (*Ngl. W.* I. 217, 244, 271, 446, 565); and we are now dwelling wholly in the image-region, hence speak of images as reality, for reality is image). This Seyn exists only for the purpose of being understood, and in as far as it is understood; if understanding were removed, Seyn would vanish, for it has no other existence than as the first element of Understanding (33).

This first function, positing Seyn as something to be understood, is an unconscious function for the plain man.

The second function is to mount above the first image thrown off. Understanding mounts above the so-called "external Seyn" in the shape of the formal Understanding already described — a duplicity of image of Seyn and image of image, or *Anschauung* and *Begriff* (33-35). Hence we see that the being, the nature, of Absolute Understanding brings with it as one of its elements, Seyn; that there may be Understanding there must be something to be understood, hence Understanding involves Seyn: in other words, Understanding divides itself into subject and object (37).

The image first thrown off — the plain man's Seyn, which we will call *x* (36) — is governed by the law that its content must be such that Understanding can understand it as image of the Absolute (40). That is, *x* is not a capricious image of the fancy, but must seem to be an image of a real Seyn behind it (39, 40).

We have now developed a new proposition. By our former analysis Understanding understood itself as image. Now Understanding understands itself as image of *das absolute Seyn* (40).

If it is true that Understanding understands *x* as image of *das absolute Seyn*, *x* must bring with it an exponent, a *Begriff*, that can tell what its nature is (44). It does; every presentation is accompanied by a *Begriff* which says that it is image of *das absolute Seyn*. It follows that the *Begriff* is the formal image of Seyn in general (45). It is that image of Seyn in general which, in our analysis of the formal Understanding we found opposed to image, since the plain man in understanding an object has always the instinct that he is seeing a reality (47).

What have we won so far by our analysis? The recognition of the truth that all existence is deduced from Understanding. To be sure the Absolute appears in the exponent of *x*, the *Begriff* that *x* is image of the Absolute. But even here the Absolute itself does not appear — we see only a *formal image* of it, hence even the Absolute appears in the form of Understanding. So the highest and last, the basis even of all Knowledge is deduced from the Understanding (48).

Our analysis has also made clear the relation between *Anschauung* and *Begriff* — they both issue from the Understanding: — when the principle of the Understanding remains unseen, and its product only is perceived,

it is an Anschauung ; when we see clearly that the Understanding forms the image, it is a Begriff (48, 49).

The view of Absolute Understanding which we have at this point, is not our own arbitrary construction, but a view which we are forced to take by the laws of thought ; hence *our view* is a self-understanding of Absolute Understanding ; *we* are Absolute Understanding understanding itself (51, 52).

It follows that Absolute Understanding is not only itself, but it is also image of itself, *i. e.*, just as its product is divided into *x* or *Seyn*, and image of *x* or *Seyn*, so itself is divided into its own *Seyn* and image of this *Seyn* (53).

Und jetzt stände die Sache demnach so : der Absolute Verstand ausser dem Spalten seines Principiats in *Bild* und *Seyn*, theilt noch dazu sich selbst, als schlechthin seiendes, als Substanz und absolutes Princip in seiner Gesetzmässigkeit, in Sein und Bild (53, 54).

Also das Absolute Sein des Verstandes selbst spaltet sich, ist nunmehr zu sagen. In der Einheit dieser Spaltung bekommen wir sonach erst den höhern Begriff von dem absoluten Sein des Verstandes ; und zwar ist dieser ein synthetischer, bestehend aus den Hälften einmal als Sein in der That und Wahrheit, sodann als Bild, im blossen Reflexe dieses wahrhaftigen Seins (54).

This division of itself by Absolute Understanding into two mutually involving spheres of consciousness, into *Seyn* and *Bild*, is of the utmost importance, and we must be careful not to misconceive its nature. Two errors are to be avoided : — (1) We must not think of Understanding as *Seyn* alone ; (2) neither must we think of it as *Bild* alone. If we see it as *Seyn* alone we fancy it an extra-mentem reality which may or may not throw forth an image. Fichte warns us against this misconception in the following terms :

Man darf es darum nicht etwa so fassen, als ob der objective absolute Verstand, nachdem er vorher schon ist, sich unter andern auch abbilde in diesem Bilde, als ob es nur möglich wäre accidentaliter, so dass er auch wohl objectiv sein könnte, ohne sich in diesem *Seyn* abzubilden in dem aufgezeigten Bilde, nun aber einmal faktisch es thue : dass darum sein objectives Sein unabhängig von diesem Bilde sei, und umgekehrt das Bild nicht schlechthin durch das objektive *Seyn* gesetzt sei, und von ihm abhängt. Sondern beides, Bild und *Seyn* ist schlechthin bei einander. So gewiss der Verstand absolut ist, so ist er *Alles*, was er ist, absolute, und führt darum auch dieses Bild seines selbst schlechthin bei sich (55).

On the other hand, if we see it as *Bild* alone, we fall into empty Idealism. We quote Fichte's warning : — Das ganze reale Principsein geht nicht völlig auf in diesem Bilde, sondern das bleibt übrig, dass diese Principiate, die hier gesetzten Bilder, ja eben als *seiende* Bilder gebildet werden, nämlich in der Anschauungs- oder Seins-Form, und dass der Verstand sich ja nicht setzt als selbst Princip durch sein Bild des Principseins, sondern dass

er sich setzt als blossen Reflex eines *ohne* ihn vorhandenen Principseins. Und so verhielte sich die Sache demnach also : das Principsein mit allem, was durch dasselbe wieder gesetzt ist, mit allen Principiaten, ist zwar freilich durchaus nur im Bilde ; dieses Bild aber (was auch als Principiat hier angesehen werden kann) ist wirklich und in der That Bild eines Principseins aus sich, von sich, durch sich ; es wird sich darum, falls es sich etwa erkennt, nicht als selbst Princip, sondern nur als blossen leidenden Reflex jenes Principseins anerkennen (56).

Fichte resumes the relation of the two mutually involving spheres of consciousness in the following terms : — Und so stände denn demnach die Sache also : — der absolute Verstand ist Bild seines selbst als eines *absoluten Principes* ; es versteht sich innerhalb des Gränzen seines Wesens. Indem er darum dieses Bild von sich, als von einem absoluten ist, thut dies darauf Verzicht, dass es Grund sei des Principseins, und lässt dem Principsein seine eigne Absolutheit übrig (57).

Und so ist denn der Verstand gespalten in *Bild* und *Seyn* über und an seinem *Principsein*. Dies dürfte (1) wohl eine Spaltung am absoluten Verstande selbst sein, indem mit Princip wohl etwas erkleckliches gemeint ist, nämlich sogar Princip seines Seins selbst, und so möchten wir denn durch das Setzen des Verstandes als Princip wohl dahin gekommen sein, ihn absolut zu setzen. (Hieraus das Grundgesetz der Sittlichkeit.) (2) Ist dies eine wahrhafte Spaltung, indem hier nämlich im Bilde etwas liegt, was nur in ihm liegen kann, eine *Principheit* nämlich, die doch keine *ist*, ein Sein, jenseits alles Seins ; und indem umgekehrt im Sein etwas ist, das durchaus nicht im Bilde sein kann, indem das Bild darauf verzichtet, sich nur für einen leidenden Reflex gebend des effectiven Principseins (57).

Absolute Understanding has been forced by its own laws to take the view of itself as principle of itself which we have set forth above. In now recognizing this truth it sees that it is not a capricious principle, but, instead, Absolute Principle under Law (60-68).

Suppose now Understanding develops its principleship : then the Anschauung x, or the plain man's Seyn, arises, and is conceived as image. So far have we gone and no farther in our exposition (69, 70).

But this is not sufficient : the conception of the image must be such that from it may be mediately understood that Understanding is principle of this image, hence there must be with every image a permanent image of Understanding (70) ; every image that lies in Understanding must be absolutely accompanied by the potential image " *I am* the understanding principle in this image." Hence perception involves apperception (71).

This *I* is the absolutely permanent and indestructible in all Understanding (71).

Hence our fundamental and basal proposition is, " Das Absolute Verste-

hen ist das *Sich*verstehen des Verstandes in seiner Gesetzmässigkeit." This is the Seyn which does not become, which suffers no variation or shadow of turning, which is indestructible (71).

Der *nervus probandi* liegt darin: es ist schlechthin unzerstörbene Verstandesform, dass er sich Verstehe als Princip in allen seinen Bestimmungen: dieses, dass er sich verstehe, ist sein absoluter und unwandelbarer Wesensbegriff von sich selbst, der nicht *wird* sondern schlechthin *ist* (71).

Hence Understanding must see itself as principle, not only of Anschauung, but of Begreifen (72).

But this is hardly correct, for there is no freedom in Begreifen. According to what we have so far said, the I is only *possible* principle of Anschauung (60-65); hence it may or it may not be the principle, hence it is freedom (70). But if the Anschauung does come, the Begriff that it is image and that the I sees it as image must, of necessity, follow. Hence Understanding is not principle of Begriff, but substance to be moulded into Begriff; and that into which it is moulded without any co-operation of its own is its accident (73, 74).

Hence we must say, "Der Verstand ist sonach in seinem Wesensbegriffe von sich selbst Substanz (in Beziehung auf das Begreifen, als sein Accidens); und Princip in Beziehung auf die Anschauung. Diese beiden Formen des Bildes, Substanz und Princip, sind darum im ursprünglichen Wesensbegriffe schlechthin mit einander verschmolzen, und in einem Schlage. Substanz ist das Bild eines bloss formalen Seins, synthetisch mit der absoluten Möglichkeit eines Werdens: aber eines Werdens nicht durch sich, denn sonst wäre es ein Principsein, sondern durch ein fremdes gebietendes Gesetz (74).

Schematismus (74-81).

Apperception is the point of unity of all existence (81-86).

(1813) *Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. I.* 1-102.

The "Einleitung" of 1813 is devoted wholly to the discussion of Seyn, hence its analysis is fitting here. It is also Fichte's last philosophical treatise, and was intended as an introduction to the final exposition of his system which was to be given to the world in the summer of 1814. After this task was finished he hoped to devote the rest of his life to the education of youth. We therefore read the "Einleitung" with interest as an expression of Fichte's final opinions.

He begins the treatise with the statement that the Wissenschaftslehre is a view of the premises upon which the judgment "this is something" is founded. For this view a new sense is necessary which may be developed in every man (4-32). As an exercise for this sense he asks his hearers to construct with him Sein (43). In this construction his method is essentially

that of the Jena period and of the "Darstellung" of 1801: he starts with a bit of consciousness, develops contradictions within it, reconciles the contradictions by mounting above the consciousness that beholds them, and analyzing it as their synthesis.

The first contradiction is that Sein is external yet within consciousness (43, 44). The solution of the contradiction is found in the nature of Seeing Seyn, or Consciousness. Consciousness is a holding together of two opposites, ego and non-ego, hence it is a *Leben* (45). As each opposite exists only *through* the presence of the other we may call the *Leben* a "lebendiges Durch" (46). "Dieses Durch ist die allbekannte Denkform, in der jeder sein Lebelang sich bewegt hat" (47). The unity of the two opposites takes the form of a conclusion, of the judgment "it is." This act of concluding we call Seeing (48-50).

The second contradiction is developed from the first solution, for this solution makes "Sein" the product of thought; but what the plain man means by "Sein" is not-thought, something-in-itself (54).

The second solution is that Seeing Sein is really Seeing Seeing, for the conception by the plain man of Sein as an independent existence which is not produced by himself, involves his holding in his mind a concept of self producing something seen, his comparing Sein with this concept, and his denying that Sein is like it (55). The fundamental difference between his own production and Sein is that he sees in Sein an independent *Leben* of its own which his activity does not produce (55). In other words, Seeing Seyn is holding together the concepts of image and reality, and classifying the seen under reality (55, 56).

We see that the essence of Seeing Seyn is the projection of an independent *Leben* which absolutely determines itself without any co-operation from Seeing (57). As the act of projecting and the independent *Leben* condition each other, we have two lebendige Durch (84), hence we may say that "Das Sehen ist Durch eines absoluten Durch" (58).

But a great problem remains for us. If Seeing is the cause of everything seen, how does this independent *Leben*, which absolutely determines itself, this second Durch, enter it (59, 60)? (Problem repeated, 81, 82.)

Before we discuss this question let us examine the synthesis of the two Durch. We find it to be an organic union of Anschauung and Denken, or of ego-stuff in thought-forms (60-68).

Seeing Seeing further involves a general concept of Seeing, a view of a given Seeing, and the subsumption of the given under the concept, or apperception (68-80).

We have discovered that the true nature of Seeing Seyn is the Seeing of Seeing in its formal being and nothing else (*i. e.*, Seyn is the negation of the concept of Seeing, Seyn is the image "not image"). This Seeing of Seeing is called "experience" (81).

But our chief problem remains unanswered: — Seeing from our point of view is absolute principle and ground, hence cause of Seyn. But Seyn appears as an independent *Leben* and as not caused by Seeing. If we say that Seeing is principle, not of Seyn itself, but of its image, we merely evade the difficulty. The reconciliation lies deeper: — Seeing is cause of an independent *Leben*, because Seeing, by choosing to be, gives this independent *Leben* opportunity to appear: if Seeing did not begin, did not will to be, did not offer itself as sphere for the appearance of the independent *Leben*, this *Leben* could not appear. Hence it may be said to be the *Durch* of this *Leben*. Therefore Seeing is a *Durch* in two senses: — (1) a cause of image; (2) a condition and ground of possibility of an independent *Leben* (83).

We have now found the category of reciprocity. We have two *Durch*, two principles, which meet and unite at one blow, one of Seeing, one of Seyn, in order to bring forth their mingled product — the given world of consciousness. But the two principles are not of equal rank. The *Durch* of Seeing stands above: from it the reciprocity starts: the *Durch* of Seeing is condition of the other *Durch*, therefore of the real object (84).

Recapitulation (85-91).

Space (91-93).

In the two *Durch*, the two principles, the two independent *Leben* of Fichte's last work, the "Einleitung" of 1813, we have the unabhängige Thätigkeit of the "Grundlage" with its two elements, the freie Kräfte of the "Grundriss," the Moral Law involving Freedom of the "Sittenlehre" of 1798, the Freedom and Law of the "Darstellung" of 1801. Fichte's philosophy in its essentials is unchanged from first to last.

LEBEN AND ENDZWECK.

THE term *Leben* is sometimes used interchangeably with *God*, hence it sometimes denotes: — (1) the Inconceivable which appears as the world of consciousness; (2) the notion which we form of the Inconceivable. Ordinarily it means the postulated generating power of the world of consciousness, which we have called in our paper “Freedom,” and have described as, in the sphere of potential existence, seeing potential Law, choosing it from love of Law, and by this act appearing as the world of consciousness, — “*die Erscheinung in und an Gott.*” In describing Freedom or *Leben* as consciously choosing Law, Fichte gives it consciousness or the ego-form. Hence he constantly tells us that the essence of the ego is Freedom, *Leben*, *Vermögen*, *Princip*, etc. Since Freedom is one of the elements of the sphere which we call “*God*,” the true ego is the “*Leben Gottes*,” the power of *God* to manifest himself as the world of consciousness. *Die Erscheinung an sich* is a *God* element.

(1805) *Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten.* *W.* VI. 347-448. *Leben* = *Gott* (361-371).

(1806) *Anweisung zum seligen Leben.* *W.* V. 397-580. *Leben* appears in its various significations, as may be seen by reading the first few pages, but usually it denotes *God* (403-407, 443, 475-491, 539, 540, etc.).

(1810) *Umriss.* *W.* II. 693-709. *Leben* = *Gott* (696-709).

(1810, 1811) *Die Thatfachen des Bewusstseyns.* *W.* II. 535-691. *Leben* und *Endzweck*. The various parts of consciousness: — Perception (542-549); Reflection (549-565); Reproduction (565-570); Time (570-582); Design (583-600); plurality of egos (600-615); laws of thought (615-628); the Moral Law (628-649), are examined by Fichte, and the conclusion is reached that consciousness, in its every aspect, is the expression which One Organic Life gives to itself. *Das Leben* is looked upon as a power, a will to exist or not to exist, which chooses to exist. The question

is next asked, "why does it so choose?" The answer is, "to realize an Endzweck, which is that Leben shall be the realization of the Moral Law, the form of perception of morality (649-656). This Endzweck is the ground of Leben (658), it creates and determines Leben because it wills to be realized, and needs an instrument for this realization (659). It follows that the Endzweck is a consciousness in which are a Free Will and Law: it is another name for the Begriff of the "Sittenlehre" of 1812, and das Leben is the Ich, the will, of that treatise, and the Freedom of the other works (680). Fichte now recognizes the two spheres of consciousness, and describes them as such (658-662); the one is a sphere of potential existence, in which we have a fully determined, unchangeable Endzweck conceived as having absolute Freedom, Leben, or a sphere of potential Freedom and potential Law (659, 660); the second sphere is the sphere of visible existence (660.) The specified content of the Endzweck finds concrete existence in the activity of individuals, and the natural world exists as the sphere of such activity (663, 664). What the exact form of the activity of the individual shall be in realizing the Endzweck is shown him in his inner self-consciousness as his duty. He must will to obey in all eternity the voice of duty in whatever form it appears. This will in holy men is the immediate visibility of the Endzweck (669-675).

Is this Endzweck an absolute, or is it only the visibility of a higher being? (680.) Since it is a concept, a mental image (683), it involves a higher being behind it of which it is image (684); but this higher being we can never reach (684, 685); we must content ourselves with its appearance in image form (685). Fichte reaches this result by the following steps: — Being is that which does not become (681); Leben is a becoming (681); hence to ask the being of Leben is to ask the being of becoming; the being of becoming is that in becoming which does not become, but persists (681), that which enables us to perceive it as becoming (682); this is the only being in becoming, for otherwise it would not be a becoming, but a permanence (681). That which persists in becoming is the aim to utter itself as becoming, or to utter its being (682); hence the being of becoming is aim, Endzweck, and the Endzweck is the utterance of being in becoming (683). This being of becoming can be differently expressed: — that which persists in becoming is the perception, the image of becoming, hence the being of becoming is Bild, Anschauung (683); but Anschauung, Bild relates itself to the being which it images (684); hence behind the ultimate Bild, whether Endzweck, Begriff, or what not, we must postulate inconceivable being or God (684). More than the postulated existence of this being, this Inconceivable, we cannot know; but it expresses its nature fully in the Erscheinung (684, 685). Hence for us the Endzweck is truth as the ultimate image which reason finds.

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II.* 315-492. Here the term "Leben" is used incidentally as identical with Principle, Power, Freedom, etc., to express the ultimate image which reason forms of the true being of the ego (372, 425, etc.).

(1812) *Sittenlehre. Ngl. W. III.* 1-118. In this work that sphere of consciousness which we have described as containing Superactual Freedom, Superactual Law, and the superactual choice of Freedom to subject itself to Law for the love of Law, or Holy Will, is called the Begriff. In the Begriff Superactual Freedom as the power to be or not to be, the power which sees Law and has the power to choose whether or not to subject itself to Law, is called das Leben des Begriffs (13, 17). This power, since it sees, understands and chooses, is evidently an ego; hence the ego is das Leben des Begriffs (16-20). Ein Ich ist gefunden, als das stehende und feste Leben des Begriffs, der *Einheitspunkt* seines Lebens. Dieses darum auch der eigentliche Standpunkt der Sittenlehre. Wir müssen also von nun an ersehen und analysiren aus dem Standpunkte dieses also erkennen und abgeleiteten Ich (19).

(1812) *Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I.* 103-400. In this work Leben usually denotes the superactual power of consciousness as God's freedom to exist or not to exist. The Erscheinung (world of consciousness) in its true nature is a Leben (152, 156, 157, 191-193, 201, 202, 204, 205, 235, etc.). This Leben, when visible, is the appearing of the Absolute itself (203, 205, etc.). Leben, as Freedom, sees itself freely choosing law (211-220). Leben is the expression in the Anschauung of the hovering of existence between being and image (226, 227). The Bildleben (life of consciousness) is limited by the laws of thought (228-232). From the limitation of the Bildleben we have the various phenomena of the world of consciousness (232-326).

(1813) *Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I.* 401-574. Here also das Leben is the superactual ego (410, 411); but on almost every page Fichte reminds us that such terms as Leben, Freiheit, Vermögen, Werden, Princip, etc., by which we try to express the Inconceivable, are, after all, only mental images. The Erscheinung, in its true nature, is a Leben (410, 411, 421, 422, 526, 548). To the form of the Erscheinung belongs the only freedom which exists. Freedom is not an attribute of God or of the individual, but of the form of the Erscheinung (412-415). Leben, Princip, and all similar terms are only human notions to express the Inconceivable (423). Leben = Gottes Erscheinen selbst (535-537): discrimination be-

tween the ordinary concept "Leben" und "das wahre und eigentliche Leben der Erscheinung," which is "Identität des Bildens und des Verstehens des Göttlichen" (535-537). Vermögen, Freiheit, Leben, are mere images in which the Superactual Erscheinung appears to consciousness (537).

(1813) *Einleitungsvorlesungen in die Wissenschaftslehre.* Ngl. W. I. 1-102. Since Seinsetzen is the holding together of two opposites, ego and non-ego, and concluding from them as to the existence of an object, it must be a Leben. Since it exists only *through* opposites, we may call it a "leben-diges Durch." Since its holding together is the cause of the appearance of a seemingly independent object with a life of its own which absolutely determines itself, but which gains existence only through the activity of the ego in Seinsetzen, we may call it a "Durch eines absoluten Durch." Hence we have as ultimates of consciousness two Durch (Freedom and Law). These two Durch image themselves as Space and Matter, or as the world of consciousness (42, 74, 45, 46, 78; 49, 50; 52, 53; 55-59; 60, 64, 66; 70; 72; 81-83; 87; 88; 94-96; 99-101).

THE BEGRIFF.

WITH Fichte the "Begriff" is key to the understanding of the two worlds, and the unfolding of the Begriff is the substance of his philosophy. In its simplest form the Begriff is that exponent of every object which tells us that what we see is image of being, a mental picture of a reality behind. Hence it is the fundamental Denkform, Urbegriff, Grundanschauung in which all existence is cast. When we learn that what we see is self, it becomes "I am image of being." The development of the two spheres indicated in this proposition, image and being, puts before us the phenomenal world and God's nature. Hence the Begriff, in its fullest expansion, includes within itself the totality of consciousness viewing its own significance and functions, and is a synonym for the Absolute Ego and the Intellectuelle Anschauung. Sometimes the word means chiefly the sphere of being, or God, since this sphere is pure Begriff unmixed with Anschauung, and since it involves the phenomenal world, because if it exist it must exist in men's mind. Fichte uses the term in its more or less highly developed meaning in almost all his works. In its simplest form as the exponent of empirical objects, it is the foundation of Fichte's Transcendental Logic (see summary under Seyn and *Ngl. W.* I. 131-140). It is given most prominence in the "Sittenlehre" of 1812 and in the "Thatsachen" of 1813, therefore we summarize what Fichte says of it in these two treatises.

(1812) *Das System der Sittenlehre.* *Ngl. W.* III. 1-118. Here consciousness seeing *itself as creator of the world* is called the Begriff. The plain man calls the Begriff God, and fancies it a *Ding an sich*: he does not know that what he sees is consciousness seeing *itself as creator of the world*. In our paper we have called the Begriff the sphere of potential existence, and have analyzed it:—reason shows us that it contains Superactual Freedom, Superactual Law, and the act of choice by Superactual Freedom of Superactual Law from love of law: on account of this act we have also named the sphere Holy Will. In the "Sittenlehre" of 1812 the outlines of this analysis are very clear; we sketch them:—

Consciousness examines itself and seeks its ground, its creator. It finds only self, and formulates its creed in the proposition, "Der Begriff ist Grund der Welt, mit dem absoluten Bewusstsein, dass er es sei" (3). From this proposition it follows that:— (1°) the plain man's "being" is only the concept of being grounded in consciousness (6); (2°) since consciousness with its concepts is the only existence, the act of being ground, or the act of creation, exists only as consciousness thinks it, *i. e.*, the act of creation was not the temporal beginning of a process, but is a conclusion at which consciousness in the moment of reflection arrives (8, 9); (3°) if consciousness can find only self as creator, it must look upon itself as Freedom (9); (4°) if it is Freedom to be ground of the world, or not, it must be a Power, Life (12, 13). Such concept of potential consciousness, or of the potential Begriff, free will, essential life, creative power, is the concept of God, and the concept of its appearing through an act of free will as the actual Begriff, is the concept that the world of consciousness is the appearing of God as consciousness, or, since consciousness consists of mental images, in image form (13, 14). Also: *der Begriff ist Grund seiner selbst, heisst: er setzt ausser sich ab in einem objektiven Sein sein inneres Sein: und er hat ein Vermögen, realiter Grund zu sein, heisst: er hat das Vermögen, ein Bild, das das Gepräge seines inneren Wesens trägt, ausser sich hinzustellen; er ist eine absolut freie, reale, und objektive Kraft* (14). (5°) Freedom, or das Leben des Begriffs, has only one free choice, to be ground of the world or not to be ground; what results from the choice, or the world, is fixed by law (15). (6°) We have now found:— (1°) confronting Freedom, as, with Freedom, an ultimate element of consciousness, Law; and (2°) Freedom, or das Leben des Begriffs, conscious of this law in willing to become ground of the world by submitting to it (16, 17). Hence our ultimate conception of the origin of consciousness, of Freedom or das Leben des Begriffs and of its act of submission to Law, takes the ego form, and we have completed the circle which the mind is always forced to tread in seeking its Creator; it finds only self, or "Das eben heisst, und so soll genommen werden der Satz: der Begriff ist unmittelbar Grund: die *Sehe* ist unmittelbar und durch sich selbst schöpferisches Leben: die Realität wird in der That hingesehen; *hingesehen*, sage ich, ohne Anwendung irgend eines anderen Organs, *als* Realität hingesehen, nicht etwa als blosses Bild, indem sie eben Realität ist für die andere objektive Anschauungsform" (17).

The important results of this analysis by consciousness of itself are that: (1°) In obedience to the laws of consciousness the First Cause takes the form in consciousness of a Power, a Life, a Free-Will; (2°) this Free-Will is conscious of an inseparable companion, Law, hence appears in ego-form (18); through free self-determination to submit itself to Law, or to be ground of the world, it changes itself from a merely ideal principle into a real

principle, *i. e.*, into one creating a world seen as real and objective (18). Hence the realization of the Begriff is the creation of existence; obedience to the ideal creates the real (18).

In other words, consciousness falls upon examination into two spheres: one, of the Superactual Ego, as mere potentiality of existence, mere principle of objectivity, mere power to be or not to be ground of the world; the second sphere is the objective existence which results from the Superactual Ego's act of choosing to become ground of the world. If we call the first sphere the ego, we may call the second, in contradistinction, the non-ego, signifying by this term that it is the world of consciousness as appearance in image-form of the reality behind it (19).

Superactual Freedom, Power, Life, is that part of the Begriff whose function it is by an act of will to give concrete existence to Law, the other essential element of the Begriff. This partial function of the total Begriff we call the ego-power, and it appears only in individual form. The function of the ego is to will that Law shall be made manifest everywhere. Hence it ought so to will. "Ought" is inextricably involved in the very nature of the ego, and obedience to duty is only fidelity to its own nature (19-22). The ego is, of necessity, conscious of duty which its nature involves, for the ego is self-consciousness (23, 24). This duty is to be the image of God; the specified content of this image should take form in man's daily activity (25-30).

The absolute Begriff, which is the totality of consciousness understanding its own nature to be a free will doing duty for the sake of duty, or Holy Will, appears only in individuals (43). It appears in holy men who recognize that they are merely the concrete appearance of the function of willing the manifestation of law everywhere, that they are a part of God's Holy Will, and that the isolated self has no will; what may seem to be the evil will of a self is only a point where the Begriff wills to manifest itself partially (30-46). Holy men will duty for the sake of duty (39), and will that all shall so will (77). This One Moral Will, composed of an infinite number of individual wills, is the direct appearance of the form of the absolute Begriff (79, 80). The content of the absolute Begriff will find direct appearance when the consciousness of each individual has penetrated the consciousness of all individuals, and each holds the content of all within itself. The totality of the perfections of these infinite points of view of a unity will be the actualized Begriff (80).

(1813) *Die Thatfachen des Bewusstseyns. Ngl. W. I.* 401-574. In this work the Begriff "dass das Sehen ein absolutes Sein setze" (507), is shown to be the means "des Ueberganges vom Wirklichen zum Ueberwirk-

lichen . . . dadurch dass das Sehen durch seinen Begriff von sich selbst, sich ausdehnt über alle seine Gegebenheit und Wirklichkeit. Der Geist meiner Philosophie ist eben die Erhebung über das Sichtbare zum Unsichtbaren ; und die Erkenntniss, der Begriff des Sehens ist dabei das vermittelnde Glied " (507).

The connection between the two worlds is effected as follows : With any object of perception is connected the Begriff, "it is image of being," and the causal instinct is only a reaching after the being which the fundamental Denkform postulates (418-420, 440-444, 449-451). (For the strongest statement that the Begriff is der Urbegriff, die Absolute Denkform, see " Transcendentale Logik " (*Ngl. W.* I. 133-140).

Now suddenly there appears within the circumference of consciousness, a moral command or a moral deed which we will call y (424-435). Its perception is accompanied, of course, by the Begriff (434-444), and we seek the being of which it is image, or its cause. Since it is a moral deed, it appears as a free deed, *i. e.*, it does not lie in the uninterrupted chain of cause and effect in nature, but seems to be without natural cause, to generate itself, to become ; this freedom we express by the term " werden " : y müsste angeschaut werden als ein Gewordenes, neues Wirkliches (433, 436, 441, 447, 469, 506, etc.). " Absolutes Werden oder Freiheit " (*W.* II. 17 top). Freiheit-Anfangen des Ereignisses, Principseyn (*W.* IV. 383, 384). Gewordenheit an y = die Neuheit desselben in Bezug auf die Natur (*Ngl. W.* I. 476, 440-442, 479, 505). " Werden, entstehen, und zu demselben hinzutreten durch eine neue Schöpfung der Erscheinung " (436). Als *Werden, als freier Akt* (548).

The Begriff, however, gives us the unshaken conviction that some cause y must have, some being there must be of which y is image (440-444, 449-453).

We can never transcend consciousness ; if this cause does not lie within the sphere of empirical consciousness, we can seek it only by adding to consciousness another sphere which shall contain the potentiality of consciousness as cause of y ; hence we judge the Superactual Erscheinung to be the cause of moral commands and deeds (451, 452). If its nature is such that it seek morality, it must be Holy Will.

Hence the Begriff reveals to us a new sphere of consciousness in which dwells the Superactual Ego as a Moral Will, or, since such are the conditions of a Moral Will, as Freedom subjecting itself to Law for the sake of Law. The Begriff, therefore, leads from the world of sense to the world of spirit, and links the two inseparably (442, 444, 453-457, 503-509).

The Begriff, " I am image of Being," has now become, in its fullest expansion, the sight by consciousness of itself as image world resting upon not-image or Being. Hence it is identical with the Absolute Ego and the

Intellectuelle Anschauung (453). Dieser lebendige Gedanke nun ists, der in der intellectuellen Anschauung sich selbst anschaut (*W.* II. 31-38).

In order that the Begriff, "I am image of Being," may become realized, the empirical I, or the world of consciousness must actually appear in the likeness of God: it does so appear through the free development by the multiplicity of egos — in which form the empirical I is given — of the One Organic Moral Will; this One Organic Will freely subjects itself to Law for the sake of Law, hence it is the image of God who is Holy Will (516-556).

THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

It is asserted again and again by Fichte that there is no Universal Consciousness: Nur in der individuellen Form, und zwar nur in der Fortsetzung derselben, kann es (das Leben) seiner sich bewusst werden (*W.* II. 647, 606, 610, 667. *Ngz.* *W.* II. 484; *Ngz.* *W.* III. 43, 70, 73, 79).

This statement, of course, refers only to the present world of consciousness which we know as spirits in the flesh. It is in perfect harmony with Fichte's system to have faith in the existence of a Universal Consciousness, as image of God, which is infinitely more rich and complex than that ascribed to the Christian God. We remember that Fichte deduces immortality and an infinite series of worlds for moral humanity which is only a-forming in this world: when the Composite Man, "whose multiform features are men," is developed, his specific task is to be revealed to him. This Composite Man may be the interpenetration of the consciousness of each by each; the souls of holy men who have died may, through death, have learned how to penetrate all existing consciousness, and may now fall short of perfect knowledge neither in extent nor in exactness: they may know even as they are known. The only limitation of their knowledge may be that, as all the members of the great Organism are not yet developed, the widest conceivable interpenetration is not yet possible. This faith is a faith in the communion of saints, in the wisdom and efficacy of prayer: it is a spiritualism of the highest kind, for it sees the holy dead as points of sight of infinite knowledge, as now existing and knowing each of us with all his needs and aspirations, as having God's power to speak to our souls with God's consciousness. We quote a passage from Fichte which suggests such a possibility, though the context shows that it was not in his mind.

Der absolute Begriff, d. i. der eigentlich qualitative Inhalt der Erscheinung, das wahrhafte unmittelbare Bild Gottes, tritt nicht heraus in einem Gesamtbewusstsein, weil es ein inneres Gesamtbewusstsein nicht giebt, sondern nur im individuellen Bewusstseyn. Wie verhält sich nun dieses Bild in jedem individuellen Bewusstsein zum wahrhaftigen und einigen Bilde? Offenbar ist es ein Bild jenes Bildes, und zwar ist das Bild eines jeden besondern Individui von denen aller übrigen unterschieden, nach dem Gesetze der organischen Einheit eines Begriffs aus allen. Wenn alle

diese individuellen Bilder durch einander begriffen werden; ihre Einheit und ihre specifische Differenz aus einem Principe klar wird; dann ist das Allen zu Grunde liegende wahrhafte Bild begriffen. Dieses aber ist erst der wahrhaftige Begriff: dieser soll, dem sittlichen Willen zufolge, sein Leben bekommen. Aber er muss für diesen Behuf erst ein Bewusstsein bekommen. Die Form eines solchen Bewusstseins ist beschrieben: alle Individuen ohne Ausnahme müssen die Bilder aller übrigen kennen und mit den ihrigen in einer organischen Einheit begreifen, und nun hätten alle übrigen den wahrhaften einen Begriff, oder Bild (*Ngl. W. III. 79, 80*).

ANSCHAUUNG AND DENKEN.

THE reader of Fichte is at first greatly troubled by his use of the words "Anschauung," and "Denken," and as Fichte tells him repeatedly that their proper understanding is the key to his system, his perplexity seems a serious hindrance. In the (1810-11) "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns," and in the (1812) "Transcendentale Logik," the two words are carefully discriminated. We will place the results of these works before the reader under the heads "Anschauung," "Denken."

ANSCHAUUNG.

(1812) *Transcendentale Logik.* Ngl. W. I. 103-400.

The problem of Fichte's "Transcendentale Logik" is stated to be, "to discover how much of the empirical world is a matter of pure Anschauung, and how much of Denken (316, 317, 140, 195, 232, 245, 260, 262 etc.)."

As the plain man reads these words he understands by "Anschauung" the objective world (137, 222, 245, 262, 313), which he assumes to be a not-I. Hence to him the statement means, "how much of the physical world is I, and how much not-I?" But investigation shows that all existence is the I, and that the not-I is simply an inference of the I; hence the problem must be, "how much of existence is a *reference to a not-I*, a recognition of another, a confession of passivity? (142, 152, 262).

Evidently it will be that part of the I which cannot be explained as the result of the I. Now, assuming the I to be understanding, its only inexplicable element, which is, therefore, not to be looked upon as the work of the I, is the *stuff of special sensations*: why we experience red and blue, hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, pain and pleasure, why we have just these senses and just these determinations of these senses, we can never know. Hence the stuff of special sensation is a matter of pure Anschauung: it is only gazed at, not understood as created by self; it is assumed by the I to be the work of another, hence it is a reference to a not-I, a confession of passivity.

To prove the truth of this solution — that only the stuff of special sensation is Anschauung and everything else is Denken — Fichte must show that everything but sensation can be explained, hence is Denken: in other words he must explain all of the universe except the qualitative. This he

does : he begins with the physical world, but assumes that his hearers know that they see only the content of their own consciousness, only mental images of what they assume to be things-in-themselves (111, 131-133).

Fichte first analyzes the nature of image : he finds that it derives its unity from the analytic unity of apperception (131-180).

Next the I must be analyzed to show how much is explicable, and therefore the result of Denken. All existence, he finds, with one exception, can be explained : The I as law of Subject Objectivity, the necessity of Being if there is Image, the unity of Image and Being, or freedom and necessity, space, the senses, the I-form, or apperception, the necessity of the not-understood, the necessity of a determined not-understood, can be deduced from the self-evident truth that the I is the understanding of understanding : hence all this is Denken (180-298).

The one inexplicable fact is the stuff of special sensations, the qualitative content of life — why red and green should be just what they are instead of something else ; why man should know just the determinations that he does instead of other determinations ; why we have not other senses, and why just these (298-319).

Fichte has now shown Anschauung to be the concrete qualitative as *stuff*, for the determinations of the qualitative are, as determinations, thought (122, 280, 294, 317-319). Since the qualitative can appear only in thought-forms, the sum total may be called Denken, and concrete sense determinations may be termed empirical thinking (318, 319).

This view that qualitative content is in itself something wholly different from image is of the utmost importance. Our only knowledge of it is in its image, a flow of sensations, for only in image can it enter the understanding, the I ; but in itself it is not sensation. Hence sensations are not in any wise realities, they are the images of deeper truths that we can never know, for these truths are not images, but their realities, and we can know only images (153-155). Thus the Wissenschaftslehre leads us directly to a spiritual world, and teaches the nothingness of the empirical world (397, 398).

We shall find that sensation is the image-form of morality, and that morality is the truest image of reality that man can know, is for him real being : morality needs qualitative determinations that there may be choice, for it is right to do this and wrong to do that, hence this and that must be distinguished, or the qualitative must exist. Sensation is the image of material out of which the moral image must be formed (307). The empirical is that which has not yet been stamped by morality (314, 307).

Such is the analysis of Anschauung as given by "Transcendental Logic." Its result is identical with that of the "Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns" of 1810-11, which we now put before the reader.

(1810-11) *Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns*. W. II. 535-691.

Fichte aims to show that in the perception of so-called external objects, in the consciousness of a tree, a stove, there is an inseparable union of Denken and Anschauung; that which would be obtained if all Denken were eliminated from such objects is Anschauung pure and simple: this Anschauung is the stuff of self: "Anschauung ist dasjenige Wissen, welches durch das *Seyn* der Freiheit unmittelbar sich ergibt" (560). Perception is ego-stuff in thought-forms, or concrete Denken (541-565).

To reach this result, Fichte analyzes a presentation; it contains: (1) an affection of the external senses which report red, bitter, etc. (542); (2) space relations, which are a view by self of its own power of quantitating (542-545); (3) a certainty that the object affecting us in space is outside self (545-549).

(3) Now this last element is a result of thought; it is a result of: (1) an unconscious tearing of self loose from the affection of the senses; (2) the sight of a power of quantitating, and of reasoning in obedience to the causal instinct that, since the affection of the senses, etc., is not caused by anything within self, it must be caused by something outside self. Hence the fact upon which the plain man insists — that an external world exists — is simply the logical conclusion of a bit of unconscious thinking (545, 546). In accepting as indisputable fact the existence of an external world because such external world is necessary to satisfy its own causal instinct, thought reveals its nature as a *positing*, a *creating*, for the plain man's intelligence: in this positing an opposition is posited, the world is opposed to the I, hence the nature of thought is a *positing of an opposition* (547, 548). Thought has now revealed itself as a power to tear itself loose from Anschauung, or as a free and independent Life (548).

(2) In the second element of the presentation we also find thought: we have said that a view of space is a view by self of its own power of quantitating (544, 545); but the view of a *power* is a general view, rising above all special cases of its own causality (560, 561); since it is *general*, since it *goes beyond the special*, it has the character of thought. Hence in space there is a most intimate union of Anschauung and Denken (560, 561). This view of space is more fully developed in the "Transcendentale Logik," where space is shown to lie in the middle between pure thinking and empirical thinking, and to form a third class of concepts which partake equally of the nature of Denken and Anschauung (*Ngl. W.* I. 250, 251, 258-263, 334-336). In space we have something recognized by sense, and something grasped by thought.

(1) Hence, after apparently subtracting thought from the presentation, we seem to have left as pure Anschauung only the qualitative. But the qualitative always appears as determined; determinations are thought-

forms; hence it is absolutely impossible to separate Anschauung from Denken; Anschauung as absolute not-thought could not be known by the I (*W.* II. 561).

Though what the plain man sees is more properly called "concrete thought" than Anschauung, yet as the activity of thought in it is hidden to all but the philosopher, and the prominent fact is a *sight* of something, the sense world passes for an Anschauung.

Fichte uses the word "Anschauung" loosely in many of his treatises. He by no means confines himself to the technical meaning which he has given it. We give a few examples from the "Transcendentale Logik" (*NgL. W.* I. 103-400).

(1) The collective sense world (137, 145, 313). Empiricism (222, 245, 262).

(2) The collective sense world viewed as mental representation, hence "*reference*" to something beyond, *notice* that something is imaged in it (134-136, 142, 152, 262). This meaning involves passivity, recognition of a not-I (153, 262).

(3) View of any kind, as of the law of subject objectivity (125, 126, 134-137, 143, 191, 192, etc.).

(4) Intellectuelle Anschauung, as view of self (137, 187, 281, 282), as view of truth (135).

(5) It is constantly stated in the "Transcendentale Logik" that its problem is to discover how much of knowledge is Anschauung and how much Denken (140, 195, 232, 245, 260, 262, 316, etc.). The inference is that Anschauung is not-thought. We are told that sense is not-thought (260, 298-319).

In his other works we sometimes find Fichte saying that the Anschauung has all thought within itself, and again that it is not-thought. In the former statement he uses Anschauung in its ordinary sense, to denote perception, the objective universe of the plain man, and he means that what is seen is ego-stuff in thought-forms; by the second statement, when Anschauung is used in its technical sense, he signifies that the only "Anschauung-opposed-to-Denken" is the this and that of the qualitative.

DENKEN.

(1812) *Transcendentale Logik*. *Ngl. W. I.* 103-400.

The I has two constituents, its stuff and its form: the former we have found to be Anschauung; the latter is Denken. When the potential I decides to be, it goes forth in obedience to Law as the formal activity, Denken, as Life, its forms filling with the stuff of the I, and the empirical world appears.

The forms of Denken are established by Absolute Being or law; hence Denken may be figured as an eye which looks at concepts prescribed for it, and relates the stuff within its forms to them: it may be described as a seizing of relations, *i. e.*, it seizes the relation between the fact and the original concept it brings with it (125); or we may say that it is an imaging which posits absolutely an image of itself (124); or, again, it is the fashioning of the relation of a determined to another within which it is determined (129); or it is a view of absolute laws in accordance with which the fact directs itself (331).

Since the concepts of Denken establish the nature of an object, they can be called the laws of the object, the conditions of conceiving the object; when something does not accord with a given concept it is not a given object; if it accord with no concept at all, it has no existence, for sin against the concepts of Denken is expiated only by the loss of being (367-372). Denken may accordingly be said to be the image of the law of an object (204, 260).

The only real thinking is the material universe, perception. In perception every object is the conclusion of a syllogism whose three terms are: (1) all cases of such a union of attributes are cases of such an object; (2) this is a case of such a union of attributes; (3) hence this is such an object. But three terms of the syllogism are inseparably synthesized in one complex act — the empirical glance, or perception. This is the “*ursprüngliche Denken*” of the “*Darstellung*” and of the “*Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns*” (319, 320, 326, 328, 330, 335, 347, 348, 357, 368, 369, etc.).

There is no such thing as pure Denken, for in true thinking, Denken and Anschauung are inseparably united (thought-forms and sense). Much less does thought create objects. It would, perhaps, be better to substitute the term “*understanding*” for Denken, in order to express the truth that something is given as object for thought (230, 244, 245, 256, 267, 268, 270, 271, 277, 281).

But after thought has appeared in its first stratum, the empirical world, it possesses the power of divorcing itself from Anschauung, tearing itself loose from the sense world, floating over it to view it, and to form empty

images of it and of itself. Such mere images the plain man and the logician call "thought." But we must never forget their emptiness, and that the only true thinking is the sense world (319-332. *Tht. d. B., W. II.* 561).

Since thought has the power of freeing itself from its present work and rising above it to view it, any product of thought may be called an *Anschauung*, and thought in this sense is creative, *i. e.*, it weaves a web like the *Wissenschaftslehre* which may be viewed as an integral production (*Tht. d. B., W. II.* 589, 593, 594).

INSEPARABILITY OF ANSCHAUUNG AND DENKEN.

Anschauung and *Denken* are from many points of view inseparable: —

(1) *Denken*, in its primal aspect, is *Anschauung*, for it is a looking at the laws of Absolute Being to image these laws (*Ngl. W. I.* 124-131).

(2) Any product of thought may become an *Anschauung*, a "view" of the thinker. (See first lectures of the *Transcendentale Logik* for constant use of word in this sense.)

(3) In the sense world *Denken* and *Anschauung* are inseparably welded together, for sensation can appear only as determinations, and determinations are thought-forms (317-319), or, in other words, sensation involves discrimination and assimilation which are thought-processes.

(4) *Anschauung*, or Sense, refers to something beyond: sense appears to the plain man as an affection by a thing-in-itself; it is a reference, and can be expressed in no more elementary terms. But this reference is thought, for it discloses the nature of the sense-affection as not something independent in itself, but merely a result (274); and thought is the seeing the nature of a being, the grasping of its laws (204, 260). Hence Sense involves thought. On the other hand, thought involves sense, for, as we have just said, thought is understanding the nature of something. If the something is not given, its nature cannot be understood: there can be no pure thinking, no thought without sense (230, 244, 256, 268, 277). Thought is the law of an image, hence can exist only in and through the image. Thought is a determiner, hence is only in as far as something is determined. Thought determines empirical being, never posits it. "Das Denken bleibt immer ein Bestimmen eines faktischen Seins, niemals ein Setzen desselben" (278, 279).

(5) The absolute inseparability of *Denken* and *Anschauung* is finely demonstrated in lectures XIX. XX., where it is shown that the universe is merely the understanding of understanding. Understanding can be understood only through the presence of its opposite — the not-understood; hence the I, or understanding, must from its very nature bring with it the

inexplicable ; understanding itself the plain man calls mind ; its inseparable complement, the not-understood, he calls matter, and goes no further. The philosopher sees both as reciprocally involving elements of one whole which in one aspect is understanding, and in another, the not-understood. Understanding can rise above itself continually in reflection, for its nature is to understand itself ; but the not-understood never rises, it is shut in itself, its existence as counterpart is sufficient ; it is an absolute image, closed and incomprehensible.

Thought is the immediate appearance of the Absolute, of the supersensuous. Hence thought is in its nature spiritual, the means of expression of the supersensuous, and leads us at once to the spiritual world as the only reality (397). Therefore Kant's problem, — "How can reason know supersensuous truths ?" is answered (322-326, 331).

Another advantage of our theory is that it deduces thought from the absolute law of the being of the Appearance, of the *Erscheinung*, the I. This law is that the I shall be image of Absolute Being ; hence *Denken*, the form given to the I, must establish relations between the content of the I and the concepts imposed upon it by Absolute Being ; it holds the original concepts of law, and in their image shapes sensation, the stuff of the I. Presupposed the one law that the I is image of the Absolute, and the form of *Denken* follows as necessity. We, therefore, understand thought in its essence ; we see *why* it is a seizing of relations ; why its nature is ever double, and a thing is understood only through its opposite. With the logician, on the contrary, thought is empirical, he knows that he thinks in such and such fashion, but can give no reason for the process (320-336).

From what we have said, it appears that *Denken* is the form of the activity, of the Life, of the I. It goes forth, and straightway the stuff of the I appears and fills its forms, the physical world is seen. Again it tears itself loose from its union with sensation, and shapes as free thought whatever image of itself it will. It is the form of the freedom of the I in so far as the I is free after its creation.

The law of the form of the I is subject-objectivity (188-195), hence in this case *Denken* is subject-objectivity. Since subject-objectivity is the one all-comprehensive form into which all knowledge, all existence, must come. Subject-objectivity may be called *Denken* *κατ' ἐξοχήν* ; it is the image of the supreme law of all being.

GENESIS.

IN Fichte's later works one of his favorite terms is "genesis." To understand it we must remember that in his doctrine there is no Ding an sich, there is only activity everywhere; when, therefore, reason reaches a logical conclusion as to any necessary existence, whether actual or super-actual, whether Absolute Ego, God, Freedom, Holy Will, or what not, it remembers at once that this apparent existence is not a Ding an sich, but that it is only some activity of its own which appears as this existence, and straightway returns upon itself to discover what the act is which generates the appearance; in so doing it discovers, as such, the ground, the law of thought, which has led it to conclude as to the necessity of the existence, hence "genesis" is sometimes described as a seeing of the ground (*Ngl. W. II.* 128, 135); sometimes as a seeing of the law of an object (*Ngl. W. I.* 195); sometimes as a seeing of an activity (*Ngl. W. II.* 129, 194); sometimes as an analysis of existence (*Ngl. W. I.* 205). We quote: —

(1804) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II.* 87–314.

“Eine Bemerkung, die für alle frühern und künftigen Vorlesungen gilt, und sehr dienlich sein wird, um dieselben zu reproduciren und zu übersehen. — Unser Gang ist fast immer der, dass wir (a) Etwas vollziehen, in dieser Vollziehung ohne Zweifel geleitet durch ein unmittelbar in uns thätiges Vernunftgesetz. — Was wir in diesem Falle eigentlich, in unserer eigenen höchsten Spitze sind, und worin wir aufgehen, ist doch noch *Fakticität*. — Dass wir sodann (b) das Gesetz, welches eben in diesem ersten Vollziehen uns mechanisch leitete, selber erforschen und aufdecken; also das vorher unmittelbar Eingesehene, *mittelbar* einsehen aus dem Princip und Grunde seines Daseins, also in der Genesis seiner Bestimmtheit es durchdringen. Auf diese Weise nun werden wir von faktischen Gliedern aufsteigen zu genetischen; welches Genetische denn doch wieder in einer *andern* Ansicht faktisch sein kann, wo wir daher gedrungen sein werden, wieder zu dem, in Beziehung auf *diese* Fakticität, Genetischen aufzusteigen, so lange bis wir zur *absoluten* Genesis, zur Genesis der Wissenschaftslehre hinaufkommen (128).

Das kann nun die Wissenschaftslehre sich keinesweges zu Schulden kommen lassen so gewiss sie Wissenschaftslehre ist; sie darf jene Unab-

trennlichkeit der Divisionsfundamente nicht nur *behaupten*, sondern sie muss dieselbe in ihrem Principe, und aus ihrem Principe als nothwendig *begreifen*, sie daher genetisch und mittelbar einsehen (135).

(1812) *Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400.*

Davon hat die transcendente Logik ihren Beweis zu führen durch genetisches Entstehenlassen des faktisch gegebenen Wissens, von dem wir hier reden, und durch Nachweisung des Denkens darin. (Ich sage: durch genetisches Entstehenlassen; nicht, als ob es etwa wirklich entstände, in der That *ist* es.) Das Entstehenlassen ist bloss das Sichtbarmachen des Gesetzes und der Art und Weise dieses Seins. (Darüber haben auch Missverständnisse obgewaltet; wir haben ihnen stets widersprochen. Dass sie hier nicht auch einreissen! Es ist gar keine historische oder faktische Causalität, sondern eine lediglich intelligibele der Gesetze. Es gehört gar sehr zu unserm Zwecke, dies zu erklären, and wir werden darauf zurückkommen (195).

(1804) *Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 87-314.*

Dieser Idealismus ist, als an sich gültig, widerlegt: obwohl er, als Erscheinung, und wahrscheinlich als Urgrund aller Erscheinung wieder Dasein erhalten dürfte, was wir abzuwarten haben: — widerlegt aus dem Grunde, weil er faktisch ist, und eine höhere Genesis auf seinen Ursprung deutet. Faktisch nennt man eine Thatsache, und da hier vom Bewusstsein die Rede ist, wäre diese Thatsache eine Thatsache des Bewusstseins; oder es strenger ausgedrückt: nach diesem idealistischen Systeme, wäre das Bewusstseyn selber Thatsache, und da das Bewusstsein ihm das Absolute ist, das *Absolute* wäre Thatsache. Nun hat die Wissenschaftslehre, von dem ersten Augenblicke ihrer Entstehung an, erklärt, dass es das *πρῶτον ψεύδος* der bisherigen Systeme sei, von Thatsachen auszugehen, und in diese das Absolute zu setzen: sie lege zu Grunde, hat sie bezeugt, eine *Thathandlung*, was ich in diesen Vorträgen mit dem griechischen Worte, dergleichen oft williger richtig verstanden werden, als die deutschen, *Genesis* benannt habe. Sonach ist die Wissenschaftslehre von ihrer ersten Entstehung an über den beschriebenen Idealismus hinausgewesen (194; see also 129).

(1812) *Transcendentale Logik. Ngl. W. I. 103-400.*

Nun spricht das Bild von dem Erscheinen des Absoluten. Wird da ein historischer Act ausgedrückt? das wäre ja ein Widerspruch: denn indem sich die Erscheinung beschreibt in ihrer Genesis, *ist* sie ja schon. Was ist denn nun diese Genesis? Sie ist *reines* Bild, das schlechthin durch sich

setzt, dass ihm kein Sein entspreche. Bei dieser höchsten Ansicht der Genesis der Erscheinung aus dem Absoluten selbst soll Ihnen klar werden, was unter Genesis verstanden werden muss. Alle genetische Erklärung setzt das Sein voraus; sie ist reines leeres Bild des innern Seins, *Analyse* des Seins. Die Unkunde aller dieser Sätze hat die grössten Irrthümer verbreitet über die Theorie des Begriffs und der Anschauung, des *a priori* und *a posteriori* und ihren Zusammenhang (205).

NOMENCLATURE.

FICHTE'S philosophic nomenclature varies with almost every treatise, for he sought continually a more simple and concrete way of expressing his doctrine. In the following table we indicate some of the terms which he used to express the totality of consciousness as divided into two spheres — one of pure thought commonly called God, and a second called the empirical world : —

	GOD.	THE WORLD.
1794. <i>Grundlage.</i>	Die unabhängige Thätigkeit.	Das Ich und das Nicht-Ich.
1795. <i>Grundriss.</i>	Die freien Kräfte.	Das Ich und das Nicht-Ich.
1800. <i>Bestimmung des Menschen.</i>	Gott.	Die Welt.
1801. <i>Darstellung.</i>	Das Absolute.	Das Wissen as interpenetration of Freiheit und das absolute Seyn.
1804. <i>Die Wissenschaftslehre.</i>	Die Einheit, das eine Ansich, das Unbegreifliche, das Licht, das Abgebildete, 0 (<i>Ngl. W.</i> II. 163, 167, 168), die reine Vernunft, etc.	Das Wissen, die Erscheinung.
1805. <i>Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten.</i>	Seyn, Leben, das Absolute, Gott.	Die Welt.
1806. <i>Anweisung zum seligen Leben.</i>	Seyn, das Leben.	Daseyn (sometimes "das Leben" includes both Seyn and Daseyn).
1810. <i>Umriss.</i>	Gott.	Das Wissen.
1810. <i>Fichte an Jacobi.</i>	Gott.	Die Erscheinung.
1810. } <i>Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.</i>	Endzweck als das Seyn Gottes:	Das Bewusstseyn (title), das Wissen, Leben, Denken.
1811. }		
1812. <i>Die Wissenschaftslehre.</i>	Das Absolute, das Sichtbare, Gott, das Licht, das absolute <i>Von</i> sich.	Erscheinung, die Sichtbarkeit, die Construction. The sum of both spheres is called das Absolute Sehen.
1812. <i>Sittenlehre.</i>	Begriff als das Bild Gottes.	Das Ich.
1812. <i>Transcendentale Logik.</i>	Seyn.	Bild (die Erscheinung resolves itself into Bild des Seyns und Bild des Bildes).
1813. <i>Die Wissenschaftslehre.</i>	Absolutes Verstehen ist Bildsein seiner selbst als absoluten Principes unter Gesetzen.	
1813. <i>Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns.</i>	Das Absolute.	Die Erscheinung.
1813. <i>Einleitung.</i>	Zwei Durch, Principheiten, Leben.	Die gegebene Vorstellungswelt.

FICHTE'S "POINT OF VIEW," OR THE WISSENSCHAFTS-
LEHRE AS AN ALL-INCLUSIVE THOUGHT, AN "IT IS
AS IF."

WE have said that the Wissenschaftslehre is not the description of Dinge an sich which have done certain deeds that have had certain results: it is not the account of an historical process which has *extra-mentem* reality. The Wissenschaftslehre is an analysis of consciousness and an exposition of its grounds: it places before us every articulation of the whole organic thought of which so-called external facts are only one bit: it is a showing that whenever the plain man says of any bit of existence "it is," the philosopher must say, "it is as if the whole content of the Wissenschaftslehre were."

Passages explaining the nature of the Wissenschaftslehre are found in almost every treatise, and one work, the (1801) "Sonnenklarer Bericht an das grössere Publicum über das eigentliche Wesen der neuesten Philosophie" (*II. II.* 321-420), is wholly devoted to such explanation. We give summary and quotations: —

Consciousness is at first compared to the mechanism of a watch, where each piece is part of one whole, and all pieces help in bringing about one and the same result, (346-356). From one piece he who understands the mechanism can deduce the others. "Setze ferner den Fall, dass die Philosophie, oder, wenn du lieber willst, die Wissenschaftslehre eben in dem Aufsuchen dieses Mannigfaltigen des Bewusstseyns, auf dem Wege des Schlusses aus dem Gegebenen auf das Nichtgegebene, bestehe, so hättest du schon jetzt einen sehr klaren Begriff von dieser Wissenschaft. Sie wäre die Demonstration, die Ableitung des ganzen Bewusstseyns, es versteht sich immer, seinen ersten und Grundbestimmungen nach, aus irgend einer in wirklichen Bewusstseyn gegebenen Bestimmung desselben; ebenso, wie du dir eine Demonstration der ganzen Uhr aus einem einzigen dir gegebenen Rade derselben sehr wohl denken kannst" (349).

Die Wissenschaftslehre setzt, um nur erst einen Eingang in sich selbst und eine bestimmte Aufgabe zu gewinnen, voraus, dass in dem Mannigfaltigen jener Grundbestimmungen, dem angegebenen Umfange nach, ein systematischer

Zusammenhang seyn möge, zufolge dessen, wenn Eins ist, alles Uebrige seyn, und gerade so seyn muss, wie es ist; dass sonach, welches in der Voraussetzung liegt, jene Grundbestimmungen, dem angegebenen Umfange nach, ein vollendetes und in sich geschlossenes System ausmachen (353).

In the watch the final cause of each piece is the moving of the hand; in consciousness the final cause of each element is the development of self-consciousness. "Die Voraussetzung, von welcher wir ausgehen, ist die, dass das letzte und höchste Resultat des Bewusstseyns, d. i. dasjenige, zu welchem alles Mannigfaltige desselben sich verhalte, wie Bedingung zum Bedingten, oder wie die Räder, Federn und Ketten in der Uhr zum Zeiger der Stunde, nichts Anderes sey, als das *klare und vollständige* Selbstbewusstseyn; so wie du, ich, und wir alle uns unserer bewusst sind (361). Die Ichheit ist es, die Subject-Objectivität, und sonst durchaus nichts; das Setzen des Subjectiven und seines Objectiven, des Bewusstseyns und seines Bewussten als Eins; und schlechthin nichts weiter, ausser dieser Identität (362, 363).

But just as the deductions by the watch-maker of the other parts of the watch from one wheel, have only ideal existence in his mind, so the deductions of the Wissenschaftslehre exist only as logical conclusions in the mind of the thinker "Giebst du, oder irgend ein vernünftiger Mensch eine solche Repräsentation, innerliche Entwerfung und Abzeichnung einer solchen Maschine für die wirkliche, gehende, ihre Functionen im Leben verrichtende Maschine aus? und sagt dir jemand, nachdem er z. B. eine Taschenuhr beschrieben, und demonstirt: nun stecke diese Taschenuhr zu dir; sie wird richtig gehen; du kannst sie herausziehen, wenn du willst, und an ihr sehen welche Zeit es ist? (351.)

Nicht, dass ichs wüsste; wenn er nicht ein ausgemachter Thor ist (351).

Die Wissenschaftslehre leitet sonach, ohne alle Rücksicht auf die Wahrnehmung, *a priori* ab, was ihr zufolge eben in der Wahrnehmung also *a posteriori*, vorkommen soll. Ihr bedeuten sonach diese Ausdrücke nicht verschiedene Objecte, sondern nur eine verschiedene Ansicht eines und ebendesselben Objects (355).

The Wissenschaftslehre is next compared to our view of the procedure of reason in constructing a rectilinear triangle: "Mit dieser Anschauung meines Construirens eines Triangels müsste nun, um meine allgemeine Behauptung zu begründen, unmittelbar verknüpft seyn die absolute Ueberzeugung dass ich nie und in keinem Falle anders construiren könne; in der Anschauung sonach ergriffe und umfasste ich mein ganzes Constructionsvermögen mit Einem Male, und auf Einen Blick, durch ein unmittelbares Bewusstseyn, nicht dieses bestimmten Construirens, sondern schlechthin alles meines Construirens überhaupt, und zwar, *als* eines solchen (373). Die Anschauung wäre daher die sich selbst unmittelbar als solche constituirende Auffassung

der Handelsweise der Vernunft überhaupt, auf einmal, und mit Einem Blicke" (374).

So in the Wissenschaftslehre we see the procedure of reason in constructing self-consciousness, or we have an Anschauung of the pure I: "Wenn nun auf die von dir soeben als Bedingung der Geometrie nachgewiesene, und beschriebene Anschauung, aber in ihrer höchsten Abgezogenheit, die Wissenschaftslehre sich gründete, und die ganze Reihe derselben darlegte; — ja wenn sie von derselben in ihrer höchsten Abgezogenheit sogar ausginge; wenn diese Anschauung für sich selbst, also die sich selbst in ihrem einzigen Mittelpuncte auffassende und für immer bestimmende allgemeine Vernunft selbst, das erste Glied in ihrer Kette, diese eben *sich selbst*, als Vernunft fassende Vernunft, sonach das schon oben beschriebene reine Ich im höchsten Sinne dieses Wortes wäre, etc. (374, 375). Von jenem reinen Ich sonach, oder der Anschauung in ihrer höchsten Abgezogenheit, hebt die Wissenschaftslehre nur an" (375).

Just as the parts of a triangle reciprocally condition each other, so do the members of the content of consciousness: the law is always reciprocal determination by the parts of an organic whole: So wie in der ursprünglichen Construction des Triangels die dritte Seite sich bestimmt findet durch die anderen zwei und den eingeschlossenen Winkel; ebenso findet sich, der Wissenschaftslehre zufolge, in der ursprünglichen Construction ein Gewisses im Bewusstseyn bestimmt durch ein Anderes im Bewusstseyn (378).

Es tritt jetzt eine dort gebildete Bestimmung des Bewusstseyns wirklich ein; ebenso wie ein Winkel und zwei Seiten, deren freie Construction möglich war, im Felde gefunden werden. Du kannst ebenso fest glauben, dass mit der eingetretenen wirklichen Bestimmung zugleich die in dem Bilde als unzertrennlich von der ersteren gefundenen, in der Wirklichkeit eingetreten — bestimmt so eingetreten sind, wie sie dort beschrieben werden, und du wirst es, falls du die Beobachtung anstellst, wirklich so finden. Davon ist jeder, der sich zu dieser Speculation erhebt, ebenso gewiss überzeugt, als es der Geometer davon ist, dass die Messung der wirklichen Linie seine Rechnung bestätigen werde. Die Bestimmungen des wirklichen Bewusstseyns, auf die er die Gesetze des frei construirten Bewusstseyns, anzuwenden gezwungen ist, eben so wie der Geometer die Gesetze des frei construirten Triangels auf den im Felde gefundenen, sind ihm nun auch *gleichsam* Resultate einer ursprünglichen Construction, und werden in jener Beurtheilung so behandelt. *Ob nun wirklich eine solche ursprüngliche Construction des Bewusstseyns vor allem Bewusstseyn vorher vorgegangen darauf lässt er sich nicht ein; ja diese Frage ist für ihn völlig ohne allen Sinn** (378, 379).

The Wissenschaftslehre is a view of the totality of consciousness in its

* The italics are ours.

necessary interrelations : “ Das durch die Wissenschaftslehre Abgeleitete soll, der Absicht nach, eine getroffene und vollständige Abbildung des ganzen Grundbewusstseyns seyn. Kann nun dasselbe mehr enthalten, oder weniger, oder irgend etwas anderes Bestimmtes, als im wirklichen Bewusstseyn vorkommt? ” (394.)

Keinesweges, so gewiss die Wissenschaftslehre ihren Zweck erfüllt. Jede Abweichung derselben von dem wirklichen Bewusstseyn wäre der sicherste Beweis der Unrichtigkeit ihrer Ableitung (394).

Demnach wäre, zufolge alles bisher Gesagten, im ganzen Bewusstseyn eines endlichen vernünftigen Wesens, nur Folgendes möglich :

Zuvörderst die ersten und Grundbestimmungen seines Lebens als solche ; das gemeine Bewusstseyn, das in unmittelbarer Erfahrung vorkommende, oder wie man es nennen will. Dieses ist ein durchaus geschlossenes, vollendetes System ; für alle, lediglich die durchaus individuellen Bestimmungen abgerechnet, völlig dasselbe. Die oben charakterisirte erste Potenz. Sodann die Reflexion hierüber und Repräsentation desselben, das freie Trennen, Zusammensetzen und Beurtheilen ins Unendliche ; welches von der Freiheit abhängt, und nach dem verschiedenen Gebrauche derselben verschieden ist. Die oben sogenannten höheren Potenzen, — gleichsam die mittlere Region in unserem Geiste. Es ist dabei nicht aus der Acht zu lassen, dass nichts in diesen höheren Potenzen vorkommen kann, das nicht wenigstens seinen Elementen nach in der ersten gelegen. Die Freiheit des Geistes kann ins Unendliche trennen und verbinden das im Grundbewusstseyn Gegebene, aber sie kann nicht erschaffen. — Endlich eine vollständige Ableitung des der ersten Potenz ohne alle Rücksicht auf die wirkliche Erfahrung, aus dem blossen nothwendigen Verfahren der Intelligenz überhaupt ; *gleich als ob* * das Grundbewusstseyn Resultat dieses Verfahrens wäre : die Wissenschaftslehre, als absolut höchste Potenz, über welche kein Bewusstseyn sich erheben kann. Auch in dieser kann durchaus nichts vorkommen, was nicht im wirklichen Bewusstseyn, oder in der Erfahrung, der höchsten Bedeutung des Wortes nach, liegt (394, 395).

The conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are not actualities : Kein einziger ihrer Gedanken, Sätze, Aussprüche, ist einer des wirklichen Lebens, noch passend in das wirkliche Leben. Es sind eigentlich nur Gedanken von Gedanken, die man hat, oder haben sollte, Sätze von Sätzen, die man sich zu eigen machen, Aussprüche von Aussprüchen, die man selbst aussprechen soll (396).

The content of the Wissenschaftslehre is not a categorical “ it is, ” but only an “ as if it were. ” D. L. “ Aber ohnerachtet dieser Uebereinstimmung eurer Lehre mit dem gemeinen Menschenverstande, die ihr uns zusichert, könnt ihr doch wohl nicht läugnen, dass ihr sagt : Alles, was

* The italics are ours.

für uns da sey, werde durch uns selbst hervorgebracht. Dies ist doch ohne Zweifel eine Behauptung, die dem gemeinen Bewusstseyn geradezu ins Gesicht widerspricht. Wir sind uns nicht bewusst, dass wir das Daseyende hervorbringen, sondern dass es eben *da ist*, schlechthin da ist; dass wir es finden, und *vorfinden*" (397).

D. A. Ich verstehe nicht einmal recht die Behauptung, die du uns zuschreibst; dass ich sonach nicht weiss, ob ich sie als die unsrige anerkennen, oder sie ablängnen soll. Doch lass uns dieselbe erwägen (397).

Dass in der Wissenschaftslehre jeder, der dieselbe in sich erzeugt, das Bild des wirklichen Bewusstseyns, sonach die Reihe der Bilder alles dessen, was im Bewusstseyn als daseyend gefunden wird, selbst hervorbringe, und sich zusehe, wie er sie hervorbringt, liegt in der Beschreibung unserer Wissenschaft, und jeder, der sie studirt und versteht, wird es als unmittelbares Factum in sich selbst finden. Dass nun ebenso im gemeinen Bewusstseyn diese Reihe erzeugt werde, würde nicht nur diesem unmittelbaren Bewusstseyn selbst, sondern sogar der eigenen Behauptung der Wissenschaftslehre widersprechen und ihr ganzes System aufheben. Das Bewusstseyn ist nach dieser Lehre ein vollständiges System, und kein einzelner Theil desselben kann seyn, ohne dass alle übrigen, noch alle übrigen, ohne dass jeder einzelne sey. Es kann sonach, nach derselben Lehre, im gemeinen Bewusstseyn keinesweges allmählig, und in einer Reihe, erst ein einzelnes A, sodann ein B u. s. w. erzeugt werden, indem ja keines ohne das andere möglich ist, sondern wenn ja von einer Erzeugung geredet werden sollte, so müsste das Ganze, mit allen seinen einzelnen Theilen, schlechthin durch Einen Schlag erzeugt werden (398).

Aber warum wollten wir auch hier von Erzeugung reden? Das wirkliche Bewusstseyn ist; es ist ganz und durchaus fertig, so wie nur wir selbst fertig sind und Selbstbewusstseyn haben, mit welchem, als mit ihrem letzten Gliede die Wissenschaftslehre schliesst. Unsere bestehende Welt ist fertig, unstreitig nach Aller Urtheil so wie nur Wir sind. Unser wirkliches Leben kann nichts weiter thun, als dieser Welt, Stück für Stück, so wie der unerklärliche Zufall es fügt, *inne werden; dieselbe durchlaufen, analysiren und beurtheilen*.* Eine Erzeugung im wirklichen Leben zu behaupten hat durchaus keinen Sinn. Das Leben ist kein Erzeugen, sondern ein Finden. Eben dem vermeinten Erzeugen anderer Philosophien widerspricht die unsrige, und weist es ab (398).

Dieses absolut Vorhandene nun lässt, zufolge unserer Philosophie, im wirklichen Leben sich *behandeln und beurtheilen gleich als ob* es durch eine ursprüngliche Construction, so wie die Wissenschaftslehre eine vollzieht, entstanden sey: das wirkliche Leben lässt nach den Gesetzen einer solchen Construction sich ergänzen und suppliren, und man kann sicher seyn, dass

* The italics are ours.

die wirkliche Beobachtung eine solche Ergänzung bestätigen werde. Man braucht nicht gerade Alles, alle Mittelglieder, zu leben und zu erleben; ebenso wie man, durch eine wissenschaftliche Geometrie unterstützt, nicht alle Linien wirklich zu messen braucht, sondern mehrere durch blosser Berechnung finden kann (398).

Dieses *gleich als ob* für ein kategorisches *dass*, diese Fiction für die Erzählung einer wahren, irgend einmal zu irgend einer Zeit eingetretenen Begebenheit zu halten, ist ein grober Misverstand. Glauben sie denn, dass wir an der Construction des Grundbewusstseyns in der Wissenschaftslehre eine Historie von den Thathandlungen des Bewusstseyns, ehe das Bewusstseyn war, die Lebensgeschichte eines Mannes vor seiner Geburt, liefern wollen? Wie könnten wir doch, da wir selbst erklären, dass das Bewusstseyn nur mit allen seinen Bestimmungen zugleich ist; und kein Bewusstseyn vor allem Bewusstseyn, und ohne alles Bewusstseyn, begehren? Dies sind Misverständnisse, gegen welche man keine Vorkehrungen trifft, weil sie einem nicht beifallen, bis sie sich wirklich ereignen (398, 399).

So sind alle Kosmogonien Versuche einer ursprünglichen Construction des Universums aus seinen Grundbestandtheilen. Will denn nun der Urheber einer solchen sagen, dass es sich wirklich einmal also begeben habe, wie er es in seiner Kosmogonie vorträgt? Gewiss nicht, so gewiss er sich selbst versteht und weiss, was er redet. Denn ohne Zweifel ist ihm doch das Universum ein organisches Ganzes, von welchem kein Theil seyn kann, wenn nicht alle übrigen sind; das sonach gar nicht allmählig entstehen konnte, sondern zu jeder Zeit, da es da war, ganz da seyn musste. Freilich glaubt der unwissenschaftliche Verstand, den man im Umfange des Gegebenen erhalten und Forschungen dieser Art nicht an ihn kommen lassen sollte, eine Erzählung zu hören, weil er nichts denken kann, als Erzählungen. Lässt sich nicht aus der gegenwärtigen Annahme so vieler, dass wir durch unsere Gnosogonie eine Erzählung zu geben glauben, schliessen, dass sie selbst nicht abgeneigt seyn würden, es für eine Erzählung zu nehmen, wenn nur das Siegel der Autorität und des Alterthums darauf ruhte? (399.)

The conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are not *Dinge an sich*, but determinations of consciousness.

D. L. Aber doch höre ich auch jetzt immer nur von Bestimmungen eines Bewusstseyns, die da seyen, und einem Systeme des Bewusstseyns, das da sey u. dergl. Damit sind eben die Anderen nicht zufrieden; ein System von Dingen soll ihrer Forderung zufolge da seyn, und von diesen erst das Bewusstseyn erzeugt werden (399).

D. A. Begehre doch also nicht selbst über dich selbst hinauszuspringen, und irgend etwas anders zu fassen, als du es eben fassen kannst, als Bewusstseyn *und* Ding, als Ding *und* Bewusstseyn; oder eigentlicher als keines

von beiden, sondern als dasjenige, das erst hinterher in beides unterschieden wird, das absolut Subjectiv-objective und Objectiv-subjective (400), . . . wisst ihr denn je, ohne dass ihr eben ein Bewusstseyn habt ; könnt ihr denn also je mit allem eurem Wissen, und da dieses, wofern ihr euch nicht in Stöcke und Klötze, verwandelt, von eurem Wesen unzertrennlich ist, mit eurem ganzen Wesen je über Bestimmungen des Bewusstseyns hinauskommen? (401.)

Es ist uns freilich sehr wohl bekannt, dass, wenn ihr über jene Bestimmungen des Bewusstseyns wiederum urtheilt, also ein Bewusstseyn *der zweiten Potenz* erzeugt, euch dieses nun in diesem Zusammenhange ganz besonders als Bewusstseyn, und als blosses Bewusstseyn, abgehoben vom Dinge, erscheint ; und euch nun jene erste Bestimmung, in Rücksicht auf dieses blosse Bewusstseyn, als blosses Ding erscheint : ebenso, wie das *Maass* eurer Linie auch noch etwas Anderes seyn soll, als *die Linie selbst*. Aber ihr werdet euch durch diesen Schein nicht täuschen lassen, nachdem ihr ja einmal wisst, dass für euch gar nichts da seyn kann, ausser Bestimmungen des Bewusstseyns ; ihr werdet sonach auch jetzt noch sehr wohl begreifen, dass auch jenes Ding nichts sey, als eine solche Bestimmung, die nur in Beziehung auf ein höheres Bewusstseyn Ding genannt werde ; ebenso wie ihr jeden Augenblick innerwerden könnt, dass euer Maass der Linie durchaus nichts Anderes sey, als die Linie selbst, nur in einer anderen Beziehung und deutlicher gedacht (401, 402).

Ebenso wenig ist uns unbekannt, dass, wenn ihr ein stehendes System von Grundbestimmungen des Bewusstseyns denken sollt, wie ihr freilich, um auch nur den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre zu fassen, es sollt, es euch nicht wohl möglich ist, das Lebendige, in steter Agilität und im Werden Begriffene, wie euer Bewusstseyn euch erscheint, zu fixiren, und als ein Haltendes und Festes vor euch hinzustellen, welches euch auch niemand anmuthet ; sondern dass euch dieses System sodann, euerm Bewusstseyn gegenüber, zu einem Systeme der Welt ausschlägt : wie denn eure ganze, selbst im Standpuncte des gemeinen Bewusstseyns gedachte Welt nichts Anderes ist, als eben jenes stillschweigend vorausgesetzte System der Grundbestimmungen eines Bewusstseyns überhaupt. Ihr sollt aber aus der vorhergegangenen Selbstbesinnung wissen und euch lassen erinnern, dass es doch, so gewiss ihr es denkt, davon wisst und redet, und nicht — nicht denkt, nicht davon wisst noch redet, — eigentlich nur System von Bestimmungen eurer Bewusstseyns seyn könne (402).

The conception of the nature of the Wissenschaftslehre which is set forth in the "Sonnenklarer Bericht," Fichte held from the beginning. His doctrine was never given as a categorical "it is," but always as a "gleich als ob," as a statement of the way in which consciousness is forced to view its content. He wished always to teach that the only reality man can find is the image

“reality;” this image attaches itself to all rational conclusions; the philosopher is he whose eyes see that what they see is image. The Wissenschaftslehre was always for Fichte an exposition of the logical implications and connections of consciousness, not a statement of the existence of extramentem realities and acts.

It is a matter of exceeding interest to find this essentially Fichtean point of view so fully established in Fichte’s mind, even before his first formal exposition of his system, that he does not think it needs explanation; he takes it for granted that it is the essence of Kant’s teaching and familiar to all who know Kant, hence mere allusion to it will be sufficient.

We quote from a work written two years before his succession to the Jena professorship.

(1792) *Recension des Aenesidemus.* W. I. 1-25.

“Nachdem der Skeptiker die in jenen Abschnitten enthalten seyn sollen- den Behauptungen aufgezählt hat: (a) dass das Vorstellungs-Vermögen der Grund der Wirklichkeit der Vorstellungen sey; (b) dass das V. V. vor aller Vorstellung auf eine bestimmte Art vorhanden sey; [was mag das heissen sollen, und wo sagt das Reinhold?] . . . sowie das Wort: “Vorstellungs-Vermögen” sein Ohr trifft, sich dabei nichts Anderes denken kann, als irgend ein (rundes oder vierecktes?) Ding, das *unabhängig* von *seinem Vorstellen* als Ding an sich, und zwar als *vorstellendes* Ding existirt. Dass durch diese Deutung unserm Skeptiker gar nicht Unrecht geschehe, wird der Leser in kurzem sehen. — Das V. V. existirt *für* das V. V. und *durch* das V. V.; diess ist der nothwendige Zirkel, in welchem jeder endliche, und das heisst, jeder uns denkbare, Verstand eingeschlossen ist. Wer über diesen Zirkel hinaus will, versteht sich selbst nicht, und weiss nicht, was er will” (11).

Aber die Frage ist ja eben von einem *Uebergange* von dem Aeussern zum Innern, oder umgekehrt. Es ist ja eben das Geschäft der kritischen Philosophie, zu zeigen, dass wir eines Ueberganges nicht bedürfen; dass alles, was in unserm Gemüthe vorkommt, aus ihm selbst vollständig zu erklären und zu begreifen ist. Es ist ihr nicht eingefallen, eine Frage zu beantworten, die, nach ihr, der Vernunft widerspricht. Sie zeigt uns den Zirkel, über den wir nicht hinausschreiten können; innerhalb desselben aber verschafft sie uns den innigsten Zusammenhang in unsrer ganzen Erkenntniss (15).

A wirft die Frage auf, ob das Gemüth als Ding an sich, oder als Noumenon, oder als transcendente Idee, Grund der Erkenntnisse a priori sey? Als Ding an sich nicht. . . . Insofern das Gemüth der letzte Grund gewisser

Denkformen überhaupt ist, ist es Noumenon ; insofern diese als unbedingt nothwendige Gesetze betrachtet werden, ist es transcendentale Idee ; die aber von allen andern dadurch sich unterscheidet, dass wir sie durch intellectuelle Anschauung, durch das *Ich bin*, und zwar : *ich bin schlechthin, weil Ich bin*, realisiren. Alle Ansprüche Aenesidem's gegen dieses Verfahren gründen sich bloss darauf, dass er die absolute Existenz und Autonomie des Ich — wir wissen nicht wie und für wen — *an sich* gültig machen will ; da sie doch nur *für das Ich selbst* gelten soll. Das Ich ist *was* es ist und *weil* es ist, *für* das Ich. Ueber diesen Satz hinaus kann unsre Erkenntniss nicht gehen (16).

Sollte durch weiteres Zurückschreiten auf dem von ihm [Reinhold] so ruhmvoll gebahnten Wege sich etwa in der Zukunft entdecken, dass das unmittelbar gewisseste : *Ich bin*, auch nur *für* das Ich gelte ; dass alles Nicht-Ich nur *für's Ich sey* ; dass es alle Bestimmungen dieses Seyns a priori nur durch seine Beziehung auf ein Ich bekomme ; dass aber alle diese Bestimmungen, in sofern nemlich ihre Erkenntniss a priori möglich ist, durch die blosser Bedingung der Beziehung eines Nicht-Ich auf ein Ich überhaupt, schlechthin nothwendig werden : so würde daraus hervorgehen, dass ein Ding an sich, in sofern es ein Nicht-Ich seyn soll, das keinem Ich entgegengesetzt ist, sich selbst widerspreche, und dass das Ding wirklich und an sich so beschaffen sey, wie es von jedem denkbaren intelligenten Ich, d. i. von jedem nach dem Satze der Identität und des Widerspruchs denkenden Wesen, gedacht werden müsse ; dass mithin die logische Wahrheit für jede der endlichen Intelligenz denkbare Intelligenz zugleich real sey, und dass es keine andere gebe, als jene. — Alsdann würde es auch Niemanden mehr beikommen, zu behaupten welches auch A. wiederholt, dass die kritische Philosophie idealistisch sey, und alles für *Schein* erkläre, d. h. dass sie annehme, eine Intelligenz lasse sich ohne Beziehung auf etwas Intelligibles denken (20, 21. See also 19, 23).

Such was Fichte's first and last conception, — that consciousness can never transcend itself ; but within itself is governed by unalterable laws which force it to see self in certain fashions, — as an ego, as created by a God, as determined by a non-ego, — all of which, God and ego and non-ego, are only *forms of seeing self*, yet truth and reality, since they are logical results of thought. In view of the general misconception of the "Wissenschaftslehre" one is tempted to ask if it is worth while for the philosophic mind to try to express itself.

(1794) *Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre.* W. I. 27-81.

In Fichte's introduction to the "Grundlage," "Ueber den Begriff der

Wissenschaftslehre" printed in 1794, before the "Grundlage," he describes the nature of the "Grundlage" as a view of the acts of reason in setting consciousness before itself, a reflection upon the logical connection and the classification under general laws of the acts of reason in fully developed consciousness, a view of the logically connected system of rational acts to which consciousness can be reduced.

Nun aber ist ja die Wissenschaftslehre selbst die Wissenschaft von etwas ; nicht aber dieses Etwas selbst. Mithin wäre dieselbe überhaupt mit allen ihren Sätzen Form eines gewissen vor derselben vorhandenen Gehaltes. Wie verhält sie sich zu diesem Gehalte, und was folgt aus diesem Verhältnisse? (70.)

Das Object der Wissenschaftslehre ist nach allem das System des menschlichen Wissens. Dieses ist unabhängig von der Wissenschaft desselben vorhanden, wird aber durch sie in systematischer Form aufgestellt. Was ist nun diese neue Form ; wie ist sie von der Form, die vor der Wissenschaft vorher vorhanden seyn muss, unterschieden ; und wie ist die Wissenschaft überhaupt von ihrem Objecte unterschieden? (70.)

Was unabhängig von der Wissenschaft im menschlichen Geiste da ist, können wir auch die Handlungen desselben nennen. Diese sind das *Was* das vorhanden ist ; sie geschehen auf eine gewisse bestimmte Art ; durch diese bestimmte Art unterscheidet sich die eine von der anderen ; und dieses ist das *Wie*. Im menschlichen Geiste ist also ursprünglich vor unserem Wissen vorher Gehalt und Form, und beide sind unzertrennlich verbunden ; jede Handlung geschieht auf eine bestimmte Art nach einem Gesetze, und dieses Gesetz bestimmt die Handlung. Es ist, wenn alle diese Handlungen unter sich zusammenhängen, und unter allgemeinen, besonderen und einzelnen Gesetzen stehen, für die etwanigen Beobachter auch ein System vorhanden (71).

Es ist aber gar nicht nothwendig, dass diese Handlungen wirklich der Zeitfolge nach in jener systematischen Form, in welcher sie als von einander dependirend werden abgeleitet werden, eine nach der anderen, in unserem Geiste vorkommen ; dass etwa die, welche alle unter sich fasst, und das höchste, allgemeinste Gesetz giebt, zuerst, sodann die, welche weniger unter sich fasst, u. s. f. vorkommen ; ferner ist auch das gar nicht die Folge, dass sie alle rein und unvermischt vorkommen, so dass nicht mehrere, die durch einen etwanigen Beobachter gar wohl zu unterscheiden wären, als eine einzige erscheinen sollten. Z. B. die höchste Handlung der Intelligenz sey die, sich selbst zu setzen, so ist gar nicht nothwendig, dass diese Handlung der Zeit nach die erste sey, die zum deutlichen Bewusstseyn komme ; und eben so wenig ist nothwendig, dass sie jemals rein zum Bewusstseyn komme, dass die Intelligenz je fähig sey, schlechthin zu denken : *Ich bin*, ohne zugleich etwas anderes zu denken, dass *nicht sie selbst* sey (71).

Hierin liegt nun der ganze Stoff einer möglichen Wissenschaftslehre, aber nicht diese Wissenschaft selbst. Um diese zu Stande zu bringen, dazu gehört noch eine, unter jenen Handlungen allen nicht enthaltene Handlung des menschlichen Geistes, nemlich die, seine Handlungsart überhaupt zum Bewusstseyn zu erheben. Da sie unter jenen Handlungen, welche alle nothwendig, und die nothwendigen alle sind, nicht enthalten seyn soll, so muss es eine Handlung der Freiheit seyn. — Die Wissenschaftslehre entsteht also, insofern sie eine systematische Wissenschaft seyn soll, gerade so, wie alle möglichen Wissenschaften, insofern sie systematisch seyn sollen, durch eine Bestimmung der Freiheit; welche letztere hier insbesondere bestimmt ist, die Handlungsart der Intelligenz überhaupt zum Bewusstseyn zu erheben; und die Wissenschaftslehre ist von anderen Wissenschaften nur dadurch unterschieden, dass das Object der letzteren selbst eine freie Handlung, das Object der ersteren aber nothwendige Handlungen sind (71, 72).

Durch diese freie Handlung wird nun etwas, das schon an sich Form ist, die nothwendige Handlung der Intelligenz, als Gehalt in eine neue Form, die Form des Wissens, oder des Bewusstseyns aufgenommen, und demnach ist jene Handlung eine Handlung der Reflection (72).

(1794) *Grundlage*. W. I. 83-328.

The same conception of the nature of the Wissenschaftslehre is hinted in the "Grundlage." "Das Handeln, von welchem hier die Rede ist, ist wie immer, ein bloss ideales, durch Vorstellung. Auch unsere sinnliche Wirksamkeit in der Sinnenwelt, die wir *glauben*, kommt uns nicht anders zu, als mittelbar durch die Vorstellung" (W. I. 328).

(1795) *Grundriss*. W. I. 329-411.

In this work we are told that the "Grundlage" is an attempt to find in the original nature of the rational being something which *can be thought of* as *corresponding* to the determination of the I by the not-I. Wir sind in der Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre, zur Begründung einer theoretischen ausgegangen von dem Satze: *das Ich setzt sich als bestimmt durch das Nicht-Ich*. Wir haben untersucht, wie und auf welche Weise etwas diesem Satze *entsprechendes* * als ursprünglich im vernünftigen Wesen vorhanden *gedacht werden könne*. Wir haben, nach Absonderung alles unmöglichen und widersprechenden, die gesuchte einzig-mögliche Weise aufgefunden. So gewiss nun jener Satz gelten soll, und so gewiss er nur auf die

* The italics in this quotation from the "Grundriss" are, with two exceptions, our own.

angezeigte Weise gelten kann, so gewiss muss dieselbe *als* Factum ursprünglich *in unserem* Geiste vorkommen. Dieses *postulirte* Factum war folgendes : auf Veranlassung eines bis jetzt noch völlig unerklärbaren und unbegreiflichen Anstosses auf die ursprüngliche Thätigkeit des Ich producirt die zwischen der ursprünglichen Richtung dieser Thätigkeit, und der durch die Reflexion entstandenen — schwebenden Einbildungskraft etwas aus beiden Richtungen zusammengesetztes. Da im Ich, laut seines Begriffes, nichts seyn kann, das es nicht in sich setze, so muss es auch jenes Factum in sich setzen, d. i. es muss sich dasselbe ursprünglich *erklären*, vollständig bestimmen und begründen (331).

Ein System derjenigen Thatsachen welche in der ursprünglichen *Erklärung* jenes Factums *im Geiste* des vernünftigen Wesens vorkommen, ist eine theoretische Wissenschaftslehre überhaupt ; und jene ursprüngliche *Erklärung* umfasst das theoretische Vermögen der Vernunft. — Ich sage mit Bedacht : die *ursprüngliche Erklärung* jenes Factums. Dasselbe ist ohne unser wissentliches Zuthun in uns vorhanden ; es wird ohne unser wissentliches Zuthun, bloss durch und nach den Gesetzen und der Natur eines vernünftigen Wesens *erklärt* ; und die verschiedenen unterscheidbaren Momente im Fortgange dieser *Erklärung* sind neue Thatsachen. Die Reflexion geht auf das ursprüngliche Factum ; und dies nenne ich denn die ursprüngliche *Erklärung*, etc. (331–335).

(1797) *Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre.* W. I. 417–449.

Here Fichte tells us that in transcendental Idealism, from the union of freedom and necessity found in every free act of thought, the entire content of consciousness is deduced. Hierbei verfährt er auf folgende Weise. *Er zeigt dass das zuerst als Grundsatz aufgestellte und unmittelbar im Bewusstseyn nachgewiesene nicht möglich ist, ohne dass zugleich noch etwas anderes geschehe, und dieses andere nicht, ohne dass zugleich etwas drittes geschehe ; so lange, bis die Bedingungen des zuerst aufgewiesenen vollständig erschöpft, und dasselbe, seiner Möglichkeit nach, völlig begreiflich ist.* Sein Gang ist ein ununterbrochenes Fortschreiten vom Bedingten zur Bedingung. Die Bedingung wird wieder ein Bedingtes, und es ist ihre Bedingung aufzusuchen (446).

Ist die Voraussetzung des Idealismus richtig, und ist in der Ableitung richtig gefolgert worden : so muss als letztes Resultat, als Inbegriff aller Bedingungen des zuerst aufgestellten, das System aller nothwendigen Vorstellungen, oder die gesammte Erfahrung herauskommen : welche Vergleichung gar nicht in der Philosophie selbst, sondern erst hinterher angestellt wird (446).

(1797) *Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre.* W. I. 451-518.

Later in the same year, in the "Zweite Einleitung," we are told that the conclusions of the *Wissenschaftslehre* are conclusions of thought, not extra-mentem beings and acts: "Das Ich ist ursprünglich durch sich selbst gesetzt," means only that, since the essence of the I is self-consciousness, and since self-consciousness involves the act of the I in returning upon self and recognizing self, the philosopher, "jenes in sich Zurückkehren allen anderen Acten des Bewusstseyns voraus *denken* müsse, als dieselben bedingend, oder, was dasselbe heisst, jenes in sich Zurückkehren als den ursprünglichsten Act des Subjects denken müsse: und zwar, da nichts für ihn ist, das nicht in seinem Bewusstseyn sey, alles übrige in seinem Bewusstseyn aber durch diesen Act selbst bedingt ist, mithin in derselben Rücksicht nicht wiederum ihn bedingen kann — als einen *für ihn* ganz unbedingten und sonach absoluten Act; dass demnach *jene Voraussetzung* und dieses *Denken des Ich, als ursprünglich durch sich selbst gesetzt*, abermals ganz identisch seyen; und der transcendente Idealismus, wenn er systematisch zu Werke gehe, gar nicht anders verfahren könne, als er in der *Wissenschaftslehre* verfährt (462, 463).

The origin of Seyn given by Fichte in this treatise (498) and quoted under Seyn (Appendix, pages 164, 165) shows that it is at every moment the creation of the present activity of the I. Hence it is impossible to look upon God or the ego as a Ding an sich with a history: God and the ego are logical conclusions of the activity of thinking; they did not first exist and then act: activity is their existence.

(1806) *Anweisung zum seligen Leben.* W. V. 397-580.

In this treatise the "as" is emphasized: "Ferner sagte ich in der vorigen Vorlesung: das Seyn darf *in dem blossen Daseyn* mit dem Daseyn nicht vermischt, sondern beides muss von einander unterschieden werden, damit das Seyn *als* Seyn, und das Absolute *als* Absolutes heraustrete. Diese Unterscheidung, und dieses *Als* der beiden zu Unterscheidenden, ist zunächst in sich selber absolute Trennung, und das *Princip* aller nachmaligen Trennung und Mannigfaltigkeit, wie Sie auf folgende Weise in Kurzem sich klar machen können" (452, 453).

a. Zuvörderst das *Als* der beiden liefert nicht unmittelbar ihr Seyn, sondern es liefert nur *was* sie sind, ihre Beschreibung und Charakteristik: es liefert sie im Bilde; und zwar liefert es — ein gemischtes, sich durchdringendes und gegenseitig sich bestimmendes Bild beider; indem jedes von den beiden zu begreifen und zu charakterisiren ist nur durch das zweite, dass es nicht sey, was das andere ist, und umgekehrt, dass das andere nicht

sey, was dieses ist. — Mit dieser Unterscheidung hebt nun das eigentliche Wissen und Bewusstseyn — wenn Sie wollen und was dasselbe heisst: das Bilden, Beschreiben und Charakterisiren, mittelbare Erkennen und Anerkennen, eben durch den Charakter und das Merkmal, an, und in diesem Unterscheiden liegt das eigentliche Grundprincip des Wissens. (Es ist reine Relation; die Relation zweier liegt aber durchaus nicht weder in dem einen, noch in dem anderen, sondern zwischen beiden, und als ein drittes, welches die eigentliche Natur des Wissens, als ein vom Seyn durchaus verschiedenes, anzeigt (453).

b. Dieses Unterscheiden geschieht nun im Daseyn selber, und gehet von ihm aus; da nun das Unterscheiden sein Object nicht unmittelbar, sondern nur das Was desselben und seinen Charakter fasset, so fasset auch das Daseyn im Unterscheiden, d. i. im Bewusstseyn, nicht unmittelbar sich selbst, sondern es fasset sich nur im Bilde und Repräsentanten. Es begreift sich nicht unmittelbar wie es ist, sondern es begreift sich innerhalb der, im absoluten Wesen des Begreifens liegenden Grenzen. . . . (See Appendix, page 128, for rest of paragraph beginning "wir begreifen zu allernächst") (453).

d. Die Welt hat in ihrem Grundcharakter sich gezeigt, als hervorgehend aus dem Begriffe; welcher Begriff wiederum nichts ist, denn das Als zum göttlichen Seyn und Daseyn. Wird nun etwa diese Welt im Begriffe, und der Begriff an ihr noch eine neue Form annehmen? — es verstehet sich mit Nothwendigkeit, und also, dass die Nothwendigkeit einleuchte (454, 455).

. . . Diese Krafterwendung des Daseyns und Bewusstseyns folgt daraus, dass ein Als des Daseyns seyn soll: dieses Soll selbst aber ist gegründet unmittelbar in dem lebendigen — Daseyn Gottes (455).

(1812) *Die Wissenschaftslehre. Ngl. W. II. 315-492.*

Here again the "as" is emphasized: Endlich: die Erscheinung erscheint sich, *als* sicherscheinend. Dieses *Als* ist der eigentliche synthetische Vereinigungspunkt, das wahrhaft *neue* Glied des Ganzen, in welchem Begriff und Anschauung beisammen liegen. Es bedarf daher einer sehr genauen Untersuchung (357).

Zuvörderst: sichtbar (ich bitte Sie eben, es sich sichtbar zu machen) ist dieses *Als* der eigentliche Mittelpunkt der Erscheinung, der hier statt findet: oder, falls wir vorläufig uns erlauben wollen, von Sehen zu sprechen, der Sitz der Sehe. Die seiende Erscheinung erscheint sich als *das und das*: darf ich so sagen, darf ich das Letztere unentschieden lassen? Allerdings: Erscheint nur ein *bestimmtes Als*, wie ja vorausgesetzt ist; so ist in diesem

Als und durch das Sehen dieses *Als* alles andere gegeben und liegt darin. Das Sehen eines solchen *Als* muss freilich absolut gesetzt werden; ist aber dies gesetzt, so ist Alles, was in demselben liegt, mit im Sehen gesetzt, weil es das Sehen eines *solchen* *Als* ist, und wird durch dasselbe hindurch gesehen. Darum sage ich: das *Als* ist der eigentliche Sitz der Sehe (357).

Die Erscheinung *wird gesehen* als das und das: ist demnach der Sitz der *absoluten* Sehe: die Erscheinung, als seiend eben, ist das logische Subjekt: *als* das und das, das logische Prädikat; dies ist der Grundinhalt dieser Sehe. Die Erscheinung, die da ist, und an der nicht weiter gesehen wird, dass auch *dieses* Sein nur sei ihr Bild, tritt darum in diese Sehe ein mit einem *Als das und das*, also in einem Bilde, Schema, Stellvertreter. Dies wäre das eigentliche Schema II., das uns hier in die Mitte träte; und was wir zuerst als Schema II. dachten, möchte überhaupt in dieser Bedeutung nicht Statt finden: es war selbst nur Anfang der weitem Bestimmung. Bedenken Sie ferner: ich sage, in diesem Sehen erscheint die Erscheinung *als* sicherscheinend. — Sage ich etwa: sie *erscheint* sich? Nun, so habe ich gesagt im ersten Kapitel; habe aber jetzt den Ausdruck näher bestimmt und verbessert. *Ist* also in dieser Sehe ihr Erscheinen? Keinesweges, sondern es ist bloss ein *Bild* ihres Erscheinens. Sie schwebt sich vor, selbst im Bilde, und zwar als ein *erscheinendes*; genau dies und nicht mehr liegt in der Sehe, die wir jetzt aber das *Als* befestigt haben. Giebt denn nun die eigentliche und wahre Uerscheinung A ein Bild von sich unmittelbar, was in Beziehung auf Gott sein würde Schema II. Bild des Bildes? Wer möchte es läugnen? Was aber liegt in diesem Bilde? Antwort: Nichts mehr, denn ihr Erscheinen, ihr *bildendes Leben*. Sie stellt sich dar als substantialiter seiend, mit dem Accidens eines bildenden Lebens überhaupt, und schlechtweg: gerade also: wie wir selbst beim Beginne des zweiten Kapitels dieses Bild waren (357, 358).

Dieses *ihr* Sicherscheinen — (Sehen Sie, wie darin Begriff und Anschauung, logisches Subject und Prädikat synthetisch vereinigt sind) — nimmt nun die subjekt-objektive Form an; und so wird denn eben dieses ihr *Sicherscheinen* zu dem *letzten* objektiven, dem Fakto, das da eben ist, und damit gut. Ein Bewusstseyn, das nur in diesem Standpunkte steht, weiss nichts weiter, als *dass* es *so* sei; dass selbst dies wieder das Sicherscheinen der Erscheinung überhaupt ist nach den nothwendigen Gesetzen, die wir in der Form des Sicherscheinens gefunden haben, sehen *wir* ein, die Wissenschaftslehre (358).

In several of the posthumous works there are interesting passages setting forth the nature of the "Wissenschaftslehre" as an analysis of consciousness and an exposition of the logical premises upon which it is founded.

See : —

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|---|----------------------|
| (1812) Die Wissenschaftslehre. | Ngl. W. II. 317-326. |
| (1813) Die Wissenschaftslehre. | Ngl. W. II. 3-11. |
| (1813) Thatsachen des Bewusstseyns. | Ngl. W. I. 563-574. |
| (1813) Einleitungsvorlesungen. | Ngl. W. I. 1-42. |
| (1806) Bericht über die Wissenschaftslehre. | W. VIII. 361-407. |

See also : —

W. VI. 367.

Ngl. W. I. 98, 99, 145, 410, 411, 522, 523, 534-540, 564-574.

Ngl. W. II. 20-27, 42, 53-57, 229, 230, 339, 340, 430, 431, etc.

Ngl. W. III. 17.

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